Real and nominal effective exchange rates for 22 LDCs: 1971:1–1990:4

The International Monetary Fund constructs and publishes the real and nominal effective exchange rates, mostly for developed but not less developed countries. This paper employs a method of constructing real and nominal effective exchange rate from the literature to produce quarterly data over the 1971–1990 period for 22 developing nations. As an application, the stationarity of real effective exchange rates are determined to establish the empirical validity of the Purchasing Power Parity Theory (PPP). The results reveal that PPP fails to hold for most countries.     

Real Exchange Rate Variability: An Empirical Analysis of the Developing Countries Case

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the potential role of monetary and real factors in explaining real exchange rate variability in developing countries. For this purpose two indexes of real effective exchange rate variability that measure short-term and long-term variability were constructed for 30 countries. The results obtained, using a generalized least squares procedures on cross section data, indicate that real exchange rate variability has been affected both by real and monetary factors. In particular it was found that more unstable nominal exchange rate policies were reflected in higher real exchange rate instability in the short-run; more unstable domestic credit policies resulted in higher short-term real exchange rate variability; and more unstable external terms of trade also affected positively the degree of real exchange rate instability. [420]     

Real and nominal effective exchange rates of African countries during 1971Q1–2012Q4

One of the macro variables that are included in most models is the exchange rate. Overall performance of a country’s exchange rate is measured by changes in nominal or real effective exchange rate (REER). These rates are constructed and published mostly for industrial countries by international organizations. Less developed countries have received little attention. In this article, the two rates are constructed for 21 African countries using quarterly data over the period 1971Q1–2012Q4. As an application, we use the REERs to show that even in Africa the movements of the real effective rates follow a nonlinear path.     

Monetary Shocks and Real Exchange Rate Hysteresis: Evidence from the G-7 Countries

Long-run monetary neutrality specifies that nominal disturbances do not affect long-run real exchange rates. However, the "over depreciation" of the US dollar in the late 1980s, after its strong appreciation earlier in the decade, suggested to a number of observers that nominal disturbances alter long-run real exchange rates; that is, money supply shocks entail real exchange rate hysteresis. Using data from the G-7 countries and the post-1973 float, the paper measures the long-run effects of relative money supply disturbances on real US dollar exchange rates. Little evidence of hysteretic monetary policy effects is found.     

Sources of real exchange rate fluctuations in China

This paper reviews the evolution of China's real effective exchange rate between 1980 and 2003 and uses a structural vector autoregression model to study the relative importance of different types of macroeconomic shocks for fluctuations in the real exchange rate between 1985 and 2003. The structural decomposition shows that relative real demand and supply shocks account for most of the variations in real exchange rate changes during the estimation period. The paper also finds that supply shocks are at least as important as nominal demand shocks in accounting for real exchange rate fluctuations. In contrast, other studies that show that nominal shocks are more important in explaining real exchange rate fluctuations in industrial countries. Journal of Comparative Economics 33 (4) (2005) 753–771.     

Real and nominal effective exchange rates in MENA countries: 1970–2004

The main purposes of this article are 3-fold. First, we construct measures of real and nominal effective exchange rates for 14 Middle East and North African countries over the 1970–2004 period. Second, we test the validity of the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) by applying the ADF and KPSS tests to the real effective exchange rates. Finally, we employ the bounds testing approach to cointegration and error-correction modelling to show that nominal devaluation leads to real devaluation in the short-run as well as in the long-run in many of the countries.     

PPP in the medium run: The case of Norway

Existing studies generally reject purchasing power parity (PPP) on data sets from countries that have been affected by large real shocks, including Norway. However, we offer strong evidence of PPP between Norway and its trading partners during the post-Bretton Woods period, in which the Norwegian economy has experienced numerous real shocks such as discoveries of large petroleum reserves and oil price shocks. In particular, the behavior of the Norwegian real and nominal exchange rates appears remarkably consistent with the PPP theory. Moreover, convergence towards PPP is relatively rapid; the half-life of a deviation from parity is just about 1.5 years. We show that such deviations are primarily eliminated by adjustments in the nominal exchange rate and we offer some explanations for the relatively rapid convergence towards PPP.     

Purchasing power parity and country characteristics: Evidence from panel data tests

We examine long-run purchasing power parity (PPP) using panel data methods to test for unit roots in US dollar real exchange rates of 84 countries. We find stronger evidence of PPP in countries more open to trade, closer to the United States, with lower inflation and moderate nominal exchange rate volatility, and with similar economic growth rates as the United States. We also show that PPP holds for panels of European and Latin American countries, but not for African and Asian countries. Our findings demonstrate that country characteristics can help explain both adherence to and deviations from long-run PPP.     

The implications for an open economy of partisan political business cycles: Theory and evidence

This paper develops and tests the predictions of two open economy models in which partisan effects are present, a small-country-one-good model of exchange rate determination and a model that assumes the two countries each specialize in the production of one good. From these models, we can obtain predictions for the behaviour of the terms of trade, the current account, and real and nominal exchange rates. The predictions are tested empirically using panel data from 14 OECD countries and the results provide support for the theoretical predictions that systematic partisan effects are present in current accounts, real exchange rates, and the terms of trade.     

THE EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES ON REAL EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY: EVIDENCE BASED ON A NEW DATASET

Do alternative exchange rate regimes affect short‐term real exchange rate volatility differently? The existing empirical evidence is quite mixed with slightly more papers supporting that they do. We show that such lack of consensus is mainly due to current literature limitations regarding the measurement of real exchange rates (RERs), the identification of exchange rate regimes (ERRs), and the control for the incidence of real and nominal shocks. To address these limitations, we construct a novel monthly dataset for 63 countries over the period 1946–2007, which includes market‐determined multilateral RER and a proxy for terms of trade. We find that ERRs indeed affect short‐term real exchange rate volatility differently. While the evidence is generally consistent with Mussa's sticky prices argument, we find that for nonadvanced countries in post‐Bretton Woods there exists a “U‐shape nominal flexibility puzzle of RER.” We also find evidence of a “short‐run RER volatility puzzle.” Having controlled for the incidence of real and nominal shocks, nonadvanced countries' RER volatility remains between 25% and 150% greater than that of the advanced economies. Moreover, the key literature finding that short‐term RER volatility is higher in Bretton Woods (BW) than in post‐Bretton Woods (PBW) for industrialized countries vanishes when using market‐determined multilateral RER instead of official bilateral RER. (JEL F31, F33, F41)     

Growth of developing countries and world interest rates

On the basis of aggregate data covering the period 1973–1982, this note argues that the rate of growth of non-oil developing countries is influenced significantly by the growth performance of industrial countries and by the level of the real rate of interest on world markets. At the same time, no evidence was found to support the hypothesis that the nominal rate of interest has an effect on growth in non-oil developing countries.     

Sources of Fluctuations in the Real Exchange Rates and Trade Balances of the G‐7: A Sign Restriction VAR Approach

This paper estimates structural vector autoregression models of output, the real exchange rate and trade balance for the group of seven leading advanced economies (G‐7). Unlike previous studies, we do not impose long‐run purchasing power parity as an identifying assumption; instead, the shocks underlying the model are structurally identified using a set of theory‐consistent sign restrictions. Empirical results show that nominal shocks account for most of the long‐run variability in trade balances across the G‐7 countries. We are able to attribute this finding to long‐run movements in the real exchange rate, as the real exchange rate is significantly affected by nominal shocks in the long run.     

Cointegration and Causal Relationship between Taxes and Spending for Kenya,Nigeria and South Africa

Causal relationships between taxes and spending are examined for three African countries using the GDP as a control variable, and dummy variables to address structural changes in Nigeria and South Africa. There is one cointegration equation between nominal fiscal variables in all three countries, one cointegration equation for Kenya and two cointegration equations for Nigeria and South Africa for the real fiscal variables and their respective dummy variables. Short-term results of the nominal variables show fiscal independence for all three countries. In real terms, taxes cause spending for Kenya and Nigeria and a weak fiscal synchronization for South Africa. There is long run fiscal synchronization in nominal terms for all three countries, and in real terms for both Nigeria and South Africa, while real taxes cause spending in Kenya. Long-run estimates show a unit increase in nominal (real) taxes translating into a less than proportionate increase in nominal (real) spending for Kenya and South Africa, and a more than proportionate increase in nominal (real) spending for Nigeria. Fiscal imbalance is not a threat in the budgetary process in Kenya and South Africa, but an issue of concern in Nigeria, where oil revenues are a major source of support for budget short falls.     

Macroeconomic uncertainty,inflation and growth: Regime-dependent effects in the G7

We analyze the causal effects of real and nominal macroeconomic uncertainty on inflation and output growth by considering whether these effects are cycle phase specific. Employing a bivariate Smooth Transition EGARCH-M model for the G7 countries during 1957–2009, we find strong nonlinearities. First, uncertainty regarding the output growth rate is related with a higher average growth rate mostly in a low-growth regime, supporting the theory of “creative destruction”. Second, higher inflation uncertainty diminishes growth rates, mainly at a high-inflation regime. Finally, real uncertainty has mixed effects on average inflation, while the effect of nominal uncertainty is typically positive, especially so during inflationary periods. Our findings suggest that these relationships are sufficiently complex to require treatment with nonlinear models.     

The changing nature of the real exchange rate: The role of central bank preferences

We investigate the sources of real exchange rate fluctuations. We do so, first, in the context of a DSGE model that explicitly considers the central bank's preferences. Then we estimate SVAR models, where shocks are identified by sign restrictions derived from the DSGE model. We perform this exercise for twelve countries, nine of which have adopted inflation targeting during the period analyzed. In sharp contrast to the previous evidence in the literature, we find that exchange rate (country risk premium) shocks have become the main drivers of real exchange rate dynamics, while real shocks play a less important role. Evidence from the DSGE model reveals that, as the central bank becomes more averse to inflation movements, and cares less about nominal exchange rate fluctuations, the impact of nominal shocks on the real exchange rate tends to increase, while the impact of real shocks decreases. Our results suggest that the adoption of inflation targeting, along with a floating exchange rate, contributes to a shift in the relative importance of demand and country risk premium shocks in determining the RER.     

Nominal and real convergence between the CEE countries and the EU: a fractional cointegration analysis

This paper examines the real and nominal convergence between the Central and Eastern European countries and the EU, using fractional cointegration analysis for the period 1980–2003. Fractional cointegration analysis is a flexible methodology, which allows for more subtle forms of mean reversion. The tests performed are those of Geweke and Porter-Hudak. The convergence processes are valid when macroeconomic time series used in the study are fractionally cointegrated. The results indicate that inflation and interest rates series of six sample countries are fractionally cointegrated with those of the EU. Therefore, nominal convergence has been achieved by some of the transition countries, but the equilibrium errors display long memory. Results also indicate that industrial outputs of most countries in the sample are not fractionally cointegrated with that of the EU. The results further indicate that both nominal and real convergence have been achieved only for Hungary.     

Nominal and real effective exchange rates of middle eastern countries and their trade performance

Indexes of real and nominal effective exchange rates that are published by the IMF, are mostly for industrial countries. None of the Middle Eastern countries have received any attention on this regard. This paper tries to close the gap by constructing such indexes for 11 middle eastern countries over 1971(I)–1994(IV) period. As an application, long-run response of their trade balance to devaluation is also investigated.     

The Global Financial Crisis and Stochastic Convergence in the Euro Area

This paper analyzes the issue of convergence in the original Euro Area countries, and assesses the effect of the global financial crisis on the process of convergence. In particular, we consider whether the global financial crisis pulled the 12 economies of the Euro Area together or pushed them apart. We investigate the dynamics of stochastic convergence of the original Euro Area countries for inflation rates, nominal interest rates, and real interest rates. We test for convergence relative to Germany, taken as the benchmark for core EU standards, using monthly data over the period January 2001 to September 2010. We examine, in a time-series framework, three different profiles of the convergence process: linear convergence, nonlinear convergence, and linear segmented convergence. Our findings both contradict and support convergence. Stochastic convergence implies the rejection of a unit root in the inflation rate, nominal interest rate, and real interest rate differentials. We find that the differentials are consistent with a unit-root hypothesis when the alternative hypothesis is a stationary process with a linear trend. We frequently, but not always, reject the unit-root hypothesis when the alternative is a stationary process with a broken trend. We also note that the current financial crisis plays a significant role in dating the breaks.     

Agricultural productivity,the real effective exchange rate,and structural change: Some evidence from Africa

Agriculture is thought to play a number of roles in the early development process. All of these roles involve fostering non‐agricultural development, in particular manufacturing. It is argued in this paper that agriculture plays a role that has hitherto been ignored. Specifically, if agricultural labor productivity increases faster than manufacturing labor productivity, the real effective exchange rate will depreciate. This depreciation of real effective exchange rate occurs because in very poor countries agriculture makes up the dominant share of both GDP and employment. The depreciation also makes it easier for a country to expand the production of tradables relative to nontradables, with manufacturing being the main tradable. This proposition, which as agricultural labor productivity increases relative to manufacturing labor productivity the real effective exchange rate depreciates, is tested using data drawn from 10 sub‐Saharan African countries.     

Are US macroeconomic series difference stationary or trend-break stationary?

This article tests for the presence of a unit-root in all time series included in the extended Nelson–Plosser data set using the statistics devised by Zivot and Andrews, Perron and Murray and Zivot. It specifies the mixed model characterization of the trend-break stationary alternative that allows for a simultaneous break in both the intercept and slope of the trend-function. It rejects the unit-root null hypothesis for real GNP, nominal GNP, real per capita GNP, industrial production, employment, GNP deflator, nominal wages, interest rate and common stock prices. Use of appropriate critical values to assess the significance of the trend-function coefficients reveals that the slope-break should be included in real GNP, nominal GNP, real per capita GNP, nominal wages, interest rate and common stock prices. The results indicate that there is less evidence against the unit-root hypothesis with the extended Nelson–Plosser data compared to the original Nelson–Plosser data.