The impact of the Belt and Road Initiative on the expansion of China's higher education in overseas markets along the route

Due to the differences in economic and social conditions among the Belt‐and‐Road (B&R) countries, resources exchange might bring significant effect on companies and organizations in these countries. In recent years, vigorously developing university education and attracting more outstanding international students have become important means for “B&R” countries to expand education market and enhance international influence. However, there is limited research discussing the impact of “B&R” on the internationalization of higher education. Taking the sponsoring country (China) of the “B&R” strategy as an example, this article explores the impact of this strategy on Chinese universities' expansion in the education market, and further analyzes the important relevant factors from the perspectives of international competitiveness. The findings show that the B&R Initiative has a significant impact on the expansion of Chinese universities in overseas markets along the route. Furthermore, we have found “push” factors related to China's macro and micro environments, and “pull” factors associated with countries along the B&R route.     

Semimartingale theory of monotone mean–variance portfolio allocation

We study dynamic optimal portfolio allocation for monotone mean–variance preferences in a general semimartingale model. Armed with new results in this area, we revisit the work of Cui et al. and fully characterize the circumstances under which one can set aside a nonnegative cash flow while simultaneously improving the mean–variance efficiency of the left‐over wealth. The paper analyzes, for the first time, the monotone hull of the Sharpe ratio and highlights its relevance to the problem at hand.     

OPTIMAL TRADE EXECUTION AND PRICE MANIPULATION IN ORDER BOOKS WITH TIME‐VARYING LIQUIDITY

In financial markets, liquidity is not constant over time but exhibits strong seasonal patterns. In this paper, we consider a limit order book model that allows for time‐dependent, deterministic depth and resilience of the book and determine optimal portfolio liquidation strategies. In a first model variant, we propose a trading‐dependent spread that increases when market orders are matched against the order book. In this model, no price manipulation occurs and the optimal strategy is of the wait region/buy region type often encountered in singular control problems. In a second model, we assume that there is no spread in the order book. Under this assumption, we find that price manipulation can occur, depending on the model parameters. Even in the absence of classical price manipulation, there may be transaction triggered price manipulation. In specific cases, we can state the optimal strategy in closed form.     

DYNAMIC PORTFOLIO OPTIMIZATION WITH A DEFAULTABLE SECURITY AND REGIME‐SWITCHING

We consider a portfolio optimization problem in a defaultable market with finitely‐many economical regimes, where the investor can dynamically allocate her wealth among a defaultable bond, a stock, and a money market account. The market coefficients are assumed to depend on the market regime in place, which is modeled by a finite state continuous time Markov process. By separating the utility maximization problem into a predefault and postdefault component, we deduce two coupled Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations for the post‐ and predefault optimal value functions, and show a novel verification theorem for their solutions. We obtain explicit constructions of value functions and investment strategies for investors with logarithmic and Constant Relative Risk Aversion utilities, and provide a precise characterization of the directionality of the bond investment strategies in terms of corporate returns, forward rates, and expected recovery at default. We illustrate the dependence of the optimal strategies on time, losses given default, and risk aversion level of the investor through a detailed economic and numerical analysis.     

OPTIMAL STOCK SELLING/BUYING STRATEGY WITH REFERENCE TO THE ULTIMATE AVERAGE

We are concerned with the optimal decision to sell or buy a stock in a given period with reference to the ultimate average of the stock price. More precisely, we aim to determine an optimal selling (buying) time to maximize (minimize) the expectation of the ratio of the selling (buying) price to the ultimate average price over the period. This is an optimal stopping time problem which can be formulated as a variational inequality problem. The problem gives rise to a free boundary that corresponds to the optimal selling (buying) strategy. We provide a partial differential equation approach to characterize the free boundary (or equivalently, the optimal selling (buying) region). It turns out that the optimal selling strategy is bang‐bang, which is the same as that obtained by Shiryaev, Xu, and Zhou taking the ultimate maximum of the stock price as benchmark, whereas the optimal buying strategy can be a feedback one subject to the type of averaging and parameter values. Moreover, by a thorough characterization of free boundary, we reveal that the bang‐bang optimal selling strategy heavily depends on the assumption that no time‐vesting restrictions are imposed. If a time‐vested stock is considered, then the optimal selling strategy can also be a feedback one. In terms of a similar analysis developed by the present paper, the same phenomenon can be proved when taking the ultimate maximum as benchmark.     

Convergence of optimal expected utility for a sequence of discrete‐time markets

We examine Kreps' conjecture that optimal expected utility in the classic Black–Scholes–Merton (BSM) economy is the limit of optimal expected utility for a sequence of discrete‐time economies that “approach” the BSM economy in a natural sense: The nth discrete‐time economy is generated by a scaled n‐step random walk, based on an unscaled random variable ζ with mean 0, variance 1, and bounded support. We confirm Kreps' conjecture if the consumer's utility function U has asymptotic elasticity strictly less than one, and we provide a counterexample to the conjecture for a utility function U with asymptotic elasticity equal to 1, for ζ such that .     

The optimal method for pricing Bermudan options by simulation

Least‐squares methods enable us to price Bermudan‐style options by Monte Carlo simulation. They are based on estimating the option continuation value by least‐squares. We show that the Bermudan price is maximized when this continuation value is estimated near the exercise boundary, which is equivalent to implicitly estimating the optimal exercise boundary by using the value‐matching condition. Localization is the key difference with respect to global regression methods, but is fundamental for optimal exercise decisions and requires estimation of the continuation value by iterating local least‐squares (because we estimate and localize the exercise boundary at the same time). In the numerical example, in agreement with this optimality, the new prices or lower bounds (i) improve upon the prices reported by other methods and (ii) are very close to the associated dual upper bounds. We also study the method's convergence.     

OPTIMAL TIMING FOR AN INDIVISIBLE ASSET SALE

In this paper, we investigate the pricing via utility indifference of the right to sell a non‐traded asset. Consider an agent with power utility who owns a single unit of an indivisible, non‐traded asset, and who wishes to choose the optimum time to sell this asset. Suppose that this right to sell forms just part of the wealth of the agent, and that other wealth may be invested in a complete frictionless market. We formulate the problem as a mixed stochastic control/optimal stopping problem, which we then solve. We determine the optimal behavior of the agent, including the optimal criteria for the timing of the sale. It turns out that the optimal strategy is to sell the non‐traded asset the first time that its value exceeds a certain proportion of the agent's trading wealth. Further, it is possible to characterize this proportion as the solution to a transcendental equation.     

OPTIMAL MULTI‐AGENT PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR TEAM CONTRACTS

We present a continuous‐time contracting model under moral hazard with many agents. The principal contracts many agents as a team, and they jointly produce correlated outcomes. We show the optimal contract for each agent is linear in outcomes of all other agents as well as his/her own. The structure of the optimal contract strikingly reveals that the optimal aggregate performance measure in general can be orthogonally decomposed into two statistics: one is a sufficient statistic, and the other a nonsufficient statistic. As a consequence, the optimal aggregate performance measure in general is not a sufficient statistic, unless the principal is risk neutral. We further discuss agents' optimal effort choices using a “quadratic‐cost” example, which also strikingly suggests that team contracts sometimes provide lower‐powered effort incentives than individually separate contracts do.     

The great trade collapse and Indian firms

The collapse in global trade during the 2008–09 crisis has been widely studied using the developed nation(s) data. I use firm‐level data from Indian manufacturers to show that: (a) Indian firms experience strong negative demand shocks concerning their exports to the USA and the EU, the effect being significantly higher in case of the USA. Results assert that 1% increase in the exposure towards the crisis‐affected zones (the USA and the EU combined) reduces an average Indian manufacturing firm's export earnings by 1.17%–1.36%; (b) trade in consumer non‐durables and durables are the two most affected sectors, impact being higher for the latter; (c) evidence in support of similar effects throughout the size distribution of firms, with the effect being highest for small or the most vulnerable firms; (d) drop in demand, as a result of the 2008–09 crisis, only affects the high‐exposure industries. My results are robust to IV analysis and a variety of checks.     

Optimal make–take fees for market making regulation

We address the mechanism design problem of an exchange setting suitable make– take fees to attract liquidity on its platform. Using a principal–agent approach, we provide the optimal compensation scheme of a market maker in quasi‐explicit form. This contract depends essentially on the market maker inventory trajectory and on the volatility of the asset. We also provide the optimal quotes that should be displayed by the market maker. The simplicity of our formulas allows us to analyze in details the effects of optimal contracting with an exchange, compared to a situation without contract. We show in particular that it improves liquidity and reduces trading costs for investors. We extend our study to an oligopoly of symmetric exchanges and we study the impact of such common agency policy on the system.     

BETTER THAN DYNAMIC MEAN‐VARIANCE: TIME INCONSISTENCY AND FREE CASH FLOW STREAM

As the dynamic mean‐variance portfolio selection formulation does not satisfy the principle of optimality of dynamic programming, phenomena of time inconsistency occur, i.e., investors may have incentives to deviate from the precommitted optimal mean‐variance portfolio policy during the investment process under certain circumstances. By introducing the concept of time inconsistency in efficiency and defining the induced trade‐off, we further demonstrate in this paper that investors behave irrationally under the precommitted optimal mean‐variance portfolio policy when their wealth is above certain threshold during the investment process. By relaxing the self‐financing restriction to allow withdrawal of money out of the market, we develop a revised mean‐variance policy which dominates the precommitted optimal mean‐variance portfolio policy in the sense that, while the two achieve the same mean‐variance pair of the terminal wealth, the revised policy enables the investor to receive a free cash flow stream (FCFS) during the investment process. The analytical expressions of the probability of receiving FCFS and the expected value of FCFS are derived.     

Small‐cost asymptotics for long‐term growth rates in incomplete markets

This paper provides a rigorous asymptotic analysis of long‐term growth rates under both proportional and Morton–Pliska transaction costs. We consider a general incomplete financial market with an unspanned Markov factor process that includes the Heston stochastic volatility model and the Kim–Omberg stochastic excess return model as special cases. Using a dynamic programming approach, we determine the leading‐order expansions of long‐term growth rates and explicitly construct strategies that are optimal at the leading order. We further analyze the asymptotic performance of Morton–Pliska strategies in settings with proportional transaction costs. We find that the performance of the optimal Morton–Pliska strategy is the same as that of the optimal one with costs increased by a factor of . Finally, we demonstrate that our strategies are in fact pathwise optimal, in the sense that they maximize the long‐run growth rate path by path.     

Robust Markowitz mean‐variance portfolio selection under ambiguous covariance matrix

This paper studies a robust continuous‐time Markowitz portfolio selection problem where the model uncertainty affects the covariance matrix of multiple risky assets. This problem is formulated into a min–max mean‐variance problem over a set of nondominated probability measures that is solved by a McKean–Vlasov dynamic programming approach, which allows us to characterize the solution in terms of a Bellman–Isaacs equation in the Wasserstein space of probability measures. We provide explicit solutions for the optimal robust portfolio strategies and illustrate our results in the case of uncertain volatilities and ambiguous correlation between two risky assets. We then derive the robust efficient frontier in closed form, and obtain a lower bound for the Sharpe ratio of any robust efficient portfolio strategy. Finally, we compare the performance of Sharpe ratios for a robust investor and for an investor with a misspecified model.     

GENERALIZATION OF THE DYBVIG–INGERSOLL–ROSS THEOREM AND ASYMPTOTIC MINIMALITY

The long‐term limit of zero‐coupon rates with respect to the maturity does not always exist. In this case we use the limit superior and prove corresponding versions of the Dybvig–Ingersoll–Ross theorem, which says that long‐term spot and forward rates can never fall in an arbitrage‐free model. Extensions of popular interest rate models needing this generalization are presented. In addition, we discuss several definitions of arbitrage, prove asymptotic minimality of the limit superior of the spot rates, and illustrate our results by several continuous‐time short‐rate models.     

GAME CALL OPTIONS REVISITED

In this paper, having been inspired by the work of Kunita and Seko, we study the pricing of δ‐penalty game call options on a stock with a dividend payment. For the perpetual case, our result reveals that the optimal stopping region for the option seller depends crucially on the dividend rate d. More precisely, we show that when the penalty δ is small, there are two critical dividends 0 < d₁ < d₂ < ∞ such that the optimal stopping region for the option seller takes one of the following forms: (1) an interval if d < d₁; (2) a singleton if d∈ [d₁, d₂]; or (3) an empty set if d > d₂. When d∈ [d₁, d₂], the value function is not continuously differentiable at the optimal stopping boundary for the option seller, therefore our result in the perpetual case cannot be established by the free boundary approach with smooth‐fit conditions imposed on both free boundaries. For the finite time horizon case, the dependence of the optimal stopping region for the option seller on the time to maturity is exhibited; more precisely, when both δ and d are small, we show that there are two critical times 0 < T₁ < T₂ < T, such that the optimal stopping region for the option seller takes one of the following forms: (1) an interval if t < T₁; (2) a singleton if t∈ [T₁, T₂]; or (3) an empty set if t > T₂. In summary, for both the perpetual and the finite horizon cases, we characterize in terms of model parameters how the optimal stopping region for the option seller shrinks when the dividend rate d increases and the time to maturity decreases; these results complete the original work of Emmerling for the perpetual case and Kunita and Seko for the finite maturity case. In addition, for the finite time horizon case, we also extend the probabilistic method for the establishment of existence and regularity results of the classical American option pricing problem to the game option setting. Finally, we characterize the pair of optimal stopping boundaries for both the seller and the buyer as the unique pair of solutions to a couple of integral equations and provide numerical illustrations.     

Risk management with weighted VaR

This article studies the optimal portfolio selection of expected utility‐maximizing investors who must also manage their market‐risk exposures. The risk is measured by a so‐called weighted value‐at‐risk (WVaR) risk measure, which is a generalization of both value‐at‐risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES). The feasibility, well‐posedness, and existence of the optimal solution are examined. We obtain the optimal solution (when it exists) and show how risk measures change asset allocation patterns. In particular, we characterize three classes of risk measures: the first class will lead to models that do not admit an optimal solution, the second class can give rise to endogenous portfolio insurance, and the third class, which includes VaR and ES, two popular regulatory risk measures, will allow economic agents to engage in “regulatory capital arbitrage,” incurring larger losses when losses occur.     

Continuous‐time mean–variance portfolio selection: A reinforcement learning framework

We approach the continuous‐time mean–variance portfolio selection with reinforcement learning (RL). The problem is to achieve the best trade‐off between exploration and exploitation, and is formulated as an entropy‐regularized, relaxed stochastic control problem. We prove that the optimal feedback policy for this problem must be Gaussian, with time‐decaying variance. We then prove a policy improvement theorem, based on which we devise an implementable RL algorithm. We find that our algorithm and its variant outperform both traditional and deep neural network based algorithms in our simulation and empirical studies.     

“Going global” and FDI inflows in China: “One Belt & One Road” initiative as a quasi‐natural experiment

This paper investigates the impact of “One Belt & One Road” as an exogenous policy shock on the utilisation of foreign capital in China in the short term. Based on provincial panel data for the years 2003–15, the empirical study is conducted with difference‐in‐differences design. The first difference is whether a province is an OBOR province, and the second is whether “One Belt & One Road” initiative has been proposed. The empirical results suggest the utilisation of foreign capital in OBOR provinces has decreased significantly compared to non‐OBOR provinces after the initiative has been proposed. The study has further shown that the OBOR construction not only means factor movements and projects but also stands for policy shock. Its impact on utilisation of foreign capital cannot be simply captured by the commonly quantifiable “going global” indicators, namely outward direct investment, overseas contracted projects or overseas labour services. The negative impact of the initiative on foreign capital utilisation is strongly reflected in the OBOR provinces with low levels of economic development, heavy fiscal burdens and high proportions of state‐owned economy. In the short term, the negative impact of the initiative on foreign capital utilisation may be due to its role in resource competition and signal delivering. The former means that the OBOR initiative may induce resource competition between “going global” and “bringing in,” and the latter suggests that this initiative is likely to be regarded as a “signal” by foreign investors that “going global,” not “bringing in,” has become the priority of the government.