关于卢梭构建的人的自然状态的初始特质探索

卢梭在《论人类不平等的起源和基础》一文的第一部分想象并构建了一个孤独的野蛮人,其实就是对人的自然状态的探索,研究人的本性和自然状态的起点既是设定一套可以衡量人之所以为人的初始特质,也可称为人性的“零点”.卢梭在该文中构建的自然状态区别于从进化论角度构建原始人类,他通过想象构建了一个生理上是动物,精神活动上也趋同于动物的抽象概念.卢梭在这样一个“动物”身上去掉了一些动物群体中引起不平等的特征,同时加上了一些区别于动物的、可以获得上升到“人”的特质.这一思想得到伏尔泰、黑格尔等诸多思想大家的评判,也是学术研究的一个争论点.本文将从国内选取几篇具有代表性的研究卢梭思想中人的自然状态的文章进行综述并对人的初始特质界定原则进行探索研究.     

卢梭教育思想的内涵

爱弥尔诞生两百多年以来,有关卢梭教育思想的讨论从未停止过.卢梭崇尚自然的教育思想,赋予主人公爱弥尔幸福的童年、健康的体魄、健全的人格等为人欣羡的人生财富.他对教育的态度与毕生追求平等、自由的主张保持一致,尽管受到其所处历史阶段的限制,对一些问题的考虑存在缺陷或不符合现代社会的发展需求,但是他对人类教育事业的启示作用经久不衰.呼唤爱弥尔,期待最好的教育.     

试论康德哲学中卢梭道德思想的再现

在古希腊时期,人类早期的哲学思想家就提出了"人是什么?"的著名哲学命题,但在众多探讨人这个重要命题的哲学思想家中,卢梭与康德是最突出的两位:一位是法国大革命时期思想的先驱者,一位是德国古典哲学的开创者;他们都以思想敏锐、见解睿智、分析深刻而著称。细细研读他们的思想,不难发现在二者之间存在着明显的联系。考察他们的哲学思想,可以发现康德哲学中有卢梭思想的再现,从求同存异中不难理解康德批判哲学体系最后所要建构解决的"人是什么?"的终极目标。     

论卢梭的自然主义教育观

让·雅克·卢梭是18世纪法国伟大的政治家、哲学家、自然主义教育思想的创始者以及现代发展心理学的先驱，他提出了“教育要适应儿童天性的发展，以培养自然人为目的”的自然主义教育观，这一观点有力地针砭了当时教育界存在的问题。卢梭的教育思想有极其丰富的现代价值。     

《公孙龙子·名实论》疏解

在＂名即概念＂的传统研究范式中,被称之为公孙龙思想奠基之作的《名实论》,也遭到了曲解与误读。因此,重新疏解《名实论》,对于恢复公孙龙思想的本来面目,重新认识和评价公孙龙思想乃至整个中国古代名学,具有重要的基础性作用。     

论亚当·斯密对中国的研究

亚当·斯密为了建立一个关于市场经济的经济学体系 ,在他的经济学著作《国富论》中考察了当时世界上的主要国家 ,中国是他的重要研究对象之一 ,对他的经济思想有着重要影响。斯密为什么要研究中国 ?这一研究对他的思想有什么影响 ?对这一研究应如何评价 ?作者以为研究这一问题对于更准确地把握斯密及其经济思想是有意义的 ,因此根据《国富论》 ,结合十八世纪中国的实际对这一研究进行了分析。然而作者的主要结论却是斯密对中国的研究符合其整体理论需要 ,但并不符合当时中国的实际     

卢梭和他的“血手”

从卢梭这个蛰伏着的躯壳中伸出来的两只血淋淋的螯夹就是罗伯斯庇尔和康德。他们两人一个在政治领域中把令人敬畏的国王押上了断头台,另一个在思想领域中把令人敬畏的上帝送上了绞刑架。     

史华兹小传

本期的“专题”推出“著名中国研究大师史华兹纪念专辑”。史华兹对思想世界的敏锐洞察力,为西方学界开拓了探究中国思想史一条新途径,也为中国的史学家提供了不同文化背景下的思想经验。 我们纪念他,不仅是他对中国研究所作出的贡献,也在于他的高尚品格。“没有任何论文可以替代对他本人的了解,因为在高超的水平和典范的方式上,他的为学与德性合二为一。”     

王阳明《春秋》学思想初探

现代学者对于王阳明解读儒家经典的著作的研究较少,尤其缺乏对王阳明《春秋》学思想的研究。王阳明虽然在《春秋》学方面上的文字著述较少,但是从他的弟子在文集中记录的《春秋》学论断出发,可以发现他的《春秋》学思想是对宋代《春秋》学家胡安国思想的继承和发挥,看到王阳明如何从心学的维度上确定《春秋》的经传关系,进而厘定王阳明《春秋》学思想在其心学体系中的重要地位。     

误读与歧见之间——评黄克武对史华兹严复研究的质疑

已故哈佛大学中国思想史家本@史华兹教授于1964年发表<寻求富强严复与西方>一书,一直被认为是这一领域的经典之作.1998年黄克武先生就其中主要论点(包括有关寻求国家富强与理解个人自由之关系,中西文化交遇,严复的定位等论点)提出质疑.本文认为黄氏质疑实为歧见与误读的纠结,并就本文认为误读之处力求作出较详细分疏.本文旨在说明,学术争论乃艰苦功夫,误读难免,对史氏尤然,吾人只能谨慎从事.     

Smith and Rousseau on envy in commercial societies

Abstract

Several works emphasise the similarities between Rousseau and Smith's analysis of self-interest. We will show, along the lines of Le Jalle, that these similarities end on a divergent appreciation of the importance of envy in commercial societies for, contrary to Rousseau, Smith did not consider envy to be a major threat in commercial societies. Part 1 presents their quite similar definitions of envy based on three characteristics: envy comes from a disadvantageous comparison with others; it is painful and malevolent. Part 2, then, studies their moral psychology, or the way they understand the relationship between sympathy and pity on the one hand, and comparison and envy on the other. Here, we identify significant differences between our two philosophers which might explain why they have opposing views on the predominance of envy in commercial societies and on the issue of inequalities of wealth as we show in Part 3. Rousseau thinks that envy increases with wealth and inequality and thus pervades commercial societies, while Smith sees envy as the exception rather than the rule, and, moreover, does not provide a historical genesis for envy. For Smith, it is emulation rather than envy which is the driving force of the progress of society.     

The political opposition of Rousseau to Physiocracy: government,interest, citizenship

Abstract

Rousseau's relation to the Physiocrats has long been described as a “missed encounter” of which the Rousseau's letter to Mirabeau would serve as evidence. In opposition to this statement, I show in this article that this letter may offer a reliable prism which sheds light on Rousseau's meaningful opposition to physiocratic views. This opposition can be analyzed along three distinct conceptual lines, each interesting in its own right, and with regard to the birth of our political modernity. These are the theory of government, the definition of interest, and the interaction between public opinion and the formation of citizenship.     

It is Hobbes, not Rousseau: an experiment on voting and redistribution

We perform an experiment which provides a laboratory replica of some important features of the welfare state. In the experiment, all individuals in a group decide whether to make a costly effort, which produces a random (independent) outcome for each one of them. The group members then vote on whether to redistribute the resulting and commonly known total sum of earnings equally amongst themselves. This game has two equilibria, if played once. In one of them, all players make effort and there is little redistribution. In the other one, there is no effort and nothing to redistribute. A solution to the repeated game allows for redistribution and high effort, sustained by the threat to revert to the worst of these equilibria. Our results show that redistribution with high effort is not sustainable. The main reason for the absence of redistribution is that rich agents do not act differently depending on whether the poor have worked hard or not. The equilibrium in which redistribution may be sustained by the threat of punishing the poor if they do not exert effort is not observed in the experiment. Thus, the explanation of the behavior of the subjects lies in Hobbes, not in Rousseau.