Abuses of patent monopoly: A legal appraisal

The patent monopoly is abused when the economic and social objectives of the patent system are jeopardized by the behaviour of the patentee. The monopoly could be abused by: Insufficient disclosure of the invention; lack of use or inadequate use of the patented invention; and abusive practices in licensing agreements. The paper considers the legal remedies towards controlling abuses with especial emphasis on the compulsory licensing system. It shows that the compulsory licensing remedy has proved to be unsatisfactory and that a thorough re-examination of the subject, at the national and international levels, is called for, bearing in mind the needs of developing countries.     

A note on Balassa's hypothesis

Atlantic Economic Journal -     

Dynamic consistency and monopoly

A wide variety of papers study the time consistency issues and commitment problems associated with imperfectly competitive durable goods manufacturers who sell their output. Using a simple two-period model the authors show that this sort of commitment problem may occur even if the monopolist produces non-durable output. The model assumes consumers maximize their utility through the choice of a non-durable consumption good and saving through an asset that provides future returns and consumption flow. The analysis indicates that non-durable goods manufacturers with market power will wish to announce future prices that are sub-optimal (dynamically inconsistent) when the period is reached due to the impact on consumers' wealth constraint and current purchasing behavior. Thus, the so-called durable-goods monopoly commitment problem may also occur in non-durable goods industries. The model suggests that any type of intertemporal linkage may lead to time consistency and commitment problems for imperfectly competitive firms.     

我国电力改革中的垄断问题分析

针对新一轮的电力体制改革中存在或将出现的电力垄断问题,文章从发电企业的规模、电力改革的发展阶段和电网三个方面进行了分析,并指出形成竞争性的发电市场、改造电网企业、互联电网和加强政府监管等用以解决垄断形成的对策。     

A note on black-white wage disparity

Conclusion The evidence in this article helps to explain the black-white earnings differential in 1970, six years after the passage of Fair Employment Legislation, in terms of traditional measures such as experience and education along with a public policy measure that has of late come under fire. And contrary to the notion that the gains from such government policy have not benefited the less fortunate workers but simply accrued only, or mainly, to upper- or middle-class blacks, the results presented here indicate that enforcement, such as it is, has had beneficial effects for black men and women in virtually all major occupational categories. When a distinction is made between the various major occupational categories, the importance of education and experience as factors that contribute toward explaining black-white earnings differentials is generally supported by this study. However, neither education nor experience shows a consistent explanatory power across occupational categories and especially across the sexes. For example, experience is more frequently found to be a significant factor for black men than it is for black women. Education, on the other hand, was found to have no statistically significant relationship with wage differentials in major blue-collar job categories for both men and women, thus lending some credence to the dual labor market thesis regarding returns to education. By far the factor we have found to be the most consistent with respect to its impact upon racial wage differentials for both men and women is the fair employment variable. Indeed, across major occupational groups the existence and enforcement of fair employment laws seems to have had, generally, a more significant effect on reducing racial wage differentials than each of the other independent variables.     

A critique of mises’s theory of monopoly prices

Conclusion Built on Rothbardian insights, our attempt to show the peculiarities of Misesian monopoly theory results in a few conclusions. First of all, in Mises’s theory of monopoly two of the three conditions for the emergence of monopoly prices belong to different realms of scientific inquiry. On the one hand, Mises points out the idea of a counterfactual comparison between competitive price and monopoly price; on the other hand, he stresses the importance of an empirical method to discover monopoly prices. The latter, even if it describes a true statement about market conditions, i.e., the entrepreneurs do not know (beforehand) the market demand curve, does not help us to identify the monopoly price on market. Second, Mises erroneously founds his welfare arguments on value theory. His utilitarian endeavor to show that “consumers’ sovereignty” is infringed by monopolistic restriction of production does not succeed. He based his arguments on nonscientific interpersonal and intertemporal comparisons of utility. Third, Mises is not consistent in the use of a standard of comparison for “monopoly prices”: on the one hand, the market prices are not distinguishable from “monopoly prices”; on the other hand, the transfer of the discussion to the equilibrium framework does not help us either, as we try to explain real market phenomena. Thus, Mises’s attempts to incorporate the neoclassical concept of monopoly price into the framework of the market process, as depicted by Austrians, do not succeed. Our inquiry supports the largely shared opinion among Austrian economists that monopoly price (at least in its present definition) does not exist on the free market; it appears only, and is logically identifiable, as a result of a privilege given by the State.