What triggers environmental management and innovation? Empirical evidence for Germany

It is frequently hypothesized that environmental management systems (EMSs) may improve firms' environmental innovation performance. Whether this hypothesis is true is as critical for environmental policy as questions pertaining to the relevant incentives for (1) a firm's voluntary adoption of an EMS and (2) its environmental innovation behavior. Based on ample empirical evidence for German manufacturing, this paper addresses the simultaneity of these issues on the basis of a recursive bivariate probit model that explores the hypothesis that a facility's decision on innovation activities is correlated with the decision on EMS adoption. Our empirical results, indicating that environmental innovation activities are not associated with EMS implementation nor any other single policy instrument, reflect the perceptions of the survey respondents and, hence, should be interpreted as correlations rather than causal relationships. According to these perceptions, innovation behavior seems to be mainly correlated with the stringency of environmental policy.     

Prices vs. quantities: Public finance and the choice of regulatory instruments

Since Montgomery [1972. Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs. Journal of Economic Theory 5, 395-418] and Weitzman [1974. Prices vs. quantities. Review of Economic Studies 41, 477-491], it has generally been assumed that, in a full-information setting, tradable quotas and taxes are equivalent regulatory instruments. We demonstrate that, if the government is movitated by public-finance concerns, this equivalence holds only if quotas are short lived. Moreover, the government prefers quotas with the shortest possible lifetime, or, what is equivalent in our setting, taxes.     

Democracy and environmental quality

We develop and estimate an econometric model of the relationship between several local and global air pollutants and economic development while allowing for critical aspects of the socio-political-economic regime of a State. We obtain empirical support for our hypothesis that democracy and its associated freedoms provide the conduit through which agents can exercise their preferences for environmental quality more effectively than under an autocratic regime, thus leading to decreased concentrations or emissions of pollution. However, additional factors such as income inequality, age distribution, education, and urbanization may mitigate or exacerbate the net effect of the type of political regime on pollution, depending on the underlying societal preferences and the weights assigned to those preferences by the State.     

Environmental levies and distortionary taxation:: Pigou, taxation and pollution

I note an important distinction between the optimal price of environmental quality in a second-best world and the optimal level of environmental quality. Using an analytical general equilibrium model, I show that for reasonable parameter values, an increase in tax distortions (arising from an increase in required tax revenues) leads to a fall in the optimal Pigouvian tax rate even while environmental quality improves. In general, knowledge of the direction of changes in optimal environmental tax rates due to changes in the economy is not sufficient for understanding the impact on environmental quality.     

Decentralized targeting of an antipoverty program

Developing country governments often delegate authority over the targeting of antipoverty programs to community organizations, while retaining control over how much goes to each community. We offer a theoretical characterization of the information structure in such programs and the interconnected behavior of the various players. Our model motivates an econometric specification for explaining distributional outcomes. Results for Bangladesh's Food-for-Education (FFE) Program indicate that within-village targeting improved with program size, lower land inequality, less remoteness, fewer shocks, and less private redistribution. There is no sign that the center took account of village attributes conducive to reaching the poor.     

Relative prices and international competitiveness: An empirical investigation

This paper examines the relationship between competitive shares and relative prices for the exports of Japan, Korea and India over the past fifteen years. For Japan the results are consistent with neotechnological theories, and may be explained by a recently explicated model which applies the logic of Hicks' induced innovation mechanism to trade analysis. For the developing countries the results are found to be systematically associated with foreign trade regimes pursued as a part of overall development strategies. Thus the applicability of typical results derivable from standard static trade theories are found to be bound or restricted to special cases defined by stages of economic development, and by policy choices.     

Inequality,growth, and environmental quality trade‐offs in a model with human capital accumulation

This paper develops a simple endogenous growth model where pollution exposure and vulnerability are unequally spread across the population, and growth and distribution are endogenous. In this set‐up, we investigate whether trade‐offs between growth, distributional, and environmental concerns may emerge. We show that a tighter environmental policy reduces income inequality and can improve both growth and total welfare. Immediate welfare losses, though, do occur, and are larger for countries that start at low levels of environmental quality (e.g. developing countries).     

Location choice by households and polluting firms: An evolutionary approach

This paper examines several policy regimes to deal with the problem of households suffering from environmental damage by firms in the same region. We employ an evolutionary framework to analyze migration movements in the course of time, since firms and households will not relocate immediately in response to payoff differentials. We show that taxation gives firms and households an incentive to stay away from each other. Laissez faire (compensation) only gives households (firms) an incentive to stay away from firms (households). We find that taxation creates the right incentives to reach a local welfare maximum. However, when there are multiple local maxima, circumstances may arise under which compensation leads to a better outcome than taxation.     

Pricing the ecosystem and taxing ecosystem services: A general equilibrium approach

In an integrated dynamic general equilibrium model of the economy and the ecosystem humans and other species compete for land and prey biomass. Each submodel exhibits a price-driven competitive allocation mechanism, and the endogenously determined habitat is either openly accessible or privately owned. In both scenarios specific corrective taxes or subsidies are needed to internalize ecosystem externalities. An open access habitat causes additional inefficiencies through diverging prices for biomass and land in both subsystems. Values of all ecosystem components are determined in an efficient steady state clarifying the role and the interplay of ecosystem prices and economic prices.     

Policy mechanism choice for environmental management by non-commercial “lifestyle” rural landholders

For some environmental assets in rural areas, the landholders who are having the biggest impact are people with small holdings and an emphasis on lifestyle rather than commercial gains from their land. This paper aims to better understand the motivations and likely responses to policy for lifestyle landholders in Australia, in order to assess which policy mechanisms, if any, are likely to be most efficiently used to influence their land management. Through face-to-face interviews, we find that lifestyle landholders have important differences from commercial farmers, including much smaller properties, a stronger interest in environmental outcomes, a lack of land-management skills and a lack of time for land-management activities. From the perspective of environmental policy programs, engaging with lifestyle landholders is likely to involve higher transaction costs, and there are likely to be higher learning and transition costs per unit area. A framework for selection of policy tools is modified to take account of these findings. It is concluded that the prospects for worthwhile public investments in land-use changes by lifestyle landholders are lower than for commercial landholders.     

Public expenditure, international specialisation and agglomeration

It is widely recognised that public-sector purchasers tend to favour domestic suppliers. We study the consequences of such home-biased public procurement on international specialisation. Using a general-equilibrium model with a monopolistically competitive sector, we find that a country will specialise in that sector if it has relatively large home-biased procurement (the “pull” effect). Furthermore, home-biased procurement can counter agglomeration forces in that sector and thereby attenuate the overall degree of international specialisation (the “spread” effect). Our empirical analysis, conducted on input-output data for the European Union, yields supporting evidence for the pull effect and some support for the spread effect.     

Can regional policy in a federation improve economic efficiency?

In the European Union and in many federal and non-federal countries, the central government pays subsidies to poor regions. These subsidies are often seen as a redistributive measure which comes at the cost of an efficiency loss. This paper develops an economic rationale for regional policy based on economic efficiency. We consider a model of a federation consisting of a rich and a poor region. The economy is characterized by imperfect competition in goods markets and unemployment. Firms initially produce in the rich region but may relocate their production to the poor region. We show that a subsidy on investment in the poor region unambiguously increases welfare if labour markets are competitive. If there is unemployment in both regions, the case for regional subsidies is weaker.     

A shaky business: Natural gas extraction,earthquakes and house prices

The production of natural gas is strongly increasing around the world. Long-run negative external effects of extraction are understudied and often ignored in (social) cost-benefit analyses. One important example is that natural gas extraction leads to soil subsidence and subsequent induced earthquakes that may occur only after a couple of decades. We show that induced earthquakes that are noticeable to residents generate substantial non-monetary economic effects, as measured by their effects on house prices, also when house owners are fully compensated for damage to their houses. To address the issue that earthquakes do not occur randomly over space, we use temporal variation in the occurrence of noticeable earthquakes while controlling for the occurrence of earthquakes that cannot be felt by house owners. We find that earthquakes that are noticeable with peak ground velocities of above half a cm/s lead to price decreases of 1.9 percent. The total non-monetary costs of induced earthquakes for Groningen are about €170 million (about €600 per household). These results indicate that the non-monetary costs are in the same order of magnitude as the monetary damage costs.     

Income segregation and local progressive taxation: Empirical evidence from Switzerland

This study investigates spatial income segregation in fiscally decentralized urban areas. The theoretical part proposes the progressivity of local income taxes as a new theoretical explanation for income segregation. The empirical part studies how income tax differentials across municipalities affect the households' location decisions. I use data from the Swiss metropolitan area of Basel that contains tax information on all moving households in 1997. The location choice of the households is investigated within the framework of the random utility maximization model. Different econometric specifications of the error term structure, such as conditional logit, nested logit and multinomial probit, are compared. The empirical results show that rich households are significantly and substantially more likely to move to low-tax municipalities than poor households. This result holds after controlling for alternative explanations of segregation. Social interactions and distance from the central business district are established as other major factors for income segregation. Households in general tend to choose locations close to other households like themselves.     

Inter‐regional competition,comparative advantage and environmental federalism

In this paper, we compare endogenous environmental policy setting with centralized and decentralized governments when regions have comparative advantages in different polluting goods. We develop a two‐region, two‐good model with inter‐regional environmental damages and perfect competition in product markets, where both regions produce both goods. Despite positive spillovers of pollution across regions, the model predicts that decentralization may lead to weaker or stricter environmental standards or taxes, depending on the degree of regional comparative advantage and the extent of transboundary pollution. This suggests that federalism can lead to either a “race to the bottom” or a “race to the top,” without relying on inefficient lobbying efforts or capital competition.     

Strategic environmental policy and the accumulation of knowledge

In dealing with a transnational pollutant-emitting duopoly welfare-maximising policy makers face two negative externalities: imperfect competition and unpriced emissions. Strategic environmental policy models show that these externalities involve a trade-off between reducing pollution and allowing for rent-seeking of the respective firm. This dilemma usually results in a suboptimal internalisation of the negative externality emerging from emissions. Indeed, the conventional model setup includes an R&D stage that enables the firms to mitigate regulation costs. But the typical one period configuration ignores that R&D expenditures create knowledge capital which is, due to its inherent cumulativeness, also effective in following periods. Our model analyses the established trade-off in a two period setting and therefore allows for an investigation of intertemporal knowledge accumulation. We find that the intertemporal effects provide an incentive for a policy maker to set a higher tax rate compared to a one-period setup which lessens the magnitude of the suboptimal internalisation of emissions. Under certain conditions even a tax rate above the Pigouvian level is possible in period 1.     

A spatial tax harmonization model

Policies to harmonize value-added tax rates are controversial in the European Union. This paper formulates a multi-country model over a one-dimensional space as a non-cooperative Nash game, in which each country aims at maximizing its tax revenue, subject to the constraint that its tax rate lies within a given common band. Then we examine the effects of changes in the common band on tax rates, tax revenues and the number of cross-border shoppers at Nash equilibrium. We also analyze the effects of geographical variation in country size and location.     

On the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances

This paper derives optimal schemes for the free allocation of emission allowances in a dynamic context. We consider emissions- and output-based allocation rules which allow for updating of the basis of allocation over time and thereby do not rely on historical data only. We show that such dynamic schemes do not necessarily induce inefficient outcomes. In closed trading systems with an absolute cap on emissions, grandfathering schemes which allocate allowances proportionally to past emissions are first-best. However, in open trading systems where allowances can be traded with outsiders, first-best allocation schemes must not depend on firm-specific decisions while second-best schemes correspond to a Ramsey rule of optimal tax differentiation and are generally based on both past emission and output levels.     

Competing for a duopoly: international trade and tax competition

Abstract We analyse the tax/subsidy competition between two potential host governments to attract the plants of firms in a duopolistic industry. While competition between identical countries for a monopolist's investment is known to result in subsidy inflation, two firms can be taxed in equilibrium with the host countries appropriating the entire social surplus generated within the industry, despite explicit non‐cooperation between governments. Trade costs mean that the firms prefer dispersed to co‐located production, creating these taxation opportunities for the host countries. We determine the country‐size asymmetry that changes the nature of the equilibrium, inducing concentration of production in the larger country.     

Price and quantity regulation in general equilibrium

We consider a general equilibrium model with a production externality (e.g. pollution), where the regulator does not observe firm productivity shocks. We examine quantity (permit) regulation and price (tax) regulation. The quantity of permits issued by the regulator are independent of the productivity shock, since shocks are unobserved. Price regulation implies use of the regulated input is an increasing function of the productivity shock because firms take advantage of a good productivity shock by increasing input use. Thus price regulation generates higher average, but more variable, production. Therefore, we show that in general equilibrium the relative advantage of quantity versus price regulation depends not only on the slopes of marginal benefits and costs, but on general equilibrium effects such as risk aversion. The general equilibrium effects are often more important than the slopes of the marginal benefits and cost curves. In the simplest model, a reasonable risk aversion coefficient implies quantity regulation generates higher welfare regardless of the benefit function.