公务员人力资本产权激励理论渊源探析

人力资本产权激励功能源于产权所带来的收益,而产权收益的实现是产权主体拥有产权权利的根本目的.从理论渊源来看,关于公务员人力资本产权激励的研究大体可分为两种视角:即制度主义研究视角与管理主义研究视角.制度主义研究视角强调制度建设对于产权主体的重要意义,主张通过制度设计来确保公务员人力资本所有者获取到合理的产权收益.而管理主义视角则认为,公务员人力资本产权收益的实现是以人力资本所有者的需求满足为基础,不同的产权收益方式和内容带给公务员个体的满足程度不一,从而可以形成不同的产权激励效果,因而,其所关注的重点不再是产权制度的设计,而是产权收益的表现形式.两种视角共同构成了公务员人力资本产权激励的实现途径.     

技术创新产权激励的制度安排

技术创新产权激励作为技术创新利益激励机制的核心组成部分,是技术创新最根本、最直接的激励措施,具有其他激励方式不可替代的重要功能。而这一独特功能的实现,需要系统的技术创新产权激励制度安排。本文认为,分别以技术的产权化、技术资本化和技术股份化为核心内容所构建的技术产权制度、技术资本制度和技术股份化制度,构成了技术创新产权激励的系统制度体系,它为技术创新产权激励功能的充分实现提供了重要保障。     

公共产权、集体产权与中国转型经济

公共产权在市场经济中普遍存在,集体产权在中国转型经济中将长期存在.在辨析相关概念涵义基础上,本文分析比较了公共产权和集体产权的区别与联系,探讨它们对我国转型经济的意义.认为具体的制度环境和社会对具体产权形式选择的成本-收益权衡规定着现实经济中集体产权或公共产权的存在及其演变,尤其是在联系到历史与现实的关系时,集体产权的存在与发展(或演化)对于转型经济的和谐稳定发展具有正向作用.     

产权残缺与人力资本激励

无论是马克思主义的产权观还是西方产权理论,都强调产权对效率的重要作用.产权残缺会影响资源的配置、产出的构成和收入的分配等等,进而影响经济的运行.人力资本产权残缺将导致一系列后果,如自贬效应与高损失性、收益非货币化严重、人力资本流失、使用及配置效率低下乃至宏观经济效率低下等等.探讨人力资本产权残缺并进行有效的制度设计,对提高人力资本效率具有重要意义.     

产权残缺与人力资本激励

无论是马克思主义的产权观还是西方产权理论，都强调产权对效率的重要作用。产权残缺会影响资源的配置、产出的构成和收入的分配等等，进而影响经济的运行。人力资本产权残缺将导致一系列后果，如自贬效应与高损失性、收益非货币化严重、人力资本流失、使用及配置效率低下乃至宏观经济效翠低下等等。探讨人力资本产权残缺并进行有效的制度设计，对提高人力资本效率具有重要意义。     

论人力资本产权收益

本文从财务角度对人力资本产权收益的实现机制进行研究.从财务角度来看,人力资本是有意识投资的,具有促进财富和经济增长的内在特性的,一种能享有资本产权收益的价值.所有员工都符合人力资本的特性,因此都是企业人力资本的栽体.按层次可将人力资本分为高层、中层、基层人力资本.人力资本产权特性具有债权和股权双重特性,不同层次人力资本在双重特性上的分布程度是不同的.人力资本产权收益的构成既包括债权投资意义上的收益,也包括股权投资意义上的收益.相对于非人力资本享受的税后收益,人力资本的税后收益的意义更为广泛,还包括剩余控制权相对应的收益.文章提出构建以契约底薪和法定保险为基础,以税后收益分配为调节,同时实施人力资本产权基金制度的人力资本产权收益的实现模式.     

中国农村土地制度产权结构演变研究

通过优化农地产权结构来提高农民收益是解决中国“三农问题”的关键环节之一.文章通过考察中国改革开放三十余年农地产权政策调整过程及调整后农民收益的变化情况,揭示了中国农地制度产权结构的运行状态,进而明晰了农地产权结构优化的路径.研究认为:现阶段中国农村土地制度的产权结构需要优化而非变迁.产权结构优化的基本路径是:先优化产权...     

产权原则、产权功能与公允价值

市场经济的核心问题是产权的界定、安排、交易与保护,这其中最为基础的问题是产权的计量问题。平等、公平、等价、自愿、诚信代表了产权制度的五项根本要求;资源配制、激励,外部性内部化是产权的三项基本功能。公允价值计量不仅体现了产权制度的根本要求,而且有助于产权制度的改进及产权功能的实现。     

论马克思的产权理论

马克思产以理论是一个寒带科学的理论体系,它包括产权的含义和本质：认为产权是财产主体对财产所拥有的排他性、归属笥的关系或权利,其实质是人与人之间的经济关系或经济权利;产权的权能包括所有权、占有权、使用权、支配权、经营权等一系列权利;产权的权能结构既可以是统一的,也可以是分离的;产权具有激励、约束、资源配置和对企业内部的管理关系的保障功能。     

产权与民间投资的激励

产权理论认为 ,产权是收益的基础 ,有效率的产权应是竞争性的或排他性的 ,它可以减少产权主体在行使其权能时的不确定因素 ,从而激励投资者的积极性。产权的界定和细分有利于现代企业制度的建立和社会经济的发展。党的十六大报告中有关“合法的非劳动收入”和“保护私人财产”的阐述 ,明确了我国现阶段多元利益格局下 ,对私营经济和民间投资的激励政策。分析我国民间投资的发展状况和制约民间投资壮大的产权因素 ,应进一步保护民营企业的产权 ,明晰企业产权与个人产权 ,并对民营企业产权进行细分 ,使所有权和经营权适当分离 ,逐步建立现代化企业的激励约束制度。     

Moral property rights and harmonious society

To build the harmonious society needs the effect of morality.There are various kinds of moral values.Moral values can be divided into proper ones and improper ones according to whether the social benefit is bigger than the social cost of the moral behavior.The former is helpful to the optimal allocation of resources and improve the formation of the harmonious society; while the latter is harmful to the optimal allocation of resource and bad to the formation of the harmonious society.The proper and scientist moral values include： sustainable development view on ecology,fair,just and win win view on morality,credibility,right view on rich and poor,right view on consumption and so on.To build the proper and scientific moral value,the more important way is building proper moral property rights institution by recognizing properly and constructing moral property rights besides legislation,setting up moral surroundings,valuing moral penetration,strengthening moral education etc. Harmonious society;Moral property rights;Moral value     

对企业国有产权交易投招标模式的分析

企业国有产权是我国国有资产的重要组成部分,规范企业国有产权转让行为,有利于加强企业国有产权交易的监督管理。现有监管体制下,可以拍卖、招投标、协议转让以及国家法律、行政法规规定的其他方式进行交易。针对实践中国有产权交易模式存在的问题,对投招标模式进行了分析,提出了交易程序中应注意的问题。     

Capital and growth with oligarchic property rights

To analyze effects of imperfect property rights on economic growth, we consider economies where some fraction of capital can be owned only by local oligarchs, whose status is subject to political risk. Political risk decreases local capital and wages. Risk-averse oligarchs acquire safe foreign assets for insurance, thus increasing wages in other countries that protect outside investors. We show that for empirically reasonable parameter values, reforms to decrease political risk or to protect more outsiders' investments can decrease local oligarchs' welfare by increasing wages, making such reforms prone to political resistance from the ruling elite. We suggest measures of property rights imperfections derived from empirically observable data, and we test the quantitative predictions of our model using those measures and other parameter values routinely assumed in growth theory.     

The role of contracts and intellectual property rights in open innovation

Our exploratory empirical study, based on interviews and a survey of firms, addresses a number of questions on the role of formal contracts and intellectual property rights (IPR) in the context of firm-to-firm open innovation (OI). We find that firms active in OI have a very strong preference for the governance of their OI relationships with other firms through formal contracts. Also, despite the open nature of OI, firms still see IPR as highly relevant to the protection of their innovative capabilities. We find the degree of openness of firms, their formal legal attitude, and the competitive dynamics of their product market environment to be related to the preference of OI firms for IPR. Furthermore, the strength of firms’ internal R&D capabilities increases the positive relationship between openness and the preference for IPR.     

Intellectual property rights, technology transfer and exports in developing countries

We develop a model to analyze one mechanism under which stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection may improve the ability of firms in developing countries to break into export markets. A Northern firm with a superior process technology chooses either exports or technology transfer through licensing as its mode of supplying the Southern market, based on local IPR policy. Given this decision, the North and South firms engage in Cournot competition in both markets. We find that stronger IPR would enhance technology transfer through licensing and reduce the South firm's marginal production cost, thereby increasing its exports. Welfare in the South would rise (fall) if that country has high (low) absorptive capacity. Excessively strong IPR diminish competition and welfare, however. Adding foreign direct investment as an additional channel of technology transfer sustains these basic messages.     

Intellectual property rights and the upgrading of the global value chain status

The present paper explores how intellectual property rights (IPR) protection affects an economy’s status in global value chains (GVC) by introducing IPR protection into the sequential production model. We find that a suitable IPR protection system that matches the phase of economic and technological development a country has reached is the key for developing countries to upgrade their status in GVC, which are dominated by multinational firms from developed countries. Empirical analysis with multinational panel data for 55 countries from 2005 to 2015 provides evidence in support of the predictions of this model, although the GVC‐enhancing effects of IPR protection are heterogeneous for developing and developed countries. The empirical conclusions are robust after using the instrumental variable method and controlling for endogeneity.     

制度变迁中土地产权的性质与合约选择:一个有关合作经济的案例分析

This paper discusses an evolutionary process of rural collective property rights or agricultural cooperation economy in detail. We convince that both the evolution of the household contract system and the rural cooperation economy in the market elaborate the key position of property rights’ multi-attribute in the formation of contract structure and organization shape. If there were strong externality between several elements of household, the collective property rights should be chosen. __________ Translated from Guanli Shijie 管理世界 (Management World), 2008, (6): 61–67, 94     

试论知识产权海关边境保护中刑事协作机制的障碍和解决对策

本文以当前海关与公安机关共同打击侵犯知识产权犯罪的刑事协作机制为视角，通过从立法与执法层面对知识产权边境保护刑事协作机制中存在有关障碍的揭示和分析，提出了完善立法、协调冲突、加强交流等多项障碍解决对策。     

International intellectual property rights: Effects on growth, welfare and income inequality

What are the effects of strengthening developing countries’ protection for intellectual property rights on economic growth and income inequality in the global economy? To analyze this question, we develop a two-country R&;D-based growth model with wealth heterogeneity. In this growth-theoretic framework, we show that strengthening patent protection in either country increases economic growth and income inequality in both countries. Furthermore, we derive the Nash equilibrium level of patent breadth and find that it is sub-optimally low relative to globally optimal patent breadth due to the positive externality effects that are captured by a spillover parameter.     

Intellectual property rights in a quality-ladder model with persistent leadership

This paper analyzes the effects of intellectual property rights in a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth in which incumbent firms preemptively innovate in order to keep their position of leadership. Unlike in models with leapfrogging, granting forward protection, and imposing a non-obviousness requirement reduces growth. In the main case where entrants and incumbents have free access to the same R&D technology, infinite protection against imitation, granted independently of the size of the lead, maximizes growth. If entrants have to engage in costly catch up before they can undertake frontier R&D, growth is maximal for a finite (expected) length of protection against imitation.