Intellectual property right protection in the software market

We discuss the software patent should be granted or not. There exist two types of coping in the software market; reverse engineering and software duplication. Software patent can prevent both types of copies since a patent protects an invention. If the software is not protected by a patent, software producer cannot prevent reverse engineering. However, the producer can prevent the software duplication by a copyright. It is not clear the software patent is socially desirable when we consider these two types of coping. We obtain the following results. First, the number of copy users under the patent protection is greater than that under the copyright protection. Second, the government can increase social welfare by applying copyright protection when the new technology is sufficiently innovative.     

TPP语境下版权保护期限的经济分析

在TPP影响日益扩大的情况下,中国据其采取相应的对策已经不可避免。由于美国主导下的TPP对知识产权领域的重视以及美国和中国在版权保护期限上的明显差异,中国在TPP语境下面临着是否延长版权保护期限的困境。文章基于预期效用函数理论,建立了版权保护期限对社会总体福利产生影响的线性模型,并据此对不同的版权保护期限产生的经济影响进行相应的分析。根据分析结果和现实的版权保护期限互相印证,可以发现过长和过短的版权保护期限均会损害社会总体福利,而且欠发达社会的最佳版权保护期限要短于发达社会。因此,中国作为发展中国家的一员,虽然在经济建设上已经取得了相当的成就,但在创意产业方面仍然落后于欧美日等创意产业发达的国家,应当采取的最佳版权保护期限肯定要低于欧美日等发达国家。中国不能为了加入WTO而盲目迎合美国的版权保护期限标准,而必须根据自身的经济利益确定是最适当的版权保护期限。     

区域技术市场发展对创新的驱动作用

利用我国2002-2015年省级面板数据，考察技术市场对创新的影响，研究区域研发环境与技术创新的协同作用。首先，通过构建GMM模型稳健性检验，发现在控制物质资本、人力资本、制度因素、R&D投入、FDI、对外贸易、市场化程度等各种影响因素后，技术市场对创新具有显著影响，且对技术含量较高的发明专利的影响弹性最大；其次，通过交互项检验和门槛回归，发现R&D物质资本和人力资本对技术市场存在两个门槛，跨越门槛将增加技术市场的边际创新产出；再次，技术市场发展对各类专利贡献率的测度结果显示，发达地区技术市场对发明专利的贡献最大。据此提出加速我国技术市场发展、因地制宜改善区域研发环境、进一步强化技术市场驱动高质量创新发展等政策建议。     

论环境保护非政府组织——第三支力量的崛起

市场手段与政府管制的环境保护策略使企业与政府成为环境保护的两支基本力量，但是二者的终极目标并非保护环境，不能从根本上维护社会及其成员的环境利益，而环境保护非政府组织则以保护环境为根本目标。在实践中，它具有推动环境法律与政策发展、维护环境污染受害者利益、提供信息与咨询服务、提高公众环境意识的积极作用。当然，环境保护非政府组织也有其消极作用，它自身的发展也面临问题。     

Monopolistic competition and income dispersion

We develop a model of monopolistic competition that accounts for consumers’ heterogeneity in both incomes and preferences. This model makes it possible to study the implications of income redistribution on the toughness of competition. We show how the market outcome depends on the joint distribution of consumers’ tastes and incomes and obtain a closed-form solution for a symmetric equilibrium. Competition toughness is measured by the weighted average elasticity of substitution. Income redistribution generically affects the market outcome, even when incomes are redistributed across consumers with different tastes in a way such that the overall income distribution remains the same.     

Intertemporal market division:: A case of alternating monopoly

In this paper, we report on an equilibrium with market dominance that exists in a simple two-firm model that features neither entry barriers nor sophisticated punishment strategies. This equilibrium induces an intertemporal market division in which the two firms alternate as monopolists - despite the fact that the model also sustains a Cournot duopoly. Even when initially both firms are active in the market, the alternating monopoly reveals itself rather quickly. Moreover, it Pareto dominates the Cournot equilibrium - as it is close to the cartel outcome. Several examples of what well may be such alternating monopolies are presented.     

Quality Competition and Social Welfare in Markets with Partial Coverage: New Results*

We use a vertical product differentiation model under partial market coverage to study the social welfare optimum and duopoly equilibrium when convex costs of quality provision are either fixed or variable in terms of production. We show the following new results. First, under fixed costs, the social planner charges a uniform price for the single variant that just covers costs of quality provision. Like the duopoly equilibrium, this socially optimal pricing entails a partially uncovered market, but a smaller share of the market is served compared with the duopoly equilibrium. Second, for the variable cost case, it is socially optimal to provide both high‐ and low‐quality variants, but market shares need not be equal. This differs from the result in fully covered markets. Third, in the duopoly equilibrium, the quality spread is too wide under variable costs relative to the social optimum. Under fixed costs, the duopoly produces two variants, but quality is too low relative to the social optimum, which has only one variant.     

浅议拆封许可合同的认定

作为早期采用契约形式保护软件利益的延续,拆封许可合同今天广泛存在并成为软件著作权人权利行使的主要途径之一。拆分许可合同本质上是软件著作权人与用户之间订立的格式化的著作权许可使用合同,其效力同时受到合同法和著作权法的双重规范。     

Copyright piracy as prey–predator behavior

The economic analysis of the piracy of copyright products has used a variety of modeling assumptions, the majority of which use typical industrial organization settings. The results of such models are manyfold, but in general they are ambiguous as to the optimal protection strategy, and the effects of protection on the welfare of copyright holders, and on the existence of piracy. Concretely, little has been said about which types of protection mechanisms are most adequate for controlling piracy. In the present paper, we propose a new theoretical framework by drawing an analogy between copyright piracy and prey–predator behavior. This analogy gives us a new perspective to approach copyright issues and it provides the economic theory of copyright piracy with a new set of mathematical models. We consider a very simple model that can be used to show that publicly instigated and financed policies designed to deter piracy can have the effect of increasing the amount of piracy, while privately financed strategies (e.g. DRM) will always decrease piracy.     

Income based price subsidies and parallel imports

We present a policy game where a Rich country has a higher ability than a Poor country to commit to certain elements of health policy such as providing income related price subsidies and allowing parallel imports (PI). When allowing PI is not a choice for the Poor country, the Rich country allows PI and both countries provide a subsidy to their poorer buyers as the subgame perfect equilibrium policies. However, when the Poor is able to PI a different equilibrium may arise. We show that the ability of the Poor to allow PI might increase welfare in this country even if it is never implemented. We also prove that as the Poor country gets richer, it will not be in their best interest to sign an agreement with the Rich to commit to not allowing PI.     

Strategic interaction between futures and spot markets

We study an oligopolistic industry where firms are able to sell in a futures market at infinitely many moments prior to the spot market. A kind of Folk-theorem is established: any outcome between perfect competition and Cournot can be sustained in equilibrium. We then find that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a renegotiation-proof equilibrium. However, this is not true for the competitive outcome. Furthermore, only the monopolistic outcome is renegotiation-proof if firms can buy and sell in the futures market. These results suggest, contrary to existing literature, that the introduction of futures markets may have an anti-competitive effect.     

Technology Strategy And Product Diversity

This paper considers a three-stage game of a differentiated oligopoly: firms first make their entry decisions, then they choose production technologies and in the third stage of the game they decide product prices. The technology choice can be understood as selecting one from a pool of those recently available as well as developing a new technology through innovative activities. The resulting market equilibrium is then compared with the social optimum. The main conclusions are that a monopolistically competitive market will typically undersupply both product variety and production scale. R&D competition in a free entry differentiated oligopoly will lead to insufficient R&D investment at firm and industry levels.     

Industry equilibrium with outside financing and moral hazard: Implications for market integration

In this paper, we study industry equilibrium under the assumptions that (1) firms need outside financing and (2) they have a moral hazard problem in taking potentially excessive risks. We characterize an industry equilibrium with credit rationing, where firms choose not to take risks, and compare this to the industry equilibrium in the absence of credit rationing. In both cases, we show that competition increases and prices decline as markets integrate. However, in markets with credit rationing there is typically more exit, a smaller decline in prices and, most strikingly, the market value of the industry increases rather than decreases.     

The role of product market regulations in the process of structural change

The sectoral allocation of labor differs considerably across developed economies, even in the presence of similar patterns of structural change. A general equilibrium model that captures the stylized facts of structural change is presented. In this framework, economy-wide product market regulations hinder the development of dynamic sectors such as service industries. This is consistent with the negative cross-country relationship between product market regulations and the service employment share, discussed in the paper. Additionally, the model suggests that higher service prices and rents in regulated economies reduce labor supply, providing a rationale for the negative association between product market regulations and the employment rate previously found in the literature.     

知识产权强国建设背景下我国版权保护典型案例对版权产业发展的影响

版权强国是知识产权强国建设的应有之义,其为版权保护与版权产业发展带来了新的机遇与挑战。将版权保护有效性分析嵌入版权产业发展实践发现,版权保护典型案例与版权产业发展之间的关系处于割裂从而急需缝合的状态之中。因此,从逻辑进路出发阐释版权保护典型案例,认为可通过完善版权法律保护体系、激励版权人自愿登记等方式对版权产业发展产生影响。结合近10年来中国产业发展、典型案例发布数据,阐述版权保护典型案例与版权产业发展之间的关系,进而初步提出定量关系模型。在此基础上,对目前面临的问题提出针对性建议。     

通往国际市场的绿色通行证——环境标志

环境标志是在市场经济条件下,经济发展与环境保护相结合的产物。在未来的国际市场上,它将成为各国产品进入市场的绿色通行证。我国实施的环境标志制度是发展和促进我国对外贸易的重要措施。     

On the Social Desirability of Patents for Sequential Innovations in a Vertically Differentiated Market

We consider a market for vertically differentiated goods where firms enter over time, after having developed innovations characterised by different quality levels. We show that patent height and length interact to determine the ultimate emergence of duopoly. In general, imposing quality improvements on later entrants entails the persistence of monopoly, while a duopoly equilibrium emerges when the second innovator is allowed to produce a sufficiently inferior quality and the patent protection granted to the first innovator is not too long-lasting.     

Endogenizing market institutions: An experimental approach

We study experimental two-sided markets in which the information structure is endogenous. When submitting an offer, a trader decides which other traders will be informed about the offer. This setup allows both a decentralized bargaining market (Chamberlin, J. Polit. Econ. 56 (1948) 95), and a double auction market (Smith J. Polit. Econ. 70 (1962) 111) as special cases. The results show that offers are typically directed to all traders of the other side of the market, but to none of the traders of the same side of the market. Even though traders receive much less information, the resulting market institution leads to the same outcomes in terms of prices and efficiency as a double auction market. In two additional treatments we examine the robustness of these results. First, it is found that the market institution adapts predictably, but not necessarily efficiently, to the imposition of transaction costs. Second, we find that the preference of sellers to conceal offers from competitors is strict. At the same time, sellers benefit collectively when they reveal offers to each other.     

Leadership and Privatisation in a Mixed Multi‐product Oligopoly: An Endogenous Timing Model

This paper examines both leadership choice and welfare consequences of privatisation in an endogenous timing mixed multi‐product oligopoly. It shows that a multi‐product firm undermines the welfare‐maximising efforts of a public firm by cross‐subsidising. The paper demonstrates that a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium emerges in a multi‐product market, in contrast to the multiple equilibria of a single‐product market. This unique equilibrium indicates that profit‐maximising private firms retain leadership while a welfare‐maximising public firm acts as a follower. Even on the off‐equilibrium path where the public firm acts as a leader, it rarely generates maximum social welfare. However, privatising the public firm usually harms social welfare and results in a different timing structure in equilibrium.     

The impacts of suppliers and mutual outsourcing on organizational forms

We consider a downstream duopoly model with a monopolistic common supplier and mutual outsourcing between the two symmetric downstream firms. The market structure captures the recent procurement environment in the smartphone industry. We also incorporate managerial delegation into the duopoly model because deciding on organizational forms within a firm is critical to achieving better performance in almost all industries. There is an equilibrium in which only one of the firms delegates its downstream production to its sales manager. A delegating firm becomes less aggressive. The profits when both firms delegate can be higher than those when no firm delegates. Social welfare when both firms delegate can be smaller than that when no firm delegates.