Earnings inequality and the business cycle

Economists have long viewed recessions as contributing to increasing inequality. However, this conclusion is largely based on data from a period in which inequality was increasing over time. This paper examines the connection between long-run trends and cyclical variation in earnings inequality. We develop a model in which cyclical and trend inequality are related, and find that in our model, recessions tend to amplify long-run trends, i.e. they involve more rapidly increasing inequality when long-run inequality is increasing, and more rapidly decreasing inequality when long-run inequality is decreasing. In support of this prediction, we present evidence that during the first half of the 20th century, when earnings inequality was generally declining, earnings disparities indeed appeared to fall more rapidly in downturns, at least among workers at the top of the earnings distribution.     

OCCUPATIONAL AND INDUSTRY SPECIFICITY OF HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE BRITISH LABOUR MARKET

This paper builds on the recent literature on the importance of occupational and industry experience on wages and extends Kambourov and Manovskii's (2002) study using British data. Occupational experience is estimated to make a significant contribution to wage growth, while the evidence on industry specificity is not very supportive. The second contribution of the paper is that it assesses whether there is heterogeneity in the estimated returns to work experience across one-digit industries and occupations. The findings suggest that industry and occupational experience is important for individuals in professional and managerial jobs or jobs in the banking and finance sector.     

Shirking in a monetary business cycle model

Abstract .  This paper investigates whether a limited participation model with imperfectly observed effort can reproduce the economy's responses to a monetary policy shock without appealing to high labour supply elasticities or high markups. The results demonstrate that the presence of imperfectly observed effort, in combination with the limited participation assumption, allows the model to account for the presence of involuntary unemployment, nominal wage rigidity, and the observed responses to monetary policy shocks.     

Informal self-employment and macroeconomic fluctuations

Informal self-employment is a major source of employment in developing countries. Its cyclical behavior is important to our understanding of the functioning of LDC labor markets, but turns out to be surprisingly complex. We develop a flexible model with two sectors: a formal salaried (tradable) sector that may be affected by wage rigidities, and an informal (non tradable) self-employment sector faced with liquidity constraints to entry. This labor market is then embedded in a standard small economy macro model. We show that different types of shocks interact with different institutional contexts to produce distinct patterns of comovement between key variables of the model: relative salaried/self-employed incomes, relative salaried/self-employed sector sizes and the real exchange rate. Model predictions are then tested empirically for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. We confirm episodes where the expansion of informal self-employment is consistent with the traditional segmentation views of informality. However, we also identify episodes where informal self-employment behaves “pro-cyclically”; here, informality is driven by relative demand or productivity shocks to the non tradable sector.     

Specific investments, holdup, and the outside option principle

According to the outside option principle the holdup problem can be solved when the non-investor has a binding outside option. The investor then becomes residual claimant, creating efficient investment incentives. This paper reports about an experiment designed to test this. We find that when the outside option is binding investment levels fall short of the efficient level, but holdup is less of a problem than predicted when the outside option is non-binding.     

Implementing the Mortensen rule in a frictional labor market

We show that, in settings where meetings can be multilateral, the allocation rule proposed by Mortensen (1982) can be relatively straightforward to implement: as a local auction conducted by sellers. The implications of using this mechanism in a simple model of the labor market are then explored. We characterize the equilibrium properties of this model, which include wage dispersion, and examine its implied Beveridge curve. A dynamic version of the model is calibrated to the US labor market, and we show that the model can account for observed vacancy rates, given parameters that are chosen to match the average wages and the natural rate of unemployment, although the implied wage dispersion is quite small. Finally, in the limit, as the time between offer rounds in the model approaches zero, the equilibrium approaches the Walrasian competitive equilibrium.     

The contribution of domestic, regional and international factors to Latin America's business cycle

This paper quantifies the relative contribution of domestic, regional and international factors to the fluctuation of domestic output in six key Latin American (LA) countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru. Using quarterly data over the period 1980:1-2003:4, a multi-variate, multi-country time series model was estimated to study the economic interdependence among LA countries and, in addition, between each of them and the three world largest industrial economies: the US, the Euro Area and Japan. Falsifying a common suspicion, it is shown that the proportion of LA countries' domestic output variability explained by industrial countries' factors is modest. By contrast, domestic and regional factors account for the main share of output variability at all simulation horizons. The implications for the choice of the exchange rate regime are also discussed.     

TRAINING, JOB SECURITY AND INCENTIVE WAGES

This paper considers the optimal level of firm‐specific training by taking into account the positive effect of training on the expected duration of workers' current employment. In the framework of an efficiency wage model, a short expected job tenure represents a disamenity that reduces the penalty from shirking. As this disamenity increases, workers have an incentive to continue providing a positive level of effort only if they are compensated by a higher wage. We endogenize the employment separation rate by introducing firm‐specific training. Firm‐specific training creates a rent that is lost if the worker is separated from the firm. As a result, the firm will be more reluctant to fire its trained workforce in a recession. This implies that firm‐specific training can decrease current wages because it represents a commitment to lower future labour turnover.     

Competition, human capital and income inequality with limited commitment

We develop a dynamic model with two-sided limited commitment to study how barriers to competition, such as restrictions to business start-up and non-competitive covenants, affect the incentive to accumulate human capital. When contracts are not enforceable, high barriers lower the outside value of ‘skilled workers’ and reduce the incentive to accumulate human capital. In contrast, low barriers can result in over-accumulation of human capital. This can be socially optimal if there are positive spillovers. A calibration exercise shows that this mechanism can account for a sizable portion of cross-country income inequality.     

Economic transition, higher education and worker productivity in China

We investigate the role of education on worker productivity and firms' total factor productivity using a panel of firm-level data from China. We estimate the returns to education by calculating the marginal productivity of workers of different education levels based on estimates of the firm-level production function. We also estimate how the education level of workers and CEO contributes to firms' total factor productivity. Estimated marginal products are much higher than wages, and the gap is larger for highly educated workers. Our estimate shows that an additional year of schooling raises marginal product by 30.1%, and that CEO's education increases TFP for foreign-invested firms. Estimates vary substantially across ownership classes, the effect of schooling on productivity being highest in foreign-invested firms. We infer that market mechanisms contribute to a more efficient use of human capital within firms.     

A microfoundation for increasing returns in human capital accumulation and the under-participation trap

This paper considers educational investment, wages and hours of market work in an imperfectly competitive labour market with heterogeneous workers and home production. It investigates the degree to which there might be both underemployment in the labour market and underinvestment in education. A central insight is that the ex post participation decision of workers endogeneously generates increasing marginal returns to education. Although equilibrium implies underinvestment in education, optimal policy is not to subsidise education. Instead it is to subsidise labour market participation which we argue might be efficiently targeted as state-provided childcare support.     

Entrepreneurship over the business cycle

The fraction of self-employed rises in recessions because wage work is more sensitive than self-employment to the business cycle, not because of necessity entrepreneurship. Graduating during a recession reduces the probability of starting a business for the next 11 years.     

The welfare costs of union wage compression

This paper calculates the quantitative significance of the welfare costs of union wage compression. This is done in a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations where agents choose both schooling (human capital) and assets (physical capital). The labor market in this model is characterized as a right-to-manage contract, which allows unions to compress wage differentials between high- and low-skilled workers, by implementing a binding minimum wage. This paper shows that when labor markets are competitive even low levels of wage compression lead to large welfare losses, since wage compression creates costly unemployment among low-skilled workers. The effect of wage compression on the supply of skilled labor, however, is rather small, since the disincentive effect of a lower, high-skilled wage is, to a large extent, offset by a lower opportunity cost of schooling due to higher unemployment.     

THE SPOT MARKET MATTERS: EVIDENCE ON IMPLICIT CONTRACTS FROM BRITAIN

Based on the methodology of Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) , this paper investigates the relative importance of the spot market and implicit contracts in the determination of British real wages. Empirical work is carried out separately for males and females with individual-level data taken from the New Earnings Survey Panel for the years 1976–2001. In contrast to previous studies that used North American data, the spot market is found to be more important than implicit contracts in determining real wages, although we do find some support for contracting effects. Further evidence is provided through the analysis of individual wage sequences. These suggest that the downwardly rigid wage sequences implied by implicit contracts with costless worker mobility are not prevalent in Britain.     

Employment shifts, economic reform and the changes in public/private sector wages in Mexico: 1987–1997

Over the last decade, the public sector in Mexico experienced substantial fiscal reform, divestiture of public enterprises, and the elimination of many regulations affecting pay and employment. This study analyzes the changes in the public/private sector differences in wages during the 1987–1997 period. The results from analyzing microdata from the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano show that relative public sector wages increased from 1987 to 1997. Most of the relative wage increase in the public sector can be explained by increases in the price of skills and by changes in sorting across sectors. The results have important public policy implications since they suggest that public sector workers earn more and their wages have grown faster than those of their private sector counterparts. As such, policies contemplating public sector reform should take into account the effect of these measures on the inter-sectoral income distribution and the overall economic growth. First version received: April 2000/Final version received: December 2000     

Employment, wages, and the economic cycle: Differences between immigrants and natives

In this paper, we analyse differences in the cyclical pattern of employment and wages of immigrants and natives for two large immigrant receiving countries, Germany and the UK. We show that, despite large differences in their immigrant populations, there are similar and significant differences in cyclical responses between immigrants and natives in both countries, even conditional on education, age, and location. We decompose changes in outcomes into a secular trend and a business cycle component. We find significantly larger unemployment responses to economic shocks for low-skilled workers relative to high-skilled workers and for immigrants relative to natives within the same skill group. There is little evidence for differential wage responses to economic shocks. We offer three explanations for these findings: an equilibrium search model, where immigrants experience higher job separation rates, a model of dual labour markets, and differences in the complementarity of immigrants and natives to capital.