The Repo Auctions of the European Central Bank and the Vanishing Quota Puzzle*

Until June 2000 the European Central Bank (ECB) used fixed rate tenders for its weekly repo auctions. A switch to variable rate tenders became necessary due to massive overbidding by banks. In this paper we introduce a stylized game among banks to investigate this overbidding phenomenon. Our results confirm the weakness of the fixed rate tender format and indicate that the ECB's liquidity management has significantly improved since the switch to the variable rate system. Yet recent episodes of rate cut expectations suggest that the ECB's practice of setting a minimum bid rate should be abandoned in favor of a more symmetric interest rate target.     

Over- and Underbidding in Central Bank Open Market Operations Conducted as Fixed Rate Tender

Abstract. Open market operations play a key role in allocating central bank funds to the banking system and thereby in steering short‐term interest rates in line with the stance of monetary policy. Many central banks apply so‐called ‘fixed rate tender’ auctions in their open market operations. This paper presents, on the basis of a survey of central bank experience, a model of bidding in such tenders. In their conduct of fixed rate tenders, many central banks faced specifically an ‘under‐’ and an ‘overbidding’ problem. These phenomena are revisited in the light of the proposed model, and the more general question of the optimal tender procedure and allotment policy of central banks is addressed.     

Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions

This paper applies the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model to study overbidding in private-values auctions. Experimental evidence shows that the prevalence of overbidding depends on the cost of overbidding relative to underbidding, as predicted theoretically. We use QRE as an error structure to estimate parameters of several competing models of overbidding. A QRE model based on risk averse bidders closely tracks the exact distribution of bids. The estimated parameters are significant and consistent across treatments. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92, D44.     

TALKING LESS AND MOVING THE MARKET MORE: EVIDENCE FROM THE ECB AND THE FED

This paper examines and compares the communication strategies of the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, and their effectiveness. First, we find that the surprise components of both monetary policy actions and statements have important but differing effects on asset prices, with unexpected communication having a much greater impact on longer‐term interest rates. Second, both the ECB and the Fed have proven to be equally successful in moving their domestic asset prices using either monetary policy or news shocks. However, the response of the American yield curve to the surprise component of Fed's statements is larger than the reaction of the European term structure to ECB's announcements. This result is intimately related to the amplitude of the policy rate cycle that is much larger in the US than in the euro area combined with the bounded support of the news shock. Third, we analyze the cross‐effects and show that the Fed has been more able to move the European interest rates of all maturities than the ECB to move American rates. This finding is tied to the predominance of dollar fixed income assets rather than to an attempt of the ECB to mimic the Fed.     

SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES IN GAMES: AN APPLICATION TO THE OVERBIDDING PUZZLE*

This article illustrates how the joint elicitation of subjective probabilities and preferences may help us understand behavior in games. We conduct an experiment to test whether biased probabilistic beliefs may explain overbidding in first‐price auctions. The experimental outcomes indicate that subjects underestimate their probability of winning the auction, and indeed overbid. When provided with feedback on the precision of their predictions, subjects learn to make better predictions, and to curb significantly overbidding. The structural estimation of different behavioral models suggests that biased probabilistic beliefs are a driving force behind overbidding, and that risk aversion plays a lesser role than previously believed.     

What is on the ECB’s mind? Monetary policy before and after the global financial crisis

This paper analyzes the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) both before and after the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008. In the literature, researchers typically select one Taylor rule-based model to analyze monetary policy of central banks and to derive determinants for the interest rate setting. However, uncertainty about the choice of this respective model is typically neglected. In contrast, we apply a Bayesian model averaging (BMA) approach to extend the Taylor rule to account for model uncertainty driven by heterogeneity in the ECB’s decision-making body, the Governing Council. Our results suggest the following: First, the ECB focuses on the inflation rate when setting interest rates. Second, economic activity indicators were in the focus of the ECB before the financial crisis. Third, over the last decade, the role of economic activity decreased, indicating that inflation is the main driver of monetary policy decisions in the post-crisis period. Fourth, when setting interest rates, central bankers appear to consider more than one model.     

An experimental investigation of overdissipation in the all pay auction

Pervasive overbidding represents a well-documented feature of all-pay auctions. Aggregate bids exceed Nash predictions in laboratory experiments, and individuals often submit bids that guarantee negative profits. This paper examines three factors that may reduce pervasive overbidding: (a) repetition (experience), (b) reputation (strangers vs. partners), and (c) active participation. Reputation and repetition reduce aggregate overdissipation, but they eliminate it only in conjunction with active participation.     

Comparing monetary policy reaction functions: ECB versus Bundesbank

This paper compares the European Central Bank’s (ECB) conduct of monetary policy with that of the Bundesbank. Estimated monetary policy reaction functions show that the ECB reacts similarly to expected inflation but significantly stronger to the output gap than the Bundesbank did. Theoretical considerations suggest that this stronger response to the output gap may rather be due to a higher interest rate sensitivity of the German output gap than to a higher weight given to output stabilisation in the objective function of the ECB. Counterfactual simulations based on the estimated interest rate reaction functions reveal that German interest rates would not have been lower under a hypothetical Bundesbank regime after 1999. However, this conclusion crucially depends on the assumption of an unchanged long-run real interest rate for the EMU period and is reversed when the Bundesbank reaction function is adjusted for the lower long-run real interest rate estimated for the ECB regime.

On the size of the public sector

The main goal of this paper is to detect the mechanisms that should rationally stimulate the decision making-policies of the European Central Bank (ECB). This is carried out under the framework of theoretical principles of interest rate rules. Firstly, we deduce a set of logically advisable guidelines for the strategy actually developed by this central bank. Then we contrast a wide set of hypotheses with reference to those variables the ECB takes into account on deciding its monetary policy, with a flexible treatment regarding the number of months of advance or delay in the explanatory variables. The results lead us to the conclusion that the ECB, besides adopting a smooth strategy, especially bears in mind the expected core inflation rate, with a reaction coefficient adjusted to that initially proposed by Taylor. The economic growth rate, though it has a significant positive coefficient, matters relatively little and is backward looking. Finally, we evaluate up to what point the behaviour of the ECB is assimilative to an inflation targeting framework, solving this question affirmatively.     

Market efficiency broadcasted live: ECB code words and euro exchange rates

This paper examines the impact of the European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy on euro exchange rate returns using an event study with intraday data for five currencies (the euro exchange rate versus the US dollar, the British pound, the Canadian dollar, the Swiss franc, and the Japanese yen). I construct two indicators of news about monetary policy stemming separately from policy decisions and the press conference. Estimation results show that the surprise component of communication has highly statistically significant effects on exchange rates, whereas the response of euro exchange rates to the unanticipated change in the policy rate is more muted. I also estimate the financial market impact on euro exchange rates of US, European and German macroeconomic news, and I show that the impact of the ECB press conference is economically important. The process of fully incorporating the ECB news shock takes about 1 h, and thus this result suggests that the whole press conference (both the Introductory Statement and the Q&A part) provides valuable information to market participants.     

The Monetary Policies of the European Central Bank and the Euro's (Mal-)Performance: A stability-oriented assessment

The stability-oriented macroeconomic framework established in the Treaties on European Union, especially the unparalleled status of independence and peculiar mandate of the European Central Bank (ECB), were promised virtually to guarantee price stability and a strong euro. Shattering these hopes and promises in a rather drastic way, the euro's external value has declined markedly while consumer price inflation has quadrupled since the new currency's inception. This paper assesses the ECB's role in relation to the euro's (mal-)performance. It challenges the truly odd conventional wisdom that, despite these dismal monetary developments, neither the Maastricht regime nor the ECB might possibly be at fault. Reviewing the ECB's interest rate policies and scrutinising its rationale, a conspicuous anti-growth bias is diagnosed that has produced rather perverse consequences.This stability-oriented assessment concludes that the ECB has been key to the 'euro puzzle', propagating euro weakness and pushing up inflation. Euroland's democratically elected representatives are therefore urged to reform Europe's key structural problem, namely, the ECB, an independent monetary policymaker whose unbounded discretion allows it to pursue ill-guided and thoroughly idiosyncratic policies without being held to account for the consequences.     

Forecasting the Direction of Policy Rate Changes: The Importance of ECB Words

This paper evaluates the predictive power of different information sets for the European Central Bank (ECB) interest-rate-setting behaviour. We employ an ordered probit model, i.e. a limited dependent variable framework, to take into account the discreteness displayed by policy rate changes. The results show that the forecasting ability of standard Taylor-type variables, such as inflation and output gap, is fairly low both in-sample and out-of-sample, and is comparable to the performance of the random walk model. Instead by using broader information sets that include measures of core inflation, exchange rates, monetary aggregates and financial conditions, the accuracy of the forecasts about ECB future actions substantially improves. Moreover, ECB rhetoric considerably contributes to a better understanding of its policy reaction function. Finally, we find that that the ECB has been fairly successful in educating the public to anticipate the overall future direction of its monetary policy, but has been less successful in signalling the exact timing of rate changes.     

Endowment effects in contests

We experimentally study overbidding in contests and find that overbidding is significantly higher when subjects are given a large per-experiment endowment rather than when the endowment is given per-period. Risk-aversion and non-monetary utility of winning can partially explain our findings.     

What matters when? The impact of ECB communication on financial market expectations

This article analyses financial markets’ reaction to European Central Bank's (ECB) communication. We apply a novel indicator that quantifies the contents of the ECB's introductory statements and allows disentangling ECB statements on prices, the real and the monetary sector. We provide evidence that it matters what issue the ECB is speaking about: especially, the ECB's statements on price developments represent important news to financial markets. It also matters when the ECB affects markets: communication drives maturities above 4 months.     

Building responsive supervision over smaller banks in Europe: an insight from the Principal-Agent perspective

Abstract

The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) is an administrative arrangement of national assistance to the ECB in exercising its exclusive supervisory competence. It sets two systems of assistance: ECB Direct Supervision (for large banks) and Indirect Supervision (for smaller and medium-sized banks) supervision. This paper analyzes dynamics between the ECB Banking Supervision as the principal and NCAs as its agents in the system of ECB Indirect Supervision. It identifies six formal (statutory) accountability and control mechanisms which are put at the ECB’s disposal to monitor the way how the NCAs carry SSM supervisory tasks when exercising the ECB’s exclusive supervisory competences under the SSM Regulation.     

Consultations and the ECB as prudential regulator: enhancing legitimacy?

ABSTRACT

This paper examines whether the ECB’s consultations, imposed by the SSM Regulation, enhance legitimacy in terms of openness, transparency, inclusiveness, efficacy and judicial accountability. The paper argues that the ECB has, in general, established a solid consultation practice. However, although there is a need for efficacy, the lack of a profound feedback statement, the low participation rate of groups other than the sector actors, and weak judicial review can be considered to constitute its Achilles’ heel. Thus, while in theory the consultation obligation leads to more throughput legitimacy, reality has turned out to be far more complex.     

Limited Consumer Attention in International Trade

This paper introduces a model of limited consumer attention into an otherwise standard new trade theory model with love‐of‐variety preferences and heterogeneous firms. In this setting, we show that international integration needs not be welfare enhancing if the consumers' capacity to gather and process information is limited. Rather, it intensifies competition for scarce consumer attention, which causes mutual overbidding of producers in their advertising expenditures. The mutual overbidding renders advertising—which is informative in principle—wasteful and diverts purchases to imported goods at an inefficient scale. Wasteful advertising provides scope for policy intervention in the form of an advertising tax. However, if the tax instrument is not allowed to discriminate against foreign producers, it cannot eliminate inefficient diversion of consumer purchases to imports; hence it needs not be successful in securing gains from international integration in this framework.     

Optimistic irrationality and overbidding in private value auctions

Bidding one’s value in a second-price, private-value auction is a weakly dominant solution (Vickrey in J Finance 16(1):8–37, 1961), but repeated experimental studies find more overbidding than underbidding. We propose a model of optimistically irrational bidders who understand that there are possible gains and losses associated with higher bids but who may overestimate the additional probability of winning and/or underestimate the potential losses when bidding above value. These bidders may fail to discover the dominant strategy—despite the fact that the dominant strategy only requires rationality from bidders—but respond in a common sense way to out-of-equilibrium outcomes. By varying the monetary consequences of losing money in experimental auctions we observe more overbidding when the cost to losing money is low, and less overbidding when the cost is high. Our findings lend themselves to models in which less than fully rational bidders respond systematically to out-of-equilibrium incentives, and we find that our model better fits the effects of our manipulations than most of the existing models we consider.     

HIGH AND LOW BIDS IN TENDERS: STRATEGIC PRICING AND OTHER BIDDING BEHAVIOUR IN PUBLIC TENDERS OF PASSENGER RAILWAY SERVICES

ABSTRACT ** :  An important component in the deregulation of the public sector in the European Union is public procurement of services and products. This article studies the bidding behaviour of firms participating in public tenders of passenger railway services in Sweden. In a theoretical part of the article we discuss the various possible reasons behind high and low bids in tenders, linked to a discussion on pricing strategies and continuous and discontinuous economies of scale regarding costs of production. Detailed data on bids and bidders in Swedish tenders of railway services are then analyzed. 37 tenders taking place between 1989 and 2005 are included.     

Lessons from the ECB Experience: Frankfurt Still Matters!

This paper compares the European Central Bank's (ECB) conduct of monetary policy (1999–2005) with that of the Bundesbank (after the German Unification: 1990–1998) in order to test the hypothesis of an ECB with 'Bundesbank's preferences' put forward in the theoretical literature ( Alesina and Grilli, 1993 ; Fatum, 2006 ). Econometric tests and simulations based on monetary policy reaction functions show that the continuation of the former Bundesbank regime is supported by the data. Given this empirical evidence we discuss the lessons for future Monetary Unions stemming from the ECB experience.