从金融视角审视中国传统农地产权及地权交易

明清以来,我国农地具有明确的产权制度,独立而多层次的产权,复杂多样的产权交易形式,促进了土地的流动,这为农户根据自身状况合理配置劳动、土地和资本打下了基础,促进了资源的有效配置。从金融视角审视我国明清的土地市场其实是一个集债券市场、股票市场、衍生品市场和信贷市场在内的复杂的金融市场,但由于历史的局限没有发展成为真正意义上的金融市场,其中因素还有待研究。同时,历史上出现过的衣地产权制度和交易形式为我们当今的土地改革提供了重要的借鉴意义。     

Courts and contract enforcement in transition agriculture: theory and evidence from Poland

The paper investigates theoretically and empirically the role of courts for contract enforcement in transition agriculture. In a survey of 306 Polish farmers conducted in 1999, only 38.5% respondents reported to believe that they could use courts to enforce contracts with their most important customer. Furthermore, those who believed the legal system could be used would accept significant financial losses before taking action. We develop a theoretical model, based on the costs and benefits of court enforcement, which captures the boundary between contracts to be regarded as 'enforceable' and 'not-enforceable' and, simultaneously, the threshold of taking legal action. The empirical analysis strongly supports our model: (1) the farmers' responses can be explained by cost-benefit calculations regarding the use of courts, (2) the legal 'enforceability' of contracts depends not only on the efficiency of the legal system but also on the attributes of the transaction, the contracts and the relationship between buyer and seller and (3) the threshold of taking legal action is significantly influenced by indirect costs of court enforcement, such as the disruption of a valuable business relationship, and by the availability of alternative enforcement mechanisms.     

Maps as Coasian coordination tools: Heritage conservation and map representation

This paper is an original attempt to apply transaction cost reasoning to interpret map representation as a Coasian organizational coordination tool, the essence of Coase’s (1937) theory of the firm, in modern active heritage conservation planning by the state as a firm. It is argued that maps, which have been used by voluntary organizations to promote their causes in heritage conservation, is pivotal in reducing transaction costs of heritage identification, grading and planning, by non-market means, in contrast to the case of commercial dealings in small artifacts and relics. Two Hong Kong examples of heritage conservation by NGO mapping, one backed by government and the other recipient of a UNESCO Asia-Pacific award, are used to demonstrate this proposition in terms of twelve functions maps can serve in organisational coordination.     

Assessing Market Efficiency

Abstract

Government regulations through import licensing and “seasonal calendars” entail large transaction costs for traders operating in the fruit and vegetable wholesale market in Oman. Monitoring and enforcing these market regulations increase search costs and reduce market efficiency. The objective of this study is to develop a methodology to categorize and measure transactions costs by analyzing traders perceptions and attitude toward regulatory measures, and other market activities. Results show that importers operating at Al-Mawaleh market face the highest level of transaction costs. The changing nature of import calendar as well as the import license procedure represents significant elements of uncertainty that rise the importers' search and monitoring costs. It is suggested that the conversion of these non-tariff barriers into tariffs along WTO rules would reduce market uncertainty and increase market efficiency.     

Implementing EU co-financed agri-environmental schemes: Effects on administrative transaction costs in a regional grassland extensification scheme

Implementing agri-environmental schemes that are co-financed by the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union require administrative compliance with several regulations. This affects the magnitude and composition of transaction costs incurred by agricultural administrations in terms of working time spent. Distinguishing between scheme-related tasks to achieve the environmental goals of the scheme and tasks necessary to obtain the EU reimbursement, this study investigates a possible trade-off in working time allocation with the help of a multi-task principal-agent conceptual framework. Agricultural county administrations of the German state of Hesse serve as case study. Results show that the highly specified reimbursement-related tasks require most of the administrations’ working time. However, several factors exist that enhance the provision of scheme-related tasks, foremost a higher share of professional farmers in the county and a certain level of staffing. Nonetheless, the study also reveals that part of the EU-related monitoring effort is fixed and thus increases per contract costs in counties with fewer participants. The findings suggest balancing the particular incentives to perform the required tasks. This is important as more standardised compliance duties are expected for the new funding period 2014–2020.     

Situating community forestry enterprises within New Institutional Economic theory: What are the implications for their organization?

Community forestry enterprises (CFEs) have gained considerable traction with rural development and forestry practitioners as models for community development, poverty alleviation, and conservation. This paper uses New Institutional Economic theory to identify the key organizational features and potential inherent weaknesses of CFEs. NIE theory focuses on arguments of economic efficiency, specifically transaction cost reductions that serve as incentives for collective action by groups of owners. Examples are given to show how the organization of CFEs reduced transaction costs stemming from interactions with industrial loggers and service providers. However, the creation of these community enterprises goes beyond simple transaction cost reductions and economic justifications. Additional unquantifiable benefits, such as self-determination, control over resources that communities have historically used, application of acquired skills, political representation, and application of acquired skills to name a few, are also secured through community ownership. These benefits however do not come without a cost. As enterprises where ownership rights are incomplete or ill-defined and which do not operate with the incentives of investor-owned firms, CFEs have little to no initial capital pool and experience considerable investment limitations due to limited wealth, horizon problems, and unsolved issues with moral hazard vis-à-vis banks. CFEs also face important management and collective decision-making challenges. In spite of their institutional weaknesses, it is apparent that many societies have decided that the benefits of community ownership far outweigh their ownership costs. State intervention and policy have played an important role in building the necessary supportive framework for the development of these enterprises. NIE as a dominant model for understanding alternative entrepreneurial forms was useful for identifying some important aspects of CFEs that, in a profit-driven economy, can constitute weaknesses that place them at a disadvantage with investor-owned firms. This analysis informs where policy should be targeted if CFEs are to be supported and fostered.     

Financial Structure of Farm Businesses Under Imperfect Capital Markets

Recent finance studies have considered whether gaps between a firm's costs of internal and external sources of investment funds, arising from capital market imperfections, influence its investment behavior and funding preferences. This study tests the applicability of the pecking order and partial adjustment theories of financial structure to farm businesses by fitting a set of simultaneous financial equations with farm panel data from Illinois. Model results indicate that Illinois farms adjust to long-run financial targets for equity, debt, and leasing, but that additional financing needs follow a pecking order that is stronger for farms with greater asymmetric information problems.