Political foundations of the resource curse

In this paper we argue that the political incentives that resource endowments generate are the key to understanding whether or not they are a curse. We show: (1) politicians tend to over-extract natural resources relative to the efficient extraction path because they discount the future too much, and (2) resource booms improve the efficiency of the extraction path. However, (3) resource booms, by raising the value of being in power and by providing politicians with more resources which they can use to influence the outcome of elections, increase resource misallocation in the rest of the economy. (4) The overall impact of resource booms on the economy depends critically on institutions since these determine the extent to which political incentives map into policy outcomes. Countries with institutions that promote accountability and state competence will tend to benefit from resource booms since these institutions ameliorate the perverse political incentives that such booms create. Countries without such institutions however may suffer from a resource curse.     

The geography of natural resources,ethnic inequality and civil conflicts

We study whether the spatial distribution of natural resources across different ethnic groups within countries causes spatial inequality and the incidence of armed conflict. By providing a theoretical rent-seeking model and analysing a set of geo-coded data for mines, night-time light emissions, local populations and ethnic homelands, we show that the spatial distribution of resources is a major driving factor of ethnic income inequality. Moreover, a spatially unequal distribution of natural resources induces rent-seeking behaviour and thus increases the risk of civil conflicts. Consequently, we extend the perspective of the resource curse to explain cross-country differences in income inequality and the onset of civil conflicts.     

The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences

We analyze voting behavior in a large electorate in which voters have adversarial state-contingent preferences with incomplete information about the state of the world. We show that one type of voter can suffer from the swing voter's curse à la Feddersen and Pesendorfer [The swing voter's curse, Amer. Econ. Rev. 86 (1996) 408-424], and go on to characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of this model under different parameter values. We prove that unlike settings with nonadversarial preferences, there are equilibria in which in one state of the world, a minority-preferred candidate almost surely wins the election and thus the election may fail to correctly aggregate information. Indeed, we show that the fraction of the electorate dissatisfied with the result can be as large as .     

The curse of natural resources

This paper summarizes and extends previous research that has shown evidence of a “curse of natural resources” – countries with great natural resource wealth tend nevertheless to grow more slowly than resource-poor countries. This result is not easily explained by other variables, or by alternative ways to measure resource abundance. This paper shows that there is little direct evidence that omitted geographical or climate variables explain the curse, or that there is a bias resulting from some other unobserved growth deterrent. Resource-abundant countries tended to be high-price economies and, perhaps as a consequence, these countries tended to miss-out on export-led growth.     

Winner's curse without overbidding

We report the results of a series of second-price auction experiments where each bidder's signal is given by a normally distributed value plus a normally distributed error. While bidders’ values differ in one treatment they are the same in another, which allows for a direct test of the “winner's curse” irrespective of confounding factors. Bidders may also fall prey to a “news curse” when they do not sufficiently take into account that signals and errors are correlated. We find that the effects of the winner's curse are mitigated by a news curse and loss or risk aversion.     

Reprint of: A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries

This study reports results from a new series of experiments that examine the robustness of face-to-face communication as a cooperation-facilitating institution in common-pool resource settings. Results are reported from nine experiment sessions, initially designed for pedagogical purposes. The sessions were conducted between 1998 and 2007 as part of a series of summer institutes on institutional analysis and environmental change. Subjects were graduate students and professionals from diverse disciplines, representing 41 countries of residence. The participants in this study stand in sharp contrast to most previous studies, which used undergraduates who self-select into experiments by volunteering to participate. Results from these experiments substantiate earlier findings that non-binding communication can serve as an effective mechanism for solving social dilemma problems, with subjects achieving near socially efficient outcomes.     

The curse of natural resources in the transition economies*

The curse of natural resources is a well‐documented phenomenon for developing countries. Economies that are richly endowed with natural resources tend to grow slowly. Among the transition economies of the former ‘Eastern Bloc’, a similar pattern can be observed. This paper shows that a large part of the variation in growth rates among the transition economies can be attributed to the curse of natural resources. After controlling for numerous other factors, there is still a strong negative correlation between natural resource abundance and economic growth. Among the transition economies the prime reasons for the curse of natural resources were corruption and a neglect of basic education. In order to overcome the curse of natural resources and move to a sustainable path of development, the resource abundant transition countries should fight corruption and ensure that their resource revenues are invested in human capital or the preservation of natural capital.     

Contests with limited resources

Many interesting phenomena (electoral competition, R&D races, lobbying) are instances of multiple simultaneous contests with unconditional commitment of limited resources. Specifically, the following game is analyzed. Two players compete in a number of simultaneous contests. The players have limited resources (budgets) and must decide how to allocate these to the different contests. In each contest the player who expends more resources than his adversary wins a corresponding prize. Mixed-strategy equilibria are characterized in the case of identical values and budgets and the connections with the classical Blotto game are analyzed.     

Varieties of authoritarianism matter: Elite fragmentation,natural resources and economic growth

A broad literature suggests that political regimes matter for the growth effect of natural resources. However, while several studies have concentrated on the difference between democracies and autocracies in this respect, an important topic overlooked so far is the differences between varieties of authoritarian regimes. This study uses the political variation across sub-national regions of the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin to understand how differences in the extent of elite fragmentation in autocracies affects the influence of resource abundance on economic growth in the short run. We find that polities with fragmented elites underperform those with consolidated elites and link this effect to higher costs of fights over rents due to higher political uncertainty.     

A fractionally cointegrated VAR analysis of economic voting and political support

We use a fractionally cointegrated vector autoregressive model to examine the relationship between Canadian political support and macroeconomic conditions. This model is well suited for the analysis because it allows multiple fractional time series and admits simple asymptotic inference for the model parameters and tests of the hypotheses of interest. In the long‐run equilibrium, we find that support for the Progressive Conservative Party was higher during periods of high interest rates and low unemployment, while support for the Liberal Party was higher during periods of low interest rates and high unemployment. We also test and reject the notion that party support is driven only by relative (to the United States) economic performance. Indeed, our findings suggest that US macroeconomic variables do not enter the long‐run equilibrium of Canadian economic voting (political opinion poll support) at all.     

Transmission channels of the resource curse in Africa: A time perspective

Most sub-Saharan African countries share the following characteristics: a strong dependence on natural resources, weak institutions, and relatively low growth levels preventing them to catch up with the rest of the developing world. This paper aims to unfold the natural resource curse by introducing a time perspective: long-term versus short-term effects. Following the two-step Engle and Granger procedure, an error-correction model is performed after a cointegration estimation. In addition, the paper clusters the countries to differentiate the natural resource curse mechanisms by level of institutional quality. Results are three-fold. On the long run, the negative impact of the dependence is confirmed for all categories. Countries with weak institutions are more vulnerable to the curse because the resource dependence not only negatively impacts long-term growth but also adversely impacts the recovery process. Finally, in a strong institutional environment, results point towards a potential positive impact of natural resources during recovery process.     

Poverty and the resource curse: Evidence from a global panel of countries

This paper contributes to the literature in an attempt to shed further light on the mixed evidence about the link between poverty and the abundance of natural resources, i.e. the resource curse hypothesis effect. It makes use of a large country sample, the Headcount Poverty Index, and a number of panel data methodological approaches, spanning the period 1992–2014. The findings document that fossil energy resources exacerbate poverty, while both democracy and economic freedom alleviate it, with corruption increasing it. These results highlight the need these economies to reinvestment their energy revenues in social programmes.     

Conditional versus unconditional trade concessions for developing countries

Abstract We examine how trade liberalization by a large trading partner affects the ability of a small country’s government to sustain free trade through a reputational mechanism. Unconditional liberalization by the large trading partner has an ambiguous effect on the small country’s dynamic incentives. Liberalization through a reciprocal trade agreement, in which the large country lowers its tariffs conditionally on the small country doing the same, unambiguously dominates unconditional liberalization by the large country as a way of boosting trade reforms and reinforcing policy credibility in the small country. However, if capacity in the import‐competing sector can be reduced only gradually, a conditional, reciprocal agreement may require an asynchronous exchange of concessions, where the large country liberalizes before the small country does.     

A Theory of Civil Conflict and Democracy in Rentier States*

The effects of resource rents on the political equilibrium have been studied in two main types of models. The first tradition uses models of conflict, and studies how resource rents affect the intensity and duration of civil conflict. The second tradition uses political economy models, where resource rents affect the political equilibrium due to changes in the costs and benefits of buying votes. Although they provide considerable insight, these traditions have little to say about when democracy emerges, and about when conflict emerges. In this paper, by integrating the earlier model traditions, we suggest the simplest possible framework we can think of to study the choice between conflict and democracy. We show how factors such as resource rents, the extent of electoral competition, and productivity affect economic and political equilibria.     

Political credibility and economic growth in less developed countries

While the mainstream of economic development theory focuses on the efficiency of policy measures, the role of the credibility of these measures is rarely analyzed. In this paper we argue that in less developed countries the problem of establishing the credibility of policy measures is at least as important as the problem of choosing the efficient policy solution. We claim that many of the difficulties less developed countries face can be understood in terms of lack of effective control on the discretionary power of governments, which ultimately leads to policies that are not credible. The private sector anticipates large swings in policies and reacts by withholding its resources. Symptoms of these credibility problems in less developed countries include the size of the informal sector, capital flight, and the reluctance of investors to commit capital. All of these reactions contribute to the slow economic growth in these countries. This paper concludes that establishing strategies for the control of state discretionary power is a crucial precondition for overcoming these problems and generating long term economic growth.     

Poverty growth in Scandinavian countries: A Sen multi-decomposition

We show in this paper that the growth rate of the Sen index is multi-decomposable, that is, decomposable simultaneously by subgroups and income sources. The multi-decomposition of the poverty growth yields respectively: the growth rate of the poverty incidence (poverty rate) decomposed by subgroups, the growth rate of the poverty depth (poverty gap ratios) decomposed by sources and subgroups, and the growth rate of inequality decomposed by sources and subgroups. We demonstrate that the multi-decomposition is not unique. It is mainly dependent on poverty lines defined on the space of income sources. An application to Scandinavian countries shows that poverty lines based on non-correlation between the income sources imply serious risks of underestimation of the contribution levels of the different components of the global poverty growth. The main contribution of our paper is to pay particular attention to the poverty growth and its source components in order to avoid underestimation of poverty growth.     

SUSTAINABLE CONSTANT CONSUMPTION IN A SEMI‐OPEN ECONOMY WITH EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES*

To sustain constant consumption, Hartwick's rule prescribes reinvesting all resource rents in reproducible capital. However, Hartwick's rule is not necessarily the result of optimization. In this paper, we address this insufficiency by deriving a constant consumption path endogenously in a semi‐open economy with an exhaustible resource, which has full access to world goods and capital markets, while the resource flows are not internationally tradable. Our findings show that, due to the essentiality of both capital and resource to the production process, the economy transforms its domestic assets into foreign ones, consuming a constant interest flow from the latter.     

Institutional foundations of export diversification patterns in oil-producing countries

While it is well known that resource exporting countries have higher export concentration, it is lesser known that there is substantial variance in export concentration fortunes within resource-based countries. Using several estimation techniques and other sensitivity checks, this paper offers a new explanation for success and failure in export diversification patterns in oil countries, an explanation which has an institutional and political background. In measuring the number of years between the beginning of oil production and the attainment of political independence in oil developing countries, we found that the greater the number of years, the higher the degree of export diversification ceteris paribus. Our interpretation of this result is grounded in an analysis of political constraints to diversification in resource-based countries. Institutions, unfavorable to diversification, which arose from the pre-independence period, were blocked in their positive evolution by national political elites in the post-independence period. This result contributes to a better understanding of the dynamics of institutions in resource-based countries.     

The fragility of information aggregation in large elections

In a common-values election where voters receive a signal about which candidate is superior, suppose there is a small amount of uncertainty about the conditional likelihood of the signal?s outcome, given the correct candidate. Once this uncertainty is resolved, the signal is i.i.d. across agents. Information can then fail to aggregate. The candidate less likely to be correct given agents? signals can be elected with probability near 1 in a large electorate even if the distribution of signal likelihoods is arbitrarily near to a classical model where agents are certain that a particular likelihood obtains given that a specific candidate is correct.     

The curse of natural resources: An empirical investigation of U.S. counties

Research consistently shows that natural resource dependence tends to be associated with lower economic growth. However, the studies typically focus on differences across nations or states. We fill a gap in the literature by testing the so-called resource curse at a more disaggregated county level. Our results show clear evidence that resource-dependent counties exhibit more anemic economic growth, even after controlling for state-specific effects, socio-demographic differences, initial income, and spatial correlation. A case study analysis of Maine and Wyoming, and the counties within, highlight the growth effects of specializing in natural resource extraction.