Managerial compensation and the underinvestment problem

This paper studies the effect of managerial compensation terms on the well-known “underinvestment” incentive. We extend the Mauer and Ott (2000) real-option model of corporate expansion, and show that, when the manager maximizes the value of his compensation package (rather than equity value), the underinvestment problem can be substantially mitigated. Further, by designing an appropriate compensation contract, it is possible to eliminate the underinvestment incentive altogether. This managerial contract, consisting of fixed salary and equity ownership, is explicitly derived in the model. The equity ownership level is found to be an increasing function of the manager's fixed salary and the company's earnings growth rate, and a decreasing function of leverage ratio, earnings volatility, tax rate, bankruptcy costs, and the manager's severance pay at bankruptcy.     

Insolvency regimes and firms' default risk under economic uncertainty and shocks

One of the arguments often advanced for implementing a stronger insolvency and bankruptcy framework is that it enhances credit discipline among firms. Using a large cross-country firm-level dataset, we empirically test whether a stronger insolvency regime reduces firms' likelihood of defaulting on their debt. In particular, we examine whether it reduces default risk during increased economic uncertainty and various external shocks. Our results confirm that a stronger insolvency regime moderates the adverse effects of economic shocks on firms' default risk. The effects are more pronounced for firms in the top half of the size distribution. We also explore channels through which improved creditor rights influence firms' default risk, including dependence on external finance, corporate leverage, and managerial ethics. Our main results are robust to an alternative measure of default risk, inclusion of currency and sovereign debt crisis episodes, and alternative estimations.     

Optimal personal bankruptcy design under moral hazard

In this paper, we develop a normative theory of unsecured consumer credit and personal bankruptcy based on the optimal trade-off between incentives and insurance. First, in order to characterize this trade-off, we solve a dynamic moral hazard problem in which agents' private effort decisions influence the life-cycle profiles of their earnings. We then show how the optimal allocation of individual effort and consumption can be implemented in a market equilibrium in which (i) agents and intermediaries repeatedly trade secured and unsecured debt instruments, and (ii) agents obtain (restricted) discharge of their unsecured debts in bankruptcy. The structure of this equilibrium and the associated restrictions on debt discharge closely match the main qualitative features of personal credit markets and bankruptcy law that actually exist in the United States.     

Bankruptcy in the pulp and paper industry: market’s reaction and prediction

This paper examines North American pulp and paper company bankruptcies that occurred between 1990 and 2009. We demonstrate that shareholders suffer substantial losses (37 %) during the month a bankruptcy occurs. Encouragingly, we show that financial ratios are useful in predicting firm failure and that failed firms are less profitable, more liquidity constrained and higher in debt leverage. Using a binary logit model in the spirit of Ohlson (J Acc Res, 19, 109–131, 1980), we predict financial distress for pulp and paper firms 1 to 2 years ahead of the bankruptcy. We also adapt and re-estimate the empirical model on a sample of pulp and paper firms and perform in-sample and out-of-sample forecasts. For the out-of-sample analysis, our re-estimated Ohlson models correctly predict 93 % of bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy outcomes.     

Counterparty effects on capital structure decision in incomplete market

This paper builds a static contingent-claim model that allows for examining the optimal capital structure with the joint arguments of counterparty default risk and market incompleteness. A first-passage-time model with jump default barrier is adopted to capture the counterparty effects on the pricing of defaultable claims. Following the framework of Jarrow and Yu (2001), the jump in primary firm's bankruptcy barrier is designed as the loss on capital resulted from secondary firm's bankruptcy. The relevance of market incompleteness in the context of claim-pricing is considered using “good-deal asset price bound” method by Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000). We show that the effects of counterparty's default clearly diminish the uses of debt, which indirectly explains the so-called under-leveraged puzzle. We further find that counterparty effects on capital structure are sensitive to market incompleteness and firm's characteristics, such as tax rate and bankruptcy cost rate.     

BANKRUPTCY AND DELINQUENCY IN A MODEL OF UNSECURED DEBT

This article documents and interprets a fact central to the dynamics of informal consumer debt default. We observe that for individuals 60– 90 days late on payments, (i) 85% make payments during the next quarter, and (ii) 40% reduce their debt. To understand these facts, we develop a quantitative model of debt delinquency and bankruptcy. Our model reproduces the dynamics of delinquency and suggests an interpretation of the data in which lenders frequently reset loan terms for delinquent borrowers, typically offering partial debt forgiveness, instead of a blanket imposition of the “penalty rates” most unsecured credit contracts specify.     

Severe or gentle bankruptcy law: Which impact on investing and financing decisions?

This research investigates how legal sanctions prevailing under bankruptcy may impact on debt contracting and on investing decision. We model firms having the opportunity to engage (or not) faulty management. In case of default, the firms may escape costly bankruptcy by reaching a private agreement with the bank. We show that such renegotiation process may depend on the level of severity of bankruptcy law.Our approach helps in answering the following key questions: can bankruptcy costs always be internalized? Who benefits from accrued severity? Should the creditors accept a certain level of moral hazard from their debtors? Should bankruptcy law be extremely severe in order to ensure ex-ante efficiency? Does such severity depend on the financial environment?The model focuses on three equilibriums. The first equilibrium describes honest firms that choose the best investment project (ex-ante efficiency). Here, we show that bankruptcy costs can be avoided through private renegotiation (ex-post efficiency). Yet, the legislator cannot directly implement this equilibrium as it does not depend on the level of legal sanctions. A second equilibrium describes tricky firms turning to the less profitable and riskiest project. Here, default is still privately resolved: the occurrence of such equilibrium can be avoided owing to a minimal amount of legal sanctions that depend on the level of interest rate. Last, we consider firms that adopt mixed strategies regarding their investment policy. Here, two post-default bargains prevail (pooling or separating) and costly bankruptcy may occur.Simulations illustrate how the bank finally chooses between these equilibriums while the legal environment becomes more severe. For moderate levels of legal sanctions, banks may accept a certain level of faulty management, expecting to take advantage of bankruptcy punishment. An increase in sanctions, however, has a compelling effect on the companies towards honoring their commitments. Once the optimal equilibrium prevails, any additional increase in sanctions is ineffective as the players' strategies no longer depend on the legal environment. As a result, extreme severity is not required to ensure both ex-ante and ex-post efficiencies. Last, we find that a more severe bankruptcy law increases the protection of banks and may result in reduction of the contractual interest rate, which on the other hand benefits the debtors.     

PARTIALLY DISAGGREGATED HOUSEHOLD‐LEVEL DEBT SERVICE RATIOS: CONSTRUCTION,VALIDATION, AND RELATIONSHIP TO BANKRUPTCY RATES

Using individual‐level debt payments data from a credit bureau, we estimate debt service ratios by debt type for the United States. While highly correlated with the Board of Governors' national debt service ratio, we identify some required payments categories that vary substantively from the aggregate assumptions used in the Board's published data series. Estimating novel state and metropolitan statistical area (MSA)‐level debt service ratios, we show that debt service ratios rose dramatically during the 2000s housing boom in several of the most impacted states and MSAs. Our state‐level debt service ratios are shown to be useful in predicting state bankruptcy rates. (JEL D14, C8, E50)     

Outsourcing with debt financing

This paper investigates the effect of capital structure on a firm’s choice between vertical integration and outsourcing. We model the production decision in a Principal-Agent framework and show that suppliers use debt as a strategic instrument to collect the surplus from outsourcing as their wealth constraint or limited liability ensures them more attractive compensation schemes. Investigating the buyer’s capital structure, we find that outsourcing with risky debt is more likely to occur for high values of the outsourcing surplus.     

How employment insurance recipients make decision about insolvency?

Beyond the maximum insurable income, the size of the shortfall increases with the worker's income, leaving unemployed workers with little or no room to maintain a decent life while meeting all their other obligations. This situation is even more perilous in an indebted society where the debt per income ratio hovers at around 175%. This paper contributes to the literature by identifying the key socioeconomic and demographic indicators that dictate the insolvency choice (bankruptcy or consumer proposal) of Canadian insolvent employment insurance recipients. Using Canadian data, we show that low employment insurance leads debtors to eat up their asset and incur more debt, which ultimately make bankruptcy more appealing to them than proposal.     

一种基于可转换债权的创业投资模式设计

本文基于可转换债权所具有的激励与约束的双重作用,建立了有条件免偿可转股债权投资模式,解决了创业初期风险投资者和创业企业家因对创业企业家的无形资产评估定价难以达成一致而无法及时达成投资协议的问题,提供了一种在创业初期具体的、可操作的投资模式。研究结果表明,有条件免偿可转股债权投资模式不仅有助于风险投资者和创业企业家达成投资协议,而且能保证风险投资者和创业企业家的投资项目取得成功。     

Managerial Compensation and the Cost of Moral Hazard

This article investigates managerial compensation and its incentive effects. Our econometric framework is derived from a multiperiod principal-agent model with moral hazard. Longitudinal data on returns to firms and managerial compensation are used to estimate the model. We find that firms would incur large losses from ignoring moral hazard, whereas managers only require moderate additional compensation for accepting a contract that ties their wealth to the value of the firm. Thus the costs of aligning hidden managerial actions to shareholder goals through the compensation schedule are much less than the benefits from the resulting managerial performance.     

Corporate financial policy with personal and institutional investors

In this paper we present a simple general equilibrium model of the portfolio behavior of households and institutions, paying particular attention to the influence of differences in tax rates and attitudes toward risk. Under the plausible assumptions that households are more risk averse than institutions and possess a greater relative ‘tax preference’ for equity versus debt, we are able to characterize the equilibria which may result when debt is subject to bankruptcy risk.     

债务重组的公司治理效应——基于中国上市公司的实证分析

债务重组存在虚假破产信息和道德风险问题。本文运用SPSS筛选变量分析法对2003～2007年中国宣布债务重组公报的上市公司数据进行实证研究,结果显示,我国上市公司债务重组没有有效改善公司的治理绩效。     

Bancruptcy in a model of unsecured claims

Summary. We study a two periods model of incomplete markets with nominal assets unsecured by collateral, where agents can go bankrupt but there are no bankruptcy penalties entering directly in the utility function. We address two cases: first, a proportional reimbursement rule under bounded short sales and limited liability and, secondly, a nonproportional reimbursement rule, favoring smaller claims, without bounds on short-sales, but assuming that liability approaches total garnishment as debt goes to infinity. Received: September 10, 1998; revised version: August 6, 2001     

不同所有制下管理者过度自信与公司债务融资的关系

本文以2002—2008年我国沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,利用OLS回归模型考察了在不同所有制公司中管理者过度自信与债务融资之间的关系。研究结果显示:在不同所有制的上市公司中,管理者过度自信对公司债务融资的影响存在差异。与非国有上市公司相比,国有上市公司的管理者更加过度自信,更倾向于选择债务融资;在债务期限方面,不同所有制公司的过度自信管理者都倾向于使用长期债务,但在国有上市公司中这种倾向表现得更为显著。     

Does issuing equity help R&D activity? Evidence from unlisted Italian high-tech manufacturing firms

This paper evaluates the causal effect of issuing equities on the probability that a firm engages in R&D activity. Equity is a better source of external finance than debt for innovation. It does not require collateral, does not exacerbate moral hazard problems connected with the substitution of high-risk for low-risk projects, quite common when using debt, and, unlike debt, does not increase the probability of bankruptcy; equity also allows investors to reap the entire benefit of the returns of successful innovative projects. This paper focuses on high-tech firms for which asymmetric information problems are more pervasive. Implementing an instrumental variable estimation, we find that issuing equity increases the probability that the firm has R&D expenditures by 30–40%. We detect considerable heterogeneity in this effect: the impact of issuing equity is significant only for small, young and more highly leveraged high-tech firms. We also find interesting evidence that issuing equity increases R&D expenditures in relation to sales.     

Public capital,sustainable debt and endogenous growth

We analyze an endogenous growth model with public capital and public debt where we posit that the primary surplus of the government is a positive function of cumulated past debt with an exponentially declining weight put on debt further back in time. We consider two scenarios: first, we study the model assuming that the government runs a balanced budget and, then, we compare the outcome to that of the model with permanent deficits. We analyze growth effects of the two scenarios and we study how fiscal policy of the government affects the dynamics of the model economy. It is demonstrated that the balanced growth rate is higher when cumulated past public debt is smaller. Further, we show that the debt policy of the government crucially determines the dynamics of the model economy and that endogenous growth cycles can arise.     

Executive Compensation and Legal Investor Protection: Evidence from China's Listed Firms

This paper seeks to relate the increases in executive compensation observed in China to improvement of the legal environment. We build a simple model and demonstrate that improvement in legal investor protection reduces the manager's private benefits of control; in order to make the managerial incentives compatible, some of the forgone private benefits have to be compensated in the form of increased executive pay. Using a large dataset on Chinese listed corporations, we find strong evidence that improvement of the legal environment is significantly associated with both the rise in executive compensation and the reduction in agency costs, which is consistent with our model predictions.     

Matching Bankruptcy Laws to Legal Environments

We study a model of optimal bankruptcy law in an environmentwhere legal quality can vary along two dimensions: the expertiseof judges and the quality of contract enforcement. We analyzea model in which a judicially influenced bankruptcy processcan enhance the efficiency of incomplete contracts by conditioningthe allocation of control rights in bankruptcy on firm quality.We consider the optimal balance of debtor and creditor interestsas a function of the legal environment and show that the optimaldegree of "creditor-friendliness" in the bankruptcy code increasesas judicial ability to recognize firm quality falls and as thequality of contract enforcement deteriorates. Our model showsthat a bankruptcy law that attempts to preserve going-concernvalue, such as US Chapter 11, requires judicial expertise tobe effective. Where such expertise is unavailable, a law thatfocuses more on creditor recovery is preferred. (JEL D86, G33,G34, K22)