Credible Currency: A Constitutional Perspective

By contrast to private banks, public monetary authorities – central banks and currency boards – have limited credibility in making redemption or fixed-exchange-rate commitments. Their sovereign immunity obviates legal penalties for devaluing, and their monopoly status weakens reputational penalties. The softness of central bank promises invites speculative attack and currency crises. Privatization and decentralization of exchange-rate commitments provides a more credible currency by making redemption commitments legally enforceable and reputable. This contrast sheds light on (1) the breakdown of the classical gold standard and (2) the costs and benefits of dollarization. JEL Classification: E42, H42.     

The 2014–15 Financial Crisis in Russia and the Foundations of Weak Monetary Power Autonomy in the International Political Economy

ABSTRACT

This article contributes to international political economy debates about the monetary power autonomy (MPA) of emerging market and developing countries (EMDs). The 2014–15 Russian financial crisis is used as a case study to explore why an accumulation of large international reserves does not provide protection against currency crises and macroeconomic adjustments in EMDs. The analysis centres on the interplay between two dimensions of MPA: the Power to Delay and the Power to Deflect adjustment costs. Two structural factors condition Russia’s low MPA. First, the country’s subordinated integration in global financial markets increases its financial vulnerability. The composition of external assets and liabilities, combined with cross-border capital flows, restrict the use of international reserves to delay currency crises. Second, the choice of a particular macroeconomic policy regime embraced the financialisation of the – mainly state-owned – Russian banking sector, thus making it difficult to transform liquidity inflows into credits for enterprises. Russia’s main comparative advantage, hydrocarbon export revenues, is not exploited. The type of economy created due to the post-Communist transition means that provided ‘excessive’ liquidity remains in the financial system and is channelled into currency arbitrage. This factor increases exchange rate vulnerability and undermines Russia’s MPA.     

UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCE AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF EXCHANGE RATE PEGS

It is commonly thought that an open economy can accommodate output shocks through either exchange rate or real sector adjustments. We formalize this notion by incorporating unemployment persistence into a two‐sided escape clause model of currency crises. We show that unemployment persistence makes a currency peg more fragile and undermines the credibility of the monetary authority in a dynamic setting. The fragility is captured by a devaluation premium in expectations that increases the average inflation rate when the currency peg is more vulnerable to ‘busts’ than ‘booms’. This interaction between macroeconomic and microeconomic rigidities suggests that a policy reform can only be consistent if it renders either exchange rates or the economy more flexible.     

Comparing Capital- and Trade-weighted Measures of Australia's Effective Exchange Rate

Effective exchange-rate overvaluation is considered a leading indicator of currency crises. Yet, existing measures of nominal and real effective exchange rates focus on international trade in goods and neglect the importance of international trade in assets. This article develops a range of alternative effective exchange-rate indices for the Australian dollar, based mostly on international investment stocks and flows. Capital-weighted exchange-rate measures of the Australian dollar, in nominal and real terms, reveal a stronger exchange rate over recent decades than suggested by the standard measure. Similar measures for other currencies could improve understanding of exchange-rate behaviour.     

Money power of Capital and Production of ‘New State Spaces’: A View from the Global South

An array of innovative financial and monetary institutional and policy initiatives recently emerged across the Global South at various spatial scales: (1) the deployment of national ‘self-insurance’ strategies such as large foreign reserve accumulation, different forms of capital controls, and currency market interventions; (2) the multiplication of bilateral, sub-regional, and regional financial and monetary mechanisms, including currency swaps and reserve-pooling arrangements, credit lines, bilateral aid, and development finance; and (3) a growing participation and assertiveness in multilateral financial arrangements. After critically reviewing the existing literatures – the international political economy (IPE) of ‘policy space’ and the IPE of ‘financial statecraft’ – the paper deploys a ‘scalar-relational’ critical IPE approach and interprets these policy initiatives in terms of a crisis-driven production of ‘new state spaces’ across the Global South, in the context of the current period of credit-led capital accumulation. The paper argues that this process has been characterised by the contradictory extension, intensification and growing complexity of the tasks taken on by the capitalist state at various scale levels, resulting in the increasing entanglement of state power in the nested hierarchy of monetary relations, from the global scale to bodies and subjectivities.     

A contribution to the empirics of convergence in real GDP growth: the role of financial crises and exchange-rate regimes

This paper investigates the convergence in real gross domestic product growth focusing on the impact of financial crises (i.e. banking crises, currency crises and debt crises) and nominal exchange-rate regimes (i.e. fixed, intermediate and flexible) on convergence. To that end, we compute four convergence indicators (σ-convergence, γ-convergence, absolute β-convergence and conditional β-convergence) for 163 countries classified into four income groups during the period 1970–2011. The results suggest that (i) there is evidence in favour of σ-convergence and γ-convergence only for high-income countries; (ii) absolute and conditional β-convergence are present in each of the four income groups of the countries under study; (iii) exchange-rate regimes seem to play some role in upper-middle and lower-middle-income countries; and (iv) financial crises have a negative and significant impact on GDP growth independently of the income level of the countries.     

Open-Economy Macroeconomics: Developments in Theory and Policy

This paper views developments in open-economy macroeconomics through the lens of the debate over European monetary unification. The empirical tendency for nominal exchange rate regimes to affect the variability of nominal and real exchange rates alike can be rationalized by sticky-price theories or models of asset-market liquidity effects. But plausible liquidity models have difficulty generating enough persistence to match the data. Thus, the macroeconomic stabilization costs of forgoing the exchange-rate realignment option seem pertinent. It is argued that our theories of efficiencies due to a common currency remain unsatisfactory, despite recent advances. The paper concludes by reviewing theories of currency crisis     

Inflationary Expectations, Variable Output, and Exchange-Rate Dynamics

This paper develops a model of exchange-rate dynamics characterized by inflationary expectations held with perfect foresight, sticky wages, and sluggish output adjustment. In this framework monetary expansion initially lowers interest rates because of sluggish output and price adjustment but quite surprisingly produces exchange-rate overshooting or undershooting. Moreover, after its initial depreciation in the overshooting case, the domestic currency temporarily appreciates beyond its new long-run equilibrium level. In the undershooting case, the home currency temporarily appreciates away from its new long-run equilibrium level. Finally, the dynamic real exchange rate-real interest rate relationship at times becomes inverse.     

Liberalisation,Financial Risk,and Formal Financial Participation in Pakistan: Hyperinflationary Microeconomic Responses to Moderate Volatility in a Developing Economy

With formal financial inclusion much lower than its neighbours, Pakistan has been the focus of intensive efforts to ‘bank’ the ‘unbanked’. Yet, after a drop in deposits in the wake of Pakistan’s 2008 crisis, deposits are still struggling to return to their mid-1990s’ levels. Focusing on distortions in the banking sector, the Central Bank attributes this to ‘crowding out’ amidst a steep rise in the propensity to consume. This study draws on extensive fieldwork, identifying heightened financial risk driven by multifaceted monetary instability since the liberalisation of the rupee and of Pakistani markets. It proposes that heightened monetary risk has translated into a broad-based shift out of the rupee akin to hyperinflationary responses, but revealed in relatively moderate monetary conditions. It argues that, exposed to global markets, national currency itself has become a risky asset, pushing store-of-value and transactional holdings into unconventional liquid assets. This suggests that monetary stability, expressed in the currency itself and in broader pricing patterns in the economy, is key to the uptake of financial intermediation. The issue at the root of disintermediation in Pakistan, it is argued, is less one of ‘crowding out’ than of disruption to the role of national currency as money itself.     

A corporate balance-sheet approach to currency crises

This paper presents a general equilibrium currency crisis model of the ‘third generation’, in which the possibility of currency crises is driven by the interplay between private firms’ credit-constraints and nominal price rigidities. Despite our emphasis on microfoundations, the model remains sufficiently simple that the policy analysis can be conducted graphically. The analysis hinges on four main features (i) ex post deviations from purchasing power parity; (ii) credit constraints a la Bernanke-Gertler; (iii) foreign currency borrowing by domestic firms; (iv) a competitive banking sector lending to firms and holding reserves and a monetary policy conducted either through open market operations or short-term lending facilities. We derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a sunspot equilibrium with currency crises. We show that an interest rate increase intended to support the currency in a crisis may not be effective, but that a relaxation of short-term lending facilities can make this policy effective by attenuating the rise in interest rates relevant to firms.     

中心国金融危机与国际货币体系更替之间的联系

中心国金融危机与国际货币体系更替之间存在密切联系,当国际货币体系的中心国霸权地位开始逐步下降后,会带来外围国家对其货币作为储备货币的信心下降并诱发中心国储备货币信心危机的发生。从历史来看,中心国出现储备货币信心危机通常还不是货币体系更替的标志性事件,只有当中心国出现主权债务危机时,旧的国际货币体系才会到达终点。当前中国作为外围国家,应重点关注中心国美国的国债市场变化趋势,从而选择正确的应对措施。     

OUTLOOK FOR THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION: THE MESSAGE FROM EASTERN EUROPE

The European Community (EC) seems headed toward monetary union, either with "permanently" fixed exchange rates or with a common currency. Ceteris paribus, the breakup of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe makes monetary union less desirable. One can expect further shocks from the East. Analyzing stock markets' reactions to events in the East from late 1988 to early 1990 shows that these shocks typically differentially affect EC members, particularly Germany. These differential shocks often call for adjustments in relative national price levels, which can be accomplished most easily with exchange-rate adjustments. The likelihood of such pressures reduces the credibility of a system of pegged rates and makes the system more vulnerable to speculative runs. A common currency is more credible by its nature but may give an inflationary bias to the European Monetary Union.     

Theorizing the Financial Statecraft of Emerging Powers

‘Financial statecraft’, or the intentional use of credit, investment and currency levers by the incumbent governments of creditor – and sometimes debtor – states for both international economic and political advantage, has a long history, ranging from money doctors to currency wars. A neorealist, zero-sum framing of international monetary relations is not inevitable, yet casts a persistent shadow especially during periods of prospective interstate power transitions when previously peripheral countries find themselves with unexpected new capabilities. This article seeks to understand and theorise the financial statecraft of emerging economies, moving beyond the traditional understanding that closely identifies the concept with financial sanctions imposed by a strong state on a weaker state. We propose that the aims of financial statecraft may be either ‘defensive' or ‘offensive’. Financial statecraft may be targeted either ‘bilaterally' or ‘systemically’. Finally such statecraft may employ instruments that are either ‘financial' or ‘monetary’. As emerging market economies have moved up in the ranks in the interstate distribution of capabilities, they have also expanded their financial statecraft strategies from narrowly defensive and bilateral to those involving offensive tactics and targeted at the global and systemic level. Historical and contemporary examples illustrate the analysis.     

Economic Volatility and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Countries

Economic volatility has increased drastically in the age of financial liberalization. The tendency among mainstream economists has been to explain this trend by government misdeeds and various market imperfections. For instance, government overspending was the main culprit in the first generation models of currency crises. Following the Asian crisis the emphasis shifted onto capital flow reversals, and arguments based on the ‘moral hazard’ problems began to replace the emphasis on the monetized government deficits. This paper outlines an explanation of economic volatility that is not based on moral hazard problems or other market distortions. Two stylized facts associated with the aftermath of financial and capital account liberalization are singled out for emphasis and brought together in the context of a macroeconomic framework that draws from Keynes’ Treatise. These are: (i) liquidity preference becomes intertwined with currency substitution, producing a macroeconomic destabilizer that explains procyclical changes in bank credit independently of moral hazard problems; and (ii) asset prices become fairly easy to predict, stimulating destabilizing ‘trend’ speculation by foreign investors, which means that profit seeking and market rationality might lie behind erratic shifts in capital flows.     

Liquidity and Twin Crises

This paper proposes a simple analytical framework for understanding 'twin crises'– i.e. crises where a currency crisis and banking crisis occur simultaneously and reinforce each other. The distinguishing feature of such crises is the spill‐over effects across financial institutions through collateral constraints, declines in market values of assets, currency mismatches on the balance sheet and the endogenous amplification of financial distress through asset sales. We explore the role of liquidity and the role of monetary policy in such crises. In particular, a central question is whether raising interest rates in the face of a twin crisis is the appropriate policy response. Raising interest rates has two countervailing effects. Holding the domestic currency becomes more attractive (other things being equal), but the value of the domestic banking system falls due to the fall in asset prices. When assets are marked to market, there is a potential for endogenously generated financial distress that leads to a collapse of asset prices, as well as the exchange rate. It is thus possible that raising interest rates can have the perverse effect of exacerbating both the currency crisis and the banking crisis.     

The Asian Currency Crises: Vulnerability, Contagion, or Unsustainability

The Asian currency crises have been introduced by many economists as evidence that almost any country could be vulnerable to speculative attacks and to contagion effects, even with apparently good economic fundamentals. These financial crises have also been interpreted by other economists as rational market reactions to the unsustainability of domestic macroeconomic policies or structural weaknesses. The objective of this paper is to evaluate the relative importance of macroeconomic unsustainability, financial vulnerability, and crisis contagion in a model that explains and predicts the Asian currency crises. Out-of-sample forecasts based on two-stage panel and logit regressions provide evidence of a pure contagion effect, which significantly worsened the crises. They also show that Indonesia was the only one of the six Asian nations examined (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand) that was in an unsustainable economic situation, and that the other five nations were only vulnerable to a currency crisis.     

Partial Delegation in a Model of Currency Crisis

This paper shows that, in a fixed exchange-rate system with an escape clause, delegating the decision on the magnitude of realignment to an inflation-averse central banker reduces the range of realignment costs for which the policy-maker necessarily devalues. Stressing the influence of devaluation expectations on currency crises, it is also shown that this strategy of delegation reduces the width of the multiple equilibria zone within which self-fulfilling crises occur, thus promoting further the exchange-rate system's stability. The higher the central banker's degree of inflation aversion, the greater is this reduction.     

A modern reincarnation of Mundell-Fleming's trilemma

A modern incarnation of the trilemma is essential for understanding the evolving global financial architecture, and for coming up with ways to mitigate financial fragility. The scarcity of policy instruments relative to the policy goals implies complex country-specific tradeoffs between the policy goals. The financial crises of the 1990s induced Emerging markets to converge to trilemma's middle ground -- managed exchange-rate flexibility, controlled financial integration, and viable but limited monetary independence. Capital flight crises added financial stability to trilemma's policy goals. New policies were added to deal with financial fragility associated with financial integration, including precautionary management of international reserves by emerging markets, swap lines among OECD's central banks, and macroeconomic prudential regulations. These trade-offs are impacted by a country's balance sheet exposure to hard currencies, the exchange-rate regime, and the growing sensitivity to shocks emanating from the U.S. and the Eurozone in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis.     

基于货币需求的货币替代研究——以台湾为例

台湾曾经是日本的殖民地,且因地理位置的关系,所以日本一直都是台湾的主要贸易国家,以致于长期对台湾货币体系及外汇市场的影响力不亚于美国。然而过去对于台湾货币需求的研究,多半以美国作为主要对象国家来研究。现如今民众可多元地持有国际性资产,单一探讨美国的影响或许不够全面。本文根据1985-2008年的资料,研究美国和日本的货币性冲击对台湾货币需求的影响。首先通过台湾对美、日的贸易比重,编制有效汇率和有效利率,作为衡量来自两国货币性冲击的依据。其次以向量误差修正模型进行分析,找出台湾货币需求的长期均衡关系,发现台湾的货币需求与本国产出、本国利率、美日两国有效利率及有效汇率等存在显著长期均衡关系。简言之,台湾货币体系对来自美国和日本的干扰因素,具有高度的敏感性。     

Testing for the effect of current-account ‘news’ on exchange rates: A critique

Dornbusch (1980) has observed a correlation between unexpected exchange-rate changes and unexpected current account balances, which he interprets as evidence in favor of the ‘news’ hypothesis of exchange-rate determination. It is shown here that his test is flawed by simultaneity problem.