Flight‐to‐safety and the credit crunch: a new history of the banking crises in France during the Great Depression†

Despite France's importance in the interwar world economy, the scale of the French banking crises of 1930–1 and their consequences have never been fully assessed quantitatively. The lack of banking regulation severely limited the availability of balance sheet data. Using a new dataset of individual balance sheets from more than 300 banks, this article shows that the crises were much more severe than previously thought, although they did not affect the main commercial banks. By reconstructing financial flows, this study shows that the fall in bank credit was mostly driven by a flight‐to‐safety by deposits, from banks to savings institutions and the central bank. The decrease in bank deposits due to bank runs was offset by an increase in deposits with savings institutions, with the central bank, and in cash hoarding, whereas the decrease in bank credit was not offset by an increase in loans from non‐bank financial institutions. In line with the gold standard mentality, cash deposited with savings institutions and the central bank was used to decrease marketable public debt and increase gold reserves, rather than pursuing countercyclical policies. Despite massive capital inflows and rising aggregate money supply, France suffered from a severe, persistent credit crunch.     

The bank of France and the sterilization of gold, 1926–1932

The malfunctioning of the interwar gold standard is frequently ascribed to sterilization of gold flows by central banks, particularly the Bank of France. This paper analyzes the actions of the Bank of France and the issue of sterilization. New estimates of the impact of policy on the Bank of France's gold reserves indicate that, of the policies which ostensibly influenced gold flows, only the absence of expansionary open market operations, which were precluded by statute, significantly affected French reserves. Those statutes and the sentiment which led to their adoption are in turn ascribed to France's experience with inflation earlier in the decade. Thus, the gold standard's collapse in the 1930s is linked to the circumstances under which it was reconstructed in the 1920s.     

Losing autonomy: the Norwegian central bank during the Second World War

In the mid‐twentieth century a number of central banks around the western world lost their operational autonomy and were placed under government control. The origin of these policy changes can be traced to the intellectual and political developments of the interwar era in addition to the introduction of the Bretton Woods monetary system. The Norwegian central bank offers a particularly stark example of this phenomenon: experiencing a rapid decline from its high level of autonomy in the interwar years, to a clear subordination to the government after 1945. Through an analysis of the correspondence between the main policy makers in the exiled Norwegian government and central bank management, this article contributes to the understanding of central bank autonomy by tracing the decisive factors that led to the Norwegian central bank's loss of agency.     

A monetary plethora and what to do with it: the Bank of Portugal during the Second World War and the postwar period (1931–60)

Until the Second World War the Bank of Portugal (BoP) was a long way from possessing the features normally associated with a central bank. It was still a commercial bank, albeit one that had acquired some central bank functions. The war period was decisive in removing this ambiguity. The change was caused mostly by an unusually large influx of international means of payment (gold and foreign exchange) as a consequence of Portugal's neutrality during the war. However, all of this happened during a very troubled period for the BoP, thanks to the collapse of the gold‐exchange standard. The BoP adapted quickly to the new environment of discretion, government interference, and nationalism, although in a relatively original way: it followed the trend but at the same time retained certain features of a central bank still committed to gold standard principles. The two essential objectives of the BoP were to keep the value of the Portuguese currency stable and to keep interest rates low in order to encourage economic growth. The bank was successful on both counts during the war and the postwar period using a series of non‐conventional instruments.     

The evolution of Hayek's thought on gold and monetary standards

Early in his career, Hayek viewed attempts to stabilize exchange rates by facilitating cooperation between central banks, with respect to their demand for gold, to be at odds with the fundamental mechanisms of the gold standard. He opposed proposals by Irving Fisher, Gustav Cassel, and Ralph Hawtrey that promoted stabilization of demand for gold and price levels as a next best option. Hayek viewed the nations that refused to devalue their currency after monetary expansion during wartime as complicit in degrading the international gold standard. In 1935 Hayek's emphasis began to change, his position sounding much like the arguments of Cassel and Hawtrey. Though he eventually gave up hope that the international gold standard would be reestablished, his later work on money provides theoretical underpinnings for systems that would promote the same sort of stability and predictability that the classical gold standard had provided.     

Scylla and Charybdis. Explaining Europe’s exit from gold, January 1928–December 1936

The paper examines the timing of exit from the interwar gold-exchange standard for a panel of European countries, based on monthly data over the period January 1928–December 1936. I show that exit from gold can be understood in terms of a trade-off between a limited set of factors commonly suggested in the theoretical literature on currency crises. A simple and parsimonious econometric framework that nests various hypotheses allows me to predict the month of exit in the 1930s, except for France. I consider the separate cases of France and Poland to show my results shed light on country-specific debates.     

The Evolution of Australian Monetary Policy in the 1950s

The 1950s in Australia was a decade of major change in both central banking and the financial system. The changes fed upon one another: financial innovation responded to monetary policy; the authorities adapted their strategy in response. The private banks resisted the harnessing of their balance sheets to policy, and a protracted process of conflict and compromise unfolded. Meanwhile, the growth of non‐bank financial institutions undermined bank‐centred policy. Official controls on bank interest rates opened a space for the new intermediaries. The central bank's attempt to restrain their growth contributed to a credit squeeze at the turn of the 1960s.     

Development as liberation: Policy lessons from case studies

Four case studies are summarized in which oppressed people have successfully assumed control over their own destinies and development strategies. Lessons from experience are drawn, at the national and macro-economic level, from Guinea-Bissau where the popular liberation movement has grown into the national government without losing close contact with its constituency; from the Sarvodaya movement in Sri Lanka which has started as a modest development organization of poor people, based on indigenous social and cultural values, and which has grown into a popular movement of 1 million people (of 14 million total population) in some 2000 villages; from the SEWA (Self-Employed Women's Association) in Ahmedabad, India, where oppressed street vendors, artisans, junksmiths and garment-makers have founded their own bank (which now has 1000 shareholders and 10,000 depositors) to circumvent usurious lending practices and to gain access to capital at their own terms; and from a Quechua community in central Bolivia where handicrafts producers' cooperatives have successfully maintained self-reliance and cultural identity through conscious choice of appropriate technology at their own terms. Lessons on development as a form of liberation are drawn from the social praxis of each of these examples.     

Central banks and gold puzzles

We study the curious patterns of gold holding and trading by central banks during 1979–2010. With the exception of several discrete step adjustments, central banks keep maintaining passive stocks of gold, independently of the patterns of the real price of gold. We also observe the synchronization of gold sales by central banks, as most reduced their positions in tandem, and their tendency to report international reserves valuation excluding gold positions. Our analysis suggests that the intensity of holding gold is correlated with ‘global power’ – by the history of being a past empire, or by the sheer size of a country, especially by countries that are or were the suppliers of key currencies. These results are consistent with the view that central bank’s gold position signals economic might, and that gold retains the stature of a ‘safe haven’ asset at times of global turbulence. The under-reporting of gold positions in the international reserve/GDP statistics is consistent with loss aversion, wishing to maintain a sizeable gold position, while minimizing the criticism that may occur at a time when the price of gold declines.     

An ‘art’, not a ‘science’? Central bank management in Portugal under the gold standard, 1863–871

As long as Portugal was on the gold standard, the Bank of Portugal sought to help stabilize the currency at the exchange rate to which the country was committed. Because it was subject to political and other non-economic constraints, the bank carried out discount rate interventions sparingly, although in accordance with what could be termed the contemporary ‘science’ of central banking. Consequently, it had to intervene frequently in the currency markets, usually in covert fashion, in order to conciliate the needs of convertibility with this less than orthodox stance towards the gold standard. This article also shows how the bank was able to keep on repeatedly infringing the ‘rules of the game’ with success for almost 30 years, and raises the question of the sustainability of such a state of affairs.     

Gold-Point Arbitrage and Uncovered Interest Arbitrage under the 1925-1931 Dollar-Sterling Gold Standard

Efficient gold-point arbitrage confines the exchange rate to the gold-point spread, but efficient uncovered interest arbitrage stabilizes the exchange rate even more, locating it within a narrower "speculation band." Under the 1925-1931 dollar-sterling gold standard, gold-point arbitrage was uniformly efficient, but uncovered interest arbitrage exhibited periodic episodes of apparent inefficiency, susceptible to various explanations. Gold-point arbitrage and uncovered interest arbitrage reinforce each other′s efficiency, thereby enhancing exchange-rate stability. In fact, the dollar-sterling exchange rate during the interwar gold standard was considerably more stable than that in the classical period.     

Worldwide Inflation and International Monetary Reform： Exchange Rates or Interest Rates？

The international dollar standard is malfunctioning. Near‐zero US short‐term interest rates launch massive hot money outflows into emerging markets (EM) in Asia and Latin America. Each EM central bank buys dollars to prevent its currency from appreciating but loses monetary control. Despite some appreciation, average inflation in EMs is now much higher than in the old industrial economies and world commodity prices are bid up sharply. This inflation on the dollar's periphery only registers in the US CPI with a long lag. However, the more immediate effect of the Fed's zero interest rate is to upset the process of bank intermediation within the American economy. Bank credit continues to decline while employment languishes. Therefore, constructive international monetary reform calls for the Fed to abandon its zero‐interest rate policy, which is best done in cooperation with the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, and the Bank of England also abandoning their ultra low interest rates.     

Dual-track interest rates and the conduct of monetary policy in China

China has a dual-track interest-rate system: bank deposit and lending rates are regulated while money and bond rates are market-determined. The central bank also imposes an indicative target, which may not be binding at all times, for total credit in the banking system. We develop and calibrate a theoretical model to illustrate the conduct of monetary policy within the framework of dual-track interest rates and a juxtaposition of price- and quantity-based policy instruments. We show the transmission of monetary policy instruments to market interest rates, which, together with the indicative credit target in the banking system, ultimately are the means by which monetary policy affects the real economy. The model shows that market interest rates are most sensitive to changes in the benchmark deposit interest rates, significantly responsive to changes in the reserve requirements, but not particularly reactive to open market operations. These theoretical results are verified and supported by both linear and GARCH models using daily money and bond market data. Overall, the findings of this study help us to understand why the central bank conducts monetary policy in China the way it does, using a combination of price and quantitative instruments with differing degrees of potency in terms of their influence on the cost of credit.     

The Inter-War Land Reforms in Estonia,Finland and Bulgaria: A Comparative Study

Abstract

^*This study compares the development and performance of the interwar land reforms in Estonia, Finland and Bulgaria: three countries within the so-called Agrarian Reform Zone, which constituted previous parts of the Russian and Ottoman Empires heavily influenced by the Russian revolutions. In spite of their different scope and outlook these land reforms aimed at solving similar problems of an agrarian and socio-economic developmental character. Finland and Estonia underwent wars of liberation when seceding from revolutionary Russia: Finland also had to go through civil war before the land redistributions took place. In Bulgaria, however, land redistribution had been an ongoing theme since the late 1870s when autonomy from the Ottoman Empire was achieved. The interwar land expropriation and redistribution was most profound and radical in Estonia. The gradual Finnish reforms were also radical from the perspective of the precarious political situation they aimed at solving. Bulgaria's less thorough reform was nevertheless radical from the perspective of its agrarian ideological aspirations. These land reforms must therefore be seen as a part of the interwar state-building process and struggle for independence: peasant movements were influential in all three cases and geographical proximity to revolutionary Russia had impacts on their outcomes. The study emphasises that by exploring and comparing the profound interwar land redistributions, we can gain a better understanding of current problems, such as those resulting from the post-socialist de-collectivisation: e.g. the return to small-scale family farming by means of restitution, in countries that were subjugated to a command economy after World War II. For this reason interwar Finland's different road and sustained national independence makes an interesting comparison, since Finland shared several features with the land reform zone countries before the Russian revolution of 1917 and not least during the 1920s and 1930s. In the case of Estonia and Bulgaria, however, the development path was interrupted by Soviet expansion.     

Commodity option pricing efficiency before Black,Scholes, and Merton

It is often thought that the arrival of the Black–Scholes–Merton (BSM) model of option pricing in the early 1970s allowed traders to understand how to price and value options with greater precision. However, our study suggests that interwar commodity options traders may have been able to intuit ‘fair’ value and to adjust their prices to changes in the market environment well before the advent of this innovative model. A scarcity of historical price data has limited empirical tests of option price efficiency well before BSM to studies of stock options in the 1870s and the early twentieth century which revealed contrasting findings. This study deals with option pricing in a different market—commodities—during the interwar period. We conclude that option prices were closer to their BSM theoretical values than prior studies suggest. Institutional differences between interwar commodity options markets and stock options markets in the 1870s and the early twentieth century may partly account for this result. Furthermore, we find that interwar option prices were no more mispriced than in modern times, and were as sensitive to changes in volatility—the key valuation parameter in the BSM model.     

The money supply mechanism and monetary policy in China

One of the main difficulties of analyzing the macroeconomic condition in The People's Republic of China is the lack of information of its money supply mechanism. The present paper tries to provide a systematical analysis of the Chinese money supply process from both the theoretical and empirical points of view. It shows that the economic reform in the 1980s caused profound changes in the structure of the banking system in the following ways, (a) The establishment of the central bank paved the foundation of the money creation process through the monetary base and a multiplier effect, (b) Consequently, the money supply and credit condition are controlled, at least partially, by economic instruments such as the monetary base, required reserve ratio, and interest rates, (c) The old money supply system is far from being phased out yet. As a matter of fact, it is the mixture of a central bank system and an administrative command driven centrally planned system that constitutes the money supply mechanism with the “Chinese characteristics”. The successes and failures of the monetary policies in the late 1980s and early 1990s reflect the central bank's ability to control the macroeconomic condition of the economy. They also indicate that at the beginning of the 1990s, after a decade of economic reforms, the money supply mechanism in China is still, by and large, controlled by the central government through administrative orders rather than economic leverages.     

Internal versus external convertibility and emerging-market crises: lessons from Argentine history

Argentina’s money and banking system was hit hard by the Great Depression. Banks were awash with bad assets when gold convertibility was suspended in December 1929. We argue for an explanation of the crisis that focuses on the inside-outside money relationship in a system of fractional-reserve banking and gold-standard rules with a tension between internal and external convertibility. After financial fragility appeared in the 1914-1927 suspension, resumption in 1928 was probably unsustainable due to the problems of the financial system and a dynamic model illustrates the point well. When the state bank became insolvent, the currency board started bailing out the system using high-powered money. Thus, came about the demise of the currency board and the creation of a central bank in 1935. As one of its first substantive actions, the central bank engineered a bailout of the banking system at a massive social cost. The parallels with recent developing-country crises are remarkable and the implications for the institutional design of monetary and banking systems are considered.     

Estimation of historical inflation expectations

Expected inflation is a central variable in economic theory. Economic historians have estimated historical inflation expectations for a variety of purposes, including studies of the Fisher effect, the debt deflation hypothesis, central bank credibility, and expectations formation. I survey the statistical, narrative, and market-based approaches that have been used to estimate inflation expectations in historical eras, including the classical gold standard era, the hyperinflations of the 1920s, and the Great Depression, highlighting key methodological considerations and identifying areas that warrant further research. A meta-analysis of inflation expectations at the onset of the Great Depression reveals that the deflation of the early 1930s was mostly unanticipated, supporting the debt deflation hypothesis, and shows how these results are sensitive to estimation methodology.     

Central Bank Independence,Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio

Using a theoretical model in which the degree of central bank independence affects the degree of inflation persistence and therefore the speed of disinflation, this paper suggests that sacrifice ratios are lower when central bank independence is higher. Empirical tests, using estimates of sacrifice ratios based on disinflation episodes for 18 OECD countries during the 1960–90 period, show that this result also holds empirically. This finding seems to be consistent with the credibility hypothesis by pointing out that an independent central bank may produce a credibility bonus.     

The case against currency boards

Conclusion We have argued that a CB is a creation of the state, aiming at granting particular political favors, and purposefully designed to secure the reappearance of an independent domestic money producer. A CB establishes a foreign fiat money standard enforced by legal tender laws for its bank notes, which are mere money substitutes in the context of fractional-reserve commercial banking. This insight helps us to understand why CBs have always degenerated into national central banks of the modern type: they were intentionally created to do so. This surely will also be the fate of present-day CBs. Although technically the transition from a CB to a commodity money (gold or other commodity standard) is facilitated by the warehouse aspect of the currency board, this institution does not present any incentive for the policy-makers to subject the production of money to the regulation of the free market. The paper was presented at the Southern Economic Association meeting, New Orleans, 2002.