基于垂直产品差异的技术转移分析

为了揭示跨国厂商的技术转移与东道国环境之间的关系,本文利用垂直产品差异模型分析了FDI途径下跨国厂商的技术转移策略及其对本土厂商的技术水平、利润和东道国福利所产生的影响。研究结果表明,东道国环境决定了跨国厂商的最佳转移水平,该最佳水平与跨国厂商掌握的最高技术水平间的差距决定了所转移技术的核心程度;本土厂商利用转移技术提升自身技术水平的激励随着东道国收入水平和市场竞争程度递增;跨国厂商的进入对本土厂商利润的影响包括合作效应(增加利润)和竞争效应(减少利润),只有当合作效应大于竞争效应时才能提升本土厂商利润;无论何种情况下,技术转移总是有利于东道国消费者,如果利润影响中的合作效应大于竞争效应,则会提升东道国整体福利,否则,对东道国福利的影响是不确定的。     

基于成本信息缺失的VER政策与社会福利分析

文章在贸易主体间成本信息缺失的基础上,重新探讨了VER的政策含义。研究结果发现,在本国对外国厂商成本信息缺失的情境下,若产品市场为Cournot竞争,则VER将对两国产生实质的影响:对出口国而言,不论其厂商为何种类型,此时的VER政策都是非自愿的;本国的福利变化则需视出口厂商的类型而定。而在Bertrand竞争下,VER只在出口厂商为高成本类型时方对出口国有利,且不论外国厂商为何种类型,VER皆无法使两国同时获利。     

跨国并购与东道国经济增长关系的研究

随着经济一体化,国际直接投资兴盛,各国政府积极引进外资,FDI势必会对东道国的经济增长造成影响,但不同的进入模式即跨国并购和绿地投资的影响程度是不同的.传统观念认为,跨国并购仅造成所有权的转移,对东道国经济无明显正向作用.因此,本文选取了包括发达国家和发展中国家在内的37个国家进行实证分析,研究跨国并购对不同发展程度地区的经济增长是否存在影响.结果显示,跨国并购对发达国家和发展中国家有正向作用,随着发展中国家制度和市场的不断完善,其软环境优势不断释放,加之依靠原本的自然资源和人力资源等优势,跨国并购将会进一步促进发展中国家的经济增长.     

跨国并购与绿地投资的选择——兼论东道国FDI政策取向

跨国公司通过对外直接投资方式进入东道国市场,其最终目的是为了追求自身利益最大化,东道国引入FDI则是为了获得先进技术转移和竞争性更强的市场,模型从跨国并购与绿地投资的区别出发,引入技术转移程度和股权比例两个概念,来分析跨国公司市场进入模式的选择与东道国在不同进入模式下的福利变化和政策启示。     

东道国舆论环境与海外进入模式选择 ——基于海量媒体数据的定量考察

逆全球化背景下日趋复杂的东道国舆论环境给我国国际化进程带来严峻挑战,对其如何影响跨国企业进入国际市场的关键决策还缺乏系统的实证检验。基于情感分析技术（NLP）和网络爬虫,对2015-2022年间830余万条媒体报道进行文本分析,构建涉华舆情指数,系统分析与检验了东道国舆论环境对我国企业海外进入模式选择的影响。研究发现,东道国舆论环境越差,相比于独资模式,中国企业更倾向于选择合资模式进入海外市场;相比于跨国并购,中国企业更倾向于选择绿地投资进入海外市场;跨国企业的产权性质和国际化经验起到正向调节作用。在影响机制方面,东道国舆论环境通过影响企业的规制、规范和认知合法性来影响跨国企业投资设立模式的选择。本文的研究结论为跨国企业恰当地选择海外市场进入模式、积极规避或弱化舆论风险,更好地在东道国投资布局与经营发展提供对策建议。     

减排技术的跨国转让与环境政策选择——基于Stackelberg竞争的博弈模型

细分外国企业对减排技术的转让方式,使转让方式与东道国环境政策相匹配,是一个有待深入研究的问题.在Stackelberg竞争模型中考虑拥有减排技术的外国企业作为市场跟随者在东道国市场上与东道国企业竞争,分析外国企业减排技术的最优授权方式,提出东道国政府的最优环境政策选择.从分析结论看:固定收费和特许权收费的技术授权都可以增加外国企业利润,但外国企业更偏好于特许权收费的技术授权,而双重收费可能降低外国企业的利润;技术授权对东道国的社会福利不确定,特许权收费的技术授权总可以增加外国社会福利,固定收费和双重收费的技术授权可能恶化外国社会福利;特许权收费和双重收费下减排技术的扩散可以有效改善环境,而固定收费则可能增加排放总量;特许权收费的技术授权需要东道国制定相对宽松的环境政策.东道国政府需要根据不同污染物的污染属性和扩散程度适时调整环境税政策,以实现企业利润、社会福利和环境的共同改善.     

基于古诺竞争模型的我国航空产业技术提升策略研究——以大飞机为例

在扩展古诺竞争模型的基础上,通过比较不同技术提升策略对我国大飞机厂商收益的影响,考察了发展大飞机产业自主研发与技术引进的选择问题。研究结果表明,在单一机型竞争市场上,若自主研发的成功概率很大,则国内厂商在未来两期的最优技术提升策略是自主创新;在两种机型竞争市场上,若自主研发的成功概率很大,则国内厂商在未来两期的最优技术提升策略是第一期技术引进、第二期自主研发。     

竞争、市场结构与国际直接投资效应分析

国际直接投资对东道国市场的集中与竞争产生深刻影响 ,进而改变了该市场的市场结构 ,这种改变又进一步影响了国际直接投资的效果。文章首先分析了跨国并购和跨国战略联盟两种主要进入方式的发展趋势及其绩效 ,然后通过国际直接投资对市场集中、国内投资和生产率影响的分析来进一步阐述国际直接投资对东道国经济发展的作用。     

跨国公司"利润溢出效应"的研究——基于行业面板数据的实证分析

根据Markusen and Venables(1999)的分析,在不完全竞争和规模收益递增的条件下,跨国公司和东道国企业之间除了"技术溢出效应"外,还可以通过"利润溢出效应"(Pecuniary Spillover)促进东道国企业发展.本文根据中国统计年鉴提供的36个行业的面板数据,考察了不同行业跨国公司对本地企业进入率的影响,结果表明:在大多数的行业中,跨国公司对本地企业都存在正向"利润溢出效应".     

中国企业跨境并购促进了并购企业研发国际化吗

基于2007—2020年中国工业企业上市公司跨境并购数据，实证分析跨境并购与并购企业研发国际化的关系，并整合制度观点，分析产权异质性和东道国（地区）异质性的影响。结果显示：第一，跨境并购规模和跨境并购股权对并购企业研发国际化均存在显著正向影响，跨境并购整合对并购企业研发国际化的影响不稳健；第二，基于产权异质性分组检验发现，跨境并购规模对并购企业研发国际化的正向影响仅在国有企业样本中显著；第三，基于东道国（地区）异质性分组检验发现，当东道国（地区）为发达国家（地区）时，跨境并购规模和跨境并购股权对并购企业研发国际化均存在显著正向影响，当东道国（地区）为发展中国家（地区）时，跨境并购对并购企业研发国际化的影响不显著。结论丰富了现有理论成果，对中国工业企业跨境并购实践具有一定借鉴价值。     

Asymmetric equilibria under price cap regulation

This study analyzes the effects of a price-cap regulation on market outcomes in Cournot and Stackelberg duopolies. Although two firms are ex-ante identical, there are asymmetric Cournot equilibria as well as the symmetric equilibrium under the price-cap regulation, when the price-cap level is binding. By contrast, the Stackelberg equilibrium is unique and equivalent to the most asymmetric Cournot equilibrium under a binding price-cap level. We present several comparative statics results with respect to the equilibrium outcomes. The main concern of this study is the welfare effect of a change in a price-cap level. We show that when asymmetric Cournot equilibria or the Stackelberg equilibrium are focused on, a reduction in a price-cap level may be socially harmful even if the price-cap level is more than the competitive price.     

Stackelberg Beats Cournot — On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets

We report on an experiment designed to compare Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets with quantity competition. We implement both a random matching and a fixed-pairs version for each market. Stackelberg markets yield, regardless of the matching scheme, higher outputs than Cournot markets and, thus, higher efficiency. For Cournot markets, we replicate a pattern known from previous experiments. There is stable equilibrium play under random matching and partial collusion under fixed pairs. We also find, for Stackelberg markets, that competition becomes less intense when firms remain in pairs but we find considerable deviations from the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction which can be attributed to an aversion to disadvantageous inequality.     

跨国公司研发投资的前向关联模式

经济全球化背景下,跨国公司为保持市场竞争优势和技术领先地位在全球范围内进行R&D投资,这为东道国通过产业关联获取跨国公司技术资源以提高本国产业技术水平创造了机会。从前向关联模式角度入手,研究了跨国公司与东道国本土企业通过R&D投资建立产业关联的动因、关联溢出效应及技术溢出路径,揭示了跨国公司R&D投资与东道国企业建立前向关联的内在机理,可为我国政府有效利用跨国公司R&D投资提升本土企业技术水平提供相应的管理启示和政策建议。     

International trade in genetically modified products

This paper investigates competition between two markets that sell close substitutes: a traditional product and a genetically modified (GM) product. Tightening an import quota on the GM product raises the prices of both goods and hurts consumers. Two scenarios are considered under free trade: Cournot–Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium. A Stackelberg type monopolist produces more, and the competitive traditional firms produce less, than in Cournot–Nash equilibrium. In the long run, an import ban on the GM product does not help competitive producers of the genetically modified organism (GMO)-free products but benefits only the landowners in Europe.     

二元经济结构下最低工资的就业效应研究——基于劳动力市场的视角

现阶段我国整体就业形势不容乐观,分析最低工资对就业的影响具有重要的现实意义。通过对我国劳动力市场分割条件下最低工资的就业效应进行实证分析发现,最低工资对竞争性行业劳动力市场（城市二级劳动力市场）就业有显著的正面影响,对行政垄断行业劳动力市场（城市一级劳动力市场）就业的正面影响则很小。因此,根据我国劳动力市场的具体情况,合理设置最低工资标准有利于促进就业。     

On the role of network externalities in strategic delegation contracts with an industry-wide union

This article analyses the role of network externalities in managerial delegation contracts for differentiated products when the marginal product costs (the wage) are set by an industry-wide union. The results show that, in both Bertrand and Cournot equilibria, each owner offers a profit-oriented incentive scheme to his or her managers by penalizing sales maximization, irrespective of the strength of the network externalities. In the presence of weak network externalities and low product differentiation, firms can obtain higher profits in the equilibrium under Cournot-type quantity competition compared with that under Bertrand-type price competition. Furthermore, the wage chosen by the union is higher in the Cournot than in the Bertrand equilibrium. In the Cournot equilibrium, the wage increases with the strength of the network externalities. However, in the Bertrand equilibrium, there exists a threshold level of the degree of product differentiation.     

Duopoly competitions with capacity constrained input

This paper focuses on the duopoly substitutability product with an upstream input subjected to capacity constraints. The effects of capacity constraints are captured. Combining competition effect with constraint effect, some interesting conclusions are reached. First, the relationship between capacity constraints and firm size is addressed. We argue that the capacity constraints reduce market size difference and price difference under Cournot. Second, under the Stackelberg case, the existence of solution is proved, and Stackelberg competitions enlarge firm-size difference and price difference if the more efficient firm plays the leading position. When the weaker firm plays the leading position, the conclusions depend on the total capacity. Finally, under the Stackelberg case, when the stronger firm plays the leading position, the firm-size difference and price difference decrease with total input under capacity constraints, which is contrary to the conclusions under Cournot competitions.     

跨国公司对发展中东道国市场集中效应的分析

本文利用库诺特数量竞争的扩展模型,就跨国公司对发展中东道国市场集中效应的内在机理进行了分析,并对跨国公司在中国汽车产业的市场集中效应进行了实证检验,指出在我国市场结构表现为低集中、分散竞争的形态下,促进跨国公司对我国投资可以作为实现市场适度集中的重要举措之一,但为防止跨国公司在我国市场上形成垄断地位从而采取不利于市场有效竞争的垄断行为,提出了引进"寡占反应"型跨国公司投资等具体对策.     

WELFARE ANALYSIS OF PRIVATIZATION IN A MIXED MARKET WITH BARGAINING

The author analyzes the welfare effects of privatization in a mixed duopoly model in which the wage rate for the privatized firm is determined by Nash bargaining beforehand. The evaluations are based on three-stage privatization frameworks respectively under two regimes: Cournot competition and a public firm acting as a Stackelberg leader. The author finds that the optimal degrees of privatization from the viewpoint of social welfare may be different for various types of competition. The article also shows that even optimal privatization set by a welfare-maximization government may not guarantee welfare improvement, owing to the interference of wage bargaining. (JEL D60, D78, L32, L33 )     

A Two-stage Cournot Duopoly with Inventory Costs

This paper analyses the Cournot duopoly model which has two production periods before the market clears. As shown by Saloner (1987), if inventory costs are zero, many outcomes including both Cournot and Stackelberg outcomes are subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes. However, if small inventory costs are introduced, the Cournot outcome is no longer found in equilibrium and the equilibrium outcomes are only of Stackelberg-type. This suggests that more attention should be paid to the Stackelberg model than to the Cournot model.