Spot market wages,implicit contracts and technological change: skill-level evidence from Finland

This article investigates the relevance of the theories of implicit contracts and spot market model to the skill-level wages in Finland. We use linked worker-firm panel data over the period from 1991 to 2004, which included major institutional and technological changes. We find similar patterns in the wage flexibility of primary and highly educated workers: their wages increased with the decreasing spot market unemployment rate after the EU membership still exhibiting some weak backward linkages. The wages of the secondary-educated did not follow the decreasing spot market unemployment, but instead some signs of the full commitment risk sharing were found.     

Contracts,incentives and organizations: Hart and Holmström Nobel Laureates

This article reviews the contribution of Hart and Holmström, the 2016 Nobel Laureates in economics. Holmström's work on the principal-agent problem answered questions as to what should (and should not) be included in an incentive contract. His work helped explain the simple structure of incentive contracts we typically observe in the real world. The models he developed have been used to address questions of CEO compensation, organizational design and optimal regulation. A key element of Hart's research focused on the question of what are the optimal boundaries of a firm (and indeed, what a firm actually is). In doing so he developed the incomplete-contracts framework, which has subsequently been used to explain many economic phenomena whenever renegotiation is important, including authority and decision-making structures in firms, why financial contracts look the way they do, and various questions in international trade and public policy.     

高新技术企业性质:一个基于关系契约视角的解释

高新技术企业的涌现和大力发展给企业契约理论带来了新的研究课题.本文通过对企业契约性质理论的梳理,得出了企业契约不同于一般市场契约的根本点在于前者是一个关系契约的结论.并在此基础上,给出了高新技术企业作为一个特殊的关系契约,其特殊性在于契约的多重性和递进谈判特征的解释.     

Knowledge and Power in the Mechanical Firm: Planning for Profit in Austrian Perpsective

This essay draws on the transaction costs model of the firm and an Austrian perspective on the knowledge problem in centrally planned orders to propose an empirically useful Austrian theory of central planning. After an initial review of existing theories of the firm, part two develops insights from the calculation debate to sketch a theory of planning centered on the interrelated problems of purpose, information and control in both individual and central planning. Part three joins this theory to the basic framework of the transaction cost model to produce an Austrian theory of the private firm that addresses the relation between knowledge and power in planned orders, and illustrates its principal themes through a discussion of the historical development of American manufacturing in the fifty years prior to World War I.     

企业通用人力资本培训激励研究——基于贝克尔模型的视角

在人力资本成为企业核心要素的背景下,研究企业培训通用人力资本的激励成为当前的热点问题。对贝克尔模型进行扩展发现,在不完全竞争的劳动力市场中,由于交易成本与信息不对称的存在,压缩的工资结构以及企业培训雇员的潜在收益使企业具有对雇员通用性人力资本的培训激励,并获得一定的培训利益。但是这种培训激励会受到市场环境的制约,市场环境的变化使劳资双方对培训利益的分享发生变化。     

Externalities,communication and the allocation of decision rights

The assignment of authority entitles the decision maker to undertake decisions that impose externalities on the payoffs of other members of the organization. This paper studies how the optimal allocation of decision rights depends on the preferences of the organization’s members. It adopts a mechanism-design approach to show how the communication of private information affects the efficient allocation of authority. An extension to multiple decision areas shows that decentralized control rights may enhance organizational efficiency unless there exist strong complementarities between different decisions.     

Intergenerational Transfer Schemes as Incomplete Social Contracts

Intergenerational transfers are often viewed as emerging from social contracts that specify the terms of trade for some pattern of exchange among generations. Here it is argued that such a view should incorporate contractual incompleteness and the impossibility to ex ante rule out the renegotiation of the social contract. In the present setting, such issues preclude that social contracts implement first-best decisions. Yet, a situation with an incomplete and renegotiable social contract is superior to various other scenarios, including the no-contract solution.     

美国延迟退休激励机制分析——兼论对中国延迟退休年龄改革的启示

美国社会保障法案的颁布标志着现代社会保障制度的建立。在人口老龄化的背景下,美国对法定退休年龄和养老金领取年龄进行改革,逐步废除法定退休年龄,提高正常退休年龄,同时对养老保险制度中的退休收入核查制度进行调整,建立延迟退休补助制度,由此增强延迟退休对老年劳动力延迟退休的激励。美国废除法定退休年龄和延迟正常退休年龄的改革对中国延迟退休年龄改革提供了有益借鉴。     

退休年龄选择机理：基于人力资本与社会保障的视角

近年来,延长退休年龄问题日益成为社会和学界的热点话题。本文从我国人口老龄化社会的到来并渐近达到峰值谈起,指出人口老龄化趋势、人均寿命的延长以及我国人口平均人力资本存量的不断增加要求我们实行延迟退休制度。     

明星VS非明星：分析师评级调整与信息属性

本文以2001—2010年明星及非明星分析师对中国A股上市公司的4 643次评级调整为样本,研究不同分析师在提供公司特质信息及行业层面信息方面是否存在差异。结果表明：（1）明星分析师向市场提供了更多公司特质信息,而在行业信息层面,两类分析师并无区别;（2）专注程度越高,明星分析师与市场反应中公司特质信息成分的正向关系越显著,表明专注程度是其挖掘更多公司特质信息的一个重要因素。在进一步的研究中,本文对明星分析师的“名气”假说进行了排除,同时考察了牛市、熊市对两类分析师提供信息属性的影响。本文的结论既丰富了分析师报告信息属性的文献,对理解明星分析师的荐股评级行为也具有一定的积极意义。     

所有权结构、股价波动异步性与上市公司现金持有价值

股价中包含了较多的企业特质信息或者信息噪声都可能导致企业股价异步性现象。股权集中程度越高,其股价吸收企业特质信息的效率越低。借鉴Faulkender和Wang(2006)以及Dittar和Mahrt-Smith(2007)提出的衡量现金持有价值的方法,本文系统检验了2003～2006年我国A股上市企业的股价异步性与资金效率的关系。实证检验发现,其他情形相同的情况下,股价异步性与现金持有价值呈显著正相关关系,然而这种显著的正相关关系主要体现在股权分散的企业和非国有企业中。可见,所有权结构安排和股权性质是影响股价信息含量以及股价在资本配置过程中的发挥基础性作用的决定因素。