Incentive and informational properties of preference questions

Surveys are frequently used by businesses and governments to elicit information about the public’s preferences. They have become the most common way to gather preference information regarding goods, that are not (or are not yet) bought or sold in markets. In this paper we apply the standard neoclassical economic framework to generate predictions about how rational agents would answer such survey questions, which in turn implies how such survey data should be interpreted. In some situations, the standard economic model would be expected to have no predictive power. For situations where it does have predictive power, we compare different survey formats with respect to: (a) the information that the question itself reveals to the respondent, (b) the strategic incentives the respondent faces in answering the question, and (c) the information revealed by the respondent’s answer. Earlier versions of this paper have been presented as a plenary address to the European Association of Environmental and Resource Economics in Oslo, as an invited paper at the Japanese Forum on Environmental Valuation meeting in Kobe, and at a NOAA conference on stated preference methods.     

Retailers as agents and the limits of parallel trade

The volume of retail-level parallel trade is surprisingly small despite persistent international price differences. We offer an agency-based explanation by considering competition between an original home manufacturer and a foreign retailer. The model endogenizes the role of the retailer as an agent with private information on the perceived quality of the good in its own market. The manufacturer cannot control the retailer once the latter has ordered its sales quantity but it can limit the initial offer. If parallel trade is permitted, this offer will fall if there is incomplete information, resulting in a small, or zero, volume of parallel trade. This outcome makes both the original producer and foreign consumers worse off, while offering little benefit to home consumers, compared to the case where such trade is banned.     

Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents

A setting in which a single principal contracts with two agents who possess perfect private information about their own productivity is considered. With correlated productivities, each agent's private information also provides a signal about the other agent's productivity. In contrast to the setting in which there is only one agent, it is shown that such private information may be of no value to the agents. It is only if the agents are risk-averse that their private information may allow them to command rents. Moreover, when the agents are constrained only to reveal their private information truthfully as a Nash equilibrium, the Pareto optimal incentive scheme may induce the agents to adopt strategies other than truth-telling. This leads to the consideration of truth-telling equilibria that are not Pareto dominated in the subgame played by the agents. Among all such equilibria, the one preferred by the principal restricts one agent to tell the truth as a dominant strategy and the other as a Nash response to truth.     

Informative advertising by heterogeneous firms

This paper introduces a model to analyze the role of the cost of information dissemination in large markets where firms have varying degrees of intrinsic efficiency reflected in their marginal costs. Firms enter a market and discover how efficient they are. Those firms with high enough efficiency stay, others exit. Remaining firms then compete to attract consumers by disseminating information about their existence and their prices using a common advertising technology. The properties of the model’s equilibrium are analyzed. The model is then used to study the effect of the cost of information dissemination on the competitiveness of the market and key industry aggregates, such as price distribution and the distribution of firm value.     

Screening by the Company You Keep: Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect

We look at an economic environment where borrowers have some information about the nature of each other's projects that lenders do not. We show that joint-liability lending contracts, similar to those used by credit cooperatives and group-lending schemes, will induce endogenous peer selection in the formation of groups in a way that the instrument of joint liability can be used as a screening device to exploit this local information. This can improve welfare and repayment rates if standard screening instruments such as collateral are unavailable.     

Information, bilateral negotiations, and worker recruitment

This paper studies experimentally how firms choose between using a centralized market and bilateral negotiations to recruit new personnel. In the market firms interact with several workers but do not have information about workers’ behavior in the past. In the bilateral negotiations firms negotiate bilaterally with prospective workers and learn about workers’ performance in previous jobs. We show that the interaction between social preferences, the incompleteness of contracts and the existence of information about a worker’s past performance provides an explanation for firms forgoing market opportunities and bilaterally negotiating with a worker. We observe that approximately 30% of all job contracts were bilaterally negotiated when these contracts are incomplete as opposed to only 10% when contracts were complete. The surplus from trade is higher when incomplete contracts can be bilaterally negotiated, which can be attributed to the presence of information.     

Drug Prohibition and Individual Virtue

As far as economics is concerned, the market for drugs, as in all other cases, maximizes the welfare of all who participate in it, at least in the ex ante sense. Legalization—like the repeal of alcohol prohibition—will also help solve drug related problems such as crime, impurities leading to death and child abuse. Nor does it follow from the fact that such substances are addictive and harmful that using them must be coercive, and should be banned. Also rejected is the ‘public health’ argument that legalization would result in too great a rate of addiction.     

Why do parents socialize their children to behave pro-socially? An information-based theory

We present a model of intergenerational transmission of pro-social values in which parents have information about relevant characteristics of society that is not directly available to their children. Differently from existing models of cultural transmission of values (such as Bisin and Verdier, 2001, Tabellini, 2008) we assume that parents are exclusively concerned with their children's material welfare. If parents coordinate their educational choices, a child would look at her system of values to predict the values of her contemporaries, with whom she may interact. A parent may thus choose to instill pro-social values into his child in order to signal to her that others can generally be trusted. This implies that parents may optimally decide to endow their children with values that stand in contrast with maximization of material welfare, even if their children's material welfare is all they care about.     

Competition and coordination in experimental minority games

This work presents experimental results on a coordination game in which agents must repeatedly choose between two sides, and a positive fixed payoff is assigned only to agents who pick the minoritarian side. We conduct laboratory experiments in which stationary groups of five players play the game for 100 periods, and manipulate two treatment variables: the amount of information about other players’ past choices and the salience of information regarding the game history (i.e., the length of the string of past outcomes that players can see on the screen while choosing). Our main findings can be summarized as follows: aggregate efficiency in the game is in most cases significantly higher than the level corresponding to the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition, providing players with information about individual choices in the group does not improve aggregate efficiency with respect to when such information is absent. Displaying information about more rounds than just the previous one, on the other hand, seems to have a positive effect on aggregate efficiency. At the individual level, we find a stronger statistical relation between players’ current choices and their own past choices than between players’ choices and previous aggregate outcomes. In addition, the depth of the relation between present and past choices seems to be affected by the prompt availability of information about the game history. Finally, we detect evidence of a mutual co-adaptation between players’ choices over time that is partly responsible for the high level of efficiency observed.      

变革中多渠道信息传递对员工绩效的影响机制

面对日趋复杂的外部环境,组织变革成为企业获得竞争力的重要方式。员工参与是组织变革成败的关键,充足的组织变革信息有利于员工积极投入变革。本文以社会信息加工理论为基础,对来自被兼并企业的36个工作团队185名员工进行研究,探索多渠道变革信息传递对员工的影响机制。基于多层次线性模型的数据分析结果表明:(1)变革情境下,组织正式渠道进行信息沟通和变革氛围包含的非正式信息,均能正向促进员工变革绩效;(2)员工所持有的积极变革期望,在多渠道信息传递和变革绩效间起到中介作用;(3)变革氛围跨层调节变革信息沟通对员工积极变革期望的正向作用,相比于低变革氛围情景,具有高变革氛围的团队,通过变革信息沟通更能显著提升员工对变革的积极期望。研究结论对企业变革实践中信息传递和沟通工作具有现实指导意义。     

Safe Minimum Standards in Dynamic Resource Problems: Conditions for Living on the Edge of Risk

Safe Minimum Standards (SMSs) has been advocated as a policy rule for certain environmental problems where uncertainty about risks and consequences are thought to be profound. This paper explores the rationale for such a policy within both static and dynamic frameworks and derives conditions for when SMS can be summarily dismissed as a policy choice and for when SMS can be defended as an optimal policy based on standard economic criteria. It turns out that these conditions can be checked with quite limited information about damages and risks. In order to analyze the SMSs in a dynamic setting, we develop a method for solving optimal control problems when state space is divided into risky and non-risky sub-sets.      

Norms in conflict and confusion: Six stories in search of an author

Political conflict involves the conflict of norms; yet resolution of political conflict requires that the disputants share some norms about conflict resolution. This presents a problem at the global level, where no such shared normative framework exists. The world is increasingly interconnected; yet the peoples of the world continue to embrace ideas of separateness which are reinforced by their various normative systems. The authors identify six major “stories”—worldviews or paradigms—competing in the current postmodern world: the Western-style mystique of progress, Christian fundamentalism, Islamic fundamentalism, Marxist revolutionary ideology, Green politics, and the “new paradigm.” Each of this is in conflict with other normative systems, and none is adequate to serve as the normative framework for a global society. Whether or not such a society emerges depends on whether, as a fundamental characteristic, there exists an ability to deal with information—not only data and concepts, but also “meta-information” about the uses and limitations of information. Whatever the norms of a global information culture, its emergence will be accompanied by a protracted period of conflict and great stress for individuals and institutions of governance.     

Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias

A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation (CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect on the winning bid.      

Banned from the sharing economy: an agent-based model of a peer-to-peer marketplace for consumer goods and services

The emergence of profit-based online platforms related to the Sharing Economy, such as BlaBlaCar and Airbnb, provides new means for end users to create an income from their possessions. With this opportunity, participants have to make strategic economic decisions despite limited formal expertise and information. Decentralization (using digital technologies) and reputation (using user reviews) are the core mechanisms chosen by these platforms to mitigate these limitations and to work efficiently as online matchmakers. We test the performance of these two mechanisms by studying the allocative efficiency (in terms of value and volume of transactions) of simulated marketplaces under different types of motivation from the participants and control from the platforms. As a result, we find an inverted-U relationship between the decision-making leeway available to the participants and the platform’s allocative efficiency. From the participants’ perspectives, too much freedom or too many barriers lead to market failures affecting specific participants: low-end consumers are banned from the marketplace while high-end providers experience lower levels of activity. As governance advice for these platforms, we show the limitations of promoting these platforms on the sole motive of monetary rewards.     

Learning in Network Contexts: Experimental Results from Simulations

This paper describes the results of simulation experiments performed on a suite of learning algorithms. We focus on games in network contexts. These are contexts in which (1) agents have very limited information about the game and (2) play can be extremely asynchronous. There are many proposed learning algorithms in the literature. We choose a small sampling of such algorithms and use numerical simulation to explore the nature of asymptotic play. In particular, we explore the extent to which the asymptotic play depends on three factors: limited information, asynchronous play, and the degree of responsiveness of the learning algorithm. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C63, C72.     

Asymmetric information, signaling and environmental taxes in oligopoly

This paper examines the effects of signaling on environmental taxation in a two-period oligopoly model in which each firm privately knows whether its technology is clean or dirty, while third parties (the rival firms and the regulator) have only a subjective perception about this fact. Consequently, there are both horizontal and vertical asymmetric information, and each firm can strategically manipulate both, the competitor's and the regulator's priors. In this context, we find that each firm wishes to be perceived as a technologically clean firm in period 2 whenever the regulator's ecological conscience is sufficiently high. We also show that taxes under symmetric information are always positive, but under asymmetric information and signaling they may be negative (subsidies) and lower or greater than in the symmetric information case, depending on the ecological conscience of the regulator and the probability of firms being dirty. Finally, taxes are below environmental marginal damage, both under symmetric and asymmetric information, and signaling reinforces such under-taxation.     

Consumer expectation and output growth: The case of China

This study shows that China’s Consumer Expectation Index contains useful information about pure expectation shocks, which are unrelated to economic fundamentals. It turns out that such shocks are likely to be an important independent driver of industrial output growth.     

Experimentation with heteroskedastic noise

Conclusion The direction of information with respect to the choice variable can easily change under a general class of distributions. The implication is that, when information is a function of the choice variable, the result of a model may be an outcome of the structure of the uncertainty and not of the existence of uncertainty. Thus, incomplete information does not always have such a clear effect on an agent's decision as previous models have suggested. If such results are key to the conclusions, then the structure of the model should be examined.The model presented here can be used to determine the relationship between information and the choice variable and to derive basic insights into the particular model being examined. It can also be used to eliminate the informational aspect of decisions so as to examine other aspects of a model, e.g., the incentive for information transmission (jamming) and other dynamic aspects (e.g., capital accumulation). Finally, the functional form of the unknown function as well as the error function are inportant in determining the direction of increased information, as the direction of increased noise can be the direction of experimentation.In models ofactive learning orexperimentation with noisy observations, the informativeness of the signal obviously depends on the (not always evident) relationship between the choice variable and the noise. This previously implicit relationship is made explicit by introducing heteroskedastic noise into the model. The general conditions for the informativeness of the signal to beindependent ordecrease with respect to the choice variable are obtained. Furthermore, the model reveals that many of the results in previous models of learning do not arise from what is unknown nor the existence of uncertaintyper se, but rather from how incomplete information is modeled.JEL D42, D83.     

DELAYED OVERSHOOTING AND REAL EXCHANGE RATE PERSISTENCE IN AN IMPERFECT INFORMATION MODEL

Recent studies have pointed out that monetary shocks in sticky price models cannot generate real exchange rates that exhibit delayed overshooting and are highly persistent. This paper demonstrates that such exchange rate dynamics can be generated by incorporating incomplete information about the true nature of the monetary shock into a standard New Keynesian model of a small open economy.     

Green Business and Blue Angels

This paper presents a model of a monopolist'svoluntary overcompliance with legal environmentalstandards under asymmetric information about thefirm's environmental impacts. The key assumptions are:the existence of quality premia for environmentalsoundness, a positive but imperfect degree ofmonitoring, and adaptive consumer expectations.Conditions necessary for overcompliance to arise in aprofit-maximizing equilibrium are derived. The effectsof a third-party eco-labeling system are analyzed. Itis shown that the existence of an independent labelingauthority increases the likelihood of overcomplianceto be profit-maximizing. Moreover, firms might have anincentive to lobby for the introduction of such asystem. The effect of consumers' risk preferences andan instrument for preventing ``Greenwash' (companieslying about their environmental performance) is alsodiscussed.