Monopoly and demand uncertainty

We develop a formal framework to analyse a monopoly’s problem when demand is determined by a Poisson-distribution and the valuations of the buyers are draws from a common distribution. The buyers have unit demand, and the good in question is discrete. The monopoly has to make its quantity and pricing decisions before demand is realised. We determine sufficient conditions for the monopoly’s pricing decision to be unique, and we demonstrate the difference to the planner’s problem by numerical examples. We also study an economy with a fixed number of buyers assuming that the valuations are draws from the uniform distribution. When the economy grows in the limit one recovers the standard case of a monopoly with linear demand and constant marginal costs.     

TESTING MODELS OF DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS MARKETS: CONSOLIDATION IN THE CABLE TV INDUSTRY

Research on differentiated products markets often uses structural demand/supply models to identify firms' marginal costs as product‐level cost data are unavailable. Using unique demand and cost data from cable TV, I evaluate a differentiated products model's ability to identify marginal costs. I find firms systematically price below profit‐maximizing levels, leading to biases in the model's marginal cost estimates. I study the implications for merger simulations and find that these biases compromise estimates of merger‐related cost efficiencies, yet do not prevent these models from generating useful predictions of the price and nonprice effects of mergers.     

Theory and Application of Linear Supply Function Equilibrium in Electricity Markets

We consider a supply function equilibrium (SFE) model of interaction in an electricity market. We assume a linear demand function and consider a competitive fringe and several strategic players having capacity limits and affine marginal costs. The choice of SFE over Cournot equilibrium and other models and the choice of affine marginal costs is reviewed in the context of the existing literature. We assume that bid rules allow affine or piecewise affine non-decreasing supply functions by firms and extend results of Green and Rudkevitch concerning the linear SFE solution. An incentive compatibility result is proved. We also find that a piecewise affine SFE can be found easily for the case where there are non-negativity limits on generation. Upper capacity limits, however, pose problems and we propose an ad hoc approach. We apply the analysis to the England and Wales electricity market, considering the 1996 and 1999 divestitures. The piecewise affine SFE solutions generally provide better matches to the empirical data than previous analysis.     

Market entry,privatization and bank performance in transition1

This paper examines how market entry and privatization have affected the margins and marginal costs of banks in the post‐communist transition. We estimate bank revenue and cost functions, allowing the estimated parameters to change over time. In the first sub‐period (1995–98), we find that privatized banks earned higher margins than other banks, while foreign start‐ups had lower marginal costs. In the third sub‐period (2002–2004), foreign banks remained low marginal cost service providers, while privatized domestic banks had the widest margins. Subtracting marginal costs from margins to calculate mark‐ups, an indication of demand for services, shows that initially privatized banks had the largest mark‐ups. However, by the third sub‐period, differences among private banks diminished. In comparison to private banks, state banks persistently under‐performed in controlling costs and attracting demand. Our evidence therefore indicates that foreign bank entry promoted lower costs and that privatization and market entry encouraged more demand for services.     

A two-stage translog marginal cost pricing approach for Floridian hospital outputs

Since the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010, issues still remain regarding the mandated purchase of insurance to ensure more universal coverage. One such issue is the pricing of these insurance packages and whether or not the reimbursements will cover necessary services. Therefore, policy concerns exist that increasing the number of insured individuals may not curtail costs. Conversely, providers may not wish to treat patients covered by excessively frugal plans such as Medicaid; hence the trade-offs between access and cost control. In this article, we present findings from a cost function and a productivity approach to determine the marginal cost of providing inpatient hospital care for hospitals operating in Florida during 2005. Using these methodological approaches, we are able to use the marginal rate of transformation to determine the relative marginal costs while controlling for hospital technical and allocative inefficiency. Our work differs from earlier articles as we avoid the Greene problem for cross-sectional models through a two-step approach. By including both reimbursement rates under conditions of hospital efficiency, we can ascertain payment schemes that should, at least in theory, cover necessary costs for patient care without leading to excessive input usage.     

Tax evasion and competition

Using a Cournot oligopoly model with an endogenous number of firms and evasion of indirect taxes, we show that more intense competition may have the negative side effect of increasing tax evasion, thereby, lowering public revenues and welfare. This will be the case if market entry costs decrease. A similar result will hold if marginal production costs fall and demand is either weakly concave, or convex and inelastic. The result of more competition, less evasion and higher public revenues will be obtained if (a) marginal production costs fall and demand is convex and elastic or (b) the demand elasticity increases. As a policy implication, we prove that tax enforcement should be intensified if there is a negative trade‐off between competition and evasion.     

IMPACT OF PRICING STRUCTURE SELECTIVITY ON URBAN WATER DEMAND

Interest in demand management policies has intensified as residential water demand has grown in the United States. Using data from the 1984 American Water Works Association (AWWA) survey, the study here provides an empirical analysis of the differences in price elasticities of demand across water pricing block structures and examines these structures' "conservation-orientedness." However, a potential sample selection bias exists. That is, in cities where people are more interested in conservation, utility managers may be more likely to select a rate structure that they believe is conservation-oriented–an increasing block structure, for example. Managers' selectivity bias may cause research results either to understate or to overstate a particular block structure's impact on water conservation. The analysis here corrects for this selectivity bias in estimating water demand and tests whether consumers respond to average prices or to marginal prices. Correcting for selectivity bias involves an explicit analysis of the factors that influence utility managers' selection of rate structures. Estimating water demand under increasing and decreasing block structures suggests that sample selection bias remains a problem worthy of further investigation.     

Output price indices for regulated monopoly

We construct an output price index for monopoly firms based on the firm's markups over marginal costs. Computation of the index requires product-specific markups over marginal costs or demand elasticities. The form of the Tornqvist exact output price index number is the same in both regulated and unregulated cases.     

Welfare-optimal pricing and capacity selection under an ex ante maximum demand charge

This paper deals with the simultaneous determination of welfare-optimal pricing and investment rules under a multi-period ex ante maximum demand charge by allowing the possibility of purchasing electricity from third party generators at some cost when excess demand occurs. I show that at the optimal size of capacity, expected short-run marginal shortage cost and long-run marginal capacity cost should be equal. The optimal maximum demand tariff does not entail marginal cost pricing. In general, it is shown that maximum demand charges are welfare superior to marginal cost pricing when tariffs must be set ex ante, before demand is known.     

Optimal replenishment order for uncertain demand in three layer supply chain

The authors study the well-known order quantity model in a three-player context, using a framework of newsboy problem. An expected average cost function of the chain by trading off inventory cost and shortage costs is formulated which is minimized to obtain optimal order sizes of the supplier, manufacturer and retailer. Our theoretical analysis of both cases; (i) when demand per unit time of each member of the chain is uncertain, (ii) when uncertain demand is distributed uniformly over finite time horizon; suggests the determining of optimal order sizes of the members so that the expected average channel cost is minimum. Numerical examples for different distributions are illustrated to justify our model.     

基于同时博弈和序贯博弈的寡头市场古诺均衡比较分析

根据国内外在古诺模型研究上的缺陷,分别从古诺假定、产品差异、成本差异以及非线性市场需求等方面对垄断市场结构中厂商之间同时博弈与序贯博弈两种情况的均衡状况进行比较分析,得出寡头垄断市场中厂商之间的均衡与产品质量、成本状况、市场需求以及博弈的顺序等因素有关的结论,从而为中国相关行业的决策提供理论依据。     

Segmentation of Rural Labour Contracts: Some Further Evidence

The paper offers an explanation of labour tying commonly observed in seasonally agricultural economies. Employers may either hire regular labourers in the slack season to satisfy all or most of the labour demand in the high season but have underutilised labour in the low–demand season or rely on casual labourers only. Thus farmers hiring regular labour may also hire some casual labour as and when needed to minimise the hoarding costs of regular labour. Secondly, daily regular wages are usually lower than daily casual wages, but regular labourers usually get some wage–advance as well. Thus asset–poor workers have incentives to choose regular labour with interest–free wage advance because they face high marginal costs of credit in the segmented credit markets. The optimum hoarding costs decrease with increase in farm size, but increase with increase in spot market wages. However with improved availability of alternative employment opportunities and/or cheaper credit facilities to the asset–poor labourers, the supply of regular labour is likely to decline. Empirical evidence from the ICRISAT villages in south India seems to be consistent with the primary propositions of the model.     

Alternative Specifications of the Institutional Constraints to Economic Growth - Or Why is there a Shortage of Electronic Engineers and Computer Scientists in Sweden?

There is a shortage of engineers and scientists, in particular, electronic engineers and computer scientists, in Sweden. This shortage is argued to be one factor behind the structural weakness of Swedish industry in the 'high tech' area. The conventional explanation of the imbalance in the supply and demand for electronic engineers and computer scientists is focused on the incentives for the individual to demand higher education. These are argued to be low due to the relatively equal income distribution in Sweden and to high taxation. We find that the evidence given in support of this specification of the institutional problem is not convincing. Instead, we specify the institutional problem as having been a lack of opportunities to study electronics and computer science. With recent institutional changes in higher education, this problem is currently being tackled. Looking ahead, we see a new institutional problem emerging with a distinct gender bias. In order to increase the number of degrees awarded in electronics and computer science further, we will need to raise the interest of women in science and technology studies. This requires major institutional changes with regard to both the form and content of the educational programmes.     

The projected costs and benefits of water diversion from and to the Sultan Marshes (Turkey)

The Sultan Marshes in the Develi Basin, Anatolia, one of twelve internationally important wetlands of Turkey, have been severely affected by the construction of an irrigation project in 1988. Intensive use of surface and ground water in irrigation has caused more than a 1 m decline in water levels and has affected the wetlands' ecological characteristics. Previous studies indicate that Sultan Marshes will need more water to restore viable ecological conditions. In this study, we analyze how economic benefits from agriculture and wetlands would be affected if moderate amounts of water were diverted from agriculture back to wetlands in the Develi Basin. By estimating total and marginal costs and benefits associated with water diversions, we determined the optimum or economically-efficient amount of water diversion. When only direct-use values of the wetland (animal grazing, plant harvesting, and ecotourism) were included in the analysis, the optimum amount of water diversion to the wetlands was found to be 5.2 million m³ year^− 1 (165 L sec^− 1), which compares to about 62 million m³ year^− 1 (1,957 L sec^− 1) used in irrigation. When wastewater treatment benefits (an indirect-use value) were added, the optimum amount rose to 7 million m³ year^− 1. Overall, the analysis showed that water diversion from agriculture to the Sultan Marshes is economically preferable.     

A Note on Emissions Taxes and Incomplete Information

In contrast with what we perceive is the conventional wisdom about setting a second-best emissions tax to control a uniformly mixed pollutant under uncertainty, we demonstrate that setting a uniform tax equal to expected marginal damage is not generally efficient under incomplete information about firms’ abatement costs and damages from pollution. We show that efficient taxes will deviate from expected marginal damage if marginal damage is increasing and there is uncertainty about the slopes of the marginal abatement costs of regulated firms. Moreover, tax rates will vary across firms if a regulator can use observable firm-level characteristics to gain some information about how the firms’ marginal abatement costs vary.     

Entry Invitations in a Market with Network Effects

Abstract

This paper reinvestigates the well-known claim by Economides (1996) that the network effects can lead a monopolist to give away its technology for free. This so-called ‘open’ strategy is likely to be adopted when marginal network effects are strong but not too strong relative to marginal price effects. Highly elastic demand and highly convex costs also increase the likelihood of such a strategy. I first study the case in which the post-entry market structure is of the Cournot type and later compare the results with the Stackelberg case.     

Commitment and price competition in a dynamic differentiated-product duopoly

This paper characterizes linear Markov-perfect equilibrium in a duopolistic environment where firms engage in dynamic price competition. Firms have constant (but potentially different) marginal costs and produce differentiated products. We show that, for the case of linear demand, dynamically stable Markov-perfect equilibrium prices are strictly higher than one-shot Nash equilibrium prices, but lower than fully collusive (monopoly) prices. We provide closed-form solutions for the Markov-perfect equilibrium prices which, in principle, can be estimated given data on firm demand and costs. Our results suggest that static two-stage models of price commitment are on reasonably solid ground in that they might be viewed as a reduced form for more complicated dynamic models.     

水资源承载力分析及可持续发展对策探讨——以山西为例

山西水资源总量低,水资源短缺问题已成为制约全省经济、社会发展的硬约束.立足本省水资源开发利用现状,从供需平衡的角度,对未来山西水资源承载力进行定量测算,揭示有限水资源与人口、环境和经济发展的关系,提出实现水资源可持续开发利用的建议.     

An Estimable Model of Supermarket Behavior: Prices, Distribution Services and Some Effects of Competition

In this paper we present and estimate a simple model of supermarket behavior that has several attractive properties: It permits the incorporation of the (distribution) services provided by a supermarket as an output of supermarkets and a determinant of demand for supermarket products; it generates, as a special case, one of its main competitors in the supermarket literature – the so called full price model of services; and, it can be estimated with a unique data set originally constructed by the Economic Research Service of USDA. The main results of the analysis are three. First, the aggregate demand for a supermarket's products depends critically on distribution services: at the substantive level, a 1% increase in these services increase quantity demanded by 0.4%; at the methodological level, the restrictions on the parameter values implied by the model are critical in the evaluation of functional forms for demand. Second, supermarkets exhibit constant marginal costs with respect to the quantity of output or turnover and substantially declining marginal costs with respect to (distribution) services, which implies substantial multiproduct economies of scale. Third, in response to an exogenous increase in competition those supermarkets that have adopted newer formats such as superstores and that employ newer technology such as optical scanners choose prices and (distribution ) services in ways that increase consumer welfare, whereas those that do not have these characteristics choose prices and services in ways that lower consumer welfare.     

Prices and Deadweight Loss in Multiproduct Monopoly

The paper investigates prices and deadweight loss in multiproduct monopoly with linear interrelated demand and constant marginal costs. We show that, with commonly used models for linear demand such as the Bowley demand and vertically or horizontally differentiated demand, the price for each good is independent of demand cross‐effects and of the characteristics and number of other goods. This contrasts with the oft‐expressed view that prices critically depend on demand cross‐effects. We also show that for these linear models, the deadweight loss due to monopoly amounts to half the total monopoly profit. Finally, we show how a production subsidy might restore social efficiency.