FINANCIAL CRISES AND INTERNATIONAL STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY TRANSMISSION

This paper examines the interplay between stock market returns and their volatility, focusing on the Asian and global financial crises of 1997–98 and 2008–09 for Australia, Singapore, the UK, and the US. We use a multivariate generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (MGARCH) model and weekly data (January 1992–June 2009). Based on the results obtained from the mean return equations, we could not find any significant impact on returns arising from the Asian crisis and more recent global financial crises across these four markets. However, both crises significantly increased the stock return volatilities across all of the four markets. Not surprisingly, it is also found that the US stock market is the most crucial market impacting on the volatilities of smaller economies such as Australia. Our results provide evidence of own and cross ARCH and GARCH effects among all four markets, suggesting the existence of significant volatility and cross volatility spillovers across all four markets. A high degree of time‐varying co‐volatility among these markets indicates that investors will be highly unlikely to benefit from diversifying their financial portfolio by acquiring stocks within these four countries only.     

Asian Currency Crisis and the International Monetary Fund, 10 Years Later: Overview*

This paper is an overview of the Asian currency crisis in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea in 1997–1998, with an emphasis on the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It provides a detailed account of the development of the crisis and analyses and evaluates the content of IMF advice and its consequences. The size of the IMF package for each of these three countries is judged to have been too small. This paper also has a comparative perspective; the Mexican crisis is reviewed as a precursor to the Asian crisis to see what the IMF learned, and how it prepared, for future crises. The causes of the crises and IMF conditionality for the post‐Asian crisis countries, Russia, Brazil, Turkey, and Argentina, are also compared to the Asian crisis countries. By agreeing to maintain a fixed exchange rate, for example, the IMF is judged to have been “softer” in its approach to the post‐Asian crisis countries.     

Regional Integration in East Asia: Achievements and Future Prospects

Economic integration in East Asia has been largely market driven. Attempts in the late 1980s to establish an East Asian regional economic grouping failed to materialize for a number of reasons. The financial crisis in 1997–1998 has strengthened the realization of regional countries that they need to have some self‐help mechanisms to overcome that crisis and to prevent future crises. This led to the development of several functional integration programs, including the network of bilateral swap arrangements known as the Chiang Mai Initiative. However, progress remains slow. The question that has arisen is how far these efforts need to be supported by institutional integration. Should the ASEAN Plus Three, the main regional cooperation process in East Asia involving the 10 South‐East Asian countries plus China, Japan, and South Korea, be deepened institutionally? Meanwhile, the region has seen the establishment of a new process, the East Asia Summit, involving the above 13 countries plus Australia, India, and New Zealand. How will these different arrangements contribute to East Asia's economic dynamism and prosperity as well as peace and political stability?     

Credit in Times of Stress: Lessons from Latin America during the Global Financial Crisis

The 2008–2009 global financial crisis disrupted the provision of credit in Latin America less than in previous crises. This paper tests whether specific characteristics at both the bank and country levels at the onset of the global crisis contributed to the behavior of real credit growth in this region during the crisis. As shown, financial soundness characteristics of Latin American banks, such as capitalization, liquidity, and bank efficiency in the pre‐crisis period, played a role in explaining the dynamics of real credit during the crisis. We also found that foreign banks and banks that had expanded credit growth more before the crisis were also those that cut credit the most. Among country‐specific characteristics, we found evidence that balance sheet measures such as the economy's overall currency mismatches and external debt ratios (measuring either total debt or short‐term debt) were key variables in explaining credit growth resilience.     

THE POST‐ASIAN CRISIS DROP IN INVESTMENT: THE CASES OF INDONESIA,KOREA, MALAYSIA,AND THAILAND

This study analyzes drops in East Asian investment and their determinants after the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis. We first employ a random level‐shift autoregressive model to quantify the shift in investment ratios of four Asian economies hit by the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. We trace the major historical shifts in the levels of investment ratios and we find that the cumulated downward shifts in investment ratios during 1997–1998 for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand are 6, 5, 14, and 14 percentage points, respectively. The investment ratios of most countries experienced several rebounds between 1999 and 2001, but the rebounds were too small to bring investment ratios back to their pre‐1990 levels. Having identified the episodes of investment shifts, the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) and several robust tests are employed to investigate the determinants of those level shifts in investment ratios. We find that real per capita gross domestic product growth and banking crises are the two most important factors contributing to shifts in the investment levels of these four crisis‐hit Asian economies. The results are useful in understanding the causes and remedies of global imbalances. (JEL C11, E22, F32, O53)     

Once Bitten: The Effect of IMF Programs on Subsequent Reserve Behavior

Traditional models have encountered problems in explaining the accumulation of international reserves, particularly in Asia, in the period since the late 1990s. One suggestion has been that countries have sought to self‐insure against future crises, either because of a perceived increase in the cost of crises or because of the perceived conditionality costs of using IMF credits. This paper offers an empirical investigation of these ideas, disaggregating across regions and across IMF facilities. We find that IMF programs have had a significant positive effect on subsequent reserve accumulation, allowing for other determinants, and that this effect endures over time. We also find that the effect differs between Latin America and Asia, and that it is not simply a phenomenon that is associated with the Asian crisis of 1997/98. The paper goes on to discuss the implications for the design of policy and for the reform of the IMF.     

外商直接投资与东亚金融危机——一个新的分析视角

关于东亚金融危机爆发原因的研究很多。但是大多数研究没有注意到FDI的大量流入对于东亚国家爆发金融危机的影响。虽然FDI没有直接引起金融危机的爆发,但是它确实对危机国家经济脆弱性的形成发挥了作用。FDI给东道国带来的金融风险往往是潜在的,如果不能有效监管,这种潜在金融风险就有转化成现实金融风险的可能。所以,一味提高FDI的引资比重并不能使发展中国家摆脱金融危机的侵扰,发展中国家有必要加强对FDI的监管。     

“两次金融危机”产生的原因与影响及对中国经济发展的启迪

分析1997年"亚洲金融危机"和2007年"世界金融危机"产生的原因及其异同点与"两次金融危机"对世界及其中国经济发展的影响.在此基础上,探讨"两次金融危机"对中国经济发展的启迪,为中国在今后经济发展中防范和应对金融危机提供科学依据.     

Fundamentals and Sovereign Risk of Emerging Markets

We empirically assess the relative importance of various economic fundamentals in accounting for the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads of emerging markets during 2004–2012, which encompasses the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. Inflation, state fragility, external debt and commodity terms of trade volatility were positively associated, while trade openness and a more favourable fiscal balance/GDP ratio were negatively associated with sovereign CDS spreads. Yet the relative importance of economic fundamentals in the pricing of sovereign risk varies over time. The key factors are trade openness and state fragility in the pre‐crisis period, the external debt/GDP ratio and inflation in the crisis period, and inflation and the public debt/GDP ratio in the post‐crisis period. Asian countries enjoy lower sovereign spreads than Latin American countries, and this gap widened during and after the crisis. Trade openness was the biggest factor behind Asia's lower sovereign spreads before the crisis, and inflation during and after the crisis. The results imply that external factors were paramount in pricing sovereign risk prior to the crisis, but internal factors associated with the capacity to adjust to adverse shocks gained prominence during and after the crisis.     

国际产业转移与危机冲击的关系研究

通过纵向比较分析认为:二战后的前三次全球性产业大转移,与之相对应的分别是50年代的冷战、60年代的美元危机、70年代的石油危机,最近的一次产业转移亦有亚洲金融危机的影子。因此,国际产业转移的根本动因是世界生产力的发展和国际分工的深化,但危机作为一个外部性因素,始终伴随全球性产业转移的全过程。由美国次贷危机所引发的新一轮国际金融危机和世界经济波动,亦可能带动新一轮产业转移。有鉴于此,我国需要做好承接新一轮国际产业转移的准备工作。     

Interdependence or contagion: A model switching approach with a focus on Latin America

Empirical research analysing contagion has become increasingly fragmented. Different definitions of contagion have resulted in different methods being deployed to analyse financial transmission channels. This paper devises a novel econometric strategy where the nature of interdependencies, magnitude of interdependencies and transmission channels selected for inclusion can change over time. We thus appeal to multiple definitions of contagion, distinguishing between: interdependence, contagion through interdependence and abrupt contagion through changing linkages. Using our approach we analyse different crisis episodes in Latin America. Results generally indicate interdependence not contagion during the currency crises of the 1990s and Argentine crisis of 1998–2002. During the global financial crisis, results indicate abrupt contagion from the US to Argentina and Brazil. Mexico, however, experiences contagion through existing interdependencies with the US. Results also show that macroeconomic and uncertainty channels play a role during different crises not just financial channels. By establishing whether or not different interdependencies and transmission channels are present during different crises our model switching approach provides new insights.     

CRISES AND GOVERNMENT: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

We examine a panel of 70 countries during 1966–2010 and utilize Reinhart and Rogoff crisis dates to estimate the effects of crises on the size and scope of government over both 5‐year and 10‐year horizons. We also estimate cross‐section regressions using 40‐year (1970–2010) changes in government variables. In general, the estimated effects of crises on government size/scope are statistically insignificant. We report reasonably robust evidence that inflation and currency crises lead to decreases in the extent of government regulations throughout an economy over a 10‐year horizon. Also, over the 40‐year period, countries that spent more years in crisis are associated with weaker legal systems and property rights. The size and scope of government appear to be persistent to the extent that even crisis episodes fail to leave a significant mark upon them. A notable exception may be that, over 40‐year periods, countries that spend more years in crisis are associated with weaker legal systems and property rights. (JEL E02, O11, O43)     

Banking Sector Performance in Latin America: Market Power versus Efficiency

Since the mid‐1990s the banking sector in the Latin American emerging markets has experienced profound changes due to financial liberalization, a significant increase in foreign investments, and greater merger activities often occurring following financial crises. The wave of consolidation and the rapid increase in market concentration that took place in most countries has generated concerns about the rise in banks' market power and its potential effects on consumers. This paper advances the existing literature by testing the market power (Structure–Conduct–Performance and Relative Market Power) and efficient structure (X‐ and scale efficiency) hypotheses for a sample of over 2500 bank observations in nine Latin American countries over 1997–2005. We use the Data Envelopment Analysis technique to obtain reliable efficiency measures. We produce evidence supporting the efficient structure hypotheses. The findings are particularly robust for the largest banking markets in the region, namely Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. Finally, capital ratios and bank size seem to be among the most important factors in explaining higher than normal profits for Latin American banks.     

The Vulnerability of ASEAN+3 Countries to International Financial Crises

This article focuses on the reaction of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) economies to international financial shocks. The crises in emerging markets at the end of the last century underlined the significant vulnerability of the emerging ASEAN economies to international financial fluctuations and a lack of sustainability in their exchange rate regime. A structural VAR model is used to analyze the efficiency of the measures adopted by these countries after this episode of crisis in order to protect their economies against speculative attacks. The results reveal that the impact of the recent subprime crisis on emerging ASEAN countries is less significant than that observed in industrialized ones.     

Balance Sheet Effects, Growth, and Crises

This paper addresses two questions: are currency crises predicted by increases in a central bank’s external and contingent liabilities relative to assets, and do these “balance sheet effects” generate persistent output losses following a crisis? I find empirical evidence that the answer to both questions is yes. I use data on stocks of gross external assets and liabilities for 167 countries over 1973–2003, in an unbalanced panel probit regression to obtain robust estimates of the probability and determinants of a post‐crisis recession. Several single and simultaneous equation specifications support the idea that the output cost of a currency crisis depends on its transmission mechanism. Specifically, a recession is likely to be severe if it is preceded by a crisis that works its way through the financial sector. In addition, the results show that measures of contingent liabilities, capital flight, and lack of financial depth are significant predictors of costly crises.     

Indonesia After the Asian Crisis*

Indonesia was deeply affected by the 1997–1998 crisis, more so than its East Asian neighbors. Its economic contraction was deeper and more prolonged. It was the only one to experience a (temporary) loss of macroeconomic control. It also suffered “twin crises,” in the sense that its serious economic and financial problems were accompanied by regime collapse. Consequently, recovery was a slow and complex process, as new institutions had to be created, and old ones reformed under successive short‐lived administrations. But this process is largely over. The directly elected president with a strong popular mandate is in power. The new institutional framework for economic policy‐making is in place. Macroeconomic stability has been restored. Although growth has yet to return to pre‐crisis levels, by 2004 per capita income and poverty incidence had recovered to levels prevailing in the mid‐1990s, and in the circumstances economic recovery has arguably proceeded about as quickly as could reasonably have been expected.     

Political Regimes and Currency Crises

This paper examines the relationship between political regime type and currency crises. Some theories suggest that democratic regimes, owing to their greater political transparency and larger number of veto players, should have a lower risk of currency crisis than dictatorships. Alternative arguments emphasize the advantages of political insulation and rulers with long time horizons, and imply that crises should be most likely in democracies and least common in monarchic dictatorships. We evaluate these competing arguments across four types of political regimes using a time‐series cross‐sectional dataset that covers 178 countries between 1973 and 2009. Our findings suggest that the risk of currency crisis is substantially lower in monarchies than in democracies and other types of dictatorship. Further analyses indicate that the adoption of prudent financial policies largely account for this robust negative association between monarchies and the probability of currency crises. This suggests that political regimes strongly influence financial stability, and perverse political incentives help explain why currency crises are so common.     

发展中国家金融化与中国的抵御探索

本文尝试在发展模式与外部经济依赖性相互作用的分析框架内来分析中国经济从抵御金融化到出现金融化趋势的过程。本文认为发展中国家金融化和频繁的债务金融危机源自本国发展模式与外部经济依赖性相互作用下金融扩张与生产性积累的背离。对于中国而言,在政府有效的产业政策和渐进的金融政策引导下形成的工业化主导的发展模式,能够不断解决经济发展矛盾,同时完备的工业体系和谨慎的金融开放政策减轻了中国对世界经济体系的依赖,使其得以抵御金融化和危机。但2008年全球金融危机后,中国发展模式面临新的矛盾并且对外部经济依赖性逐渐增强,出现了经济金融化的趋势,将对中国经济和金融体系的稳定性带来巨大的挑战。中国政府已经意识到金融化风险,在近年来出台了一系列政策,以期引导资金“脱虚向实”,并取得了一些成效,但金融化风险尚未根除,中国经济未来的发展仍需要政府制定行之有效的政策积极引导金融和实体经济的协调发展。     

The Asian Currency Crises: Vulnerability, Contagion, or Unsustainability

The Asian currency crises have been introduced by many economists as evidence that almost any country could be vulnerable to speculative attacks and to contagion effects, even with apparently good economic fundamentals. These financial crises have also been interpreted by other economists as rational market reactions to the unsustainability of domestic macroeconomic policies or structural weaknesses. The objective of this paper is to evaluate the relative importance of macroeconomic unsustainability, financial vulnerability, and crisis contagion in a model that explains and predicts the Asian currency crises. Out-of-sample forecasts based on two-stage panel and logit regressions provide evidence of a pure contagion effect, which significantly worsened the crises. They also show that Indonesia was the only one of the six Asian nations examined (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand) that was in an unsustainable economic situation, and that the other five nations were only vulnerable to a currency crisis.     

Asian economic success and Latin American failure in the 1980s: new analyses and future policy implications

A striking feature of the world economy during the last decade has been the collapse of economic growth in Latin America whilst industrialization and development have proceeded apace in the Asian countries. This paper, firstly, reviews and assesses alternative hypotheses concerning Asian economic success and the Latin American failure during the 1980s. Secondly, it examines the related question of the long-term development strategies followed by the outstandingly successful east Asian economies. The paper arrives at rather different analyses and policy conclusions on these issues from those of the international financial institutions and the mainstream economists.