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1.
Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find that pure indirect reciprocity exists, but also that the helping decisions are substantially affected by strategic considerations. Finally, we find that strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity. 相似文献
2.
We investigate the role personality plays in Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (FRPD) games. Even after controlling for demographic factors such as race, course of study, and cognitive ability, we find that cooperative behavior is significantly related to the Big Five personality trait Agreeableness. A one standard deviation increase in agreeableness increases the predicted probability of cooperation by a subject with modal demographic characteristics from 67.9% to 80.6%. 相似文献
3.
We consider bargaining in a bipartite network of buyers and sellers, who can only trade with the limited number of people with whom they are connected. We perform an experimental test of a graph-theoretic model that yields unique predictions about equilibrium prices for the networks in our sessions. The results diverge sharply depending on how a connection is made between two separate simple networks, typically conforming to the theoretical directional predictions. Payoffs can be systematically affected even for agents who are not connected by the new link, and we find evidence of a form of social learning. 相似文献
4.
Francesco Feri Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez Giovanni Ponti Fernando Vega-Redondo 《Games and Economic Behavior》2011,73(1):136-146
The paper reports an experimental study based on a variant of the popular Chinos game, which is used as a simple but paradigmatic instance of observational learning. There are three players, arranged in sequence,each of which wins a fixed price if she manages to guess the total number of coins lying in everybody?s hands. Our evidence shows that, despite the remarkable frequency of equilibrium outcomes, deviations from optimal play are also significant. And when such deviations occur, we find that, for any given player position, the probability of a mistake is increasing in the probability of a mistake of her predecessors. This is what we call an error cascade, which we measure by evaluating the (heterogeneous) Quantal Response Equilibrium which better suits our data. We also check the robustness of our findings when we allow for belief heterogeneity by applying Kübler and Weizsäcker?s (2004) cognitive frame of limited depth of reasoning. 相似文献
5.
Considerable experimental evidence suggests that non-pecuniary motives must be addressed when modeling behavior in economic contexts. Recent theories of non-pecuniary motives can be classified as altruism-, equity-, or reciprocity-based. We outline the qualitative differences in prediction these alternative explanations yield in a gift-exchange game. We estimate and compare leading approaches in these categories, using experimental data. We then offer a flexible approach that nests the above three approaches, thereby allowing for nested hypothesis testing and for determining the relative strength of each of the competing theories. In addition, the encompassing approach provides a functional form for utility in different settings without the restrictive nature of the approaches nested within it. Using this flexible form for nested tests, we find that intentional reciprocity, distributive concerns, and altruistic considerations all play a significant role in players' decisions. 相似文献
6.
We explore whether competitive outcomes arise in an experimental implementation of a market game, introduced by Shubik (1973) [21]. Market games obtain Pareto inferior (strict) Nash equilibria, in which some or possibly all markets are closed. We find that subjects do not coordinate on autarkic Nash equilibria, but favor more efficient Nash equilibria in which all markets are open. As the number of subjects participating in the market game increases, the Nash equilibrium they achieve approximates the associated competitive equilibrium of the underlying economy. Motivated by these findings, we provide a theoretical argument for why evolutionary forces can lead to competitive outcomes in market games. 相似文献
7.
In this article we explore the issues that surround within-subject and between-subject designs. We describe experiments in economics and in psychology that make comparisons using either of these designs (or both) that sometimes yield the same results and sometimes do not. The overall goal is to establish a framework for understanding which critical questions need to be asked about such experimental studies, what authors of such studies can do to ameliorate fears of confoundedness, and which scenarios are particularly susceptible to divergent results from the two approaches. Overall, we find that both designs have their merits, and the choice of designs should be carefully considered in the context of the question being studied and in terms of the practical implementation of the research study. 相似文献
8.
Daniel M. G. Arce 《Journal of Economics》1995,61(2):175-183
This paper employs Greenberg'sTheory of Social Situations to explain the variation of sharecropping contracts across economies as a function of social norms that satisfy von Neumann-Morgenstern stability. We demonstrate that equal division and core outcomes are jointly possible when bargaining is unrestricted. By contrast, when the landlord acts as a monopsonist, core outcomes are the only possible social norm. In addition, if the presence of an outside wage is recognized, core and equal division norms may coincide. 相似文献
9.
Linear altruism predicts the estimated preferences to be independent of the subject’s position in the game, if the role allocation is randomly determined, because subjects, in each role, have the same preferences ex ante. We test and reject this hypothesis. 相似文献
10.
Hung- Ju Chen 《Economic Modelling》2011,28(3):785-794
In this paper, we study how social status affects the impact of monetary policy on the long-run growth rate in a two-sector monetary economy with human capital accumulation, and find that the super-neutrality of money, with regard to the growth rate of the economy depends on the formation of human capital. In an economy with Lucas-type human capital formation, money is super-neutral; however, for an economy in which both physical and human capital are used as inputs for human capital accumulation, the money growth rate will have a positive effect on the long-run economic growth rate. The existence, uniqueness and saddle-path stability of balanced-growth equilibrium are also examined. 相似文献
11.
We report on an experiment using video technology to study effects of communication on donations to and discrimination between potential receivers. The experimental design eliminates strategic factors by allowing two receivers to unilaterally communicate with an anonymous dictator before the latter decides on her gifts. Through the use of three communication setups (none, audio, and audio-visual) we analyze purely social effects of communication. A silent video channel leads to discrimination between potential receivers based on impression formation, but does not affect average levels of donations. When the auditory channel is added, average donations increase. The social processes invoked by the visual and audio channels are heterogeneous and communicator-specific but not unsystematic. 相似文献
12.
Due to embodied technological progress new generations of capital goods are more productive. Therefore, in order to study the effects of technological progress, a model must be analyzed in which different generations of capital goods can be distinguished. We determine in what way the firm adjusts current investments to predictions of technological progress. In the presence of market power we show that a negative anticipation effect occurs, i.e. current investments in recent generations of capital goods decline when faster technological progress will take place in the future, because then it becomes more attractive to wait for new generations of capital goods. In case that only investments in new machines are possible, actually a whole wave of anticipation phases arises. 相似文献
13.
We provide evidence that institutional improvements lead to lower levels of financial dollarization through previously unidentified channels. These indirect channels operate in addition to the direct impact identified in the literature and further illustrate the importance of institutions for the extent of banking dollarization. 相似文献
14.
We investigate inter-ethnic trust and reciprocity by having subjects from distinct ethnic origins play the trust game [Games Econom. Behav. 10 (1995) 122]. The participants in the experiment are male small businessmen of Turkish or Belgian ethnic origin, all of whom have a business in the same city (Ghent, Belgium). Our main finding is that the average levels of trust and reciprocity are independent of ethnic origin and, moreover, independent of the ethnic origin of the opposite party. 相似文献
15.
We report experiments studying mixed strategy Nash equilibria that are theoretically stable or unstable under learning. The Time Average Shapley Polygon (TASP) predicts behavior in the unstable case. We study two versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors that include a fourth strategy, Dumb. The unique Nash equilibrium is identical in the two games, but the predicted frequency of Dumb is much higher in the game where the NE is stable. Consistent with TASP, the observed frequency of Dumb is lower and play is further from Nash in the high payoff unstable treatment. However, Dumb is played too frequently in all treatments. 相似文献
16.
Uzi Segal 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,136(1):197-216
This paper assumes that in addition to conventional preferences over outcomes, players in a strategic environment have preferences over strategies. It provides conditions under which a player's preferences over strategies can be represented as a weighted average of the utility from outcomes of the individual and his opponents. The weight one player places on an opponent's utility from outcomes depends on the players’ joint behavior. In this way, the framework is rich enough to describe the behavior of individuals who repay kindness with kindness and meanness with meanness. The paper identifies restrictions that the theory places on rational behavior. 相似文献
17.
A monotone game is an extensive-form game with complete information, simultaneous moves and an irreversibility structure on strategies. It captures a variety of situations in which players make partial commitments and allows us to characterize conditions under which equilibria result in socially desirable outcomes. However, since the game has many equilibrium outcomes, the theory lacks predictive power. To produce stronger predictions, one can restrict attention to the set of sequential equilibria, or Markov equilibria, or symmetric equilibria, or pure-strategy equilibria. This paper explores the relationship between equilibrium behavior in a class of monotone games, namely voluntary contribution games, and the behavior of human subjects in an experimental setting. Several key features of the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium (SMPE) are consistent with the data. To judge how well the SMPE fits the data, we estimate a model of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) [R. McKelvey, T. Palfrey, Quantal response equilibria for normal form games, Games Econ. Behav. 10 (1995) 6-38; R. McKelvey, T. Palfrey, Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games, Exp. Econ. 1 (1998) 9-41] and find that the decision rules of the QRE model are qualitatively very similar to the empirical choice probabilities. 相似文献
18.
Andreoni (1995) showed that pure framing effects may influence contribution in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms (VCM) by comparing a standard public goods game, called the positive frame condition (giving to the public good), with a negative frame condition (taking from the public good) where the subjects' choice to purchase a private good makes the other subjects worse off. This paper aims at testing the robustness of such framing effects in the context of Provision Point Mechanisms (PPM). Our approach is original in that it combines both framing and provision point dimensions by comparing maintaining (taking from the public good) and creating (giving to the public good) contexts using Provision Point experiments. Consistent with previous findings, we find that individuals tend to be less cooperative in the maintaining frame than in the creating frame. Our results also show that the framing effects are stronger under a PPM than under a VCM and increase with the provision point level. These results may have important consequences for the management of environmental resources. 相似文献
19.
Bradley J. Ruffle 《Journal of public economics》2005,89(8):1519-1542
A basic tenet in microeconomics is tax incidence equivalence, which holds that the burden of a unit tax on buyers and sellers is independent of who actually pays the tax. By contrast, policymakers and the public often mistake statutory incidence for economic incidence. Using competitive laboratory markets, I test both tax incidence equivalence and an analogous theorem for subsidies. For sufficiently large markets, the results show strong support for both theories; there is little to no evidence, even in the short run, of the popular misperception that statutory incidence equals economic incidence. In smaller markets in which competitive forces are weaker and relative bargaining strengths may play a role, the evidence for tax incidence equivalence is weaker as minor price discrepancies may persist between markets. 相似文献
20.
We demonstrate theoretically and illustrate the implications of assuming power utility when the true function is of the expo-power form. Empirical results can appear to be consistent with cumulative prospect theory when they are in fact generated from a Markowitz model. 相似文献