Resource abundance, growth and welfare: A Schumpeterian perspective

This paper takes a new look at the long-run implications of resource abundance. It develops a Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth that incorporates an upstream resource-intensive sector and yields an analytical solution for the transition path. It then derives conditions under which, as the economy's endowment of a natural resource rises, (i) growth accelerates and welfare rises, (ii) growth decelerates but welfare rises nevertheless, and (iii) growth decelerates and welfare falls. Which of these scenarios prevails depends on the response of the natural resource price to an increase in the resource endowment. The price response determines the change in income earned by the owners of the resource (the households) and thereby the change in their expenditure on manufacturing goods. Since manufacturing is the economy's innovative sector, this income-to-expenditure effect links resource abundance to the size of the market for manufacturing goods and drives how re-source abundance affects incentives to undertake innovative activity.     

International transmission of environmental policy: A New Keynesian perspective

In this paper we examine the international transmission of environmental policy using a New Keynesian model of the global economy. We first consider the case in which the quality of the environment affects utility, but not productivity. This allows us to look at the trade-off between environmental quality and output. We then consider the case in which the quality of the environment increases productivity but does not affect utility. Our main results show that in both cases a unilateral implementation of a more stringent environmental policy by the domestic country raises foreign welfare under a benchmark parameterization. Our modeling strategy allows an analysis of how nominal rigidities interact with the implementation of environmental reforms, by allowing the domestic country to shift, through exchange rate depreciation, parts of the costs of more stringent environmental policies to the foreign one.     

Competition and inter-firm credit: Theory and evidence from firm-level data in Indonesia

Using firm-level data we investigate the relationship between trade credit and suppliers' market structure and find a ∩-shaped relationship between competition and trade credit, with a discontinuous increase in credit provision between monopoly and duopoly. This “big jump” arises because monopolists are more likely to not offer any trade credit than firms in competitive environments. Our model exploits the fundamentally different nature between cash and trade credit sales, arguing that firms are unable to commit ex ante to a trade credit price. We show that monopolists will often sell only on cash, while credit is always provided in competitive environments.     

Parallel trade,product quality,and welfare

We study the welfare effects of parallel trade (PT) considering investment in quality. We thus revisit the case for PT in research-intensive industries. We find that PT may raise quality, depending on how preferences for quality differ across countries. Conditional on quality, consumer surplus may rise (fall) in the PT-source (PT-recipient) country. While PT reduces ex post welfare, improving quality is a necessary condition for PT to increase welfare ex ante.     

Privatization, strategic foreign direct investment and host-country welfare

Recent evidence shows that developing countries and transition economies are increasingly privatizing their public firms and at the same time experiencing rapid growth of inward foreign direct investment (FDI). We show that there is a two-way causality between privatization and greenfield FDI. Privatization increases the incentive for FDI, which, in turn, increases the incentive for privatization compared to the situation of no FDI. The optimal degree of privatization depends on the cost difference of the firms, and on the foreign firm's mode of entry.     

Bank regulation and supervision and its welfare implications

This study provides a general equilibrium model to explore the welfare implications of bank regulation and supervision (RS). The model supports the basic expectations regarding the positive effects of RS on the growth rate, output, credit, investment, wages and profits; and its negative effects on the interest rate. In addition, RS is observed to lead to a convergence effect. Furthermore, it is observed that the decision of banks to monitor and charge differentiated interest rates to firms depends on the distribution of firm-specific moral hazard rates; bank monitoring increases profits as the distribution of producer type improves.     

Risk capital,private credit,and innovative production

Abstract Although ideas production plays a critical role for growth, there has been only a modicum of research on the role played by financial forces in fostering new inventions. Drawing on Schumpeterian growth theory, this paper tests the roles of risk capital and private credit in stimulating knowledge production. Using panel data for 77 countries over the period 1965–2009, we find that countries with more developed financial systems are more innovative. A stronger patent protection framework, on the other hand, curbs innovative production.     

Demand-supply coevolution with multiple increasing returns: Policy analysis for unlocking and system transitions

Currently, there is much concern about how to make a transition away from environmentally unsustainable activities to sustainable ones, notably in agriculture, energy and transport sectors. The success of such a transition depends on whether one is capable of escaping the lock-in of the dominant, unsustainable technology, which is usually due to multiple lock-in factors. Here, we present a formal model to study the likelihood of market lock-in in the presence of multiple increasing returns. The proposed framework describes coevolving populations of boundedly rational consumers and innovating firms. On the demand side, we focus attention on the interdependence of consumer preferences. We examine the impact of alternative demand side specifications on the direction of innovative activities of firms. On the supply side, a technological trajectory arises from the interplay of incremental innovation, search for a new product design and marketing activities. Our framework provides a general and complete account of increasing returns on supply and demand sides, as well as their synergetic interactions. The model is used to study a number of policy instruments aimed at escaping lock-in.     

The trade-off between innovation and defense industrial policy: A simulation model analysis of the Norwegian defense industry

The paper investigates the trade-off between innovation and defense industrial policy. It presents an agent-based simulation model calibrated for the Norwegian defense industry that compares different policy scenarios and examines the effects of a pending EU market liberalization process. The paper points to two main results. (1) It finds that a pure scenario where national authorities focus on, and provide support exclusively for, either a) international competitiveness or b) national defense and security objectives, is more Pareto efficient than a corresponding mixed strategy where policy makers simultaneously pursue both international competitiveness and defense and security objectives. (2) Under the conditions of the new EU liberalization regime, it finds that a stronger and more visible trade-off will emerge between international competitiveness and national defense and security objectives. Policy makers will have to choose which to prioritize, and set a clear agenda focusing on one of the two objectives.     

Economic growth,exports and foreign direct investment in Least Developed Countries: A panel Granger causality analysis

This paper investigates potential Granger causality among the real GDP, real exports and inward FDI in Least Developed Countries for the period between 1970 and 2009. A new panel-data approach developed in Kónya (2006) [Kónya (2006), Exports and growth: Granger causality analysis on OECD countries with a panel data approach, Economic Modelling, 23, 978–992] which is based on SUR systems and Wald tests with country specific bootstrap critical values has been employed. The results indicate direct, one-period-ahead, unidirectional causality from exports to GDP in Haiti, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, and from GDP to exports in Angola, Chad and Zambia. Considering the FDI–Growth nexus, there is evidence of FDI Granger-causing GDP in Benin and Togo, and GDP Granger-causing FDI in Burkina Faso, Gambia, Madagascar and Malawi. While studying EXP–FDI relations, this paper finds that the causality is from FDI to real exports in Benin, Chad, Haiti, Mauritania, Niger, Togo and Yemen, and from real exports to FDI in Haiti, Madagascar, Mauritania, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal and Zambia.     

A new measure of financial development: Theory leads measurement

This study presents a new measure of financial development that is directly derived from theory. Our measure, the Marginal Utilization of Debt (hereafter, MUD) comes from the seminal work of Myers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984) and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). Further, it is directly related to the development facts of Gurley and Shaw (1955). MUD is a global measure that reflects conditions in both debt and equity markets. It varies enormously across nations; from 0.23 in Australia at one extreme to 0.96 in Turkey at the other. Cross‐country variations in MUD are not random; they are related to special‐purpose measures of debt and equity market advancement from the financial development literature. Richer, more advanced nations have smaller average MUDs. We argue that the MUD may be useful for a variety of purposes and provide three example applications.     

Strategic competition and optimal parallel import policy

Abstract In a two‐country Hotelling type duopoly model of price competition, we show that parallel import (PI) policy can act as an instrument of strategic trade policy. The home firm’s profit is higher when it cannot price discriminate internationally if and only if the foreign market is sufficiently bigger than the domestic one. The key mechanism in the model is that the home firm’s incentive to keep its domestic price close to the optimal monopoly price affects its behavior during price competition abroad. We also analyze the welfare implications of PI policies and show that our key insights extend to quantity competition.     

Does services liberalization affect manufacturing firms’ export performance? Evidence from India

This paper investigates the relationship between the reform of energy, telecommunications and transport services in India in the mid-1990s and manufacturing firms’ export performance. The empirical analysis relies on exogenous indicators of regulation of Indian services sectors and detailed firm-level data from India in the 1994–2004 period. I find that the reform of upstream services sector has increased the probability of exporting and export sales shares of firms producing in downstream manufacturing industries. The results suggest that the effect of services liberalization on manufacturing firms’ export performance is stronger for initially more productive firms. These empirical findings are robust to alternative econometric specifications that control for other reforms, industry, firm characteristics and that deal with potential reverse causality concerns.     

Trade‐related intellectual property rights: industry variation and technology diffusion

Abstract This paper assesses how a strengthening of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects international technology diffusion by altering the volume of high‐tech exports into developing countries. A simple North‐South general equilibrium model in which industries differ in their imitation rates is developed. Stronger IPRs encourage Northern firms in a wider range of industries to start exporting. Exports in industries with the highest risk of imitation rise, while exports in other industries may fall. More technology diffuses to the South because new high‐tech products are introduced in the Southern market. This works against the reduction in technology diffusion caused by limited imitation.     

The MFN clause,welfare, and multilateral cooperation between countries of unequal size

This paper analyzes MFN in a “competing exporters” model of trade between three countries with unequal endowments and shows that MFN yields higher aggregate welfare than tariff discrimination even as it makes low income countries worse off. Furthermore, in a repeated game of tariff cooperation, multilateral free trade is easier to sustain under MFN punishments relative to discriminatory ones. This conclusion holds even when tariff discrimination takes the form of bilateral trade agreements. Overall, the analysis shows that from the viewpoint of low income countries, MFN and multilateral tariff cooperation are complementary in nature.     

Law, trade, and development

This paper uses a Ricardian model to generate predictions about the influence of institutions on trade in differentiated (complex) and commoditized (simple) products and then uses a rich international trade data set for empirical tests. The model draws the distinction between the role of international transaction costs and domestic production costs in the trade of complex and simple products. The effects of institutions predicted by the model are identified with a three-step estimation procedure. We find that when countries have low quality institutions, institutional reform primarily influences production costs and has little influence on the volume of trade. Institutional reform, however, increases the diversity of exports in complex goods markets. Conversely, in countries with more developed institutions, institutional reform primarily influences transaction costs and is associated with gains in the volume and the diversity of complex exports.     

Commercial policy variability, bindings, and market access

Protection unconstrained by rules often varies substantially over time. Rules-based disciplines, such as WTO tariff bindings and bindings on market access in services, constrain this variability. We examine the theoretical effects of such constraints on the expected cost of protection and offer a formalization of the concept of “market access”, emphasizing both the first and second moments of the distribution of protection. As an illustration, we provide a stylized examination of Uruguay Round bindings on wheat.     

Monetary union: A welfare based approach

This article attempts to shed light on the consequences of the transition to EMU for individual welfare following specific shocks. To this end, we develop a two country intertemporal general equilibrium model that extends the Obstfeld and Rogoff (Journal of Political Economy 103 (3) (1995) 624) specification to nominal rigidities through price adjustment costs and pricing-to-market behavior.We show that, when facing a positive asymmetric permanent shock to either technology or government expenditures occurring in one country, implementing a monetary union is beneficial to the households living in this economy. Conversely, it is detrimental to foreigners. Further, a sensitivity analysis shows that if the gains/losses to implementing monetary union are qualitatively robust when facing changes in the degree of nominal rigidities and the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods, they are quite sensitive to the degree of pricing-to-market in the economy.     

An analysis of entry-then-privatization model: welfare and policy implications

This study formulates a new model of mixed oligopolies in free entry markets. A state-owned public enterprise is established before the game, private enterprises enter the market, and then the government chooses the degree of privatization of the public enterprise (termed the entry-then-privatization model herein). We find that under general demand and cost functions, the timing of privatization does not affect consumer surplus or the output of each private firm, while it does affect the equilibrium degree of privatization, number of entering firms, and output of the public firm. The equilibrium degree of privatization is too high (low) for both domestic and world welfare if private firms are domestic (foreign).