Foreclosure Discount: Definition and Dynamic Patterns

The lack of a consistent definition of foreclosure discount gives rise to discount rates that vary from nonexistent to sizeable across locations and time. We define the foreclosure discount as the discount of the real estate owned (REO) sale price relative to a normal‐sale estimated market value. With a dataset of 1.34 million REO sale transactions, across 16 CBSAs between 2000 and 2012, we find three noteworthy empirical findings. First, a high REO sale concentration in a market increases the foreclosure discount. Second, foreclosure discount is negatively related to recent house‐price appreciation. Third, the often reported high foreclosure discount for lower value properties is likely due to property condition.     

Estimating the House Foreclosure Discount Corrected for Spatial Price Interdependence and Endogeneity of Marketing Time

Most previous empirical research estimates a greater than 20% discount associated with the sale of foreclosed properties. Under the assumption that the real estate market is somewhat efficient, such a large discount would be counterintuitive. We argue, and empirically show, that the estimated foreclosure coefficients in most of the previous research are upward biased because they do not control for variables such as the physical condition of the property and the relationship between marketing time and price. Accounting for these factors and correcting for two types of spatial price interdependence, our results show that estimates of foreclosure discount reported by previous studies are about one-third higher than the true discount caused by foreclosure per se .     

Optimal ordering policies in response to a discount offer

Sometimes supplier offers a temporary price discount to increase cash flow or decrease the inventory level of certain items. Thus, the manufacturer may be able to improve the effectiveness of his inventory system by ordering a special quantity at this sale period. In this paper, economic order quantity (EOQ) models with a discounted price are developed to obtain the optimal ordering policy during the sale period for five different cases: (a) coincidence of sale period with replenishment time, (b) non-coincidence of sale period with replenishment time, (c) sale period is longer than a cycle, (d) discounted price as a function of the special ordering quantity, and (e) incremental discount. Each case has its own characteristics of the sale period and the discounted price. The objective is to take the maximum possible advantage from the discounted price by ordering a special quantity during the sale period. The optimal ordering policy is obtained by maximizing the difference between the two costs: Regular EOQ cost and special quantity cost during the sale period. Moreover, a comparison of different discount scenarios is developed to sense the effect of different parameters on the ordering policies. The annual gain obtained is linearly related to the discount and the on-hand remnant inventory. Numerical analyses are provided to illustrate and testify the values of the optimal special quantity. The analysis showed an impressive improvement in the effectiveness of the inventory system when a special order is placed during the sale period. The optimal special quantity is driven for each case to visualize real-life problems. Sensitivity analysis is also initiated to study the change in the total savings with respect to the variation of the special optimal quantity.     

Assessing the Performance of Real Estate Auctions

This article investigates the performance of real estate auctions relative to negotiated sales. It uses a repeat-sales methodology to control for unobserved differences in the quality of auction properties. Properties auctioned in Los Angeles during the 1980s boom sold at an estimated discount of 0%–9%, while sales in Dallas following the oil bust obtained discounts of 9%–21%. This evidence is consistent with the theoretical prediction that the auction discount increases in downturns when a seller trades-off a longer expected selling time in a search market against an immediate auction sale. The study finds no evidence of the declining price anomaly.     

Why Are Foreclosures Contagious?

This article investigates the mechanism by which foreclosed properties depress neighboring property prices. Using a novel dataset on housing capital expenditure, I verify as accurate the claim of disinvestment theory made in earlier studies. When capital expenditure investment, neighborhood price trends, number of Multiple Listing Service listings and neighborhood fixed effects are controlled for, the negative effect on property prices is significant from nearby foreclosures, real estate owned (REO) listings and REO sales, but not from default and delinquent properties. The effect is larger in a depressed market than in an appreciating market. I argue that the most plausible explanation for these results is that a foreclosure discount drives down the reference prices for nearby properties and depresses neighborhood values. This discount information is revealed to the public through foreclosures, REO listings and REO sales.     

The hotel yield management with two types of room prices,overbooking and cancellations

We consider a problem for hotel room allocations with early discount, cancellations and overbooking. In our model, customers can book a room in discounted price if they reserve before a certain deadline. The model takes overbooking into account. We have expressed the expected total sale function, proved it is unimodal on the number of allocated rooms for early discount and for overbooking, respectively, under a condition and clarified the range where the optimal solution exists. We have derived an optimal allocation for early discount in a specified model without cancellations and overbooking.     

Deed Types, House Prices and Mortgage Interest Rates

When houses are sold they come with a deed attached that spells out the legal guarantees on good title. Some deeds give clues about the characteristics of the seller or the house. Using a 37,043-observation house price hedonic with a Bayesian spatial error model, we find the type of deed attached to a housing sale can have a dramatic correlation with the sale price. Ten deed types command a discount, and one commands a premium relative to warranty deeds. Mortgage rates for sheriff's deeds and foreclosure deeds are lower than for warranty deeds, indicating more sophisticated buyers.     

Optimal Pricing Strategy in the Case of Price Dispersion: New Evidence from the Tokyo Housing Market

We adopt a multistage search model, in which the home seller's reservation price is determined by her or his opportunity cost, search cost, discount rate and additional market parameters. The model indicates that a greater dispersion in offer prices leads to higher reservation and optimal asking prices. A unique dataset from the Tokyo condominium resale market enables us to test those modeled hypotheses. Empirical results indicate that a one percentage point increase in the standard deviation of submarket transaction prices results in a two‐tenths of a percent increase in the initial asking price and in the final transaction price. Increases in the dispersion of market prices enhance the probabilities of a successful transaction and/or an accelerated sale.     

A Spatiotemporal Solution for the Simultaneous Sale Price and Time‐on‐the‐Market Problem

There exists an important methodological challenge when dealing with sale price and time‐on‐the‐market variables because both variables are simultaneously determined and related to the motivation of the sellers and buyers. Exploiting the fact that transactions occur over space and time, we propose a two‐stage approach based on instrumental variables (IV) built from information collected from previous transactions. The unidirectional temporal property and the fact that other transactions are exogenous from the perspective of a single buyer or seller are exploited to evaluate the effect of the sale price on time‐on‐the‐market, and the effect of time‐on‐the‐market on the sale price. Based on 29,471 transactions occurring in the suburban neighborhood of Montréal (1992‐2000), the results suggest that, everything else being equal, houses staying longer on the market provide negative information to the market, which results in a lower final sale price, while the final sale price is negatively related to time‐on‐the‐market, indicating that houses of better quality (better amenities) stay less time on the market.     

Optimal Selling Mechanism,Auction Discounts and Time on Market

This article examines the optimal selling mechanism problem in real estate market using mean‐variance analysis and downside risk analysis. When sellers can choose between accepting the first offer above a reservation price or auctions (waiting an optimal and fixed time), sellers having higher risk aversion choose auctions and wait a fixed time while sellers having lower risk aversion choose an optimal reservation price and wait a random time. Positive auction discounts are compensated by reduced risks, and there exists a connection between liquidity risk and conditional auction discount. More (Fewer) sellers will choose to sell their houses through auctions in a hot (cold) market or when holding cost increases (decreases). When sellers choose auctions, sellers having higher risk aversion who have lower holding cost wait longer and obtain higher sale price. Loss‐averse sellers unanimously choose the mechanism of setting an optimal reservation price.     

ADVERSE SELECTION IN ELECTRONIC MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM ONLINE STAMP AUCTIONS

We analyze adverse selection costs in online stamp auctions, based on a comparison of prices on eBay with those of matched stamps at a specialty stamps auction site in the U.S., Michael Rogers, Inc. (MR), which we know a priori has low quality uncertainty. We find that buyer prices are 10–15% lower on eBay as compared to MR, and the price difference, increases with the value of the stamps. Consistent with this adverse selection discount we find that the seller reputation mechanism on eBay has an economically modest, although statistically significant, effect on auction price and probability of sale.     

Discount Brokerage in Residential Real Estate Markets

Transaction costs are thought to affect asset prices and market liquidity, but the direction and magnitude of these effects continue to be the subject of debate. In the single‐family residential market, discount brokers offer to list a house for a lower price and thus reduce the transaction costs associated with obtaining a match. In this article we obtain empirical estimates of the price and liquidity impact of a seller selecting a discount broker to market a single‐family residential property. The unique data set allows for the identification of residential properties that were listed by a discount brokerage firm. The empirical results confirm the predictions of our theoretical model. Using a sample of 318,221 listings and 243,625 sales, we find that houses listed by discount brokers sell at prices similar to non‐discount brokerage listings, but are less likely to sell, and when they do sell, take approximately three days longer to sell. The results indicate that lower transaction costs do not impact housing prices in this market, but that they are related to asset liquidity.     

Closed-form solutions for Wee’s and Martin’s EOQ models with a temporary price discount

In this article, we use closed-form solutions to solve Wee and Yu (1997) deteriorating inventory model with a temporary price discount and Martin’s (1994) EOQ model with a temporary sale price. In Wee and Yu (1997) and Martin’s (1994), the benefits during the temporary price discount purchase cycle are represented by their objective functions. Wee and Yu (1997) and Martin (1994) only used search methods to find approximate solutions. Following the theorems we suggested, you can find closed-form solution directly when there are integer operators involve in an objective function. Using the data of Wee and Yu (1997) and Martin (1994), we can find the results are more quick and more accurate.     

Can Tightness in the Housing Market Help Predict Subsequent Home Price Appreciation? Evidence from the United States and the Netherlands

This article assesses the predictive power of variables that measure market tightness, such as seller's bargaining power and sale probabilities, on future home prices. Theoretical insights from a stylized search‐and‐matching model illustrate that such indicators can be associated with subsequent home price appreciation. The empirical analysis employs listings data on residential units offered for sale through a real estate broker in the Netherlands and for certain U.S. regions. Individual records are used to construct quarterly home price indices, an index that measures seller's bargaining power and (quality‐adjusted) home sale probabilities. Using conventional time‐series models we show that current sale probabilities and bargaining power can significantly reduce home price appreciation forecast errors and help to predict turning points in local area housing markets. The measures and approaches in this article help to demonstrate ways in which researchers and practitioners can leverage listings data to gain knowledge about the current and future state of the housing market.     

Political connections in the land market: Evidence from China's state‐owned enterprises

This study examines whether political connections lead state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) to behave differently from privately owned enterprises (POEs) in acquiring land parcels at auctions and explores the underlying mechanisms that drive the price premiums paid by SOEs. We find that SOEs pay 11.9% more than POEs for observably comparable land parcels at auctions, and the price premiums SOEs pay are mainly driven by wholly state‐owned enterprises (WSOEs). In particular, we provide evidence that SOEs have advance access to information about the development of land parcels in 134 state‐level special economic zones, and land parcels purchased by SOEs lead to positive stock market performance. We also show that an anti‐corruption campaign that weakens political connections and reduces the information advantage leads to a decrease in the price premiums paid by SOEs.     

Consumer behavior change at the base of the pyramid: Bridging the gap between for‐profit and social responsibility strategies

This longitudinal field experiment compares two different for‐profit market entry strategies with a philanthropic strategy in terms of how each influences consumer behavior in base‐of‐the‐pyramid communities. We analyze reactions to a water purification product offered at three price points (moderate discount, deep discount, and free) in rural Malawi. We find that those who paid the deeply discounted price remain more likely to re‐obtain and use the product than do those who paid the moderate price or who took it for free. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

House Prices and Rents: Microevidence from a Matched Data Set in Central London

I analyze a real estate agency's proprietary dataset containing tens of thousands of housing sale and rental transactions in Central London during the 2006–2012 period. I isolate 1,922 properties that were both sold and rented out within six months and measure their rent‐price ratios. I find that rent‐price ratios are lower for bigger and more central units. These stylized facts are consistent with the user cost formula and reflect differences in maintenance costs, vacancy rates, growth expectations and risk premia.     

The Pricing of the Emergent Leasehold (Possessory) Estates of Ghana

The paper develops hedonic analyses of the pricing of leasehold versus freehold estates in Ghana. The motivation of the paper is the passage of Act 267(5) in 1992 that effectively abolished outright sale of stool lands in Ghana. Stool lands are lands controlled by tribal "chiefs." Act 267(5) prohibits the sale of freehold estates for stool lands. There are two important findings in this study. The first is that freeholds tend to attract premium prices relative to leaseholds. This supports the bundle-of-rights argument. The second is that the effect of the 1992 Act is indeed capitalized into land prices because of the relative increase in the supply of leaseholds vis-à-vis freeholds. Specifically, the price of freeholds increased relative to the price of leaseholds after the constitutional event. The study also finds that transactions involving stools and individuals, usually perceived to be associated with litigation risk (or title insecurity) relative to government lands, are sold at a discount. Transactions noted to have a history of litigation are also associated with price discounts. The estimated coefficients on all the variables representing services to the site like water, electricity and access roads are significantly positive, indicating a high demand for such essential services.     

Institutional Investment,Asset Illiquidity and Post‐Crash Housing Market Dynamics

We examine institutional investors’ entry into the equity side of the single‐family detached housing market using an asset illiquidity framework. We find that institutional investors purchased owner‐occupied houses after the real estate crisis for approximately 6.3–11.8% less than owner‐occupiers. The large discount was in addition to distressed sale and cash purchase discounts which, when combined, highlight the low liquidation value for owner‐occupied housing. The results suggest that asset illiquidity is an important cost of leverage in the owner‐occupied housing market.     

Long‐Lived Consumers,Intertemporal Bundling and Collusion

In a repeated price game with long but finitely‐lived consumers, long‐term contracts facilitate collusion. Intertemporal bundling reduces the gains from business stealing but has little effect on the cost of the resulting price war. When consumers anticipate future price wars, the maximum deviation profit is a single period of consumer surplus per consumer. Hence long‐term contracts do not increase the incentive to deviate per consumer, but do reduce the the number of consumers currently in the market by locking them into past contracts, so tacit collusion is sustainable for a wider range of discount factors and market structures.