Company interests and foreign aid policy: Playing donors off against one another

The evidence on conditionality indicates that this instrument sometimes works, and sometimes does not work. We suggest that third parties to the donor-recipient relationship influence the aid disbursement. The halt in aid that should follow non-compliance could trigger the recipient to cancel contracts with companies from donor countries, which creates incentives for the companies to put pressure towards aid disbursement. We use a multi-agent triadic model of the relationships between a recipient and two donors and two companies to illustrate that recipients may act strategically to make third parties (like companies and others) influence the disbursement decision. Failing to take account of third parties’ role yields the opposite result; conditionality becomes successful.     

Motives for sharing in social networks

What motivates people in rural villages to share? We first elicit a baseline level of sharing using a standard, anonymous dictator game. Then using variants of the dictator game that allow for either revealing the dictator's identity or allowing the dictator to choose the recipient, we attribute variation in sharing to three different motives. The first of these, directed altruism, is related to preferences, while the remaining two are incentive-related (sanctions and reciprocity). We observe high average levels of sharing in our baseline treatment, while variation across individuals depends importantly on the incentive-related motives. Finally, variation in measured reciprocity within the experiment predicts observed ‘real-world’ gift-giving, while other motives measured in the experiment do not predict behavior outside the experiment.     

Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation

Recent evidence highlights the importance of social norms in many economic relations. However, many of these relationships are long term and provide repeated game incentives for performance. We experimentally investigate interaction effects of reciprocity and repeated game incentives in two treatments (one-shot and repeated) of a gift-exchange game. In both treatments we observe reciprocity, which is strengthened in the repeated game. A detailed analysis shows that, in the repeated game, some subjects imitate reciprocity. Thus, reciprocity and repeated game incentives reinforce each other. Observed behaviour is robust against experience. We conclude that long-term interaction is a "reciprocity-compatible" contract enforcement device.
JEL classification : J 30; C 91     

Group Selection and the Limits to Altruism

Several evolutionary mechanisms have been identified in the literature that would generate altruism in humans. The most powerful (except for kin selection) and most controversial is group selection, as recently analyzed by Sober & D.S. Wilson. I do not take a stand on the issue of the existence of group selection. Instead, I examine the level of human altruism that could exist if group selection were an engine of human evolution. For the Sober & Wilson mechanism to work, groups practicing altruism must grow faster than other groups. I call altruistic behavior that would lead to faster growth efficient altruism. This often consists of cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma. ltruistic acts such as helping a temporarily hungry or injured person would qualify as efficient altruism. Efficient altruism would also require monitoring recipients to avoid shirking. Utilitarianism would be an ethical system consistent with efficient altruism, but Marxism or the Rawlsian system would not. Discussions of efficient altruism also help understand intuitions about fairness. We perceive those behaviors as fair that are consistent with efficient altruism. It is important to understand that, even if humans are selected to be altruistic, the forms of altruism that might exist must be carefully considered and ircumscribed.     

Market experience eliminates some anomalies—and creates new ones

We report two experiments which investigate whether experience of decision making in repeated markets purges behaviour of preference reversals. We investigate two behavioural mechanisms that may be shaping bids in repeated auctions: A tendency to adjust bids towards previously observed market prices, and a tendency to reduce bids following bad market outcomes. We find little support for the former but strong support for the latter. Also, whilst ‘just enough’ market exposure eliminates the typical preference reversal phenomenon, continued exposure fosters the mirror image anomaly. Therefore, although market experience shapes behaviour, in our experiments, it does not generally promote consistency with standard preference theory.     

Capital income taxation when inherited wealth is not observable

This paper extends the Atkinson-Stiglitz model of direct and indirect taxation to a dynamic setting with two unobservable characteristics: productive ability and inherited wealth. Bequests are motivated by the ‘joy of giving’. A child’s inheritance is a random variable with a probability distribution that depends on his parent’s investment in a ‘bequest technology’. Public borrowing is assumed and implies the modified golden rule. We study the optimal tax policy when two instruments are available: a non-linear (wage) income tax and a proportional tax on capital income. We show that the second instrument ought, in general, to be used but that the tax rate is not necessarily positive. However, a positive tax rate is more likely when there is a positive correlation between inherited wealth and innate ability.     

Separating reputation, social influence, and identification effects in a dictator game

This study explores the ways in which information about other individual's action affects one's own behavior in a dictator game. The experimental design discriminates behaviorally between three possible effects of recipient's within-game reputation on the dictator's decision: Reputation causing indirect reciprocity, social influence, and identification. The separation of motives is an important step in trying to understand how impulses towards selfish or generous behavior arise. The statistical analysis of experimental data reveals that the reputation effects have a stronger impact on dictators’ actions than the social influence and identification.     

Crime and social norms

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of crime. It is shown that law and norms are substitutes in achieving a stable equilibrium. Here we offer a new interpretation of different theories of social norms in the context of crime and deterrence. The law and economics theory is presented as an opportunism-limiting approach to norms whereas the evolutionary theory is presented as an opportunity cost approach.Received: January 2003, Accepted: July 2003, JEL Classification: D59, K14, K42Paper presented at the 3rd annual meeting of SPIE Portuguese Association for Research in Economics, June 22-23, 1998, Braga and at the 15th annual meeting of the European Association of Law and Economics, September 24-26, 1998, Utrecht. I am grateful to two referees and the editor for helpful comments that much improved the paper, and to Dorothea Kübler, Eric Posner, Dieter Schmidtchen, and Stergios Skaperdas for suggestions that much improved this paper, and to Kelly Markva for research assistantship. The author acknowledges the financial support of FCT, Lisbon, Portugal. Part of this paper was written while the author visited Stanford Law School. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Trust and reciprocity in inter-individual versus inter-group interactions: The effects of social influence, group dynamics, and perspective biases

Using an experimental trust game, I examine whether the perspectives and behavior of group representatives and consensus groups differ from those of the same individuals in an analogous inter-individual situation. A primary goal of this research is to extend past work on trust and reciprocity by examining the impact of the social contexts within which social interactions are characteristically embedded. Specifically, this research concerns whether norms and dynamics of trust and reciprocity differ in the contexts of inter-individual and inter-group interactions. First, I examine whether dynamics of trust and reciprocity differ in various inter-group interactions where inter-group decisions are operationalized as 1) autonomous group representatives, i.e., individuals who are given the responsibility of unilaterally making a decision on behalf of a three-person group engaging with a group representative of another such group; and 2) consensus groups, i.e., group members making a consensus trust or reciprocity decision for their groups via a collective process with another such group. Results of these studies show that 1) people trust less and reciprocate less when responsible for a group or organizational decision as autonomous group representatives; 2) consensus groups do not differ from individuals in their level of trust but show dramatically less reciprocity. The group consensus mechanism in fact produced by far the lowest reciprocity level, significantly lower than that exhibited by either individuals or autonomous group representatives. Thus, inter-group trust and reciprocity dynamics are not readily inferable from their inter-individual counterparts. Moreover, an important implication is emerging here: the extent and direction of the discrepancy between individual and group choices in regard to trust and reciprocity levels and possibly other social preferences in general may depend importantly on the precise details of the group decision-making mechanism, for example whether decisions are made consensually, by majority vote, or by a group leader or representative. In addition to examining the level of trust and reciprocity that occur in these various situations, I also studied, using both behavioral and questionnaire data, the roles of self-interest, social influence, and group dynamics in trust and reciprocity perceptions and behavior. The results showed that there exist discrepancies between behavioral forecasts and the actual behavior, and that trusting behavior is driven strongly by expectation of level of reciprocation, while reciprocating behavior is driven strongly by the difference between trust expectation and actual trust received.     

Breaking the norm: An empirical investigation into the unraveling of good behavior

We present results from an artefactual field experiment conducted in rural Peru that considers whether observing non-reciprocal behavior influences an individual's decision to reciprocate. Specifically, we consider the behavior of second movers in a trust game, assessing whether their decision to reciprocate is influenced by the observed reciprocity of others. In documenting the impact of an external shock to observed reciprocity, this paper shows that small increases in non-reciprocal behavior result in an unraveling of the norm of reciprocity. Survey data is used to explore mechanisms by which this occurred. Results are not consistent with learning effects, suggesting that preferences may be changed by observing others deviating from a norm of reciprocity. These results suggest that investing in encouraging trustworthy behavior can have large benefits in situations where individuals are observing each other's behavior, such as may be the case in a new market institution.     

Endogenous private information structures

We formally incorporate the option to gather information into a game and thus endogenize the information structure. We ask whether models with exogenous information structures are robust with respect to this endogenization. Any Nash equilibrium of the game with information acquisition induces a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game with an exogenous structure. We provide sufficient conditions on the structure of the game for which this remains true when ‘Nash’ is replaced by ‘sequential’. We characterize the (sequential) Nash equilibria of games with exogenous information structures that can arise as a (sequential) Nash equilibrium of games with endogenous information acquisition.     

Financial expectations and the ‘left-right’ political value scale: Testing for the POUM hypothesis

Using a uniquely defined indicator of political ideology we test whether expectations of future financial well-being have an effect on an individual’s position on the political ‘left-right’ spectrum. We find evidence of a significant “prospect of upward mobility” effect.     

Natural resource extraction and civil conflict

Based on evidence linking natural resources to civil conflict, this paper studies two armed groups fighting to control a resource and possibly a second prize. Labor is used in the agricultural, resource extraction and conflict sectors, and the groups also buy a capital input to conflict subject to the constraint that capital spending cannot exceed resource earnings. I find that exogenous shocks can have different effects on conflict intensity depending on whether the credit constraint binds. In particular, international policies to ban natural resource exports from conflict zones (e.g. ‘blood diamonds’), raise agricultural productivity or limit the import of weapons will limit conflict intensity if the credit constraint binds. However, if the credit constraint does not bind, then the first two policies promote conflict, and so could even the third policy. The results therefore suggest some caution in international policymaking.     

A matter of opinion—How ecological and neoclassical environmental economists and think about sustainability and economics

The differing paradigms of ecological and neoclassical environmental economics have been described in various articles and books and are also embedded in different professional associations. However, we cannot take for granted that the paradigm debates described in the literature are actually mirrored in exactly the same way in the perceptions and opinions of researchers looking at sustainability from an economic perspective. This paper presents empirical results from a German case study on how economists and others involved in sustainability research from different schools of thought think about the issues of sustainability and economics, how they group around these issues, how they feel about the current scientific divide, and what they expect to be future topics of sustainability research.We analyze the data using cluster analysis. Based on a literature survey, we generated forty sustainability economics-related statements and asked 196 sustainability researchers about their degree of agreement or disagreement with these statements. In evaluating our survey results, we discuss to what extent the clusters that we identified do—or do not—represent the two schools of thought of ecological and neoclassical environmental economics. We also propose some fields of research that can help to bridge the gaps amongst sustainability economics researchers while clearly marking others that are more suitable for a scientific ‘competition of ideas’. Key results of the study are: We identify two primary scientific clusters, one clearly confirming the existence of the ecological-economics school of thought, and the other largely capturing the neoclassical environmental view. Yet, there are some surprising exceptions: Both schools of thought share a conceptual definition of sustainability that is integrative in considering ecological, societal and economic dimensions (‘three pillar concept’) and is geared at preserving the development potentials of society. We also find a shared critique of ‘pure economic growth’ strategies in our sample. These shared opinions may provide bridging concepts between the schools of thought. Also both clusters agree with respect to a wide range of future fields of sustainability economics research. Yet, the research agenda of the ecological-economics cluster contains a large number of additional topics, primarily related to social, distributional and evolutionary aspects of sustainable development. Strong divides between the clusters that seem to be more suitable for a scientific competition of ideas are primarily related to the question of how to achieve sustainability, including appropriate environmental policies.     

A bibliometric account of the evolution of EE in the last two decades: Is ecological economics (becoming) a post-normal science?

In ecological economics the debate on formalism and formalization has been addressed in the context of a lively discussion on ecological economics as a ‘post-normal’ (versus ‘normal’) science. Using ecological economics (EE) as a ‘seed’ journal and applying bibliometric techniques to all (2533) the articles published in EE from January 1989 to December 2009, we analyze the evolution of the field of ecological economics aiming to shed light on this debate. We observe the predominance (and increased relevance) of certain research topics: ‘Methodological issues’, ‘Policies, governance and institutions’ and ‘Valuation’. Moreover, ‘Collective action’, ‘Technical change and the environment’ and ‘Values’ stand as emergent themes of research. Finally, we note that ecological economics experienced an ‘empirical turn’ reflected in a shift away from exclusively formalized papers towards exclusively empirical and, to a larger extent, ‘formal and empirical’ ones. The combination of the prominent and emergent topics and the ‘empirical turn’ mirrors the increasing awareness among researchers in the field of the need to address a key specificity of ecological economics — the interdependence of the economic, biophysical and social spheres. On this basis, we argue that at least through the lens of EE, ecological economics has evolved towards a post-normal science.     

Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game

We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that pure indirect reciprocity exists, but also that the helping decisions are substantially affected by strategic considerations. Finally, we find that strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.     

Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game

We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that pure indirect reciprocity exists, but also that the helping decisions are substantially affected by strategic considerations. Finally, we find that strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity.     

Polycentricity, reciprocity, and farmer adoption of conservation practices under community-based governance

Significant steps have occurred under Australia's ‘regional delivery model’ towards devolving responsibilities for natural resource management (NRM) to community-based regional bodies, particularly in respect of motivating farmers to adopt priority conservation practices. Challenges remain in effectively engaging the large populations covered by these bodies, especially with these bodies expected to assume responsibilities that risk them becoming perceived as extensions of government and favoring particular stakeholders. In this article, I examine whether polycentric systems of collaborative community-based governance can help address these challenges. The examination involves double-censored regression analyses of data from postal surveys of farmers in three regions. The findings suggest that community-based approaches are capable under the regional delivery model of motivating greater voluntary cooperation from farmers than otherwise possible. They highlight the importance of farmers coming to adopt reciprocity strategies in their key institutional relationships under this model. It seems subregional bodies have an advantage over regional bodies in motivating such behavior from farmers because the former are better positioned to engage them sufficiently to turn around norms of free-riding or opposition entrenched by earlier paternalistic approaches to agri-environmental conservation. This indicates the value of a polycentric approach to community-based NRM wherein responsibilities are devolved to the lowest possible governance level consistent with the principle of subsidiarity. The economic dividend from increased voluntary adoption of conservation practices under this approach arises from the reduced transaction, political and other opportunity costs of achieving the same result entirely through coercion or financial inducements.     

WHEN YOU ASK ZEUS A FAVOR: THE THIRD PARTY'S VOICE IN A DICTATOR GAME

We conducted a laboratory experiment on a dictator game with the option for a “voice” by a third party and compared it with the dictator game with a “voice” by the recipient. Our findings are as follows. The dictators' offers in response to an aggressive voice of the recipients are significantly lower than the dictators' offers in response to the corresponding voice of the third party. The dictators' responses to an aggressive voice differentiate the effects of the recipient's voice from those of the third party's.     

A heuristic procedure to identify the most valuable chain of patent priority network

In this study, we provide support for the argument that patents are at their maximum value at those times when they are under litigation. We develop a heuristic procedure to determine the way in which such patents under litigation form a network of patent family members, and then go on to examine the priority patents involved. We subsequently attempt to develop a simple procedure to further identify both the ‘critical’ and ‘significant’ chains within our proposed patent priority network. We suggest that the ‘critical’ and ‘significant’ chains that are created within the above network provide companies with important information which will ultimately provide them with valuable support for the subsequent decision of their patent portfolio strategies.