Occupational and Internal Labor Markets in Japan

The distinction between internal and occupational labor markets requires the development of informative indicators that go beyond standard measures such as firm size, which are too vague. This article develops an alternative measure, based on the comparison between firm-specific and occupation-specific tenure, and applies it to Japanese occupational data. We believe that the proposed measure is useful not only in classifying different occupations according to the degree of labor market internalization but also in documenting changes over time in job definition, "reengineering" of the corporation, and the like.     

Consumer Search in Retail Gasoline Markets

This paper develops direct tests for search behavior in retail gasoline markets. We exploit a unique market‐level dataset that allows us to directly measure search intensity with daily web traffic data from a gasoline price reporting website and perfectly measure daily changes in price levels and dispersion. Our simple yet powerful tests provide strong evidence of both cross‐sectional and intertemporal price search.     

Internal Labor Markets and Worker Quits

This article uses establishment-level data to explore the impact of internal labor markets on worker quits. Quits are lower where job ladders are long, pay growth from the bottom to the top of job ladders is high, and seniority is used as a criterion for promotion. Using a system of internal promotion without a commitment to seniority is associated with higher worker quits. These results hold true even when controlling for the specific human capital skills of workers, suggesting that personnel factors other than specific training are responsible both for the existence of internal labor markets and for the impact of internal labor markets on worker quits.     

Search Frictions in Many-to-one Markets*

This article studies how search frictions affect competition and matching efficiency in many-to-one loan markets where a borrower requires support from multiple investors and coordination is desired but absent. We develop a dynamic search model and show that borrowers employ mixed strategies in quoting interest rates. More importantly, we find that in many-to-one markets, the rate dispersion caused by search frictions facilitates coordination and hence improves allocation efficiency relative to a no friction environment. Further, we empirically present stylized facts consistent with the theoretical predictions and structurally estimate the impact of search frictions on matching efficiency.     

Job Characteristics and Labor Market Discrimination in Promotions

We extend promotion signaling theory to generate new testable implications concerning racial differences in promotions. In our model, promotions signal worker ability. When tasks differ substantially across job levels, the opportunity cost of not promoting qualified non‐whites/non‐Asians is large, so employers are less likely to inefficiently withhold their promotions. Thus, given prepromotion performance, the extent to which non‐whites/non‐Asians have lower promotion probabilities decreases when tasks vary more across levels. Racial differences in wage increases at promotion diminish when tasks vary more across levels. Evidence from a single firm's personnel records supports the model's predictions concerning promotion probabilities.     

Household Behavior with Imperfect Labor Markets

A household model with differential asset endowments and idiosyncratic transactions costs in accessing labor markets is developed to (1) explain membership of farm households to alternative labor regimes (sellers, employers, or self-sufficient in labor), (2) test for recursivity between production and consumption decisions selectively by labor regime, and (3) identify the determinants of differential labor productivity across labor regimes. The model is applied to a 1994 household survey of the Mexican land reform sector.     

The Economics of Internal Labor Markets

Our essay focuses on the economics of long-term contractual relationships between a firm and its employees, referred to as the internal labor market. We review the economics literature on match-specific investments, risk aversion, asymmetric information, and transaction costs. We argue that an integrated treatment of all four factors is needed in order to apply implicit contract theoy to internal labor markets. Integrating the topics also highlights the tradeoffs created among these factors. Our discussion stresses contract enforcement mechanisms, including self-enforcing contracts and third-party enforcement.     

House Search Duration in Hot and Cold Residential Markets

This study analyzes the determinants of house search duration of consumption‐driven buyers and individual investors in different housing market environments. We use data from surveys of recent house‐buyers in “hot” and “cold” housing markets in the 2000s housing bubble in California characterized by rising and declining residential house prices, respectively. The average house price and the surveyed geographical area are the same for both periods. Expected house ownership horizon is shown to be an important determinant of the realized search duration in addition to commonly considered housing and buyer characteristics. We find a statistically significant positive effect of it on the time until purchase in both housing price environments for consumption‐driven buyers. We also find that consumption‐driven house purchases were highly pronounced in coastal areas in the hot market and inland areas in the cold market. In contrast, long‐horizon investment activity leads that of consumption activity in those areas. Short‐horizon investors, on the other hand, concentrated their house search activity in inland areas in both housing market environments.     

LDC Labor Markets: Applications of Internal Labor Market Theory

This article does not attempt, nor has it delivered, a complete theory for the labor market in Egypt, let alone for LDC labor markets in general. The macro-model developed here serves mainly to demonstrate the diaculties involved in formulating macro-theories for LDC labor markets that, while necessarily simple, can still claim realism when confronted with certain fundamental “stylized h t s. Our considerations have, moreover, been limited to LDCs with mixed economies, using Egypt as the example. Hence, large-scale modern industry was assumed to belong to the public sector which then emerges as the country dominant, nonagricultural employer. Agriculture is the second large and relatively homogeneous sector, in Egypt dominated by small holdings. In-between we find the private, nonagricultural sector, overwhelmingly dominated by small-scale enterprises with large numbers of the self-employed, and with trade as the most important single activity. Labor is (in Egypt) generally unorganized or enrolled in government-controlled unions, active mainly in the public sector and without much real say in matters of wages and salaries. It is in this specific institutional setting that I have tried to discuss the application of internal labor market theory. This theory has, to the best of my understanding, nothing to offer by way of explaining public sector behavior (which is of crucial importance for wage and employment formation in a mixed economy). However, adapted to the circumstances, internal labor market theory goes a long way toward explaining wages and employment in agriculture and the “informal” small-scale sector. Our considerations, tentative though they are, do not point to any single, dominant labor market mechanism that could form the basis for a simple macro-theory. Wage flexibility differs greatly between sectors, overstaEng may be a more important phenomenon than unemployment in some activities, and unemployment may be of both the voluntary and involuntary variety, with withdrawals from the labor market related to well-defined reserve wages, and open unemployment related to internal labor market behavior. These considerations are based more on loose impressions than on solid facts. Further theorizing may be needed, but the development of labor market theory for LDCs has undoubtedly reached a point where progress depends critically upon painstaking empirical studies of basic labor market institutions such as employment and wage forms and responses, bargaining procedures, and conditions of both labor and output markets for small private enterprises in particular countries. Considerable work has been done in India but even here much remains for investigation. Studies of specific countries may, even for LDCs in rapid, turbulent transformation, disclose ongoing changes in institutions that for a full understanding of the labor market may be more important than the institutions themselves. Existing wage theory has little to offer for the analysis of such institutional change, but something may be learned from the American institutional school in labor economics whose leading exponent we are paying homage to with these papers.     

Industrial Structure and Unemployment in Regional Labor Markets Industrial Structure and Unemployment

Even during periods of moderated national joblessness, certain regions face stubbornly high unemployment. Rust Belt areas are often particularly affected and raise the question of whether such labor markets may not clear even in equilibrium. This article examines evidence from a panel data set of West Virginia counties, along with case-study surveys. The combined findings help provide a better understanding of persistent local unemployment, which appears to be due to nonclearing labor markets.     

A Simple Search and Bargaining Model of Real Estate Markets

This paper examines the impact of brokers on buyers' and sellers' search behavior and on the transaction prices in real estate markets. It is shown that the seller and the buyer search less intensively if the house is listed with a broker. The seller gets a higher price when he employs a broker, but the increase in price is smaller than the commission fee. More specifically, the portion of the commission covered by the increase in price is directly related to the bargaining powers of the buyer and the seller. In the special case where the price is determined according to the Nash bargaining solution, the increase in price is shown to be half of the commission fee. It is also shown that an increase in the commission rate increases the equilibrium price but decreases the equilibrium search intensities.