The ultimate creativity machine. How BMW turns art into profit

Many companies face the challenge of balancing art with commerce. The conflict between corporate pragmatism and artistic passion and quality is persistent: designers chafe under corporate requirements, budgets, and deadlines, and nondesigners struggle to understand the business value of artistic choices. At German carmaker BMW, the fanaticism about design excellence is matched only by the company's driving desire to remain profitable. Global design director Chris Bangle presides over the intersection of art and commerce at BMW, managing the often-strained relationships among the designers, engineers, and business managers. Bangle goes to great lengths to protect his designers from the unproductive commentary of others in the company, literally posting "Stop: No Entry" signs on the design studio doors. He also protects the design process, making sure that time-to-market pressures do not harm the designs by shifting the focus to engineering too soon. As a mediator, Bangle appeals to the core values of the company and a deeply held sense about BMW-ness--a pride of product shared by everyone in the company that expresses itself in the classic quality of the cars. Every employee, designer and nondesigner alike, understands that if a car doesn't meet this standard of excellence, it's simply not a BMW--and customers won't buy it. Managing at the intersection of art and commerce means translating the language of art into the language of the corporation. In this First Person account, the author describes his inventive techniques for getting the best from his artists--and getting his ideas across to corporate managers.     

Threat to regulate and coordination failures: Experimental evidence

Coordination games can represent a wide range of issues in real estate. In this paper, we present the results of an experiment designed to investigate the impact of regulatory threats in a coordination game. The experiment consisted of two sessions. The first session included a simple coordination game. We found significant coordination failures among the players in this session. We then conducted a second session in which we introduced a new player who had the choice to either intervene and regulate the payoffs of the other players or not to intervene and let the other players' actions determine the outcome. Our objective was to test whether the introduction of such a regulatory authority would induce more cooperative play by the players and move the market to the Pareto superior outcome. We found this not to be the case. There was no statistically significant difference between the choices of subjects in the two sessions.     

How executives can shape their company's information systems.

When a big New York bank expanded in London, technical specialists in the two cities disagreed about which vendor's information system was best. The debate continued for several months until finally the technical experts took the issue to a senior-management policy committee. But the senior managers didn't understand the terminology and kept postponing the decision. Meanwhile, the London office complained loudly that the slowdown was threatening the unit's growth. Like the bank, most companies need a new approach to making decisions about information technology (IT), especially since it now affects so many aspects of the business. The company's technical experts seldom understand the overall business, and the senior managers who understand the business are usually lost when it comes to computers. One way to blend both perspectives is to establish a task force that solicits input from top management and creates a set of principles to guide subsequent investments in information technology. By drawing on 10 to 15 statements that reflect management's basic beliefs about how the company should use IT, the task force translates the language of corporate strategy into computerese. For instance, an electronics company wanted various functions to act more like one company. It created a principle that said, "Information systems will provide application that support cross-functional integration of business processes." Managers making subsequent decisions about computers could immediately rule out any technologies that contradicted that statement. Principles thus speed up the decision-making process, but more important, they ensure that every investment in IT helps the corporation achieve its strategic goals.     

Strategic intensity: a conversation with world chess champion Garry Kasparov

It's hard to find a better exemplar for competition than chess. The image of two brilliant minds locked in a battle of skill and will-in which chance plays little or no apparent role-is compelling. Even people who have scant knowledge of the game instinctively recognize that chess is unusual in terms of its intellectual complexity and the strategic demands it places on players. Can strategists learn anything from chess players about what it takes to win? To find out, H BR senior editor Diane L. Coutu talked with Garry Kasparov, the world's number one player since 1984. Kasparov believes that success in both chess and business is very much a question of psychological advantage; the complexity of the game demands that players rely heavily on their instincts and on gamesmanship. In this wide-ranging interview, Kasparov explores the power of chess as a model for business competition; the balance that chess players strike between intuition and analysis; the significance of his loss to IBM's chess-playing computer, Deep Blue; and how his legendary rivalry with Anatoly Karpov, Kasparov's predecessor as World Chess Champion, affected his own success. Kasparov also shares his solution to what he calls the champion's dilemma, a question for all world masters, whether they are in business, sports, or chess: Where does a virtuoso go after he has accomplished everything he's ever wanted to, even beyond his wildest imagination? If you are lucky, says Kasparov, your enemies will push you to be passionate about staying at the top.     

Why business models matter

"Business model" was one of the great buzz-words of the Internet boom. A company didn't need a strategy, a special competence, or even any customers--all it needed was a Web-based business model that promised wild profits in some distant, ill-defined future. Many people--investors, entrepreneurs, and executives alike--fell for the fantasy and got burned. And as the inevitable counterreaction played out, the concept of the business model fell out of fashion nearly as quickly as the .com appendage itself. That's a shame. As Joan Magretta explains, a good business model remains essential to every successful organization, whether it's a new venture or an established player. To help managers apply the concept successfully, she defines what a business model is and how it complements a smart competitive strategy. Business models are, at heart, stories that explain how enterprises work. Like a good story, a robust business model contains precisely delineated characters, plausible motivations, and a plot that turns on an insight about value. It answers certain questions: Who is the customer? How do we make money? What underlying economic logic explains how we can deliver value to customers at an appropriate cost? Every viable organization is built on a sound business model, but a business model isn't a strategy, even though many people use the terms interchangeably. Business models describe, as a system, how the pieces of a business fit together. But they don't factor in one critical dimension of performance: competition. That's the job of strategy. Illustrated with examples from companies like American Express, EuroDisney, WalMart, and Dell Computer, this article clarifies the concepts of business models and strategy, which are fundamental to every company's performance.     

How to kill creativity

In today's knowledge economy, creativity is more important than ever. But many companies unwittingly employ managerial practices that kill it. How? By crushing their employees' intrinsic motivation--the strong internal desire to do something based on interests and passions. Managers don't kill creativity on purpose. Yet in the pursuit of productivity, efficiency, and control--all worthy business imperatives--they undermine creativity. It doesn't have to be that way, says Teresa Amabile. Business imperatives can comfortably coexist with creativity. But managers will have to change their thinking first. Specifically, managers will need to understand that creativity has three parts: expertise, the ability to think flexibly and imaginatively, and motivation. Managers can influence the first two, but doing so is costly and slow. It would be far more effective to increase employees' intrinsic motivation. To that end, managers have five levers to pull: the amount of challenge they give employees, the degree of freedom they grant around process, the way they design work groups, the level of encouragement they give, and the nature of organizational support. Take challenge as an example. Intrinsic motivation is high when employees feel challenged but not overwhelmed by their work. The task for managers, therefore, becomes matching people to the right assignments. Consider also freedom. Intrinsic motivation--and thus creativity--soars when managers let people decide how to achieve goals, not what goals to achieve. Managers can make a difference when it comes to employee creativity. The result can be truly innovative companies in which creativity doesn't just survive but actually thrives.     

Managing by commitments

What makes a great manager great? Despite differences in their personal attributes, successful managers all excel in the making, honoring, and remaking of commitments. Managerial commitments take many forms, from capital investments to personnel decisions to public statements, but each exerts both immediate and enduring influence on a company. A leader's commitments shape a business's identity, define its strengths and weaknesses, establish its opportunities and limitations, and set its direction. Executives can all too easily forget that commitments are extraordinarily powerful. Caught up in the present, managers often take actions that, while beneficial in the near term, impose lasting constraints on their operations and organizations. When market or competitive conditions change, they can find themselves unable to respond effectively. Managers who understand the nature and power of their commitments can wield them more effectively throughout a company's life cycle. Entrepreneurs can avoid taking actions that imprint a new venture with a dysfunctional character. Managers in established enterprises can buttress past commitments that retain their currency and learn to recognize when commitments have become roadblocks to needed changes. The manager can then replace those roadblocks with new, rejuvenating commitments. That doesn't mean you should try to anticipate all the long-run consequences of every commitment--and it certainly doesn't mean you should shy away from making commitments. But it does mean that before making important decisions about, say, operating processes or partnerships, you should always ask yourself: Is this a process or relationship that we can live with in the future? Am I locking us into a course that we'll come to regret?     

从博弈看上市公司股利政策的决定

本文从股利政策的内涵出发,运用博弈论的基本原理,分别从管理者与股东、管理者(股东)与债权人方面的利益冲突入手,建立博弈模型,列出支付矩阵,进行均衡分析,得出博弈的均衡结果——低股利支付政策,继续持有股权或债权,指出低正常股利加额外股利政策是最符合这一博弈结果的股利政策选择。     

Relationships among budgetary leadership behavior, managerial budgeting games, and budgetary attitudes: Evidence from Taiwanese corporations

In this paper, we examine the relationship among leadership behavior (contingent reward vs. contingent punishment), managerial budgeting games (devious games vs. economic games), and attitudes towards the budgetary process. Relationships were tested using a structural equation model that was estimated on the basis of questionnaire data from 216 Taiwanese managers. The majority of respondents were accounting/finance managers employed by manufacturing firms. Results reveal that contingent-reward leadership behavior has a direct and positive effect on attitudes toward the budgetary process, and an indirect effect through economic games. On the other hand, we find evidence that contingent-punishment leadership behavior has only an indirect and negative effect on attitudes toward the budgetary process through devious games, especially for non-accounting/finance managers. Managers who play economic games tend to have positive attitudes towards the budgetary process, while those who play devious games do not. The findings should be useful to management in understanding what effective leadership behavior is in the budget-preparation process in Taiwan, and assessing how budgeting games are likely to be adopted by Taiwanese managers.     

Beware the busy manager

Managers will tell you that the resource they lack most is time. If you watch them, you'll see them rushing from meeting to meeting, checking their e-mail constantly, fighting fires--an astonishing amount of fast-moving activity that allows almost no time for reflection. Managers think they are attending to important matters, but they're really just spinning their wheels. For the past ten years, the authors have studied the behavior of busy managers, and their findings should frighten you: Fully 90% of managers squander their time in all sorts of ineffective activities. A mere 10% of managers spend their time in a committed, purposeful, and reflective manner. Effective action relies on a combination of two traits: focus--the ability to zero in on a goal and see the task through to completion--and energy--the vigor that comes from intense personal commitment. Focus without energy devolves into listless execution or leads to burnout. Energy without focus dissipates into aimless busyness or wasteful failures. Plotting these two traits into a matrix provides a useful framework for understanding productivity levels of different managers. Managers who suffer from low levels of both energy and focus are the procrastinators: They dutifully perform routine tasks but fail to take initiatve. Disengaged managers have high focus but low energy: They have reservations about the jobs they are asked to do, so they approach them half-heartedly. Distracted managers have high energy but low focus: They confuse frenetic activity with constructive action. Purposeful managers are both highly energetic and highly focused: These are the managers who accomplish the most. This article will help you identify which managers in your organization are making a real difference--and which just look busy.     

The 2002 HBR list. Breakthrough ideas for today's business agenda

In the last year, war broke out, the economy took a nosedive, and an alarming number of businesses went belly up. Thus it is with some urgency that we bring you this year's list of the seven best new business ideas to help you find your way through these complex times. History Returns. Many thought that the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the beginning of a new world order, one in which history didn't matter. But September 11, 2001, put an end to that theory. And it raised serious questions about globalization, security, and strategy. Enter the Everyday Leader--at Last. CEOs are used to getting all the glory, but leaders outside the limelight--middle managers and tempered radicals--are beginning to receive the attention they deserve. The Internet Is Not About You. The real value of the Internet may lie less in connecting individuals than in connecting databases, servers, and devices--a web not of people but of machines. Mind Your Behavior. Behavioral scientists are beginning to be able to accurately predict the ways individuals and crowds will respond to stimuli, and the implications for business are profound. Don't Delight Your Customers Away. Companies have wooed and coddled customers for too long. The truth is, people delight in being teased and are repelled by those who try too hard to befriend them. Games Are for Losers. Financial game playing and verbal politicking are seriously damaging businesses. Honesty is more than an admirable virtue; it's the foundation of every lasting enterprise. Three Cheers for Creativity (Sometimes). Creativity and best-practice replication are fundamentally different undertakings. Managers who mix the two achieve creativity that is merely incremental and replication that is sadly inept.     

Case of the disputed dismissal

Managers in the United States, acting in anger, indignation, frustration, or even error, fire many capable employees every year. In some of these cases, the managers act unfairly. Perplexing questions arise when the story of an unjustified discharge catches the public's eye. Does an organization have an obligation to manage equitably as well as efficiently? It is conceivable that every man and woman has a right to a job, and, if so, is this right a factor that managers must weigh in deciding to lay off an employee who doesn't "fit in"? The employee in this case "Adrian Reese," is an outspoken health official who irritates the city manager and members of the "Marshall City" board of health. Like most HBR cases, this is based on a real situation. As the problem unfolds, readers may find the circumstances and the characters familiar. And yet they may be surprised at the outcome, as truth is stranger than fiction.     

Creativity under the gun

If you're like most managers, you've worked with people who swear they do their most creative work under tight deadlines. You may use pressure as a management technique, believing it will spur people on to great leaps of insight. You may even manage yourself this way. If so, are you right? Not necessarily, these researchers say. There are instances where ingenuity flourishes under extreme time pressure--for instance, a NASA team within hours comes up with a primitive but effective fix for the failing air filtration system aboard Apollo 13. But when creativity is under the gun, it usually ends up getting killed, the authors say. They recently took a close look at how people experience time pressure, collecting and analyzing more than 9,000 daily diary entries from individuals who were working on projects that required high levels of creativity and measuring their ability to innovate under varying levels of time pressure. The authors describe common characteristics of time pressure and outline four working environments under which creativity may or may not flourish. High-pressure days that still yield creativity are full of focus and meaningful urgency--people feel like they are on a mission. High-pressure days that yield no creativity lack such focus--people feel like they are on a treadmill, forced to switch gears often. On low-pressure days that yield creativity, people feel like they are on an expedition--exploring ideas rather than just identifying problems. And on low-pressure days that yield no creative thinking, people work on autopilot--doing their jobs without engaging too deeply. Managers should avoid extreme time pressure when possible; after all, complex cognitive processing takes time. For when they can't, the authors suggest ways to mollify its effects.     

Portfolio optimization under model uncertainty and BSDE games

We consider robust optimal portfolio problems for markets modeled by (possibly non-Markovian) Itô–Lévy processes. Mathematically, the situation can be described as a stochastic differential game, where one of the players (the agent) is trying to find the portfolio that maximizes the utility of her terminal wealth, while the other player (“the market”) is controlling some of the unknown parameters of the market (e.g., the underlying probability measure, representing a model uncertainty problem) and is trying to minimize this maximal utility of the agent. This leads to a worst case scenario control problem for the agent. In the Markovian case, such problems can be studied using the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs (HJBI) equation, but these methods do not work in the non-Markovian case. We approach the problem by transforming it into a stochastic differential game for backward stochastic differential equations (a BSDE game). Using comparison theorems for BSDEs with jumps we arrive at criteria for the solution of such games in the form of a kind of non-Markovian analogue of the HJBI equation. The results are illustrated by examples.     

An Investigation of the Dynamic Relationship between Agency Theory and Dividend Policy

Agency theory posits that the dividend mechanism provides an incentive for managers to reduce the costs associated with the principal/agent relationship. Distributing resources in the form of cash dividends forces managers to seek outside capital, thus causing them to reduce agency costs as they subject themselves to the scrutiny of the capital marketplace. Under this scenario the optimum level of dividend payout is that which minimizes the agency cost structure relative to the cost of raising needed funds. A test of this theory employing time-series cross-sectional analysis and more direct measures of the agency cost structure shows that these tenets of agency theory may be valid. Managers do appear to adjust the dividend payout in response to the agency cost/transaction cost structure, both through time as well as across firms.     

Work and life: the end of the zero-sum game

Most companies view work and personal life as competing priorities in a zero-sum game, in which a gain in one area means a loss in the other. From this traditional perspective, managers decide how their employees' work and personal lives should intersect and often view work-life programs as just so much social welfare. A new breed of managers, however, is trying a new tack, one in which managers and employees collaborate to achieve work and personal objectives to everyone's benefit. These managers are guided by three principles. The first is to clearly inform their employees about business priorities and to encourage them to be just as clear about personal priorities. The second is to recognize and support their employees as whole people, not only acknowledging but also celebrating their roles outside the office. The third is to continually experiment with the way work gets done, looking for approaches that enhance the organization's performance and allow employees to pursue personal goals. The managers who are acting on these principles have discovered that conflicts between work and personal priorities can actually be catalysts for identifying inefficiencies at the workplace. For example, one manager and his staff found a way to accommodate the increased workload at their 24-hour-a-day command center while granting the staff more concentrated time off. So far, these managers have usually been applying the principles without official sanction. But as the business impact of their approach becomes better appreciated, the authors predict, more and more companies will view these leaders as heralds of change.     

The balanced scorecard--measures that drive performance

Frustrated by the inadequacies of traditional performance measurement systems, some managers have abandoned financial measures like return on equity and earnings per share. "Make operational improvements and the numbers will follow," the argument goes. But managers do not want to choose between financial and operational measures. Executives want a balanced presentation of measures that allow them to view the company from several perspectives simultaneously. During a year-long research project with 12 companies at the leading edge of performance measurement, the authors developed a "balanced scorecard," a new performance measurement system that gives top managers a fast but comprehensive view of the business. The balanced scorecard includes financial measures that tell the results of actions already taken. And it complements those financial measures with three sets of operational measures having to do with customer satisfaction, internal processes, and the organization's ability to learn and improve--the activities that drive future financial performance. Managers can create a balanced scorecard by translating their company's strategy and mission statements into specific goals and measures. To create the part of the scorecard that focuses on the customer perspective, for example, executives at Electronic Circuits Inc. established general goals for customer performance: get standard products to market sooner, improve customers' time-to-market, become customers' supplier of choice through partnerships, and develop innovative products tailored to customer needs. Managers translated these elements of strategy into four specific goals and identified a measure for each.     

3-D negotiation. Playing the whole game

What stands between you and the yes you want? According to negotiation experts David Lax and James Sebenius, executives face obstacles in three common and complementary dimensions. The first dimension is tactics, or interactions at the bargaining table. The second is deal design, or the ability to draw up a deal at the table that creates lasting value. And the third is setup, which includes the structure of the negotiation itself. Each dimension is crucial in the bargaining process, but most executives fixate on only the first two: 1-D negotiators focus on improving their interpersonal skills at the negotiating table--courting their clients, using culturally sensitive language, and so on. 2-D negotiators focus on diagnosing underlying sources of value in a deal and then recrafting the terms to satisfy all parties. In this article, the authors explore the often-neglected third dimension. Instead of just playing the game at the bargaining table, 3-D negotiators reshape the scope and sequence of the game itself to achieve the desired outcome. They scan widely to identify elements outside of the deal on the table that might create a more favorable structure for it. They map backward from their ideal resolution to the current setup of the deal and carefully choose which players to approach and when. And they manage and frame the flow of information among the parties involved to improve their odds of getting to yes. Lax and Sebenius describe the tactics 3-D negotiators use--such as bringing new, previously unconsidered players into a negotiation--and cite examples from business and foreign affairs. Negotiators need to act in all three dimensions, the authors argue, to create and claim value for the long term.     

Putting the enterprise into the enterprise system

Enterprise systems present a new model of corporate computing. They allow companies to replace their existing information systems, which are often incompatible with one another, with a single, integrated system. By streamlining data flows throughout an organization, these commercial software packages, offered by vendors like SAP, promise dramatic gains in a company's efficiency and bottom line. It's no wonder that businesses are rushing to jump on the ES bandwagon. But while these systems offer tremendous rewards, the risks they carry are equally great. Not only are the systems expensive and difficult to implement, they can also tie the hands of managers. Unlike computer systems of the past, which were typically developed in-house with a company's specific requirements in mind, enterprise systems are off-the-shelf solutions. They impose their own logic on a company's strategy, culture, and organization, often forcing companies to change the way they do business. Managers would do well to heed the horror stories of failed implementations. FoxMeyer Drug, for example, claims that its system helped drive it into bankruptcy. Drawing on examples of both successful and unsuccessful ES projects, the author discusses the pros and cons of implementing an enterprise system, showing how a system can produce unintended and highly disruptive consequences. Because of an ES's profound business implications, he cautions against shifting responsibility for its adoption to technologists. Only a general manager will be able to mediate between the imperatives of the system and the imperatives of the business.     

Go for broke or play it safe? Dynamic competition with choice of variance

We consider a differential game in which the joint choices of the two players influence the variance, but not the mean, of the one‐dimensional state variable. We show that a pure strategy perfect equilibrium in stationary Markov strategies (ME) exists and has the property that patient players choose to play it safe when sufficiently ahead and to take risks when sufficiently behind. We also provide a simple condition that implies both players choose risky strategies when neither one is too far ahead, a situation that ensures a dominant player emerges “quickly.”