市场经济与农村产权界定

市场经济与农村产权界定蒋和平，申曙光建立社会主义市场经济意味着经济体制特别是一些基本制度的变革。只有从一些基本体制的因素着手进行改革，我们才能逐步建立起真正的有效益的市场经济体制，才能真正解决农业经济中的一些“深层次”的问题。在这些问题中，农村产权关...     

产权制度与国有企业产权界定

本通过对产权问题的理论分析,阐述了产权制度与建立现代企业制度之间的内在联系与要求,论证了企业制度应具有的特征,提出了我国有企业产权界定的基本内容与要求。本的宗旨,是为中国市场经济的运行提供有效的微观基础。     

关于中国海洋资源产权界定的探讨

海洋资源有效运转的根本途径是要明晰海洋资源产权。通过对海洋资源产权的相关概念及海洋资源产权的界定内容进行论述,并以漳州市沿海各县为例,说明中国海洋资源产权的目前出现的一些问题：海洋资源的所有权、管理权和经营权界定模糊,各种产权权能没有明确划分,各利益主体间的经济关系纠纷不断,这些都影响了海洋资源的有效利用。最后指出,应明确界定海洋资源产权的重要性,以便更好地实现中国海洋资源的可持续发展。     

产权流动:产权变革的突破口——我国产权专家谈产权流动问题

<正> 一、国有产权流动的总体态势问题 在国内的整个企业运行里面,产权流动大致有三种主体:国外资本在不断地进军国内的产权市场;中国原有的国有资本也在进行大量的产权交易,最重要的现象是企业集团的现象,这些大的集团、大企业在产权交易中也是非常活跃的;新兴企业,特别是南方一些在改革开放中生长起来的,过去靠金融业、房地产业发展的新兴企业,都力图很快把国有资产的产权转化成一种高增殖的应用领域。这三种主体目前都在产权领域非常活跃地碰撞,可以从中对产权流动的态势做个大致分析。     

产权界定的游戏规则-从国有资产的产权界定说开去

20世纪90年代以来,国有企业改革的目标被定位于建立“现代企业制度”,“产权清晰”是其标志之一。因此,产权界定成为国有企业产权变动的必经程序。 一、国有资产产权界定的法律框架 国务院的行政规章规定:国有企业中的国有资产属于全民所有,即国家所有。国务院并授权自己代表国家统一行使对国有企业财产的所有权,由其统一领导,对国有资产实行分级行政管理。1990年7月国务院     

浅析高校后勤社会化改革的产权界定

高校后勤改革是现代高校改革的一个重要内容 ,改革的目标是实行后勤社会化 ,建立后勤服务实体 ,使之成为市场经济主体。在产权关系上 ,就要进行明确的产权界定 ,以保证国有资产的保值、增值以及建立完善的后勤保障体系。     

关于人力资本产权界定的相关问题

在讨论人力资本和人力资本产权涵义的基础上，分析了人力资本产权界定的不同观点，最终得出人力资本产权应归属于人力资本所依附的个人所有的结论。     

Moral property rights and harmonious society

To build the harmonious society needs the effect of morality.There are various kinds of moral values.Moral values can be divided into proper ones and improper ones according to whether the social benefit is bigger than the social cost of the moral behavior.The former is helpful to the optimal allocation of resources and improve the formation of the harmonious society; while the latter is harmful to the optimal allocation of resource and bad to the formation of the harmonious society.The proper and scientist moral values include： sustainable development view on ecology,fair,just and win win view on morality,credibility,right view on rich and poor,right view on consumption and so on.To build the proper and scientific moral value,the more important way is building proper moral property rights institution by recognizing properly and constructing moral property rights besides legislation,setting up moral surroundings,valuing moral penetration,strengthening moral education etc. Harmonious society;Moral property rights;Moral value     

Intellectual property rights, technology transfer and exports in developing countries

We develop a model to analyze one mechanism under which stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection may improve the ability of firms in developing countries to break into export markets. A Northern firm with a superior process technology chooses either exports or technology transfer through licensing as its mode of supplying the Southern market, based on local IPR policy. Given this decision, the North and South firms engage in Cournot competition in both markets. We find that stronger IPR would enhance technology transfer through licensing and reduce the South firm's marginal production cost, thereby increasing its exports. Welfare in the South would rise (fall) if that country has high (low) absorptive capacity. Excessively strong IPR diminish competition and welfare, however. Adding foreign direct investment as an additional channel of technology transfer sustains these basic messages.     

对企业国有产权交易投招标模式的分析

企业国有产权是我国国有资产的重要组成部分,规范企业国有产权转让行为,有利于加强企业国有产权交易的监督管理。现有监管体制下,可以拍卖、招投标、协议转让以及国家法律、行政法规规定的其他方式进行交易。针对实践中国有产权交易模式存在的问题,对投招标模式进行了分析,提出了交易程序中应注意的问题。     

Capital and growth with oligarchic property rights

To analyze effects of imperfect property rights on economic growth, we consider economies where some fraction of capital can be owned only by local oligarchs, whose status is subject to political risk. Political risk decreases local capital and wages. Risk-averse oligarchs acquire safe foreign assets for insurance, thus increasing wages in other countries that protect outside investors. We show that for empirically reasonable parameter values, reforms to decrease political risk or to protect more outsiders' investments can decrease local oligarchs' welfare by increasing wages, making such reforms prone to political resistance from the ruling elite. We suggest measures of property rights imperfections derived from empirically observable data, and we test the quantitative predictions of our model using those measures and other parameter values routinely assumed in growth theory.     

Spontaneous (non)emergence of property rights

The paper analyses preferences of private owners over the degree of property rights protection. It is shown that inequality in resource ownership and/or relative inefficiency of production technologies could make wealthier agents favour less than full protection of property rights. If such agents control the choice of a property rights regime, fully secured property rights will not emerge from the grassroots. This conclusion is consistent with the failure to create an efficient property rights system in Russia.     

制度变迁中土地产权的性质与合约选择:一个有关合作经济的案例分析

This paper discusses an evolutionary process of rural collective property rights or agricultural cooperation economy in detail. We convince that both the evolution of the household contract system and the rural cooperation economy in the market elaborate the key position of property rights’ multi-attribute in the formation of contract structure and organization shape. If there were strong externality between several elements of household, the collective property rights should be chosen. __________ Translated from Guanli Shijie 管理世界 (Management World), 2008, (6): 61–67, 94     

The commons,common property,and environmental policy

The conceptual confusion among property, common property, open access resources, and the tragedy of the commons is identified and rectified. Property rights are defined and clarified. From that it is possible to understand the traditional confusion between open access resources and common property resources. It is urged that common property regimes be used in place of common property resources. This will emphasize that institutional arrangements are human creations and that natural resources can be managed as private property, as common property, or as state property. It is the property regime — an authority system — that indicates the rules of use of a variety of natural resources.     

用益物权转让法律问题探析

用益物权转让是我国经济领域之中的一个新问题,随着这一问题的出现和发展变化,需要有相应的法律制度进行规范和调整。用益物权作为一种财产权利应当由法律确认和保护,并在法律的框架下进行有效的行使。用益物权可以依法转让,其转让制度的形成和发展,有利于促进相关的经济活动。在土地承包经营权、建设用地使用权、宅基地使用权、地役权等财产权利的流转和交易过程中,相关法律制度的建立和完善将推进经济和社会的发展。     

Conceptions of property rights and norms

The social norm literature in law and economics fails to account for the differences between the two major conceptions of property rights. The differences between the two conceptions affect people’s utility function by affecting how increases in property rights are perceived. This paper discusses how the modern, in rem, conception evolved from an older, in personam, conception; it also discusses how economics has absorbed the modern, in rem, conception. The paper demonstrates that if people do not perceive the benefits of modern property rights, they will follow their social norms if the government or planner imposes modern property rights on them. In the end, this allows one to make a fuller discussion of why norms economize information. This discussion has various consequences ranging from developmental economics to financial market economics and cannot be ignored.

Defining the frontiers of the firm through property rights allocation: The case of the French retailer cooperative Leclerc

France harbours three large retailer cooperatives which, put together, account for more than a third of the national market share. The largest of these is Leclerc, a leading firm on the French territory. The paper presented here shows how, through the particular distribution of property rights and decision patterns, this cooperative, although hampered by an unstable size, manages to compete with integrated firms. Indeed, the processes that have been developed enable the cooperative to acquire long-term property rights on the specific assets (stores), while remaining in the cooperative framework. The system built is efficient because incentives remain high for members to increase their own performance.