Are cooperative firms a less competitive form of business? Production efficiency and financial viability of cooperative firms with tradable membership shares

Cooperative firms are generally considered a less competitive form of business than conventional capitalist firms in a market system. In this study, we consider cooperative firms that issue tradable membership shares and show that they are in principle as efficient and financially viable as capitalist firms. This implies that, if allowed to issue tradable membership shares, cooperative firms could be a promising alternative to capitalist firms in a wider range of circumstances.     

The peer-firm effect on firm’s investment decisions

This study investigates the effect of peer firms on firm investment strategies. We test the peer group effect hypothesis along differing levels of financially constrained firms as well as differing degrees of industry competition. Using idiosyncratic equity returns as the instrument variable, we use 2-stage least squares regression to identify the influence of peer firms’ investment decisions on a firm’s own investment policies. Our analyses empirically confirm that there is a peer group effect in making firm investment decisions. More financially constrained firms show greater dependency on peers’ investment decisions. Tests of peer sensitivity to the increase in industrial competition, however, displayed a U-shaped quadratic curve, which shows that firms have the lowest peer group effect in medium-competition markets. We claim that imitative behavior in investment is presumably weak in the mid-competition market because firms are yet to be distinguished in this market.     

Member Coordination Costs and Spatial Entry Deterrence in a Mixed Duopsony with a Cooperative

This paper investigates cooperative spatial entry deterrence. To this end, it employs a dynamic game where an investor-owned firm (IOF) competes with a farmers’ processing cooperative which incurs a fixed coordination cost per member. The results indicate that as the value of coordination cost per member increases or the processing margin rises, it becomes more likely for the IOF to use cooperative limit pricing, that is, to deter the cooperative’s market entry. The opposite is true for an increase in the freight rate.     

Reference Dependence and Market Competition

This paper examines the implications of consumer reference dependence for market competition. If consumers take some product (e.g., the first product they consider) as the reference point when evaluating others and they exhibit loss aversion, then the more “prominent” firm whose product is taken as the reference point by more consumers will randomize between a high and a low price. We also find that consumer loss aversion in the price dimension intensifies competition while that in the product dimension softens competition. With consumer reference dependence, asymmetric prominence can arise as an equilibrium outcome when firms advertise before engaging in price competition.     

Multibrand pricing as a strategy for consumer search obfuscation in online markets

This paper argues that a firm with multiple brands can obfuscate consumer search by excluding the brands of other firms from a consumer's consideration set. This is examined empirically by regressing price data for a leading U.K. motor insurance price comparison site (or “shopbot”). It finds that multibrand firms own three‐quarters of brands in this market, and that allowing for other brand strategies, they post significantly lower and clustered prices relative to other firms. The firms also conceal their brand ownership, consistent with search obfuscation. The results are not otherwise explained and they have implications for market competitiveness.     

Firm entry,product repositioning and welfare

We show that the entry of a second firm in a horizontally differentiated market (ala Hotelling) may harm consumers as prices increase and consumer’s surplus possibly decrease. We first derive the price and the consumer’s surplus of a monopoly which is located at the center of the market. When a second firm enters the market the first firm repositions and the two firms locate at their equilibrium points. Although competition adds to variety and increases consumer’s surplus, the post entry increase in price may outweight the gains from extra variety and make consumers worse off.     

Corporate financial distress: The case of publicly listed firms in an emerging market economy

Occurrences of financial distress (FD) are not readily obvious yet can span several periods. This paper examines episodes of FD using industry‐relative (IR) firm‐/ accounting‐, market‐ and macro‐level information. Mixed logit regressions reveal that firm‐ and market‐based measures, as well as macro‐level variables explain the likelihood of FD in 263 publicly listed non‐banking firms in the Philippines during the period 1995 to 2018. Rates of identification of firms in financial distressed states of close to 69 percent are obtained at a cutoff probability of 0.30 in the model with time‐varying intercept and slope. This study shows the importance of recognizing heterogeneous firm behavior. The ability to more accurately predict the probability of FD and to determine the financial health of firms can help financial institutions in allocating funds and policy makers in predicting crises episodes.     

Firm performance and the political economy of corporate governance: survey evidence for Bulgaria,Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia

Using survey data for 220 traditional manufacturing firms over 7 years of transition and 4 Central Eastern Europe (CEE) countries, we find firms that produced for the EU market under planning consistently outperform those that produced for the CMEA market. Within the previously CMEA market, the best firms were selected to outside privatisation and outperformed insider/state owned firms. Outside privatisation was resisted in EU oriented firms and ownership was found to have no effect on performance. Path dependent demand shocks and political constraints on the sequencing of state firms to private ownership determine the relationship between firm performance and ownership structure during transition.     

Is the Competitor of my Competitor also my Competitor?

This paper presents several results on multimarket competition. First, whenever a firm faces multimarket competitors that sell goods in markets to which the firm itself has no access, the firm gains a strong incentive to expand production in its own market(s). In the capacity choice model, such a firm builds larger than Cournot capacity and pushes its competitors towards other markets. Consumers always benefit from multimarket competition. In asymmetric market structures, some firms may also benefit from multimarket arrangements, but in symmetric ones, all firms are necessarily harmed by it. Second, the intensification of indirect competition is not necessarily bad for the firm. It may be the case that, the more competitors its competitors have, the higher the firm’s profit. Finally, this model also has a multiproduct interpretation which suggests that a merger of single‐product firms may be beneficial or harmful from a social welfare perspective, depending on whether the new entity will compete with several single‐product firms or another multiproduct one.     

Risk reporting and stock return in the UK: Does market competition Matter?

This study examines the extent to which market competition influences risk reporting practice. It also explores how market competition affects the usefulness of risk reporting. The automated textual analysis measures the level of risk reporting [how much to report] and its tone [how it is reported] of UK FTSE 350 firms. The abnormal stock return is used as a proxy for the usefulness of risk reporting. In contrast to the proprietary cost hypothesis, our results indicate that the level of risk reporting is a positive function of market competition. Besides, UK firms are likely to disseminate more (less) negative (positive) news about their risks when market competition increases. However, after examining the informativeness of this reporting, we provide evidence that the level of reported risk information does not significantly enhance the abnormal stock returns of UK firms. Nevertheless, the tone of the reported risks carries incremental information indicative of a firm’s abnormal stock return, especially when market competition decreases. The findings suggest that firms are likely to alleviate their proprietary costs by framing their reporting of risk information in a way that deters potential competitors from entering their market and that market competition diminishes the perceived informativeness of such reporting. The results provide implications for investors as they should not acknowledge the disclosure of higher risk information when asking for more corporate transparency, as it lacks informativeness. Besides, policymakers may impose extra compulsory requirements on the UK firms to avoid reporting overly optimistic risk news to protect investors and avoid the adverse effects of this reporting.     

Observability and Sorting in a Market for Names

Can firm names be tradeable assets when changes in name ownership are observable? Earlier literature focuses on trading of firm names when trading is not observable to the consumer. Yet, casual empiricism suggests that shifts in name ownership are often publicly known. This paper studies how firm names can be traded even under full observability. In equilibrium, even when consumers see a reputed name being divested they continue to trust it and so, these names are tradeable. I further demonstrate an appealing “sorting” property of these equilibria. Competent firms can separate themselves by buying valuable names, and incompetent firms can give themselves away by using worthless names.     

Mixed oligopoly, foreign firms, and location choice

We investigate a mixed market in which a state-owned, welfare-maximizing public firm competes against n domestic private firms and m foreign private firms which are all profit-maximizing. A circular city model with quantity-setting competition is employed. We find that the equilibrium location pattern depends on m. All private firms agglomerate in the unique equilibrium if m is zero or one. Two foreign firms induce differentiation between domestic and foreign private firms. More than two foreign firms yield differentiation among the foreign firms. Regardless of n and m, agglomeration of all domestic private firms appears in equilibrium. We provide several conditions in which eliminating the public firm from the market enhances social welfare. We extend the basic model and investigate three issues concerning multiple public firms, inefficiency of the public firm, and entries by private firms. We obtain some additional implications of welfare and equilibrium locations.     

Why Does the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Enhance Firm Value? The Case of Japanese Manufacturing Firms

This paper examines the influence of firms’ reductions of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on firm value, measured by Tobin's q. If the stockholders/investors regard the reduction of GHG emissions as a form of intangible value, the reduction of GHG emissions will enhance firm value. To prove this relation more precisely, this paper analyzes not only the effect of the reduction of GHG emissions on firm value but also that of the market discipline imposed by the stockholders/investors in terms of the reduction of GHG emissions. Using data on 641 Japanese manufacturing firms in the period 2006–2008, the random effect instrumental variable estimate supports the view that firms with strong market discipline imposed by stockholders/investors are more likely to reduce GHG emissions and, consequently, firms that reduce more GHG emissions are more likely to enhance firm value. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Rate of return regulation and the Le Chatelier principle

This paper examines whether rate-of return regulation alters the input quantities firms use to produce their selected output level when the corresponding input prices change, in a manner similar to the Le Chatelier principle. More specifically, would the change in a rate regulated firm’s input quantity due to a change in its input price be less price elastic than the unregulated firm’s change in the input quantity due to a change in its input price. We follow Färe and Logan (1986), Nelson and Wohar (1983) in estimating a rate regulated cost function and capital input share system of equations. Using a 1992–2000 panel of 34 US major investor-owned electric utilities, empirical results indicate that the regulated own-input price elasticities of demand for labor and fuel are less price elastic than their corresponding unregulated own-input price elasticities of demand (a Le Chatelier principle type effect). Having a fuel clause (1) reduces the firm’s willingness to substitute from fuel to either non-fuel (capital, labor) input when the price of fuel rises, and (2) enhances the firm’s willingness to substitute from non-fuel inputs to fuel when the price of non-fuel inputs rises.     

Growth and social capital: an evolutionary model

In this paper, we analyze the role of cooperation between firms through a model of growth and social capital. In a growth model à la Solow we incorporate the set of resources that a relational network has at its disposals, as a distinct production factor, and thus examine its dissemination through evolutionary type processes in firm interactions. Dynamic analysis of the model demonstrates that cooperation is able to increase the productivity of factors, fostering a higher rate of growth in the long term. The most significant result is that scarcity of social capital can produce a general collapse of the economic system in areas in which long term growth is usually sustained by the learning by doing and spillover of knowledge phenomena. This conclusion leads to reconsider the role of local development economic policies that should concentrate on activities that promote repeated interaction between firms proven to be cooperative or that encourage the formation of technological consortia.     

Consumer cooperatives as an alternative form of governance: The case of the broadband industry

With a growing number of consumer cooperatives in non-agrarian industries such as energy and broadband, there is a need to better understand their emergence as a viable form of governance. In this context, the paper uses Mikami’s (2010) model on consumer cooperatives to explain their emergence as a result of their ability to generate additional equity financing through the membership market. It focuses on the motivations of consumers to financially contribute to a cooperative by examining the risks and benefits associated with the investment. Based on a survey of 759 consumers, it links their motivations for joining a cooperative to different forms of risks and benefits associated with the investment. It shows that the risks related to cost sharing and switching costs are important determinants for consumers. Other factors that affected the likelihood of joining a cooperative were expected benefits with respect to user network externalities and infrastructure gains.     

Does Competition Make Firms More Flexible? A Study of Limited Managerial Cognition

A model of procedural decision making in firms is combined with an oligopoly model to study the effect of limited managerial cognition on firm flexibility. It is argued that a firm may vary its flexibility, and, hence, that there exists a trade-off between decision-making costs and costs due to imperfect adjustment to the environment. The main conclusions are the following: (1) The level of flexibility chosen by firms tends to be too low, from a social welfare point of view. (2) Entry reduces firm flexibility. Aggregated flexibility in the market may, however, increase in which case consumers are unambiguously better off. (3) Integration of isolated markets increases firm flexibility and consumer welfare.     

Value Relevance of Multinationality: Evidence from Korean Firms

The purpose of this study is to examine the valuation effects of multinationality in Korean firms and to identify the role of multinationality in internalization theory. We hypothesize that the market positively values the multinational activities of Korean firms, which are operating in a small open economy in which firms have strong motivations for internationalization. We use Ohlson's (1995, Contemporary Accounting Research, 11, 661) value model and document the positive effect for multinational firms compared to domestic firms, as well as the positive effect of multinationality on firm value. These results are robust across studies, as indicated by Tobin's q measure, as well as across years. We also hypothesize that multinationality mediates or moderates the relationship between intangibility and firm value that is proposed in internalization theory. We do not find supporting evidence for a mediated influence of intangibility through multinationality on firm value nor for a moderated influence of intangibility on firm value. We find that multinationality and intangibility directly and independently influence firm value, without any interference from each other. These results are also robust across studies, as indicated by Tobin's q measure. Finally, we find that multinationality in Korean firms has never lost its importance, even during the global financial crisis in the year 2008.     

Common holdings and strategic manager compensation: The case of an asymmetric triopoly

We study an asymmetric triopoly in a heterogeneous product market where quantity decisions are delegated to managers. The two biggest firms are commonly owned by shareholders such as index funds, whereas the smallest firm is owned by independent shareholders. Under such a common holding owner structure, the owners have an incentive to coordinate when designing their manager compensation schemes. This coordination leads to a reallocation of production and induces a redistribution of profits. The trade volume in the market is reduced so that shareholder coordination is detrimental to consumer surplus as well as welfare.     

Herding versus Hotelling: Market Entry with Costly Information

Why do businesses such as fast‐food restaurants, coffee shops, and hotels cluster? In the classic analysis of Hotelling, firms cluster to attract consumers who have travel costs. We present an alternative model where firms cluster because one firm is free riding on another firm's information about market demand. One consequence of this free riding is that an informed firm might forego a market that it knows to be profitable. Furthermore, an uninformed firm might earn higher profits when research costs are high, because it can credibly commit to ignorance.