Guaranteeing quality in the EU: who gains most?

Regulating product quality benefits consumers in reducing uncertainty and allowing them to economize on search costs. Theoretical analysis suggests that not all consumers benefit to the same extent, with non-poor, less well educated and older people tending to gain most. These conclusions are supported by regression analysis of Eurobarometer data on attitudes to an EU priority to guarantee quality. The results also indicate the essential nature of the EU trade-off with countries having to compromise on their desired outcome when agreeing on a common EU standard. Institutional trust is also a critical factor in determining support for such a standard.      

Sequential Screening

We study price discrimination where consumers know at the time of contracting only the distribution of their valuations but subsequently learn their actual valuations. Consumers are sequentially screened, as in a menu of refund contracts. Initial valuation uncertainty can differ in terms of first-order stochastic dominance or mean-preserving-spread. In both cases, optimal mechanisms depend on informativeness of consumers' initial knowledge about their valuations, not on uncertainty that affects all consumers. It can be optimal to "subsidize" consumers with smaller valuation uncertainty through low refund to reduce the rent to those who face greater uncertainty and purchase more "flexible" contracts.     

Large market games with demand uncertainty

We consider a market game with a continuum of consumers, where the measure of each type is stochastic. Nature selects the set of active consumers, who make bids and offers on ?−1 spot market trading posts. Existence of type-symmetric Nash equilibrium is proven. When facing price uncertainty, best responses are unique, and a Nash equilibrium to the sell-all game is typically not a Nash equilibrium to the original game. Under plausible circumstances, consumers strictly prefer to be on one side of the market.     

Ignorance Is Bliss as Trade Policy

Consider domestic consumers that purchase from foreign firms. A presumption would be that consumers prefer being informed when quality is uncertain and exogenous. However, in a multifirm framework based on previous models, consumers can be worse off if they are informed of the quality. Further, in the Salop-circle model, consumers may prefer not learning even though expected high-quality output is greater with learning. Moreover, the possibility that consumers prefer uncertainty increases with the probability that products are of low quality. Essentially, the benefit of screening quality (better matching) can be less than its cost (higher prices from market segmentation).     

ON THE PROFITABILITY OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE WHEN DEMAND IS UNCERTAIN

A previous study finds that in a market where a manufacturer faces uncertain demand and sells to consumers through competitive retailers, the manufacture wishes to support adequate retail inventories by imposing resale price maintenance (RPM). I show that if retail inventories are allocated to consumers through first‐come‐first‐served rule rather than efficient rationing rule in the game with unconstrained retail competition, imposing RPM may not be profitable. It may not encourage more retail inventories either. RPM may also lower consumer surpluses and social welfare. This study casts some doubt on the demand uncertainty theory that supports RPM.     

Consumer Self-Generation and Monopoly Limit-Pricing under Timing Uncertainty of Deregulation in the Electricity Market

Due to uncertainty in the timing of deregulation for electric power generation, large and potentially self-generating consumers should consider a lost option value as part of the cost of any investment they consider. This paper uses a simple two-period model to analyze the role played by the timing anticipation of deregulation in the decision making of potential self-generators (PSGs) and for limit-contract pricing of local utilities. We develop an effective limit-pricing rule and conclude that a higher-probability of early deregulation will lead utilities to retain more consumers and to set higher limit prices before deregulation. A possible early deregulation might not harm utilities; it could even benefit utilities in finite lifetime periods. Finally, a simulation is provided which supports our main results and shows that the effects on utilities' expected profits of uncertainty about the coming deregulation will depend on the distribution of consumer types.     

POLITICS WITH AND WITHOUT POLICY†

When strategic complementarities lead to the existence of multiple equilibria, a change in control of government may lead to changes in economic behavior by consumers or firms even if the different parties pursue the same policies. The existence of multiple equilibria, however, is not necessary to predict partisan effects. Furthermore, electoral uncertainty is not necessary to generate partisan effects; indeed, such uncertainty can dampen the cycle.     

Information asymmetry,attitudes toward risk,and macroeconomic performance

Every firm in differentiated oligopoly offers a product that is different from that of rival firms. Similarly, in general, a firm interfaces with consumers and interacts with rival firms on the market. As a result, both the firm and consumers experience information asymmetry. In practice, a firm is a risk taker in its dealings with rival firms and is a risk averter in its interface with consumers. However, firms utilize intangible investments (non-price strategies) to convey the value of their product to consumers and stabilize their market share. Note that consumers are risk averse and ignore such attempts by a firm once they recognize the intrinsic value of the product. These two features explain the frequency and depth of the supply fluctuations that have not been acknowledged so far. This study offers a fundamental explanation of this phenomenon along with the steady state behavior in a synthetic manner.“With uncertainty entirely absent, every individual being in possession of perfect knowledge of the situation, there would be no occasion for anything of the nature of responsible management or control of production activity.”- Knight (1957, p.267)     

Information Advantage in a Public Good Economy with Multiplicative Structure of Utilities

This paper extends results on information advantage in Cournot oligopoly to a public good economy with uncertainty and private information where the state‐dependent utilities have a multiplicative structure. We show that in a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium where consumers’ contributions are positive in all states of nature, a consumer with superior information is rewarded with a higher ex ante expected utility. Our counter example shows that in the case where one consumer does not contribute, information disadvantage might emerge. Thus, the interiority assumption is essential to obtain our results.     

Location decisions: The role of uncertainty about consumer tastes

This paper analyzes to what extent firms make decisions about location based on uncertainty about consumer tastes. The model used in this analysis incorporates a linear city and quadratic consumer-transportation costs. In this framework, when firms choose locations, or in other words, choose the kind of product they are going to manufacture, they ignore the location, or real tastes, of their consumers. The existence of uncertainty raises the degree of product differentiation, because the anti-competitive effect that arises as distance from rivals increases counteracts the reduction in the degree of differentiation provided by the demand effect.     

Consumer attitudes toward low stake risk in food markets

Consistency of quality is viewed as important for producers of consumer goods. However, there is no literature testing the importance of quality consistency on consumers’ willingness to pay for consumer goods. We use an experimental auction market to investigate how inconsistency in tenderness affects consumers’ willingness to pay for beef. We find that most consumers are risk averse with respect to sensory quality. Both the average tenderness and the variance of tenderness affected the consumers’ willingness to pay for beef. Reducing the uncertainty of the sensory quality by categorizing the beef into three tenderness classes increased the total value of the beef by 8%.     

价格离散、信息搜寻与团购行为

团购行为是当今消费行为学中的一个重要现象,源自市场和产品信息不对称的双重因素是导致消费者行为变化的根本原因。基于产品信息的价格函数模型,分析团购有利于消费者实现信息共享,减少搜寻成本,降低与企业间的信息不对称,减少消费行为的不确定性,从而获得更大的消费效用的结论。     

Bayesian Equilibrium in a Public Good Economy

This paper studies the provision of a public good via voluntary contributions in an economy with uncertainty and differential information. Consumers differ in their private information regarding their future endowment as well as in their preferences. Each consumer selects her consumption ex ante, i.e., before knowing the state of nature. Contributions to the provision of the public good are determined ex post, i.e., when the state of nature is realized. Assuming that some normality conditions hold, a Bayesian equilibrium exists. Further, equilibrium is unique, regardless of the number of consumers, when either (1) the information partitions of consumers can be ranked from the finest to the coarsest, or (2) there are only two types of consumers.     

中国农村居民消费的不确定性及其“锯齿状”消费路径

农村地区特定的社会现状决定了西方消费理论很难找到能够完全解释农村居民消费行为的"中国解"。由于受不确定性因素的影响,我国农村居民的消费支出并不平滑,而是具有明显的"短视性""阶段性"和"谨慎性"特征,这些特征的共同作用致使农村居民的消费路径呈现出"锯齿状"。这一消费路径可以更好地解释我国农村居民的消费行为,为进一步制定行之有效的启动农村市场的政策提供了新的视角。     

General equilibrium, wariness and efficient bubbles

Wary consumers overlook gains but not losses in remote sets of dates or states. As preferences are upper but not lower Mackey semi-continuous, Bewley?s (1972) [4] result on existence of equilibrium whose prices are not necessarily countably additive holds. Wariness is related to lack of myopia and to ambiguity aversion (and, therefore, to Bewley?s (1986) [6] work on Knightian uncertainty). Wary infinite lived agents have weaker transversality conditions allowing them to be creditors at infinity and for bubbles to occur in positive net supply assets completing the markets. There are efficient allocations that can only be implemented with asset bubbles.     

Optimal consumption and the timing of the resolution of uncertainty

As is well-known, consumers want to accumulate precautionary savings in the face of income risks when their marginal utility is convex (prudence). In this paper, we explore the effect of the timing of the resolution of income uncertainty on savings. An agent faces uncertainty about his income at date t+2. What is the effect of being informed that the uncertainty will be resolved at date t+1 on the consumption at date t? We show that the effect is positive, if and only if, marginal utility is convex (prudence), when either the risk free rate is equal to the rate of pure preference for the present, or when the utility function is HARA. The intuition is that an early resolution of uncertainty allows for time-diversifying the risk. It therefore plays a role similar to a reduction of the income risk, whose effect on savings is negative under prudence.     

A Reexamination of the Wealth Effect and Uncertainty Effect

In an influential article, [Romer, C. “The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105, 1990, pp. 597–624.] estimates the magnitudes of the uncertainty and wealth effects. She reports that before and after the Great Depression, the uncertainty effect has a large and statistically significant influence on durable good production, while the wealth effect is negative but negligible. When the authors of this paper change the specification of the model with respect to the amount of time necessary for stock returns to translate into changes in consumption, they reach the exact opposite conclusions that Romer does. Specifically, when the authors allow consumers 12 or more months to alter consumption behavior, rather than Romer's three, stock price uncertainty did not significantly affect the durable goods production before, during, or after the Great Depression. The authors also find that stock market returns from the previous year have a positive and statistically significant impact on the durable goods production, indicating the importance of the wealth effect.     

Liquidity constraint,uncertainty and household consumption in China

This paper investigates the changing roles played by liquidity constraint and uncertainty in accounting for the dynamism of Chinese household consumption behaviour. Starting from the Euler equation-based model of Robert Hall, a framework encompassing an array of consumption models is developed and applied to Chinese data over the period 1961?1998. Empirical results reveal a regime shift in the early 1980s and imply that increases in the proportion of liquidity constrained consumers and increased uncertainty in the post-reform period are responsible for the extremely low consumption or high savings in China. Moreover, it is found that interactions between liquidity constraint and uncertainty reinforce each other's effects and lead to declines in both the level and growth of consumption.     

The value of information in a simple duopoly model

This paper is concerned with the evaluation of information in a duopoly model in which the cost functions are subject to uncertainty. It explores how changes in information about the costs available to either firm affects the welfare of both firms along with the welfare of consumers. By comparing the ten possible types of information structures, it is shown that information may be detrimental, that improved information for one firm may or may not benefit the other firm and/or the consumer, and that it may be more desirable for a firm to gather information about the rival's cost rather than its own. All of these “irregular” results depend on the values of the variances of the costs and their correlation coefficient.     

Uncertainty and the theory of international trade in long-run equilibrium

We consider a country with two factors and two industries, each of which faces technical and price uncertainty. Entrepreneurs choose outputs in order to maximize the expected utility of profits. They also draw factor payments and purchase consumption goods after the uncertainty isresolved. They enter and exit from an industry according to whether participation there increases their expected utility. Within this model, the validity of the propositions of neoclassical trade theory depends on how the entrepreneurs' entry decisions are affected by parameter changes via their roles as risk bearers, consumers and factor owners.