Financial globalization and monetary policy

Recent data show substantial increases in the size of gross external asset and liability positions. The implications of these developments for optimal conduct of monetary policy are analyzed in a standard open economy model which is augmented to allow for endogenous portfolio choice. The model shows that monetary policy takes on new importance due to its impact on nominal asset returns. Nevertheless, the case for price stability as an optimal monetary rule remains. In fact, it is reinforced. Even without nominal price rigidities, price stability is optimal because it enhances the risk sharing properties of nominal bonds.     

International dimensions of optimal monetary policy

This paper provides a baseline general equilibrium model of optimal monetary policy among interdependent economies with monopolistic firms and nominal rigidities. An inward-looking policy of domestic price stabilization is not optimal when firms’ markups are exposed to currency fluctuations. Such a policy raises exchange rate volatility, leading foreign exporters to charge higher prices vis-à-vis increased uncertainty in the export market. As higher import prices reduce the purchasing power of domestic consumers, optimal monetary rules trade off a larger domestic output gap against lower consumer prices. Optimal rules in a world Nash equilibrium lead to less exchange rate volatility relative to both inward-looking rules and discretionary policies, even when the latter do not suffer from any inflationary (or deflationary) bias. Gains from international monetary cooperation are related in a non-monotonic way to the degree of exchange rate pass-through.     

Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy with a Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates

I characterize optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a stochastic New Keynesian model when nominal interest rates may occasionally hit the zero lower bound. The benevolent policymaker controls the short‐term nominal interest rate and the level of government spending. Under discretionary policy, accounting for fiscal stabilization policy eliminates to a large extent the welfare losses associated with the presence of the zero bound. Under commitment, the gains associated with the use of the fiscal policy tool remain modest, even though fiscal stabilization policy is part of the optimal policy mix.     

Monetary conservatism and fiscal policy

Does an inflation conservative central bank à la Rogoff (1985) remain desirable in a setting with endogenous fiscal policy? To provide an answer we study monetary and fiscal policy games without commitment in a dynamic, stochastic sticky-price economy with monopolistic distortions. Monetary policy determines nominal interest rates and fiscal policy provides public goods generating private utility. We find that lack of fiscal commitment gives rise to excessive public spending. The optimal inflation rate internalizing this distortion is positive, but lack of monetary commitment generates too much inflation. A conservative monetary authority thus remains desirable. When fiscal policy is determined before monetary policy each period, the monetary authority should focus exclusively on stabilizing inflation. Monetary conservatism then eliminates the steady state biases associated with lack of monetary and fiscal commitment and leads to stabilization policy that is close to optimal.     

Optimal monetary policy with the cost channel

In the standard new Keynesian framework, an optimizing policy maker does not face a trade-off between stabilizing the inflation rate and stabilizing the gap between actual output and output under flexible prices. An ad hoc, exogenous cost-push shock is typically added to the inflation equation to generate a meaningful policy problem. In this paper, we show that a cost-push shock arises endogenously when a cost channel for monetary policy is introduced into the new Keynesian model. A cost channel is present when firms’ marginal cost depends directly on the nominal rate of interest. Besides providing empirical evidence for a cost channel, we explore its implications for optimal monetary policy. We show that its presence alters the optimal policy problem in important ways. For example, both the output gap and inflation are allowed to fluctuate in response to productivity and demand shocks under optimal monetary policy.     

Monetary shocks, the exchange rate, and the trade balance

This paper investigates the response of the exchange rate and the trade balance to monetary policy innovations for the US economy during the period 1973:01–1993:12. The empirical findings indicate that contractionary monetary policy shocks lead to transitory appreciations of the real and the nominal exchange rate. Exchange rate appreciations that are caused by a temporary contractionary shock to monetary policy are correlated with a short-lived improvement in the trade balance which is then followed by a deterioration, giving support to the J-curve hypothesis.     

The Interaction of Monetary and Macroprudential Policies

I analyze a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model where the financing of productive investment is affected by a moral hazard problem. I solve for jointly Ramsey‐optimal monetary and macroprudential policies. I find that when a financial friction is present in addition to the standard nominal friction, the optimal policy can replicate the first‐best allocation if the social planner can conduct both monetary and macroprudential policy. Using monetary policy alone is not enough: a policy trade‐off between stabilizing inflation and output gap emerges. When policy follows simple rules, the source of fluctuations is relevant for the choice of the appropriate policy mix.     

Durable Goods,Investment Shocks,and the Comovement Problem

Sticky‐price models suggest that capital investment shocks are an important driver of business cycle fluctuations. Despite quantitative importance in explaining business cycles, a comovement problem emerges because the shocks generate intertemporal substitution effects away from consumption toward investment. This paper resolves the problem by extending the standard sticky‐price model to a two‐sector model with consumer durable services. When durable goods are used as investment in capital and consumer durables, positive capital investment shocks also generate intratemporal substitution effects away from consumer durable services toward nondurable consumption that dominates intertemporal effects. Consequently, consumption increases, and the comovement problem is resolved.     

Expenditure switching versus real exchange rate stabilization: Competing objectives for exchange rate policy

This paper develops a view of exchange rate policy as a trade-off between the desire to smooth fluctuations in real exchange rates so as to reduce distortions in consumption allocations, and the need to allow flexibility in the nominal exchange rate so as to facilitate terms of trade adjustment. We show that optimal nominal exchange rate volatility will reflect these competing objectives. The key determinants of how much the exchange rate should respond to shocks will depend on the extent and source of price stickiness, the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, and the amount of home bias in production. Quantitatively, we find the optimal exchange rate volatility should be significantly less than would be inferred based solely on terms of trade considerations. Moreover, we find that the relationship between price stickiness and optimal exchange rate volatility may be non-monotonic.     

Implications of habit formation for optimal monetary policy

We study the implications for optimal monetary policy of introducing habit formation in consumption into a general equilibrium model with sticky prices. Habit formation affects the model's endogenous dynamics through its effects on both aggregate demand and households’ supply of output. We show that the objective of monetary policy consistent with welfare maximization includes output stabilization, as well as inflation and output gap stabilization. We find that the variance of output increases under optimal policy, even though it acquires a higher implicit weight in the welfare function. We also find that a simple interest rate rule nearly achieves the welfare-optimal allocation, regardless of the degree of habit formation. In this rule, the optimal responses to inflation and the lagged interest rate are both declining in the size of the habit, although super-inertial policies remain optimal.     

Why do central banks intervene?

Intervention by central banks, in terms of buying and selling foreign currency, has been a major activity in recent years. This paper investigates the motivations for such policy and the evidence for its effectiveness. We use high quality daily data on the dollar amounts of intervention by the central banks of the US and Germany. We also use information on agreed G7 target levels for the $/DM and $/Yen nominal exchange rates. Daily, nominal dollar exchange rate returns are well described as a Martingale-GARCH process, and we find little evidence that the different types of intervention have had much effect on the conditional mean of exchange rate returns. There is some evidence that intervention is associated with slight increases in the volatility of exchange rate returns. While little evidence is found for the effectiveness of intervention, the motivations are more clear. In particular, from the application of probit analysis we find that the probability of intervention is determined by the magnitude of the deviation of the nominal exchange rate from the agreed target level and, to a lesser extent, by the current volatility of exchange rates.     

Optimal Monetary Policy in a Small Open Economy with Home Bias

We analyze optimal monetary policy in a small open economy characterized by home bias in consumption. Peculiar to our framework is the application of a Ramsey-type analysis to a model of the recent open-economy New Keynesian literature. We show that home bias in consumption is a sufficient condition for inducing the monetary policymaker of an open economy to deviate from a strategy of strict markup stabilization and contemplate some (optimal) degree of exchange rate stabilization. We focus on the optimal setting of policy both in the case of firms setting prices one period in advance and in a gradual fashion subject to adjustment costs. While the first setup allows us to analytically highlight home bias as an independent source of equilibrium markup variability, the second setup allows to study the effects of future expectations on the optimal policy problem and the effect of home bias on optimal inflation volatility. The latter, in particular, is shown to be related to the degree of trade openness in a U-shaped fashion, whereas exchange rate volatility is monotonically decreasing in openness.     

Price‐Level Targeting and Stabilization Policy

We construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study optimal monetary stabilization policy. Prices are fully flexible and money is essential for trade. Our main result is that if the central bank pursues a price‐level target, it can control inflation expectations and improve welfare by stabilizing short‐run shocks to the economy. The optimal policy involves smoothing nominal interest rates that effectively smooths consumption across states.     

Monetary Policy and the Asset Risk‐Taking Channel

How important is the risk‐taking channel for monetary policy? To answer this question, we develop and estimate a quantitative monetary DSGE model where banks choose excessively risky investments, due to an agency problem that distorts banks' incentives. As the real interest rate declines, these distortions become more important and excessive risk taking increases, lowering the efficiency of investment. We show theoretically that this novel transmission channel generates a new monetary policy trade‐off between inflation and real interest rate stabilization, whereby the central bank may prefer to tolerate greater inflation volatility in order to lower excessive risk taking.     

Optimal monetary policy with imperfect common knowledge

This paper determines optimal nominal demand policy in a flexible price economy in which firms pay limited attention to aggregate variables. Firms’ inattentiveness gives rise to idiosyncratic information errors and imperfect common knowledge about the shocks hitting the economy. This is shown to have strong implications for optimal nominal demand policy. In particular, if firms’ prices are strategic complements and economic shocks display little persistence, monetary policy has strong real effects, making it optimal to stabilize the output gap. Weak complementarities or sufficient shock persistence, however, cause price level stabilization to become increasingly optimal. With persistent shocks, optimal monetary policy shifts from output gap stabilization in initial periods following the shock to price level stabilization in later periods, potentially rationalizing the medium-term approach to price stability adopted by some central banks.     

Home bias,exchange rate disconnect,and optimal exchange rate policy

This paper examines how much the central bank should adjust the interest rate in response to real exchange rate fluctuations. The paper first demonstrates, in a two-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, that home bias in consumption is important to replicate the exchange rate volatility and exchange rate disconnect documented in the data. When home bias is high, the shock to Uncovered Interest rate Parity (UIP) can substantially drive up exchange rate volatility while leaving the volatility of real macroeconomic variables, such as GDP, almost untouched. The model predicts that the volatility of the real exchange rate relative to that of GDP increases with the extent of home bias. This relation is supported by the data. A second-order accurate solution method is employed to find the optimal operational monetary policy rule. Our model suggests that the monetary authority should not seek to vigorously stabilize exchange rate fluctuations. In particular, when the central bank does not take a strong stance against the inflation rate, exchange rate stabilization may induce substantial welfare loss. The model does not detect welfare gain from international monetary cooperation, which extends Obstfeld and Rogoff's [Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K.,2002. Global implications of self-oriented national monetary rules, Quarterly Journal of Economics May, 503–535] findings to a DSGE model.     

The Value of Interest Rate Stabilization Policies When Agents Are Learning

We examine the expectational stability (E-stability) of rational expectations equilibrium in the "New Keynesian" model where monetary policy is optimally derived and interest rate stabilization is added to the central bank's traditional objectives of inflation and output stabilization. We consider both the case where the central bank lacks a commitment technology and the case of full commitment. We show that for both cases, optimal policy rules yield rational expectations equilibria that are E-stable for a wide range of empirically plausible parameter values. These findings stand in contrast to Evans and Honkapohja's findings for optimal monetary policy rules in environments where interest rate stabilization is not a central bank objective.     

Finance and international business cycles

Business cycles are more correlated among countries that have similar financial structures. We first document this empirical regularity using OECD data, and then build a two-country DSGE model with financial frictions that replicates it. Alternative monetary policy regimes and parameter values are explored. Output co-movements increase when the countries involved are linked by a credible exchange rate peg and when they open up to trade; they decrease when their financial openness increases. The model also accounts for a number of stylized facts of international business cycles, such as the positive international correlation of output, investment and employment.     

The extensive margin and monetary policy

The creation of new firms, referred to as the extensive margin, is a significant but overlooked dimension of monetary policy. A monetary VAR documents that monetary policy has significant effects on firm creation. An analytically tractable model combining sticky prices and firm entry shows that entry alters the transmission of monetary policy innovations, acting much like a type of investment in more standard models. Monetary policy rules that offset the uncertainty of productivity shocks can raise the mean level of entry and thereby welfare, suggesting a new motivation for stabilization policy.