基于收入、时间双重约束的旅游消费分析

旅游消费函数是收入和时间的函数。通过对旅游者收入与时间的关联分析,构建出时间和收入约束下的旅游消费模型．对工资率、休闲时间、旅游产品时间消耗对旅游消费的影响进行了数学分析,诠释了旅游消费中的一些难解现象,并总结了我国旅游消费中存在的问题。     

Institutional inequality and tax incidence

This paper analyses the effects of taxation when inequality is not innate. A theory of institutional inequality is presented which employs a trade model with circular production and the theory of clubs. Inequality is introduced by constraints on entry into sectors and ‘local’ groups within sectors. Individual time is treated as a fixed factor of production, and work and leisure are re-defined. The analysis suggests that when inequality is institutional and government policy does not alter the mechanisms by which institutions translate the distribution of power into the distribution of income, a redistribution of income by conventional tax-transfer schemes may not always be feasible.     

A reinterpretation of the traditional income–leisure model,with application to in-kind subsidy programs

The traditional income–leisure model treats income as a composite commodity; it is not appropriate for studying commodity subsidies which alter relative prices within the composite. I suggest reinterpreting the traditional model as a special case of a utility function weakly separable with respect to leisure and all other commodities. This interpretation allows the work incentive effects of any subsidy program to be inferred from the terms of the program and data on the work effort effects of any other subsidy program, most notably income maintenance experiments. I illustrate the approach by estimating the work incentive effects of public housing. The model implies that even if special complementaries between leisure or work and the subsidized good are neglected, in-kind transfers will have different work incentive effects than equivalent cash transfers. In practice, in-kind transfers will generally stimulate work effort vis-à-vis equivalent cash grants.     

Progressive Taxation and the Distribution of Freedom

Freedom of choice in consumption activity can be represented by opportunity sets that are bounded by both budget and time constraints. I argue that, in a society in which income is distributed more unequally than leisure time, a government aiming at leaving freedom distribution unaltered should apply progressive taxation. Since incomes bind freedom only partially when this is bound by time constraints, taxing the rich reduces her/his freedom proportionally less than the reduction in freedom caused by taxation of the poor. The degree of tax progressiveness will be higher if the government aims at redistributing freedom from the rich to the poor.     

CONSUMPTION AND LEISURE EXTERNALITIES, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EQUILIBRIUM EFFICIENCY

This paper analyzes the effects of consumption and leisure externalities on growth and welfare in a two‐sector endogenous growth model with human capital accumulation. Both types of externalities are shown to affect the long‐run equilibrium and optimal growth rates in a rather different way. The relationship between the steady state of the market and the centrally planned economy is also analyzed. The optimal growth path can be decentralized by resorting to consumption or labor income taxation, whereas capital income should be untaxed. Numerical simulations suggest that growth and welfare effects of mild consumption and leisure externalities may be quantitatively important.     

居民休闲消费不平等研究——以北京市为例

休闲消费蕴含休闲时间消费和休闲消费支出。本文以北京市为例，探讨居民休闲消费不平等问题。研究发现，休闲时间消费和休闲消费支出不平等现象日趋显著。本文通过K means均值聚类刻画了休闲时间消费差异。构建回归模型发现，休闲时间和收入是影响休闲消费支出的主要因素，随着年份的推移，休闲时间逐渐成为影响“有钱无闲”群体休闲消费支出的主要因素，收入的拉动作用逐渐弱化。对于“有闲无钱”群体，虽然增加该群体收入能有效提高其休闲消费水平，但收入与年份交叉项并不显著。     

Wealth Effects, Incentives, and Productivity

Comparative static effects of varying the wealth level of a risk-averse agent in a moral hazard setting with limited liability constraints are investigated. There are two principal opposing effects of increasing wealth: the incentive effect, which allows stronger punishments for poor performance, thereby encouraging higher effort; and the preference effect, which reduces the agent's effort incentives owing to income effects in the demand for leisure. It is shown that optimal effort levels are initially constant, subsequently increasing and eventually decreasing in wealth. Hence agents with intermediate wealth levels are the most productive.     

Optimal taxation in the Uzawa–Lucas model with externality in human capital

In this paper we study the optimal policy in the Uzawa–Lucas model with externality in human capital when agents value both consumption and leisure. We find that the government pursuing the first best can achieve its goal by a subsidy which depends on foregone earnings while studying and which is financed through a lump sum tax. Anyway, the optimal policy, that should be designed to provide incentives for agents to devote more time to schooling and cut both on leisure and working, is not unique. There exists an infinite number of combinations of consumption, capital income, labor income and lump sum taxes that can decentralize the first best.     

Relative Consumption Concerns and the Optimal Tax Mix

This paper studies the optimal tax mix (taxes on income and commodities) under asymmetric information in a two‐type model, when individuals make relative consumption comparisons. The model includes both positional and nonpositional goods, taking into account the fact that relative concerns matter for some but not for all commodities. We find that in general the whole tax system is affected by the externalities caused by the consumption of positional goods, notably also the taxes on income and on a nonpositional good. The tax rates on positional goods are higher than in the absence of status effects, reflecting their Pigouvian role. The sign of the Pigouvian part in the income tax schedule is ambiguous and depends crucially on whether status goods are complements or substitutes to leisure.     

Conspicuous Leisure: Optimal Income Taxation When Both Relative Consumption and Relative Leisure Matter*

In previous studies on public policy under relative‐consumption concerns, leisure comparisons have been ignored. In this paper, we consider a two‐type optimal non‐linear income tax model, in which people care about both their relative consumption and their relative leisure. Increased consumption positionality typically implies higher marginal income tax rates for both ability types, whereas leisure positionality has an offsetting role. However, this offsetting role is not symmetric; concern about relative leisure implies a progressive income tax component (i.e., a component that is larger for the high‐ability type than for the low‐ability type). Leisure positionality does not modify the policy rule for public‐good provision.     

Fair Income Tax

In a model where agents have unequal skills and heterogeneous preferences over consumption and leisure, we look for the optimal tax on the basis of efficiency and fairness principles and under incentive-compatibility constraints. The fairness principles considered here are: (1) a weak version of the Pigou–Dalton transfer principle; (2) a condition precluding redistribution when all agents have the same skills. With such principles we construct and justify specific social preferences and derive a simple criterion for the evaluation of income tax schedules. Namely, the lower the greatest average tax rate over the range of low incomes, the better. We show that, as a consequence, the optimal tax should give the greatest subsidies to the working poor (the agents having the lowest skill and choosing the largest labour time).     

Do Distortionary Taxes Always Harm Growth?

This paper examines the long-run effects of capital income taxes, labor income taxes, and expenditure taxes in an R&D-based model of endogenous growth with endogenous labor supply. The main contribution of this paper is to investigate how tax effects on long-run growth are influenced by the emergence of indeterminate equilibria. Indeterminacy in this instance arises due to nonseparable preferences between consumption and leisure, in conjunction with prior distortionary taxes. In contrast to conventional wisdom, we show that higher distortionary taxes improve long-run growth, as well as social welfare, when the steady state is indeterminate.     

The Impact of Non-Labor Income Given Job Heterogeneity on Household Time Allocation: The Evidence from China

This paper proposes a theoretical framework based on new household economic theories. A dataset from the 2006 China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) is used. Given heterogeneity in major family members’ jobs, the effect of non-labor income on household time allocation is discussed under two scenarios: jobs with flexible work hours and jobs with fixed work hours in the market. Based on the nature of the employer the major family member works for, employers can be categorized into four categories: government-owned, family contract, privately-owned, and foreign-funded. Each of the four categories is used for dissecting the data into different sets for analysis by category. The results imply that job heterogeneity is significantly correlated to household time allocation. An increase in non-labor income results in a decrease in the time allocated to housework for all households. However, leisure time is allocated differently among different households due to job heterogeneity. An increase in non-labor income leads to less leisure time for households working for government-owned or foreign-funded enterprises, and more leisure time for households working for family contract or privately-owned enterprises.     

城市居民休闲时间投入意愿及其影响因素研究——以杭州市为例

调查了杭州市居民休闲时间的投入意愿,结合杭州市的社会文化背景,分析影响居民休闲时间投入意愿的因素。研究发现,年龄、性别、职业和文化程度是影响居民休闲时间投入意愿的重要因素。总体上,年龄越小,文化程度越高,休闲时间投入意愿越强烈;性别对休闲时间投入意愿的影响主要源自于不同性别在工作生活中的不同角色定位及其休闲偏好。婚姻状况对休闲时间投入意愿影响不大,收入对此没有影响。对于不同的休闲活动项目,影响居民休闲时间投入意愿的变量各不相同,由此得出诸多居民休闲意愿特征。     

Bargaining frictions, labor income taxation, and economic performance

This paper is an attempt to explain differences in economic performance between a subset of OECD countries. We classify countries in terms of their degree of rigidity in the labor market, and use a matching model with labor/leisure choice, bargaining frictions, and labor income taxation to capture these rigidity differences. Added flexibility improves economic performance in different ways depending on whether income taxation is high or low. Feeding income taxation rates estimated from the countries at hand, we find that the model is able to replicate the observed rigidity levels. The model is also shown to reproduce well cross-country differences in non-employment population ratios and the share of part-time jobs. In the absence of rigidity differences, taxation shows little promise to replicate cross-country differences, as it has insufficient quantitative effects on production and productivity. However, the interaction of rigidity and income taxation is crucial in explaining the empirical patterns of the non-employment rate and of the share of part-time jobs.     

Optimal taxation with consumption time as a leisure or labor substitute

This paper studies the optimal commodity taxation problem when time taken in consumption is a perfect substitute for either labor or leisure. It shows that while labor substitutability affects the optimal tax structure, leisure substitutability leaves the classical optimal tax results intact. In the Ramsey tax framework with linear income taxes, whether the consumers have the same or different earning abilities, labor substitutes tend to be taxed at a higher rate than leisure substitutes with the tax differential being increasing in consumption time. This is not necessarily the case when one allows for nonlinear income taxation.     

Utility and production externalities, equilibrium efficiency and leisure specification

This paper analyzes the implications that the specification of the leisure activity has on the equilibrium efficiency in a two-sector endogenous growth model with human capital accumulation. We consider external effects of consumption and leisure in utility, and sector-specific externalities associated to physical and human capital in production. The optimal tax policy to correct for the distortions caused by the externalities is characterized under all the typical leisure specifications considered in the literature: home production, quality time and raw time. We show that the optimal policy depends markedly on the leisure specification.     

Optimal income taxation when couples have endogenous bargaining power

This study examines the optimal income taxation for a two-earner household, where the couple bargains over their private goods consumption and time allocation between work and leisure. In the model, bargaining power is determined endogenously by the income gap between the two earners. Conventional studies have shown that the higher income tax rate should be imposed on the individual with the smaller wage elasticity, typically the individual with the higher productivity. In contrast to conventional argument, this study shows that the optimal tax rate on the household member with the higher productivity is lower than that of the individual with the lower productivity if the required tax revenue is relatively small and the influence of the gender income gap on the power balance of the couple is moderate. This is because such a tax structure encourages the labor supply of the individual with the higher productivity to mitigate the decrease in the household’s consumption induced by income taxation.     

Labor-Leisure Choice and Relative Income Concerns in the Shadow of the Housing Market

We theoretically examine the connection among labor productivity, work time, and housing costs in an economy with households differing in wages and neighborhoods differing in quality. We argue that the location rent component of housing cost is key to explicating the connection. We trace how the housing market makes relative income instrumental for maximizing utility even if households’ utility functions are not interdependent. Over time, productivity growth yields higher wages but households compete some of that away on the housing market. This structural inflation of location rents counteracts preferences to work less as wages rise and hinders the expansion of leisure. Relative income effects are shown to arise as a consequence of a market institution that monetizes socially-imbued preferences.     

The effects of longevity and distortions on education and retirement

This article studies the impact of longevity and taxation on life-cycle decisions and long run income. Individuals allocate optimally their total lifetime between education, working and retirement. They also decide at each moment how much to save or consume out of their income, and, after entering the labor market, how to divide their time between labor and leisure. The model incorporates experience–earnings profiles and return to education function that follows evidence from the labor literature. In this setup increases in longevity raises the investment in education—time in school—and retirement. The model is calibrated to the US and is able to reproduce observed schooling trends of the last century. It also reproduces the increase in retirement, as the evidence shows. Simulations show that a country equal to the US but with 20% smaller longevity will be 25% poorer, mostly because of the impact of life expectancy on human capital formation and retirement. In this economy labor taxes have a strong impact on the per capita income, as it decreases labor effort, time at school and retirement age, in addition to the general equilibrium impact over physical capital.