The price of rapid exit in venture capital-backed IPOs

This paper proposes an explanation for two empirical puzzles surrounding initial public offerings (IPOs). Firstly, it is well documented that IPO underpricing increases during “hot issue” periods. Secondly, venture capital (VC) backed IPOs are less underpriced than non-venture capital backed IPOs during normal periods of activity, but the reverse is true during hot issue periods: VC backed IPOs are more underpriced than non-VC backed ones. This paper shows that when IPOs are driven by the initial investor’s desire to exit from an existing investment in order to finance a new venture, both the value of the new venture and the value of the existing firm to be sold in the IPO drive the investor’s choice of price and fraction of shares sold in the IPO. When this is the case, the availability of attractive new ventures increases equilibrium underpricing, which is what we observe during hot issue periods. Moreover, I show that underpricing is affected by the severity of the moral hazard problem between an investor and the firm’s manager. In the presence of a moral hazard problem the degree of equilibrium underpricing is more sensitive to changes in the value of the new venture. This can explain why venture capitalists, who often finance firms with more severe moral hazard problems, underprice IPOs less in normal periods, but underprice more strongly during hot issue periods. Further empirical implications relating the fraction of shares sold and the degree of underpricing are presented.      

Do venture capitalists imitate portfolio size?

Venture capitalists face the challenge of determining how many entrepreneurial ventures they should invest in. Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (J Corp Finance 9:521–534, 2003) develop a theoretical model based on economic factors that shows how a venture capital fund should set its portfolio size in order to achieve optimal returns. Determining the required economic inputs to this model is difficult in practice however, given the informational asymmetries, uncertainties and ambiguities present in the decision-making environment of venture capitalists. Hence, we contend that general partners of venture capital funds also use their prior venture capital fund management experience, which we refer to as social capital, to overcome the difficulties they face in solving the above optimization problem. Our results support our hypotheses that portfolio size is explained by the interplay of economic and social factors.      

风险投资中企业家人力资本定价影响因素的实证研究

本文从影响风险投资中企业家人力资本定价的因素分析入手,针对其多层次、多维度的特点,建立了一个有内在逻辑关系、能够较全面反映企业家人力资本定价影响因素的理论框架.并采用协方差结构模型分析(CSM)方法,对这些因素进行了实证研究.结果表明,在风险投资中,企业家的控制权对企业家人力资本定价影响因素的解释率最高,其次是企业经营绩效,企业经营规模的解释率较低.     

IPO share allocation and conflicts of interest

The underwriter of an IPO has two sources of compensation for its services on behalf of the issuer. One is through a commission (spread), the other is by buying issued shares for itself (or its affiliates) and reselling them in the post-issue market. Profits from the former decrease along with the magnitude of underpricing while profits from the latter increase with it. Faced with these countervailing interests, the present paper analyzes how the underwriter decides upon the pricing and allocation of IPOs.      

Do venture capitalists give founders their walking papers?

We investigate the impact of venture capitalists on the turnover of executives within a sample of nearly 46,500 German high-tech start-up companies founded between 1995 and 2004. We confirm that the presence of VCs increases the chances that the company will change the structure of its initial executive team. For the purposes of our analysis, we distinguish between different types of changes (somebody is replaced, the team is enlarged, the team shrinks). Additionally, we take a closer look at the subsample of venture-backed companies. We find that a small distance between the VCs and the companies they finance, as well as a larger total stake in the company owned by the VCs, goes hand-in-hand with an increased probability of changes in the initial executive teams.     

IPO补税影响IPO抑价吗？——基于信息不对称理论视角

本文以1198家中国IPO公司为样本,首次从信息不对称理论视角探索了IPO补税对IPO抑价的影响及其理论解释。研究发现:(1)IPO补税对IPO抑价具有显著正向影响,在控制其他影响因素后,IPO补税公司比非补税公司的IPO抑价要高7.8%,这相当于平均少融资超过2000万元。(2)基于信号理论、“赢家诅咒”理论以及委托代理理论这三类信息不对称理论的检验表明,只有委托代理理论有助于部分解释IPO补税与IPO抑价的正相关关系——IPO补税公司抑价更高可能源于公司管理层对承销商具有更弱的监督动机,而非公司对承销商缺乏有效的报酬激励。进一步研究还发现,IPO补税对IPO抑价的正向影响在承销商声誉较低时以及信息更不透明(如中小板和创业板、税收征管强度较低地区)的环境中表现更为突出。     

When U.S. venture capital ventures abroad

Older, more experienced and smaller U.S. venture capital firms are most probable to sacrifice proximate distance for new opportunities in foreign, and mostly mature, portfolio companies. These companies are treated differently than the domestic ones, as U.S. venture capital firms collaborate with and delegate monitoring to foreign partners, rather than stage or syndicate. Successful outcomes mostly occur in more mature, non‐hi‐tech, portfolio companies that receive more financing per round. Our results are robust to the investee country's openness and industry classification, stage of the investment and possible sample selection problems.     

Advice and monitoring in venture finance

This paper provides empirical insight into the role of contracts and legal systems for managing investor–investee relationships along two dimensions: providing advice and addressing conflict. We examine a new detailed dataset from European venture capital (VC) funds. We match very specific contractual terms in VC contracts with the effort (total time spent) and advice that VCs provide to their entrepreneurial investee firms. We also analyze VC–entrepreneur conflicts. We compare the importance of contractual versus non-contractual governance mechanisms, as well as the role of legal systems in different countries for facilitating VC–entrepreneur relationships. The data indicate VC cash-flow and control rights significantly facilitating effort and advice that VCs provide to entrepreneurs. VC–entrepreneur conflicts are closely tied to the quality of laws in which the entrepreneur resides: higher quality legal systems mitigate VC–entrepreneur conflicts. The data further indicate that non-contractual governance mechanisms significantly facilitate VC advice and mitigate VC–entrepreneur conflicts. The results provide a unique unifying look into the role of actual VC contracts and legal settings versus non-contractual governance mechanisms, risk, and success potential on VC–entrepreneur relationships in an international context.      

风险投资对创业板IPO折价影响的实证研究

本文以截至2011年6月30日在我国创业板上市的236家公司作为研究对象,研究风险投资对创业板IPO折价的影响。研究发现：（1）有风险投资参与的企业IPO折价显著高于无风险投资参与的企业,支持声誉效应假说,即风险投资机构以IPO折价来提早退出投资项目,以此来建立自己的声誉,从而吸引更多的资金流入;（2）在对有风投参股的投资公司做进一步分析后发现一一随着风投参与度的增大,IPO调整折价率并未出现明显的提升,创业板企业IPO时风险投资机构的数量、风险投资机构持股比例与调整折价率关系不显著。     

Should I stay,or should I go? – How fund dynamics influence venture capital exit decisions

We investigate the determinants of venture capital (VC) exit behavior after the lockup expiry in initial public offerings (IPOs) by considering insights from prospect theory and behavioral finance for the first time. Hereby, the paper concentrates on the under-researched relationship between fund managers and the limited partners investing in these funds. The results from a proprietary dataset of 292 U.S. VC-backed IPOs from 1991 to 2008 imply that VC firm characteristics and fund dynamics have a significant influence on the exit extent after the lockup expiry and may not always be in line with limited partners' interests, hinting at the relevance of behavior grounded in prospect theory. In particular, first-time funds keep their shares longer after an IPO, whereas funds satisfied with current fund performance cash out soon after the end of the lockup period.     

Staged Financing of Start-ups

From a theoretical perspective, staged financing of start-ups mainly serves to reduce agency risks for investors dealing with founders. This risk reduction is partly offset by the transaction costs caused by staged financing. From the perspective of founders, staging can reduce the cost of equity, but it also increases the share of external company and market risks they have to bear. Our empirical study of a sample of German start-ups confirms the importance of transaction costs and shifting external risk for staging decisions, but does not support agency theoretical explanations of staged financing.     

创业投资的增值活动真的有用吗?——来自深圳中小板上市公司的经验证据

本文以2006年1月1日至2008年12月31日在深圳中小板上市的92家公司为样本,验证了创业投资对创业企业的经营绩效有积极的影响作用。然后,通过回归分析,证明了公司治理和社会网络两个方面的增值服务对创业企业经营绩效有积极影响。创业投资董事会席位、创业投资持股比例、创业投资从业年限、持股的创业投资数量和创业投资的资产规模等表示创业投资增值活动的变量,对创业企业经营绩效有显著的积极作用。     

创业投资IPO偏低定价与退出绩效实证研究

本文以1993～2006年在香港主板和创业板上市的133家H股公司为研究对象，对其偏低定价和短长期绩效情况进行了实证分析。研究表明，创业投资支持的公司的IPO偏低定价程度低于非创业投资支持的公司。创业投资支持的公司在香港主板市场的IPO偏低定价程度、长短期绩效均低于香港创业板市场，且在香港主板上市后的长期绩效呈不断下降趋势。在香港主板市场上，退出绩效与IPO偏低定价显著负相关。对创业投资支持的公司来说，在热发行期退出将获得更好的绩效。