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1.
Corporate taxation, debt financing and foreign-plant ownership 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper compares domestically and foreign-owned plants with respect to their debt-to-assets ratio and analyzes to which extent the difference is systematically affected by corporate taxation. To derive hypotheses about influence of corporate taxation on a firm's debt financing we adapt a standard model of taxation and financing decisions of firms for the case of international debt shifting activities of foreign-owned firms. We estimate the average difference between a foreign-owned and a domestically owned firm's debt ratio, treating the mode of ownership as endogenous. Using data from 32,067 European firms, we find that foreign-owned firms on average exhibit a significantly higher debt ratio than their domestically owned counterparts in the host country. Moreover, this gap in the debt ratio increases with the host country's statutory corporate tax rate. 相似文献
2.
Georg Wamser 《The Canadian journal of economics》2011,44(4):1497-1524
Abstract Foreign investments of multinational firms are often complex in that they involve conduit entities. In particular, a multinational can pursue either a direct or an indirect investment strategy, where the latter involves an intermediate corporate entity and is associated with enhanced opportunities for international tax planning. As a consequence, in the case of indirect investments, the role of corporate taxation in destination countries may change. This paper investigates the effects of corporate taxation on foreign investment decisions of German multinationals, taking explicitly into account that firms choose in a first stage the investment regime (direct vs. indirect). The empirical findings, consistent with theoretical predictions, suggest that tax effects differ according to whether the investment is direct or indirect. 相似文献
3.
When capital is sunk after it is invested, a host government facing heterogeneous foreign investors has a strong incentive to reduce preferential taxes over time in order to attract less eager investors while fully expropriating past investors. This induces investors to wait rather than invest in the initial period, and leads to loss of tax revenue. This dynamic inconsistency problem is resolved if the host government commits to non-preferential taxation in each period even if it does not commit to future tax rates. 相似文献
4.
This paper develops a real options model of an all-equity financed firm that receives mean-reverting earnings and is subject to progressive taxation. Tax progression arises from an exogenously given tax exemption threshold such that the firm pays no corporate income taxes should its earnings be less than this threshold. The firm possesses a perpetual option to liquidate its operation for a deterministic salvage value at any time. We show that the firm optimally exercises the liquidation option at the first instant when its earnings reach an endogenously determined threshold (the liquidation trigger) from above. Using numerical analysis, we show that the liquidation trigger is higher or lower than the exogenously given tax exemption threshold, depending on whether the tax exemption is below or above a unique critical level, respectively. We further show that the liquidation trigger is strictly decreasing for all tax exemption thresholds less than the critical level, and can be hump-shaped for all tax exemption thresholds greater than the critical level, especially when the salvage value is small. Corporate income taxes as such are not neutral when tax schedules are progressive. 相似文献
5.
Céline Azémar 《The Canadian journal of economics》2010,43(1):232-253
Abstract . This paper explores the effects of corporate taxation on U.S. capital invested abroad and on tax planning practices. The econometric analysis first indicates that investment is strongly influenced by average tax rates, with a magnified impact particularly for low-tax rates, implying that the attractiveness of low-tax countries is not weakened by anti-deferral rules and cross-crediting limitations. Further explorations suggest that firms report higher profit, higher Subpart F income, and are less likely to repatriate dividends when they are located in low-tax jurisdictions. Finally, when the role of effective transfer pricing regulations is estimated, it appears that low degrees of law enforcement are associated with higher income shifting. 相似文献
6.
This paper develops a real options model of a firm that operates in continuous time with an infinite horizon. The firm receives stochastic profit flows that are subject to progressive taxation. Tax progression arises from an exogenously given tax exemption threshold that makes the average tax rate increase with the tax base. The firm possesses an option to liquidate its operation, which is optimally exercised when the firm's profit flow reaches an endogenously determined threshold level (the liquidation trigger) from above. We show that the firm's liquidation trigger under progressive taxation increases with either a reduction in the tax exemption threshold or an increase in the corporate income tax rate. Corporate income taxes are thus not neutral when tax schedules are progressive. 相似文献
7.
A centralized scheme of world redistribution that maximizes a border-neutral social welfare function, subject to the disincentive effects it would create, generates a drastic reduction in world consumption inequality, dropping the Gini coefficient from 0.69 to 0.25. In contrast, an optimal decentralized (i.e., with no cross-country transfers) redistribution has a miniscule effect on world income inequality. Thus, the traditional public finance concern about the excess burden of redistribution cannot explain why there is so little world redistribution.Actual foreign aid is vastly lower than the transfers under the simulated world income tax, suggesting that voluntary world transfers - subject to a free-rider problem - produces an outcome that is consistent with rich countries such as the United States either placing a much lower value on the welfare of foreigners, or else expecting that a very significant fraction of cross-border transfers is wasted. The product of the welfare weight and one minus the share of transfers that are wasted constitutes the implicit weight that the United States assigns to foreigners. We calculate that value to be as low as 1/2000 of the value put on the welfare of an American, suggesting that U.S. policy is consistent with social preferences that place essentially no value on the welfare of the citizens of the poorest countries, or that implicitly assumes that essentially all transfers are wasted. 相似文献
8.
Abstract. Using a model of interdependent tax choices, and accounting for equalization entitlements and general transfers, this paper estimates – making use of a spatial econometric framework – corporate income tax-setting functions for all Canadian provincial governments. The results show that there is a statistically significant positive fiscal interaction among a subset of provinces and between all provinces and the federal government. Provincial corporate income taxes are also found to be negatively related to equalization entitlements, general federal transfers, and the federal corporate income tax. A robustness check on the fiscal relationship between Ontario and Quebec verifies the existence of significant bi-directional fiscal interdependencies. The paper also introduces U.S state corporate income taxes as covariates and examines their interaction with Canadian provinces. 相似文献
9.
Using the Mirrlees optimal income tax model under maximin, we derive fairly mild conditions for a decreasing marginal tax rate throughout the skill distribution with no bunching, a strictly concave tax function in income and a single-peaked average tax schedule. Assuming additive preferences and an isoelastic disutility of labor function, these tax profiles are implied by aggregate skills that are non-decreasing with the skill level. If preferences are quasilinear in leisure or in consumption, these tax profiles are also obtained under a large set of skill distributions. 相似文献
10.
ABSTRACTUsing country-level panel data over 1995–2013 on within-country income inequality and foreign bank presence, this paper establishes a positive relation between the two, running from higher foreign bank presence to income inequality. Given that foreign bank participation increased by 62% over the period 1995 to 2013, our baseline results imply a 5.8% increase in the Gini coefficient on average over this period, ceteris paribus. These results are robust to the inclusion of country and year fixed effects and to the use of restrictions on foreign bank entry in the host countries as an instrumental variable. We show that this positive effect is channelled through the lack of greenfield entry and the associated lower levels of competition. 相似文献
11.
In the standard optimal income taxation problem, tax payments depend only on each consumer's own actions. Piketty [J. Econ. Theory 61 (1993) 23-41] shows that, if one individual's tax schedule depends on others’ actions and the government knows the exact ability distribution, it can implement any undistorted allocation as the unique revelation game outcome. If some individuals misreveal their types, Piketty's mechanism may assign infeasible allocations. We require that tax schedules must balance the government budget for every possible vector of revelations. When individuals reveal their type by simple announcements, all undistorted allocations can be still implemented, even with off-equilibrium feasibility constraints. 相似文献
12.
Company taxation and tax spillovers: Separate accounting versus formula apportionment 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
It is observed in the real world that taxes matter for location decisions and that multinationals shift profits by transfer pricing. The US and Canada use so-called formula apportionment (FA) to tax corporate income, and the EU is debating a switch from separate accounting (SA) to FA. This paper develops a theoretical model that compares basic properties of FA to SA. The focal point of the analysis is how changes in tax rates affect capital formation, input choice, and transfer pricing, as well as on spillovers on tax revenue in other countries. The analysis shows that a move from SA to FA will not eliminate such spillovers and will, in cases identified in the paper, actually aggravate them. 相似文献
13.
Abstract This paper studies the role of profit taxation for an international firm's decision upon how to penetrate a foreign market – through exports or through foreign direct investment (FDI) and local supply. We show that with harmonized taxes the international firm may choose FDI even though this has welfare costs from a global point of view. With tax competition, the host country can enforce exporting instead of FDI. This leads to a Nash equilibrium associated with higher world welfare than harmonized taxes. Thus, because of the effect on entry mode, tax competition provides heretofore unexplored benefits as compared to tax harmonization. 相似文献
14.
Borys Grochulski 《Journal of Economic Theory》2010,145(3):908-943
We study the structure of optimal wedges and capital taxes in a dynamic Mirrlees economy with endogenous distribution of skills. Human capital is a private, stochastic state variable that drives the skill process of each individual. Building on the findings of the labor literature, we construct a tractable life-cycle model of human capital evolution with risky investment and stochastic depreciation. In this setting, we demonstrate the optimality of (a) a human capital premium, i.e., an excess return on human capital relative to physical capital, (b) a large intertemporal wedge early in the life-cycle, and (c) a non-zero intratemporal wedge even at the top of the skill distribution at all dates except the last date in the life-cycle. The main implication for the structure of optimal linear capital taxes is the necessity of deferred taxation of physical capital. The average marginal tax rate on physical capital held in every period is zero in present value. However, expected capital tax payments do not equal zero in every period. Necessarily, agents face negative expected capital tax payments early in the life-cycle and positive expected capital tax payments late in the life-cycle. 相似文献
15.
Foreign direct investment and China's regional income inequality 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
China's widening regional income inequality coupled with its pronounced regional disparity in foreign direct investment stock since 1990 has claimed the attention of many scholars. While some researchers confirm regional disparity in China's foreign direct investment, others attribute the widening regional income inequality to this regional disparity. This paper thus assesses the impacts of China's stock of foreign direct investment on its regional income inequality using simultaneous equation model and the Shapley value regression-based decomposition approach. Our results suggest that China's stock of foreign direct investment has accounted for merely 2% of its regional income inequality. Furthermore, the contribution ratio of per capita foreign direct investment stock to China's regional income inequality has relatively been on a steady decline since 2002. The decomposition results also reveal that provincial per capita physical assets account for over 50% of the nation's income inequality and 65% of the increases in income inequality since 1990. The other two important determinants of regional income inequality are province location and educational level. However, educational level is found to have a decreasing effect on regional income inequality. 相似文献
16.
We formulated and numerically evaluated a model of car ownership, car use and public transport use for peak and off-peak hours of the day. The model was used to study the optimal tax structure for passenger transport in Belgium, with special emphasis on the optimal tax treatment of diesel versus gasoline cars. We obtained a number of interesting results. First, if the government can set all fixed and variable transport taxes optimally, the higher marginal external cost of diesel use implies that the optimal tax per kilometre for the use of a diesel car is higher than for the use of a gasoline car. Moreover, high congestion implies that the taxes on car use in the peak period are more than twice their current levels. However, the optimal tax on ownership of a diesel car is some 200€ below its current level. Second, if the government uses kilometre taxes that do not differentiate between fuel types, the optimal ownership tax on a diesel car is twice as high as the tax on a gasoline car. Furthermore, if political constraints restrict user taxes to their current levels, we find that optimal ownership taxes on diesel cars double, whereas those on gasoline cars rise by 30%. Finally, subsidies to public transport are found to be optimal as long as variable car taxes are not differentiated between periods. 相似文献
17.
We construct a theoretical model to capture the compensation and efficiency effects of globalization in a set up where the redistributive tax rate is chosen by the median voter. The model predicts that the two alternative modes of globalization- trade liberalization and financial openness- could potentially have different effects on taxation. We then provide some empirical evidence on the relationship between taxation and the alternative modes of globalization using a large cross-country panel data set. On average, globalization is associated with lower taxation but there is some evidence that in countries with high capital-labor ratio, globalization is associated with increased taxation. We make a distinction between de jure and de facto measures of globalization and find a strong negative relationship between taxation and de jure measures of globalization. The results for de facto measures of globalization are mixed. 相似文献
18.
Chia-ying LiuJuin-jen Chang 《Economic Modelling》2011,28(4):1519-1525
This paper sets up a two-good (domestically- and internationally-produced goods) model of a small open economy with consumption externalities and uses it to examine the optimal taxation. Since keeping up with the Joneses leads an individual consumption's to impose a negative externality on the consumption of others, a consumption tax and tariff are thereby socially desirable to correct this distortion. Due to the fact that the government has to account for additional distortion caused by consumer ethnocentrism and that keeping up with the Joneses in the consumption of domestic goods tends to reinforce the influence of ethnocentrism on the purchase of domestic products, the consumption of imported goods is subject to a higher tariff rate because of the cross-market externality. Of interest, if consumption only involves an own-market externality, there is no cyclical consequence for the optimal taxes. However, if consumption involves both own- and cross-market externalities, the optimal tariff is state-contingent and, more specifically, is countercyclical. 相似文献
19.
Tax incentives offered to attract firms engaged in foreign direct investment are often tied to performance requirements such as domestic content restrictions or adherence to environmental standards. The tax competition literature has repeatedly shown that competition between municipalities for mobile firms tends to drive taxes to low levels. One would expect a comparable result for burdensome performance requirements. Despite this, the evidence suggests that while taxes have indeed been driven down, performance requirements are as popular as ever. We explain this seeming conundrum by showing that in the presence of spillovers, binding performance requirements can act as a coordination device for firms. In equilibrium, municipalities choose performance requirements, which maximize joint surplus from investment. Competition between municipalities then transfers this surplus to firms via tax subsidies. 相似文献
20.
Voting over income taxation 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
A major problem of the positive theory of income taxation is to explain why statutory income tax schedules in practice are marginal-rate progressive. While it is commonly believed that this is but a simple consequence of the fact that the number of relatively poor voters exceeds that of richer voters in general, putting this contention in a voting equilibrium context is not a trivial task. We do this here in the context of nonlinear taxation and attempt to provide a formal argument in support of this heuristic claim. We first establish the existence of mixed strategy equilibria and identify certain cases in which marginal-rate progressive taxes are chosen almost surely by the political parties. Unfortunately, we also find that if the tax policy space is not artificially constrained, the support of at least one equilibrium cannot be contained within the set of marginal-rate progressive taxes. 相似文献