Dynamic inconsistency and non-preferential taxation of foreign capital

When capital is sunk after it is invested, a host government facing heterogeneous foreign investors has a strong incentive to reduce preferential taxes over time in order to attract less eager investors while fully expropriating past investors. This induces investors to wait rather than invest in the initial period, and leads to loss of tax revenue. This dynamic inconsistency problem is resolved if the host government commits to non-preferential taxation in each period even if it does not commit to future tax rates.     

Competition in taxes and performance requirements for foreign direct investment

Tax incentives offered to attract firms engaged in foreign direct investment are often tied to performance requirements such as domestic content restrictions or adherence to environmental standards. The tax competition literature has repeatedly shown that competition between municipalities for mobile firms tends to drive taxes to low levels. One would expect a comparable result for burdensome performance requirements. Despite this, the evidence suggests that while taxes have indeed been driven down, performance requirements are as popular as ever. We explain this seeming conundrum by showing that in the presence of spillovers, binding performance requirements can act as a coordination device for firms. In equilibrium, municipalities choose performance requirements, which maximize joint surplus from investment. Competition between municipalities then transfers this surplus to firms via tax subsidies.     

The impact of endogenous tax treaties on foreign direct investment: theory and evidence

Abstract .  This paper investigates the effect of tax treaties on bilateral stocks of outward FDI. For this purpose we employ a numerically solvable general equilibrium model of trade and multinational firms to study the impact of tax treaties on both welfare and outward FDI. The model indicates under which factor endowment configurations countries gain in welfare when implementing a tax treaty. This motivates an empirical specification of the endogenous selection into implementing new tax treaties. Using data of bilateral OECD outward FDI between 1985 and 2000, we find a significant negative impact of newly implemented tax treaties on outward FDI stocks.     

Corporate taxation, debt financing and foreign-plant ownership

This paper compares domestically and foreign-owned plants with respect to their debt-to-assets ratio and analyzes to which extent the difference is systematically affected by corporate taxation. To derive hypotheses about influence of corporate taxation on a firm's debt financing we adapt a standard model of taxation and financing decisions of firms for the case of international debt shifting activities of foreign-owned firms. We estimate the average difference between a foreign-owned and a domestically owned firm's debt ratio, treating the mode of ownership as endogenous. Using data from 32,067 European firms, we find that foreign-owned firms on average exhibit a significantly higher debt ratio than their domestically owned counterparts in the host country. Moreover, this gap in the debt ratio increases with the host country's statutory corporate tax rate.     

Does size asymmetry exacerbate the inefficiency of tax competition?

Many authors demonstrate that the tax gap resulting from tax competition increases with the size asymmetry of the competing countries. Consequently, increasing country-size disparities exacerbates the inefficiency of tax competition. The aim of this note is to show that this classical view has no general validity, if we consider that countries compete not only in taxes, but also in the provision of infrastructure. The simple model we develop for this purpose demonstrates that the effect of size disparity on efficiency depends crucially on the degree of international capital mobility.     

The macro-economic impact of changing the rate of corporation tax

This paper considers the impact of changes in the rate of corporation tax in Ireland affecting the business and financial services sector. A model is estimated that relates services exports and output to world activity, competitiveness and the rate of corporation tax. This model indicates that a reduction in the rate of corporation tax in the 1990s stimulated exports and, even allowing for profit repatriations by foreign firms and replacement of lost tax revenue, it resulted in an increase in domestic output. The increase in profitability suggests that some of the increased output involved relocation of profits to Ireland by multinational firms.     

The limitations of decentralized world redistribution: An optimal taxation approach

A centralized scheme of world redistribution that maximizes a border-neutral social welfare function, subject to the disincentive effects it would create, generates a drastic reduction in world consumption inequality, dropping the Gini coefficient from 0.69 to 0.25. In contrast, an optimal decentralized (i.e., with no cross-country transfers) redistribution has a miniscule effect on world income inequality. Thus, the traditional public finance concern about the excess burden of redistribution cannot explain why there is so little world redistribution.Actual foreign aid is vastly lower than the transfers under the simulated world income tax, suggesting that voluntary world transfers - subject to a free-rider problem - produces an outcome that is consistent with rich countries such as the United States either placing a much lower value on the welfare of foreigners, or else expecting that a very significant fraction of cross-border transfers is wasted. The product of the welfare weight and one minus the share of transfers that are wasted constitutes the implicit weight that the United States assigns to foreigners. We calculate that value to be as low as 1/2000 of the value put on the welfare of an American, suggesting that U.S. policy is consistent with social preferences that place essentially no value on the welfare of the citizens of the poorest countries, or that implicitly assumes that essentially all transfers are wasted.     

An extension of the home-attachment criteria under dynamic tax competition

In this short note we extend the home attachment setting of Mansoorian and Myers (1993) and Ogura (2006) to allow the study of tax competition in a dynamic framework when international business relocation occurs over successive periods. The dynamic framework we propose also helps to understand why tax rates may change over time. Our modified home-attachment rule is illustrated by a simple model of dynamic tax competition in discrete time.     

The effects of labour unions on international capital tax competition

Abstract We analyze the impact of labour market rigidities on tax competition between two imperfectly integrated countries. Following a shift from a competitive to a unionized labour market in both countries, the capital tax can be adjusted upward in the country with the less rigid labour market, whereas the capital tax is always adjusted downward in the other country. Moreover, by reducing the labour cost differential between countries, trade liberalization gives rise to tax and welfare convergences. Finally, when a country adopts a flexible labour market, the unionized country may attract the majority of capital.     

Company taxation and tax spillovers: Separate accounting versus formula apportionment

It is observed in the real world that taxes matter for location decisions and that multinationals shift profits by transfer pricing. The US and Canada use so-called formula apportionment (FA) to tax corporate income, and the EU is debating a switch from separate accounting (SA) to FA. This paper develops a theoretical model that compares basic properties of FA to SA. The focal point of the analysis is how changes in tax rates affect capital formation, input choice, and transfer pricing, as well as on spillovers on tax revenue in other countries. The analysis shows that a move from SA to FA will not eliminate such spillovers and will, in cases identified in the paper, actually aggravate them.     

A journey from a corruption port to a tax haven

We sketch a model according to which tax havens attract corporate income generated in corrupted countries. We consider the choice of optimal bribes by corrupt officials and the share of the proceeds of corruption that will be concealed in tax havens. Our framework provides novel welfare implications of tax havens. First, tax havens’ services have a positive effect on welfare through encouraging investment by firms fearing expropriation and bribes in corrupt countries. Second, by supporting corruption and the concealment of officials’ bribes, tax havens discourage the provision of public goods and hence have also a negative effect on welfare. The net welfare effect depends on the specified preferences and parameters. One source of this ambiguity is that the presence of multinational firms in corrupted countries is positively associated with demanding tax havens’ operations. Using firm-level data, we provide new empirical results supporting this hypothesis.     

EU regional policy and tax competition

The European Union (EU) provides coordination and financing of trans-European transport infrastructures, i.e. roads and railways, which link the EU member states and reduce the cost of transport and mobility. This raises the question of whether EU involvement in this area is justified by inefficiencies of national infrastructure policies. Moreover, an often expressed concern is that policies enhancing mobility may boost tax competition. We analyze these questions using a model where countries compete for the location of profitable firms. We show that a coordination of investment in transport cost reducing infrastructures within union countries enhances welfare and mitigates tax competition. In contrast, with regard to union-periphery infrastructure, the union has an interest in a coordinated reduction of investment expenditures. Here, the effects on tax competition are ambiguous. Our results provide a rationale for EU-level regional policy that supports the development of intra-union infrastructure.     

Terrorism and the world economy

It has been argued that terrorism should not have a large effect on economic activity, because terrorist attacks destroy only a small fraction of the stock of capital of a country (see, e.g., Becker, G., Murphy, K., 2001. Prosperity will rise out of the ashes. Wall Street Journal October 29, 2001). In contrast, empirical estimates of the consequences of terrorism typically suggest large effects on economic outcomes (see, e.g., Abadie, A., Gardeazabal, J., 2003. The economic cost of conflict: A case study of the Basque country. American Economic Review 93, 113-132). The main theme of this article is that mobility of productive capital in an open economy may account for much of the difference between the direct and the equilibrium impact of terrorism. We use a simple economic model to show that terrorism may have a large impact on the allocation of productive capital across countries, even if it represents a small fraction of the overall economic risk. The model emphasizes that, in addition to increasing uncertainty, terrorism reduces the expected return to investment. As a result, changes in the intensity of terrorism may cause large movements of capital across countries if the world economy is sufficiently open, so international investors are able to diversify other types of country risks. Using a unique data set on terrorism and other country risks, we find that, in accordance with the predictions of the model, higher levels of terrorist risks are associated with lower levels of net foreign direct investment positions, even after controlling for other types of country risks. On average, a standard deviation increase in the terrorist risk is associated with a fall in the net foreign direct investment position of about 5% of GDP. The magnitude of the estimated effect is large, which suggests that the “open-economy channel” impact of terrorism may be substantial.     

International corporate taxation and U.S. multinationals' behaviour: an integrated approach

Abstract .  This paper explores the effects of corporate taxation on U.S. capital invested abroad and on tax planning practices. The econometric analysis first indicates that investment is strongly influenced by average tax rates, with a magnified impact particularly for low-tax rates, implying that the attractiveness of low-tax countries is not weakened by anti-deferral rules and cross-crediting limitations. Further explorations suggest that firms report higher profit, higher Subpart F income, and are less likely to repatriate dividends when they are located in low-tax jurisdictions. Finally, when the role of effective transfer pricing regulations is estimated, it appears that low degrees of law enforcement are associated with higher income shifting.     

On the welfare effects of competition for foreign direct investments

This paper investigates welfare effects of subsidy competition for the location of a multinational enterprise. One of the competing regions benefits more from the inward investment but, in the absence of incentives, the multinational's preferred location is the other, more advanced region. The paper shows that subsidies, by making the multinational switch location, may increase aggregate welfare. If the multinational exports in the absence of incentives, the welfare effects of subsidy competition may look very different. Allowing subsidies attracts the direct investment, which otherwise would not take place, in one of the two regions. Further, it intensifies competition in the market. The paper shows that the welfare increasing role of incentives may be amplified, but also that the competition effect, by hurting domestic firms, may cancel out any other positive role of incentives.     

Progressive taxation,tax exemption,and corporate liquidation policy

This paper develops a real options model of a firm that operates in continuous time with an infinite horizon. The firm receives stochastic profit flows that are subject to progressive taxation. Tax progression arises from an exogenously given tax exemption threshold that makes the average tax rate increase with the tax base. The firm possesses an option to liquidate its operation, which is optimally exercised when the firm's profit flow reaches an endogenously determined threshold level (the liquidation trigger) from above. We show that the firm's liquidation trigger under progressive taxation increases with either a reduction in the tax exemption threshold or an increase in the corporate income tax rate. Corporate income taxes are thus not neutral when tax schedules are progressive.