私营企业职工参与系统的和谐性分析

我国私营企业职工参与系统的和谐性较差.要实现私营企业职工参与系统的和谐,就要进行企业产权制度改革.     

私营企业职工参与系统的和谐性分析

我国私营企业职工参与系统的和谐性较差。要实现私营企业职工参与系统的和谐,就要进行企业产权制度改革。     

论家族制私营企业的制度缺陷与创新

我国私营企业大都采用的家族治理模式中的制度缺陷,成为阻碍私营企业发展的重要因素。文章认为,家族制私营企业治理制度创新的目标是建立产权制度、管理制度的创新,其主要包括治理主体的创新与治理机制的创新。     

职工参与三种模式的产权制度分析

产权制度是一个历史的范畴,经历了从古典产权制度到现代产权制度的转化过程。从股东主权-集体谈判模式、共同治理模式和工人自治管理模式这三种职工参与模式所依存的产权基础来看,分别属于过渡期两权分离式的产权制度和现代产权制度。产权制度由古典向现代产权制度变革的过程实质就是职工参与由低级向高级、由表面向实质、由部分向全面演变的一个过程。     

以私营企业为参照系:论国有企业的制度成本

该文以私营企业为参照系,运用制度经济学的理论和方法,分析了国有企业运行的制度成本。国有企业的产权制度内生了高昂的制度成本,具体包括:内生技术效率低下、内生高昂的监管成本、内生投资无人负责和短期行为以及内生不公平的市场竞争环境。     

私营企业产权制度变迁问题研究

一、现存产权制度安排的制约 (一)产权问题 产权模糊,交易成本高。在私营企业,产权模糊现象极为普遍。一方面,相当大部分以家庭或家族为单位建立起来的私营企业,产权界区在家庭之间或家族之间界定,但在家     

现代产权制度的战略地位、基本原则和内涵

建立现代产权制度是构建社会主义市场经济体制的一项基础性工作,为此,本文分析了建立现代制度的基本原则,并对现代产权制度的基本内涵重新作了界定.     

深化股份合作制企业产权制度改革的思考

股份合作制的企业形式为国有、集体中小企业产权制度改革提供了一种较为适宜的范式 ,为数众多的中小企业产权制度改革都采用了股份合作制的形式。改制后的企业产权明晰 ,职工的劳动成果与个人劳动报酬和股权收益直接挂钩 ,激发了职工群众的劳动热情和创造精神 ,提高了职工的资产责任感 ,为企业制造出显著的经济效益。但股份合作制实行以后的一段时间 ,由于这一制度的内在缺陷而引发出诸多的问题 ,给中小企业发展造成不利影响。深化股份合作制企业的产权制度改革又成了我们所面临的新课题。一、股份合作制企业现有的问题及原因分析前几年中小…     

鹰潭:"二换一新"创奇效

自2000年5月份起,江西省鹰潭市在全市国有企业中全面推进"二换一新"的产权制度改革,即通过以出让产权、股份经营、破产重组为主要形式的产权制度改革,使国有企业产权由单一投资主体向多元投资主体转换;采用一次性安置的办法置换原国有企业职工身份,把企业职工彻底推向市场;建立起产权清晰、权责明确、政企分开、管理科学的新的现代企业制度,使企业真正成为自主经营、自负盈亏、自我发展、自我约束的法人实体和市场竞争主体.     

私营企业产权制度的缺陷与改革

私营企业的制度缺陷已经严重制约了企业的扩张与发展，产权不清造成的种种矛盾已日益显现，如华晨汽车与仰融。要使私营经济发展更上一层楼，产权制度的改革已势在必行。     

Property rights protection and access to bank loans

Poor protection of private property has limited the access to bank loans by private enterprises in developing and transition economies. Under those circumstances, private entrepreneurs have resorted to various ways of enhancing the de facto protection of private property. Using a dataset of 3,073 private enterprises in China, this paper empirically investigates the impact of political participation and philanthropic activities – informal substitutes for the lack of formal protection of private property – on the access to bank loans.     

Minimum participation rules for the provision of public goods

This paper considers the endogenous formation of an institution to provide a public good. If the institution governs only its members, players have an incentive to free ride on the institution formation of others and the social dilemma is simply shifted to a higher level. Addressing this second-order social dilemma, we study the effectiveness of three different minimum participation requirements: (1) full participation/unanimity rule; (2) partial participation; (3) unanimity first and in case of failure partial participation. While unanimity is most effective once established, one might suspect that a weaker minimum participation rule is preferable in practice as it might facilitate the formation of the institution. The data of our laboratory experiment do not support this latter view, though. In fact, weakening the participation requirement does not increase the number of implemented institutions. Thus, we conclude that the most effective participation requirement is the unanimity rule which leaves no room for free riding on either level of the social dilemma.     

Participatory institutions: The context of common and private property resources

Participation is the initiation and continuance of an active process by which beneficiary groups influence the direction and execution of development activity. In the context of resource management participatory institutions often present an alternative when the market and/or the state fail to maintain resource stocks at desirable levels. This paper presents two case-studies of the emergence of participatory institutions and builds up analytical models that explain the process of their evolution in an inter-temporal framework.It is shown that the evolution, sustenance and replication of participation and its impact on levels of resource conservation depends on (a) the nature of the links between common and private property resources, (b) the possibility of taking advantage of scale economies, and finally (c) the distributional rules and arrangements.     

国有化改制后的民营企业内部管理问题探讨

民营企业国有化改制是国家产业结构调整中的重要组成部分。民营企业有自己的技术市场等竞争优势,但也存在着一些延续的固有缺陷以及改制前后管理模式上冲突等问题。多家企业实地调查研究得出：民营企业国有化后应明确企业发展战略、优化组织结构、健全制度建设、建立持续的人才培养机制等才能解决企业管理之困。     

生态产权制度建设与我国生态环境保护

文章认为,我国生态资源效率低下根源于＂公＂权,但提高其效率的出路未必就在于＂私＂权化。因此,在我国生态产权制度改革中,既要引入激励性机制,建立市场化的生态环境公共产权规制,又要打破传统＂公有＂—＂公用＂—＂公营＂中的＂公用＂、＂公营＂生态资源运行范式,把使用权和经营权按生态资源公共性、外部性做技术性分离,明确使用权和经营权各自的权能,引入民营企业、外资企业等非国有企业参与生态产权的经营和竞争,使国有企业从部分生态资源的经营领域退出,形成多元化、市场化的生态资源经营制度和生态产权混合型管理模式,实现我国生态环境的有效保护。     

民营企业参与城市公用事业PPP项目的影响因素研究*

本文以５个参与城市公用事业PPP项目的民营企业为案例研究对象，提炼出民营企业参与城市公用事业PPP项目的11个主要影响因素，即投资回报率、运营效率、政策法规、政府承诺缺失、公平竞争、风险分配、政企关系、政府观念、风险评估、企业家机会识别和技术管理经验。基于解释结构模型法，本文构建了民营企业参与城市公用事业PPP项目影响因素的多级递阶结构模型（EGM），归纳出影响民营企业参与度的三要素（市场主导型因素、政府主导型因素和企业主导型因素）及其内在的逻辑架构，并从政府层面和企业层面提出提高民营企业参与度的建议。     

The Emergence of “Modern” Ownership Rights Rather than Property Rights

There are a number of analytical conundrums in the neo-classical theory of the emergence of private ownership rights, which is closely associated with Demsetz’s works. Reconsidering the internal logic of private ownership rights, the paper argues that, first, the emergence of “modern” private ownership rights should be the subject of analysis rather than ownership rights per se. Second, at least for some latecomer countries, modern ownership rights typically emerge when feudalistic multi-layered proprietary rights over land are abolished and replaced by ownership rights for the purpose of ensuring tax revenue, prompted by pressure from and/or the intrusion of a colonial power, rather than as an efficient response to changes in resource prices. Third, the socio-economic aspect of ownership rights that related to the manner of social formation tended to be concealed in the universal aspect of private property rights that focuses on the materialistic relation between a person and a thing. These arguments urge the bringing of social relations into the basic layer of analysis of ownership rights theory, as the original institutional economists such as Ely and Commons considered.     

企业培训策略选择的博弈分析

企业对员工进行培训,可以提高员工的生产率,从而为企业带来更丰厚的利润,然而却又面临着员工跳槽的风险.企业为了挽留经过培训的员工,给予其较高的薪资待遇,结果给企业带来巨大的成本,甚至仍然留不住关键人才.笔者运用信号博弈的方法分析企业在员工培训方面的决策问题,得出多种均衡结果.     

非正式制度视角下的集群企业信誉机制

产业集群中的企业信誉是保证产业集群有序运作的前提,要保证企业间高效的合作就必须有强有力的制度保障。与科层组织的信誉机制不同,产业集群中企业间的信任和合作主要是依靠非正式制度。文章从关系性嵌入、专用性投资,以及联合制裁三个方面对此问题进行了阐释。文章的结论是,产业集群中特有的信誉机制是导致产业集群竞争优势的一个重要原因。     

Information and the persistence of private-order contract enforcement institutions: An experimental analysis

We study an experimental market in which some sellers are prone to moral hazard, and in which a private-order contract enforcement institution exists that can mediate trade and prevent sellers from reneging on their contractual obligations. Using the institution to resolve the moral-hazard problem is costly. We demonstrate that in this market, the utilization of the private-order contract enforcement institution may make public and private market signals uninformative and inhibit learning. We study whether this potential information externality can limit adaptation away from the private-order institution when it is efficient to do so. Consistent with theory, we find inefficient persistence when the institution is used, but by contrast, efficient adaptation in other situations. Providing information to individuals who are using the private-order institution allows them to partially adapt.