公司特征差异、内部治理与盈余质量

本文在考虑代理冲突程度、业绩表现与公司内部治理的内生关系基础上,分析并检验了代理冲突程度和业绩表现两个表征治理效率的公司特征因素对公司内部治理与盈余质量关系的影响。研究发现在公司代理冲突程度较高和业绩表现较差时,公司内部治理水平的提升显著改善了盈余质量;相对于代理冲突程度的影响而言,业绩水平在影响公司内部治理与盈余质量相关关系中起主导作用。本文的研究为公司内部治理与盈余质量的相关关系提供了新的解释视角。     

权益再融资资金使用方式与再融资以后的经营业绩

本文讨论了中国上市公司的权益再融资资金使用方式与再融资以后的经营业绩之间的关系。结果发现,与国外的有关研究结果不同,投资于具体项目公司的再融资以后的经营业绩下滑幅度显著低于没有具体投资项目的公司。这说明,对于中国上市公司而言,投资于具体项目公司的代理成本相对低于没有具体投资项目的公司。此外,在公司治理机制有待完善的情况下,政策因素能够发挥一定的积极作用。2001年以后,证监会关于关联交易表决的特殊规定在一定程度上减弱了再融资资金使用方式与再融资后经营业绩之间的负相关关系。     

盈余质量对会计信息报酬契约有用性的影响及股权特征的交互作用分析

本文以盈余可靠性维度作为盈余质量的替代,检验管理者报酬契约中的会计监督作用是否存在、其受到公司股权特征制约或促进的程度以及对企业未来业绩的影响。研究发现:(1)从整体情况看,上市公司盈余的低可靠性对管理者报酬—会计业绩的敏感性产生显著负向影响,说明盈余质量影响了管理者报酬契约中的会计业绩度量。(2)政府机构直接控制的上市公司控股股东缺乏监督经理人的剩余索取权激励,在管理者报酬契约制定中对盈余质量的评价监督重视不足。(3)第一大股东对董事会的控制增强了盈余可靠性影响管理者报酬—会计业绩敏感性的程度,在一定程度上说明大股东与上市公司之间在监督激励管理者方面的“治理协同效应”。(4)第一大股东与第二大股东之比对盈余可靠性影响报酬—会计业绩的敏感性程度产生削弱的影响。(5)盈余的低质量使管理者现金报酬的激励效果受到制约,在管理者报酬契约中针对会计信息的可靠性进行会计监督,增强了对管理者进行激励的效果。     

高管层内部的级差报酬研究

本文通过对我国上市公司2004年度数据的实证研究发现, (1)随着高成长公司竞争者人数的增加、公司所处地区发达程度的提高和公司规模的扩大,公司高管层级差报酬会随之增加;随着低成长公司竞争者人数的增加和公司所处地区发达程度的提高,公司高管层级差报酬会随之增加。(2)高成长公司和低成长公司在赋予高管层级差报酬影响因素的权重上没有显著差别。(3)高成长公司的高管层级差报酬与公司市场业绩之间存在正相关关系,低成长公司的高管层级差报酬与公司每股收益指标之间存在正相关关系;竞赛理论在我国上市公司中成立。     

管理层语调能预示公司未来业绩吗?——基于我国上市公司年度业绩说明会的文本分析

本文基于我国上市公司年度业绩说明会的文本数据来研究公司管理层语调是否有助于预测公司未来业绩。我们基于上市公司2005-2012年在全景网召开年度业绩说明会的相关文本数据研究发现,管理层净正面语调与公司T+1年业绩显著正相关,以及管理层正(负)面语调与公司T+1年业绩显著正(负)相关。这些结果说明,在控制了T年公司业绩等因素之后,业绩说明会上的管理层语调仍能够提供关于公司未来业绩的增量信息,也从事后验证的角度表明管理层语调具有较好的可信度。本文的研究发现意味着,管理层披露的文本信息有信息含量且有一定可信度,这对在中国高度依赖语境的文化背景下加强研究了解投资者等是如何挖掘和解读文本信息有重要意义。同时,也说明我国上市公司业绩说明会利用先进信息技术的信息披露实践在一定程度上是有效的。     

控股股东利益侵占、信息不对称与高管更换

本文从高管更换视角考察控股股东侵占上市公司利益的行为是否以及如何影响其高管激励效率。我们检验发现:(1)控股股东利益侵占会降低公司高管更换对业绩的敏感性。(2)当信息不对称程度较高时,公司高管更换对业绩的敏感性受控股股东利益侵占的负向影响更大。(3)当市场化程度较高时,控股股东利益侵占对公司高管更换效率的损害更小。这些实证结果表明,控股股东与中小股东之间的利益冲突会损害高管激励效率,并且在信息不对称程度较高时更为严重,但市场化程度的提高可以在一定程度上抑制这种负面影响。     

公司特征、CEO偏好与目标公司并购概率的实证研究

本文以2003～2012年的我国上市公司中的270起目标公司并购事件为样本,考察了公司特征以及CEO偏好对目标公司并购成功概率的影响。研究表明,CEO年龄、任期、有无官方背景、薪酬的自然对数这些因素会影响CEO的并购偏好,从而促使其改变并购的决策,并进而影响并购成功的概率,它们以及交易总价的自然对数与目标公司并购成功的概率呈显著相关的关系,而CEO的学历、是否兼职这些因素也会影响CEO的并购偏好,从而影响并购成功的概率,它们与公司账面价值与市场价值之比,市盈率、现金流量与总资产的自然对数与目标公司并购成功的概率之间的相关关系不显著。     

定向增发中的会计业绩效应与财务分析师信息预示

本文以2007-2013年907家定向增发公司为研究样本,考察了定向增发对资源使用效益衡量指标净资产收益率(ROE)与用之于市场决策转化指标每股收益(EPS)之间逻辑关系的影响,以及考察了定向增发环境下财务分析师对增发公司业绩变化的预示能力。研究发现,定向增发存在"EPS业绩效应",即在ROE下降情形下,随着定向增发规模的增大,公司EPS会越来越高。这为解释定向增发存在短期正向宣告效应长期回报不佳现象提供了新思路。尽管定向增发通常意味着信息不对称程度更高,但我们研究发现财务分析师盈余预测调整与公司EPS变化基本一致,并且其预测向上调整预示了定向增发公司有一个更好的未来会计业绩,这表明财务分析师预测活动可作为公司管理层信息披露的替代。     

业绩预告披露与盈余管理研究

盈余管理存在的根本原因在于投资者与管理层之间的信息不对称。业绩预告作为上市公司未来经营成果、财务状况与现金流量的预测,在很大程度上会影响投资者对上市公司的评估及其投资决策。从业绩预告披露的特征方面出发,研究业绩预告披露与盈余管理之间的关系,包括业绩预告的性质、预告精确度、预告误差分别与盈余管理程度的关系,结果发现：发布业绩预告的公司,盈余管理水平更高。预告精确度以及预告期间与预测当期盈余管理水平正相关,预测误差与盈余管理水平负相关。当消息类型不同的时候,预测的强制性与否以及＂变脸＂对盈余管理水平的影响不同。结论支持了上市公司财务报告迎合业绩预告披露的说法。     

创业板上市公司资本结构与业绩相关性的实证分析

公司资本结构与业绩之间存在一定的相关关系。现有研究大多是以一组样本选择一个业绩指标或一个行业多个业绩指标来检验上市公司资本结构与业绩之间的相关性。本文以创业板上市公司作为样本并从中选取了包括每股收益、加权平均净资产收益率、销售毛利率、销售净利率和总资产利润率在内的多个业绩指标对本类型中小型公司资本结构与业绩的相关性进行回归分析,结果表明除净资产收益率、销售净利率外其余业绩指标都存在着负相关。     

Large shareholders and the pressure to manage earnings

We present empirical evidence that firms inflate earnings around seasoned equity offerings in the presence of large outsider blockholdings, but not in their absence. The finding is robust to several alternative explanations, including differences in firm characteristics, growth, performance, CEO incentives, and capital usage. While we do not dispute that CEOs behave opportunistically, we challenge that earnings management is solely a symptom of weak governance. We conclude that strengthening shareholder power to alleviate the conflict between shareholders and management can also have the unintended consequence of intensifying the conflict between current and future shareholders.     

Top management turnover and firm default risk: Evidence from the Chinese securities market

China has moved rapidly from a socialist planned economy to a market economy. As a result, many enterprises in China are seeking talented top management to increase their performance and decrease their default risk. Studies abound regarding top management turnover and its relationship with firm performance, however, few studies have connected top management turnover with firm default risk. In China, a market with extensive financial fraud, firm default risk is an important factor and thus we explore this relationship in the Chinese securities market. Our results indicate that firms with higher default risk are more likely to change their top management in the next financial reporting period. In addition, following changes in top management, such firms default less than other companies.     

Shareholding structure and corporate performance of partially privatized firms: Evidence from listed Chinese companies

Equity ownership in a listed Chinese firm can have as many as five different classes: state-owned shares, legal-person (LP) shares, tradable A-shares, employee shares, and shares only available to foreign investors, a phenomenon that is unique to the Chinese equity market. In this paper, we investigate whether and how the corporate performance of listed Chinese firms is affected by their shareholding structure. The sample consists of all firms listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) from 1991 to 1996. It is found that firm performance is positively related to the proportion of LP shares but negatively related to the proportion of shares owned by the state. Additional analyses indicate that firm performance increases with the degree of relative dominance of LP shares over state shares. Moreover, for the subsample of firms that do not have both state and LP shares, the return on equity (ROE) of firms with LP shares but no state shares is higher than that of firms with state shares but no LP shares by 3.84%, and this difference is statistically significant. On the other hand, there is little evidence in support of a positive correlation between corporate performance and the proportion of tradable shares owned by either domestic or foreign investors. These findings suggest that the ownership structure composition and relative dominance by various classes of shareholders can affect the performance of state-owned enterprise (SOE)-transformed and listed firms.     

Greasing the wheels of bank lending: Evidence from private firms in China

Bribery, rather than firm performance, largely determines the extent to which private firms access bank credit in China. Bribery enables an economic outcome whereby firms with better economic performance are awarded larger loans. These firms also pay more in terms of bribes. Although satisfactory firm performance does determine whether firms can access loans, it does so only for loans originated by the big-four banks. For loans originated by smaller banks, performance is not essential for firms to secure loan access. Our evidence sheds light on the surprising finding of earlier studies that Chinese banks use commercial logic in their lending practices despite being endowed with a weak institutional framework.     

Diversification,Performance, and the Corporate Life Cycle

This paper investigates the relation between the extent of diversification in firms and their performance at different life cycle stages. To illustrate the joint endogeneity of diversification and performance, we treat both the extent of diversification and firm performance as endogenous variables in a simultaneous equation system. Empirical results reveal that corporate diversification erodes firm value. Overall, firms in their growing stages experience a significant diversification discount; however, mature firms do not show such findings. Although unrelated diversification leads to trading at a discount in all growing and mature firms, conversely, related diversification exhibits an evident premium in mature firms.     

Does the truth rest with the minority? Divergent views on nonfinancial firms' financial investments from the private equity market

We investigate how the seasoned equity market evaluates nonfinancial firms that recently bought wealth management products (WMPs). Using a sample of Chinese firms, we find that the stock market reacts less positively to private equity placements (PEPs) by firms that recently purchased WMPs (i.e., quasi-deposits) than to those that did not. Further analysis suggests that compared with retail investors, sophisticated (i.e., institutional and high-net-worth) investors pay a higher price for the shares of these WMP-buying firms. After PEPs, we find that the long-term operating performance and firm value of WMP-buying firms are higher than those of non-buying firms. Overall, the findings suggest that: (i) engaging in shadow banking activities (buying WMPs) does not mean a firm is distracted, and (ii) sophisticated investors are less concerned than retail investors about a firm's shadow banking activities.     

Hong Kong stock listing and the sensitivity of managerial compensation to firm performance in state-controlled Chinese firms

We compare the sensitivity of managerial cash compensation to firm performance, the level of long term managerial incentives, and the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance for three types of state-controlled Chinese firms: A shares (firms incorporated and listed in mainland China), H shares (firms incorporated in mainland China but listed in Hong Kong), and Red Chip shares (firms incorporated outside mainland China and listed in Hong Kong). We find no difference in the three pay-for-performance sensitivity measures between H shares and A shares. The cash pay-for-performance sensitivity and the level of long-term managerial incentives are higher for Red Chip shares than for the other two firm types. However, the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is insignificant for all three firm types. Our study illustrates the complexity in the influence of mainland China’s versus Hong Kong’s institutional forces on state-controlled Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong.     

Managerial ownership and firm performance: Evidence from China's privatizations

We examine the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance for a sample of Chinese State-owned enterprises (SOEs) privatized over the period 1992-2000. The results indicate that managerial ownership has a positive effect on firm performance. Although return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS) decline post-privatization, firms with high managerial ownership and, specially, high CEO ownership, exhibit a smaller performance decline. The difference is highly significant, with or without controlling for residual state ownership and changes in the firm's operating environment. We also find that the influence on firm performance becomes less significant at higher levels of CEO ownership. In contrast, performance continues to increase with managerial ownership. This finding suggests that, beyond a certain point, the distribution of shares would be more effective if extended to the whole management team instead of being limited to the chief executive.     

The Roles of Performance Measures and Monitoring in Annual Governance Decisions in Entrepreneurial Firms

This paper analyzes annual corporate governance decisions at firms making initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock between 1996 and 1999. Our objective is to examine relations between firms' corporate governance decisions and the informativeness of available measures of managerial performance. We consider financial measures such as earnings and stock return, as well as direct monitoring. We collect a sample of IPO firms from the manufacturing, Internet, and technology (non-Internet) industries, and examine how the use of various performance measures in annual compensation grants and turnover decisions varies with the information environment of the firm and with the extent of venture capital influence. Consistent with prior research that finds earnings are of limited usefulness in firm valuation for Internet firms, we find Internet firms place less importance on earnings and greater importance on stock returns in determining compensation grants than do non-Internet firms. We also find that compensation grants of firms with little or no venture capital influence display significantly stronger association with accounting and stock performance measures than those of firms with more intense monitoring by venture capitalists. This result is consistent with direct monitoring and the use of explicit performance measures acting as substitute governance mechanisms.     

Strategy, performance-measurement systems, and performance: A study of Chinese firms

Numerous studies in developed Western countries have shown that firms' strategic choices are responsive to attributes of their external environment. In turn, performance-measurement systems are used to support strategy implementation, which then affect firm performance. However, institutional factors may limit the extent to which these linkages exist in the transitional Chinese economy. We analyze survey and publicly available data for 104 listed Chinese manufacturing firms and find that, despite a number of identifiable impediments, these firms' strategic emphasis on growth is responsive to the competition and uncertainty that they face. In the case of uncertainty, the relationship goes in the opposite direction to that found in Western firms. Like their Western counterparts, Chinese firms with greater emphasis on growth also tend to make greater use of balanced/integrated performance measurement systems, and, in turn, they perform at a higher level.