Carbon Trading with Imperfectly Observable Emissions

The Kyoto Protocol foresees emission trading but does not yet specify verification of (uncertain) emissions. This paper analyses a setting in which parties can meet their emission targets by reducing emissions, by investing in monitoring (reducing uncertainty of emissions) or by (bilaterally) trading permits. We derive the optimality conditions and carry out various numerical simulations. Our applications suggest that including uncertainty could increase compliance costs for the USA, Japan and the European Union. Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union might be able to gain from trading due to higher permit prices. Emissions trading could also lower aggregate uncertainty on emissions.     

Hot air for sale: a quantitative assessment of Russia’s near-term climate policy options

Since January 2005 the European Union has launched an EU-internal emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) for emission-intensive installations as the central pillar to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. The EU ETS will be linked to a Kyoto emissions market where greenhouse gas emission allowances of signatory Kyoto countries can be traded. In this paper we investigate the implications of Russian market power for environmental effectiveness and regional compliance costs to the Kyoto Protocol taking into account potential linkages between the Kyoto emissions market and the EU ETS. We find that Russia may have incentives to join the EU ETS as long as the latter remains relatively separated from the Kyoto international emissions market. In this case, Russia can exert monopolistic price discrimination between two separated markets thereby maximizing revenues from hot air sales. The EU will be able to substantially reduce compliance costs if it does not restrain itself to EU-internal emission regulation schemes. However, part of the gains from extra-EU emissions trading will come at the expense of environmental effectiveness as (more) hot air will be drawn in.      

The Emergence of Market Power in Emission Rights Markets: The Role of Initial Permit Distribution

This paper offers an analytical model of emission permit markets in which a large number of regulated emitters participate, and derives formulae that estimate the degree of market distortion. These formulae clearly show the entire dependence of the ratio of market prices to competitive levels on the permit initial distribution as well as the existence of a threshold for effective market power. While the findings challenge a well-known conception of the Coase Theorem, they have significant policy implications vis-à-vis the Kyoto Protocol and the related policy debates on excess emission rights known as hot air.     

The European Union's potential for strategic emissions trading through permit sales contracts

Strategic market behavior by permit sellers will harm the European Union (EU) as it is expected to become a large net buyer of permits in a follow-up agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. In this paper, we explore how the EU could benefit from making permit trade agreements with non-EU countries. These trade agreements involve permit sales requirement, complemented by a financial transfer from the EU to the other contract party. Such agreements would enable the EU to act strategically in the permit market on behalf of its member states, although each member state is assumed to behave as a price taker in the permit market. Using a stylized numerical simulation model, we show that an appropriately designed permit trade agreement between the EU and China could significantly cut the EU's total compliance cost. This result is robust for a wide range of parameterizations of the simulation model.     

The Kyoto Protocol,market power,and enforcement

The Kyoto Protocol aims to limit aggregate carbon emissions by participating countries to 1990 emissions levels in aggregate. It also allows for the creation of a permit market in which countries will be able to buy and sell the right to emit carbon dioxide. This paper investigates how market power, held by the countries of the former Soviet Union, and enforcement of the carbon emission limits might affect the abatement and the cost of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. To do so, it uses a modified version of the van Egteren–Weber (1996 Van Egteren, H and Weber, M. 1996. Marketable permits, market power, and cheating. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30: 161–74. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) model to investigate a permit market in the presence of both market power and enforcement difficulties. It then simulates the model, finding that if meeting abatement targets is the goal, regulating the supply side of the market and convex fine schedules are the most effective tools.     

Market Power with Interdependent Demand: Sale of Emission Permits and Natural Gas from Russia

With implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, Russia will most likely be able to exert market power in the emission permit market. But, as Russia is also a big exporter of fossil fuels, the incentives to boost the permit price may be weak. However, a significant share of Russia’s fossil fuel exports is natural gas. If a high permit price boosts the demand for natural gas through substitution from more polluting fuels and thus increase gas profits, this may increase the incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit market. Moreover, a large fossil fuel exporter may use its market position to influence the effective demand for permits. Hence, the relationship between permit income and fossil fuels exports runs in both directions. In this article, we explore the interdependence between the revenues from permit and fossil fuel exports both theoretically and numerically. A computable general equilibrium model suggests the fact that Russia as a big gas exporter has small effect on the incentives to exert monopoly power in the permit market. Moreover, Russia’s monopoly power in the permit market has a small, but non-negligible impact on the optimal level of Russian gas exports.     

Economic and environmental impacts of the Kyoto Protocol

Abstract In 2003 the Kyoto Protocol, which imposes legally binding greenhouse gas emission constraints on industrialized countries, is likely to enter into force. The Protocol has been celebrated as a milestone in climate protection, but standard economic theory casts doubt that it will go beyond symbolic policy. In this paper, we show that the final concretion of the Kyoto Protocol is consistent with the theoretical prediction: Kyoto more or less boils down to business‐as‐usual without significant compliance costs to ratifying parties. JEL Classification: D58, Q43, Q58
Conséquences économiques et environnementales du protocole de Kyoto En 2003, le protocole de Kyoto, qui impose aux pays industrialisés l'obligation de réduire leurs émissions de gaz à effet de serre, entrera probablement en vigueur. Si le protocole a été accueilli comme un grand pas en avant dans le combat pour protéger l'environnement, la théorie économique jette un regard sceptique sur la portée réelle d'un tel accord et le considére comme un geste symbolique. Dans ce mémoire, on montre que la concrétisation finale de l'accord de Kyoto s'arrime aux prédictions théoriques : Kyoto n'est rien de plus que « business‐as‐usual >> et n'impliquera pas de coûts significatifs pour les parties qui ont signé le protocole.     

The clean development mechanism versus international permit trading: The effect on technological change

The clean development mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol may induce technological change in developing countries. As an alternative to the clean development mechanism regime, developing countries may accept a (generous) cap on their own emissions, allow domestic producers to invest in new efficient technologies, and sell the excess emission permits on the international permit market. The purpose of this article is to show how the gains from investment, and hence the incentive to invest in new technology in developing countries, differ between the two alternative regimes. We show that the difference in the gains from investment depends on whether the producers in developing countries face competitive or noncompetitive output markets, whether the investment affects fixed or variable production costs, and whether producers can reduce emissions through means other than investing in new technology.     

Climate Change Taxes and Energy Efficiency in Japan

In 2003 Japan proposed a Climate Change Tax to reduce its CO₂ emissions to the level required by the Kyoto Protocol. If implemented, the tax would be levied on fossil fuel use and the revenue distributed to encourage the purchase of energy efficient equipment. Analysis using the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model shows that this policy is unlikely to bring Japan into compliance with its Kyoto target unless the subsidy encourages improvement in energy intensity well beyond Japan’s recent historical experience. Similar demand-management programs in the US, where there has been extensive experience, have not been nearly as effective as they would need to be to achieve energy efficiency goals of the proposal. The Tax proposal also calls for limits on international emission trading. We find that this limit substantially affects costs of compliance. The welfare loss with full emissions trading is 1/6 that when Japan meets its target though domestic actions only, the carbon price is lower, and there is a smaller loss of energy-intensive exports. Japan can achieve substantial savings from emissions trading even under cases where, for example, the full amount of the Russian allowance is not available in international markets.     

推进河北省市场化节能减排的政策建议

欧盟、日本、美国等发达国家在节能减排方面的经验为河北省推行市场化节能减排提供了很多启示。河北省应进一步建立完善的促进节能减排的市场准入机制、交易机制和退出机制,完善相关法规,健全服务体系,构建宣传体系,推动市场化节能减排顺利进行。     

Russian exports of emission permits under the Kyoto Protocol: The interplay with non-competitive fuel markets

The paper analyses optimal strategies for a country that has market power in an international market for emission permits at the same time as a domestic fuel producer participates in a non-competitive fuel export market. In particular, the effects of coordinating fuel and permit exports are explored. We show that such coordination may either increase or reduce the optimal mark-up on permits, depending on the degree of substitution between alternative fuels.When the fuel market is oligopolistic, coordination of permit and fuel exports may lead to a strategic disadvantage in the fuel market, which makes such coordination unprofitable. However, illustrative numerical simulations suggest that Russia will benefit from coordinating its permit exports with its oil and gas exports during the Kyoto commitment period.     

Spatial and Temporal Efficiency in Climate Policy: Applications of FUND

FUND is an integrated assessment model of the interactions between climate and economy. Nine world regions emit greenhouse gases, and suffer damages from climate change. A number of greenhouse gas emission reduction policies are compared, including optimal and cost-effective strategies, strategies with early and late abatement, and strategies with and without international co-operation. The analyses confirm that co-operation matters, resulting in substantially lower costs or higher welfare. The real commitments of policy targets based on an absolute level (e.g., 1990 emissions) are hard to estimate because of the uncertainties in the baseline. Postponing action conflicts with minimising costs and maximising welfare, but so does sharp emission reduction at the short-term as proposed in the Kyoto Protocol.     

An experiment on emissions trading: the effect of different allocation mechanisms

In theory, efficiency and compliance levels induced by an emission trading system should not depend on the initial allocation mechanism for permits in the absence of transaction costs. In a laboratory experiment we investigate this prediction by comparing frequent and infrequent auctioning as well as two different grandfathering schemes under market rules that closely resemble those of the European Union Emission Trading System. Our experimental results suggest that, contrary to theoretical predictions, the initial allocation procedure has the potential to affect efficiency of the final permit allocation. While we do not identify an effect of the initial allocation procedure itself (auction vs. grandfathering), we observe higher final efficiency after infrequent auctioning of permits than for frequent auctioning. Surprisingly, for a grandfathering scheme that distributes permits proportional to expected needs the high initial efficiency is substantially reduced by secondary market trading. An analysis of behavioral patterns shows that permit prices and abatement levels are initially substantially higher if permits are allocated by auction and we also find more over-banking as compared to the grandfathering treatments. Treatment differences diminish in the course of the experiment.     

CUTTING CARBON EMISSIONS AT A PROFIT (PART II): IMPACTS ON U.S. COMPETITIVENESS AND JOBS

This article examines how an integrated least-cost implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in the United States would affect U.S. competitiveness and jobs. Drawing on previous work, the authors analyze integrated emission reduction strategies based on a $50/ton carbon tax (including border tax adjustments), a payroll tax cut, energy-productivity–oriented market reforms, and international flexibility mechanisms. This policy portfolios is compared to conventional approaches that omit market and fiscal reforms.
Input-output data are used to estimate the impact on export prices of goods and services produced in the United States. Similar data are used to translate changes in GDP and energy production into employment impacts in energy and nonenergy sectors. The costs of providing transitional assistance for workers in the coal industry are compared to the GDP benefits of a profitable Kyoto strategy.
The analysis shows that relative to purchasing international emission rights, productivity-raising domestic market, institutional, and fiscal reforms offer much broader advantages for tradE-exposed U.S. industries. Though allowance purchases alone increase export prices of U.S. manufactured goods and services, an integrated no-regrets strategy reduces export prices for the large majority of U.S. industries and limits the impact of climate protection policies on the few most energy-intensive basic materials industries to very small levels. Relative to the baseline, an integrated least-cost implementation of the Kyoto target increases economy-wide employment levels by several hundred thousand jobs in 2010.     

云南省清洁发展机制项目国际谈判研究

《京都议定书》第12条“清洁发展机制（CDM）”规定,发达国家可以帮助发展中国家实施减排项目,并为自身的可持续发展服务。CDM宣告一个巨大的全球碳排放权交易市场已形成。这对于从事新能源、节能等行业的企业是一个巨大的商机。文章通过分析云南省CDM项目在销售谈判中存在的问题,提出了加强云南省CDM项目国际谈判能力的相关建议。     

How does Japanese compliance with the Kyoto Protocol affect environmental productivity in China and Japan?

The present paper empirically investigates whether competitive pressures and Japanese compliance with the Kyoto Protocol will turn China into a pollution haven. We also analyze how the bilateral division of commodity production stimulates eco-efficiencies (i.e. environmental productivities) in Japan and China and how eco-efficiencies in the respective countries affect each other. Empirical results revealed that competitive pressure and Japanese compliance with the Kyoto Protocol did not contribute to turning China into a pollution haven. We also find that if we focus on national eco-efficiencies, China and Japan are unable to develop a mutually beneficial relationship between the eco-efficiencies in both countries.     

Creating Markets for Air Pollution Control in Europe and the USA

This paper surveys recent efforts to relax the rigid regulatory frameworks for air pollution control in Europe and the USA. European policies have mainly taken the form of bubbles and compensation or offset schemes. Emission trading has been limited to intra-firm solutions for various reasons: industry structure, absence of real scarcity, and too restrictive trading rules. Bubbles have been granted to homogenous sectors only and can be characterized as direct regulation for a group rather than tradable permit systems. By contrast, the sulphur allowance program in the USA has laid down the foundation for a pollution permit market with few formal restrictions. Problems that arise are mainly related to local environmental and public utility controls. Europe can learn from the USA that regular national permit markets could be installed, preferably for homogenous sectors. In designing the permit system, the differences between the USA and Europe in terms of ecosystem sensitivity, stringency of regulation and differentiation of regional environmental policy have to be taken into account.     

Technology Diffusion with Market Power in the Upstream Industry

This paper compares taxes and tradable permits when used to regulate a competitive and polluting downstream industry that can purchase an abatement technology from a monopolistic upstream industry. Second-best policies are derived for the full range of the abatement technology’s emission intensities and marginal abatement costs. The second-best permit quantity can be both above or below the socially optimal emission level. Explicit consideration of the output market provides further insights on how market power distorts the allocation in the downstream industry. The ranking between permits and taxes is ambiguous in general, but taxes weakly dominate permits if full diffusion is socially optimal. In addition, it is analysed how a cap on the permit price affects the diffusion of an abatement technology.     

Construction of legal system of carbon emissions trading in China

Countries in the world have taken a variety of means to control carbon emissions based on the serious situation of global warming,the concept of low-carbon economy and the provisions about emissions in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change（UNFCCC） and the Kyoto Protocol.With the measures of emissions reductions,the system of carbon emissions trading is taking shape.It is necessary for China as the big natural resources consumption country to establish its own carbon emissions trading system.By introducing the carbon emissions trading system of the European Union,America and Japan,and analyzing the market and policies been formed,the carbon emissions trading system in China can be established from the initial configuration of the emissions rights,the subject and object of carbon emissions trading,establishing the carbon emissions trading exchange and supervising and regulating the carbon emissions trading.     

Carbon Trading Reporting: The Case of Spanish Companies

Policy makers, scientists, industry leaders, and academicians all have debated how to restrain global warming and reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Three main methods are used: command and control laws and regulations, carbon taxes, and cap and trade schemes. Recognizing the consequences of global warming, all Scandinavian countries introduced a carbon emissions tax in the 1990s. They also ratified the Kyoto Protocol that ran from 2005 through 2012. The European Union (EU) instituted a carbon trading scheme (Emissions Trading System (ETS)) in February 2005 when Kyoto became operative. The three Scandinavian EU members had two methods in place during the 2005–08 period to encourage GHG reduction: taxing and trading. Norway, not in the EU, used just taxes. The other EU members, including Spain, applied just the carbon trading ETS scheme to encourage compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. The fundamental issue addressed is this one: Did publicly held firms headquartered in Spain adequately report participation in the EU carbon emissions trading mechanism? Data to answer this question were obtained from the 2011 and 2012 annual reports for domestic Spanish public companies that received tradable emissions permits. In addition to assessing investor-owned firms’ disclosure posture, the specific method of reporting about carbon emissions permits, whether companies used, banked, or sold the permits granted by the government, also is reviewed. This empirical research effort reports on a complete survey of all available data for the two financial reporting periods that concluded the second phase of the Kyoto Protocol.