Regulating Multiple Polluters: Deterrence and Liability Allocation

We consider regulation of multiple polluters when individual emissions are unobservable. The tension between pollution deterrence and funding of remediation is examined under two constraints: that penalty revenues fully fund remediation costs and that the regulator cannot make positive transfers to firms. To isolate the effect of increasing the number of polluters, we compare an industry consisting of a single large firm with one in which many small firms in aggregate mimic the large firm. Contrary to previous findings, both the number of firms and the ability to monitor individual firms affect the welfare of a large class of regulators.     

Detection Avoidance and Deterrence: Some Paradoxical Arithmetic

This paper extends Malik's analysis to the case where criminals' avoidance efforts and public expenditures in the detection of criminals are strategic complements in the aggregate technology of control of illegal behaviors. In this set up, we show that whenever criminals' avoidance efforts are more sensitive to the frequency than to the severity of sanctions, it is always socially efficient to set the fine at the maximal possible level. However, several paradoxical consequences occur: there may exist overdeterrence at optimum; more repressive policies lead to fewer arrests of offenders while more crimes may be committed; at the same time, the society may be closer to the first best number of crimes.     

Moore's law and price trends of digital products: the case of smartphones

ABSTRACT

Since the introduction of the iPhone by Apple in 2007 and Google's Android platform in 2009, the two systems have accounted for a total of 90% of the U.S. smartphone market. Apple, however, reaps most of the profit in the industry. In the second quarter of 2016, for example, Apple's iPhone gets 104% of the sector's profit. This suggests that the smartphone market resembles a Stackelberg leadership model. Despite Apple's strong market power, we investigate if the market leader is under pressure to be price competitive. We calculate a quality-adjusted price index for smartphones from 2007 to 2016. Our results show that the average price declines at an average rate of over 27% per year. The price trend is similar to other digit products such as computers, cameras, and portable music players. We observe that the large price decline reflects the effect of Moore's law, which predicts that the capacity of integrated circuits undergoes an exponential growth. The effect of Moore's law is incorporated into the Stackelberg model. We also observe that price trends of other digital products also follow a similar pattern. This suggest that the long-run price trends of digital consumer goods are somewhat independent of the market structures.     

The emergence of technology systems: knowledge production and distribution in the case of the Emilian plastics district

The emergence of technology systems is the result of interdependentdynamics of the generation and diffusion of complementary bitsof localised technological knowledge. Technological communicationis the crucial element assessing the collective conditions underwhich technological knowledge is accumulated and diffused. Thecase study of the emerging Emilian technological system in theplastics sector shows that the synchronic and diachronic localisedinteractions among industrial dynamics, institutional R&Defforts and technological interrelatedness are the determinantsof the systematic production, accumulation and distributionof localised technological knowledge, in turn explaining theorigin and development of the technology system itself.     

Entry Deterrence and the Efficient Component Pricing Rule

This note comments on the article 'Entry and Entry Deterrence under the New Access Code' by Amiti and Maddock, published in the Australian Economic Review, 3rd quarter 1996. It is found that Amiti and Maddock do not show that efficient component pricing by an incumbent vertically-integrated monopolist will deter socially efficient entry of a new competitor.     

On the dynamics of generation and utilisation of knowledge: The local character of knowledge

In this paper a theoretical framework for the analysis of knowledge suitable to study processes of knowledge generation and utilisation in advanced post-industrial societies is presented. This framework is based on two fundamental properties of knowledge, that of being a co-relational structure and that of being a retrieval/interpretative structure. The paper shows that a third property, the local character of knowledge, can be derived from the two fundamental ones. Furthermore, it is shown that the production of knowledge can be analysed by means of concepts currently used in economics, such as the division of labour, coordination, specialization, competition and so on. Finally, the paper shows that the framework proposed here is compatible with a number of epistemological concepts and theories and applicable to the empirical analysis of processes of knowledge generation and utilization in firms.     

Two tales on human capital and knowledge spillovers: the case of the US and Brazil

This article uses a quasi-Mincerian approach to verify whether the concentration of college-educated individuals employed in the business support services sector and in the own sector contributes to increased productivity in other sectors of the economy. We estimate the returns to education using data from the 2008 US Current Population Survey (March supplement) and from the 2008 Brazilian household survey. This article finds evidence of a positive and significant human capital sectorial spillover effect, which is consistent with Acemoglu’s (1996) conjecture. The sectorial concentration of highly educated workers contributes to increase wages for all workers. This study also finds evidence of increasing returns to education in Brazil and diminishing returns to education in the United States. This finding may be explained by differences in supply of skilled workers in both economies. In addition, the short supply of highly skilled workers in Brazil likely explains the importance of the spillover effect from the business supporting sector.     

Competition Between Exclusive Religions: The Counter‐Reformation As Entry Deterrence

This article sets forth a theory of competition between exclusive religions as an entry deterrence game, in which the incumbent may find it profitable not to accommodate but to deter the competitor's entry by precommitting to sufficient capacity expansion in the event of entry. If entry costs are high enough, deterrence is optimal and the incumbent remains a monopolist, although the entry threat distorts its effort upward. The model is then applied to the Catholic Church's reaction to the Protestant Reformation. It is argued that the model provides a better fit to the historical data of the Counter‐Reformation than the price‐cutting model proposed by economists Ekelund, Hébert and Tollison ( 2004 , 2006 ).     

National innovation systems and international knowledge flows: an exploratory investigation with the case of the Netherlands

Since the late 1980s, the literature on innovation systems has flourished, often tying these systems to nation-states. Technology, however, often flows across the borders of nations. In this paper, four cases are studied where foreign technology is imported and appropriated from abroad into Dutch companies. By doing so, the questions what a national system of innovation consists of and what such a system means for firms are explored. The cases studied provide a picture of international-sectoral systems, adding up to a loosely interacting innovation system at the national level.     

The process of technology evolution : Multitechnology innovations as the driving force

Technological innovations are the substance of technology and the drivers of its evolution. This process was studied by analyzing the US patent data base, getting information on types of innovation and on their trends.It was found that the evolution of a technology depends upon its annexing multitechnology innovations. Ascending technologies utilize wide-range innovations, while mature technologies utilize narrow-range innovations. The findings are summed up in a model that shows the life cycle of a technology, from emergence to maturity.The model can be applied at a laboratory level, at a firm strategy level, as well as at the national level. Some examples are presented to illustrate applications.     

The Verdoorn law revisited: A note

In his Fattori che regolano lo sviluppo della produttività del lavoro Verdoorn (1949) presented empirical evidence on the constancy of the ratio of productivity growth to output growth. As a theoretical underpinning he used a neoclassical growth model. The main purpose of this paper is to emphasize that in this model the ratio is constant only in the steady state. If Verdoorn's underpinning of his law is to be correct, the steady-state assumption should be empirically tested. Some available evidence for Verdoorn's sample appears to throw doubt upon this assumption.     

An evolutionary contractarian view of primitive law: The institutions and incentives arising under customary Indian law

This research was supported by the Political Economy Research Center (PERC) in Bozeman, Montana, and this paper draws freely from and extends material reported in Customary Indian Law: Two Case Studies, which was written for PERC's project onProperty Rights, Constitutions, and Indian Economics. I wish to thank Terry Anderson for helpful comments.     

The law and economics of sycophancy

Tullock (in: Rowley (ed) The selected works of Gordon Tullock, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, pp 399–455, 2005) was skeptical of the presumed economic efficiency of the common law, as adversarialism, apparently inherent to common law procedures, allowed for and was prone to litigiousness. Common law litigations accord to patterns of rent-seeking, as litigants invest ever more resources to assure victory. This paper asks if viable institutional solutions can emerge to resolve the problem Tullock identified. I survey the historical development of the term sycophancy within ancient Greek law as a revealing case study. Though a relatively innocuous pejorative in contemporary parlance, the term’s etymological roots stem from a formative process of ancient legal and institutional change within Athenian Greece. In the wake of specific legal reforms that expanded the scope of governmental authority under Solon (born 638–558 BCE), citizens were given explicit financial incentive to report violators of newly implemented public laws. Thereafter, social stigma surrounding third party legal representation leveraged the term sycophancy in reference to prosecutors motivated by private interests over the public welfare. Forgone social status and eventually formal criminal sanction emerged as offsetting differentials against the incentives of sycophancy.     

法律制度与金融中介的发展:国际经验及借鉴意义

金融发展能够促进经济增长,其中金融中介发展是通过创造流动性、分散风险、收集信息和监控企业等途径来影响经济增长的;而金融中介本身的发展,则主要由一个国家的法律制度决定。通过法律制度与金融中介发展关系的理论和经验回顾,笔者认为,我国金融中介发展必须注意三方面的经验和教训。     

Strategic Reaction of Vertically Integrated Firms to Downstream Entry: Deterrence or Accommodation

The purpose of this paper is to analyze strategic behavior of vertically integrated firms when there is downstream entry, taking into account the balance between competition in the market and competition for the market. This analysis can serve to explain diverse distributional structures, including the coexistence of vertically integrated firms and independent retailers. And it shows that the relative efficiency of downstream entrants and the level of competition among incumbents are two major factors in determining equilibrium configuration.     

Strategic Choice of the Price Structure and Entry Deterrence Under Price Cap Regulation

This paper shows that a price‐capped firm under the threat of entry in some of the markets it serves can strategically manipulate its price structure to deter entry. In doing so, the regulated firm uses the price cap constraint as a commitment device to an aggressive pricing behaviour in case of entry. A (dynamic) price cap generally entails that the prices allowed today are a function of the previous‐period prices and that the tighter is the constraint on each price, the larger is the quantity sold of this good in the previous period. Hence, the regulated firm may strategically choose its price structure before entry to place a tighter regulatory control on the prices set in the (potentially) competitive markets and to make it optimal to charge in these markets – in case of entry – prices so low that entry is unprofitable.