Intra-Industry Reactions to Stock Split Announcements

We examine whether favorable information conveyed by stock split announcements transfers to nonsplitting firms within the same industry. On average, nonsplitting firms' shareholders experience positive and significant abnormal returns at the stock split announcements of their industry counterparts. In addition, industrywide and firm-specific characteristics are important determinants in explaining nonsplitting firms' stock returns. These firms' earnings increase significantly, and the earnings changes are positively related to the stock price reactions. Finally, we find no evidence that investors revise the value of nonsplitting firms because they anticipate a decline in earnings volatility.     

Mispricing firm-level productivity

This paper provides a mispricing-based explanation for the negative relation between firm-level productivity and stock returns. Investors appear to underprice unproductive firms and overprice productive firms. We find evidence consistent with the speculative overpricing of productive firms driven by investor sentiment and short sale constraints. Investors erroneously extrapolate past productivity growth and its associated operating performance and stock returns, despite their subsequent reversals. Such mispricing is perpetuated because of limits to arbitrage and is partially corrected around earnings announcements when investors are surprised by unexpected earnings news. Decomposition analysis indicates that extrapolative mispricing and limits to arbitrage explain most of the return predictability of firm-level productivity.     

The effect of restatements on trading volume reactions to earnings announcements

This paper examines whether restatements affect trading volume reactions to subsequent earnings announcements. It closely follows the theoretical model developed by Kim and Verrecchia (J Account Econ 24:395–419, 1997) that decomposes the trading volume reactions around earnings announcements into the effects of pre-disclosure and event-period private information, and examines whether restatements change the trading volume reactions to earnings announcements in the post-restatement period. We find that restatements increase the degree of differential event-period information, leading to more divergent interpretation of earnings announcements subsequent to restatements. We also find that investors have less differential pre-disclosure private information in the post-restatement period, consistent with the view that investors’ beliefs converge when facing higher uncertainty in the information environment. Finally, focusing on irregularity restatement firms, we document that the effect of restatements on trading volume is more pronounced for firms announcing restatements after the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and after dismissing auditors and experiencing executive turnover. Overall, these results indicate that restatements affect investors’ behavior in forming judgments regarding earnings announcements.     

The Relation Among Targets' R&D Activities, Acquirers' Returns, and In-Process R&D in the US

Abstract:  Using a sample of 129 mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the US between publicly traded acquirers and targets in research and development (R&D) intensive industries over the period of 1994-2004 and a size- and industry-matched sample, we examine the relation among targets' R&D activities, the probability of acquirers' writing-off in-process R&D (IPRD), and acquirers' returns around the time of M&A announcements. We find that firms acquiring targets with higher R&D investments tend to write off some of the acquired R&D assets upon the completion of the M&As. We also find that the median cumulative abnormal return during the three days around M&A announcements for acquirers with subsequent IPRD write-offs is −2.73% while the return for acquirers without IPRD write-offs is −0.60%. This suggests that acquirers' stock returns around M&A announcements are much lower when investors expect acquirers to expense IPRD. The results are consistent with our conjecture that acquirers tend to write-off IPRD when they acquire overvalued targets. We also find that IPRD write-offs do not increase earnings or stock returns of acquirers after M&As, which is inconsistent with an earnings management hypothesis.     

Bank incentives and suboptimal lending decisions: Evidence from the valuation effect of bank loan announcements in Japan

Using a sample of bank loan announcements in Japan, we examine whether or not banks have incentives to engage in suboptimal lending that results in wealth transfer from the banks to the borrowing firms. We find that abnormal returns for borrowing firms are significantly positive, but those for lending banks are sometimes significantly negative. Furthermore, the announcement returns for borrowing firms are negatively related to those for lending banks, especially when poorly performing firms borrow from financially healthy (low-risk) banks. Our results suggest that the positive valuation effect of bank loan announcements for borrowing firms is mainly due to a wealth transfer from lending banks.     

Japanese stock market reaction to announcements of news affecting auditors’ reputation: The case of the Olympus fraud

The revelation of accounting fraud by the Olympus Corporation gave rise to shareholder allegations of audit failure against Olympus’ auditors—Ernst & Young ShinNihon LLC and KPMG AZSA LLC—in 2011. In this study, we investigate whether the auditors’ affiliation with Olympus contributes to divergent perceptions of audit quality in the event of news announcements affecting the reputation of Olympus’ auditors. First, we use a nonparametric generalized rank event study methodology on 918 sample firms from the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) to observe Japanese investors’ perceptions of auditor reputation as proxied by abnormal returns. Second, we perform a multivariate linear regression on firms’ abnormal returns after controlling for firm-specific variables. We find that Japanese investors do not respond to negative or neutral reputational information arising from news announcements concerning Olympus’ auditors for firms affiliated and not affiliated with those auditors. In the absence of legal penalties imposed on Olympus’ auditors, we argue that Japanese investors consider the Olympus fraud case as an expected occurrence of audit failure due to a lack of evidence suggesting systematic audit failure on the part of Olympus’ auditors and an expectation of lower audit quality in the Japanese capital market. As a result, Japanese investors do not consider news announcements affecting the Olympus auditors’ reputation as sufficient evidence to change their prior expectation regarding the reputations of the audit firms affiliated with the Olympus fraud case.     

Local institutional investors,information asymmetries,and equity returns

We examine the informational role of geographically proximate institutions in stock markets. We find that both the level of and change in local institutional ownership predict future stock returns, particularly for firms with high information asymmetry; in contrast, such predictive abilities are relatively weak for nonlocal institutional ownership. The local advantage is especially evident for local investment advisors, high local ownership institutions, and high local turnover institutions. We also find that the stocks that local institutional investors hold (trade) earn higher excess returns around future earnings announcements than those that nonlocal institutional investors hold (trade).     

Economic shock,owner-manager incentives,and corporate restructuring: Evidence from the financial crisis in Korea

We examine how owner-managers incentives and firm-specific measures of corporate governance affect restructuring decisions during an economy-wide shock. Using a large sample of Korean firms that had experienced a severe financial crisis during 1997–1998, we find that the likelihood of restructuring is negatively related to the divergence of cash flow rights and control rights of controlling shareholders, and that the announcements of restructuring by chaebol firms with such divergence are greeted more negatively by investors. However, firm-specific measures of corporate governance such as total debt, bank loans, and equity ownership by unaffiliated financial institutions mitigate these negative effects, thereby influencing firms to choose value-maximizing restructuring policies. Our results suggest that the controlling shareholders' incentives to expropriate other investors are high during an economic shock. Our results also highlight the importance of corporate governance in mitigating such expropriation incentives, and provide important implications for the role of corporate governance during an economic shock, such as the 2007–2008 global financial crisis.     

Do institutional investors reinforce or reduce agency problems? Earnings management and the post-IPO performance

This study investigates the dual roles of institutional investors in earnings management during initial public offerings (IPOs). Research suggests that institutional investors play a monitoring role in the corporate governance of firms by mitigating earnings management to reduce agency problems. However, institutional investors have incentives to opportunistically maximize their wealth by manipulating earnings when firms engage in IPOs. Results suggest that institutional investors facilitate accrual-based earnings management before IPOs but restrain earnings management after their issuance. We also find that firms with high institutional ownership experience superior post-IPO stock returns and operating performance, thereby suggesting that the capital market positively prices the monitoring function of institutional investors after IPOs, and the performance of these firms is improved. Our results are robust to controlling the endogeneity problem of institutional investors and further identifying active institutional investors.     

Individual Investor Trading and Return Patterns around Earnings Announcements

This paper provides evidence of informed trading by individual investors around earnings announcements using a unique data set of NYSE stocks. We show that intense aggregate individual investor buying (selling) predicts large positive (negative) abnormal returns on and after earnings announcement dates. We decompose abnormal returns following the event into information and liquidity provision components, and show that about half of the returns can be attributed to private information. We also find that individuals trade in both return‐contrarian and news‐contrarian manners after earnings announcements. The latter behavior has the potential to slow the adjustment of prices to earnings news.     

Earnings seasonality,management earnings forecasts and stock returns

We examine whether management earnings forecasts (MEFs) help reduce the stock return seasonality associated with earnings seasonality around earnings announcements (EAs) in Chinese A-share markets. We find that firms in historically low earnings seasons outperform firms in high earnings seasons by 2.1% around MEFs. Firms in low earnings seasons also have higher trading volume and return volatility than their counterparts around EAs and MEFs. MEFs significantly reduce the ability of historical seasonal earnings rankings to negatively predict announcement returns, volume and volatility around EAs. The reduction effects are stronger when MEFs are voluntary or made closer to EAs. The evidence suggests that MEFs facilitate the correction of investors’ tendency to extrapolate earnings seasonality and its resulted stock mispricing.     

Earnings management,market discounts and the performance of private equity placements

Private equity placement data allow us to determine whether sophisticated investors can uncover the true value of firms. This can be done by defining sophisticated investors as those who meet the stringent participation requirements of the private equity market. Our results show private equity issuing firms overstate their earnings in the quarter preceding private equity placement announcements and that sophisticated investors do not ask for a fair discount when purchasing the shares of the private issuing firms. We also find evidence showing that the reversal of the effects of pre-issue earnings management is a significant determinant of the long-term performance of private issues. Results further show that post-issue stock performance and operating performance of firms using “aggressive” earnings management significantly underperform those using more “conservative” earnings management.     

Why Do Firms Issue Equity after Splitting Stocks?

This paper examines the motivations of firms that conduct seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) after splitting stocks. We find no difference in equity announcement and issue period returns between these firms and other equity‐issuing firms, suggesting that firms do not split stocks to reveal information and reduce adverse selection costs at the subsequent SEO. However, because investors react positively to split announcements, firms that issue equity after splitting stocks sell new shares at a higher price and raise more funds. We also find that firms split stocks to make the subsequent SEO more marketable to individual investors who are attracted to low‐priced shares.     

When bank loans are bad news: Evidence from market reactions to loan announcements under the risk of expropriation

In this paper we investigate whether inefficient bank loans can reduce the value of borrowing firms when expropriation of the stock of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders is a major concern. Using data from Chinese banks, we find that bank loan announcements generate significantly negative abnormal returns for the borrowing firms. In line with this expropriation view, negative stock price reactions following bank loan announcements are concentrated in firms that are perceived to be more vulnerable to expropriation by controlling shareholders. Finally, we find evidence that a negative relationship between market reactions and firm vulnerability to expropriation exists only when firms borrow from the least efficient banks.     

Announcing the announcement

What drives investors’ attention? We study how far in advance earnings calendars are pre-announced and find that investors are more attentive to earnings news when such details are disclosed well ahead of time. This variation in investors' attention affects short-run and long-run stock returns, thereby creating incentives for firms to strategically pre-announce the report date on short notice when the earnings news is bad. Consistent with this idea, firms pre-announce their report dates well ahead of time when earnings are good and do it at the very last moment when earnings are bad. A trading strategy that exploits such variations yields abnormal returns of 1.5% per month.     

Do Private Placements Turn Around Firms? Evidence from Taiwan

We analyze the stock and operating performance of firms issuing private placements in Taiwan. Issuing firms have poor pre‐issue performance and earn significantly positive returns at announcement. Placements with an owner‐manager or with nonexecutive directors are associated with better post‐issue stock and operating performance, suggesting that an increase in insiders’ stakes leads to better alignment of managerial incentives and an increase in monitoring by insiders. In contrast, placements made to outside investors are unlikely to turn around the issuing firms.     

Information asymmetry around operational risk announcements

Operational risk incidences are likely to increase the degree of information asymmetry between firms and investors. We analyze operational risk disclosures by US financial firms during 1995–2009 and their impact on different measures of information asymmetry in the firms’ equity markets. Effective spreads and the price impact of trades are shown to increase around the first announcements of such events and to revert after the announcement of their settlement. This is especially pronounced for internal fraud and business practices related events. Market makers respond to higher information risk around the first press cutting date by increasing the quoted depth to accommodate an increase in trading volumes.The degree of information asymmetry around operational risk events may be influenced by the bank’s risk management function and the bank’s governance structure. We indeed find that information asymmetry increases more strongly after events’ first announcements when firms have weaker governance structures—lower board independence ratios, lower equity incentives of executive directors, and lower levels of institutional ownership. In contrast, the firms’ risk management function has little to no impact on information asymmetry. We interpret this as evidence that the risk management function is primarily driven by regulatory compliance needs. The results of this study contribute to our understanding of information asymmetry around operational risk announcements. They help to shed light on the role that regulation and corporate governance can play in order to establish effective disclosure practices and to promote a liquid and transparent securities market.     

Informed trading before positive vs. negative earnings surprises

This paper investigates whether institutional investors trade profitably around the announcements of positive or negative earnings surprises. Using Korean data over the period of 2001–2010, we find that information asymmetry is larger before negative earnings surprises (earnings shock) among investors and that the trading volume decreases only before earnings shock announcements due to the severe information asymmetry. We also find that institutions sell their stocks prior to earnings shock announcements whereas individual and foreign investors do not anticipate bad news. Finally, we find that institutional trade imbalance is positively related to the post-announcement abnormal returns of negative events. This study complements and extends prior literature on informed trading around earnings announcements by documenting evidence that domestic institutions exploit their superior information around particularly earnings shock announcements.     

A Reexamination of the Conglomerate Merger Wave in the 1960s: An Internal Capital Markets View

One possible explanation for bidding firms earning positive abnormal returns in diversifying acquisitions in the 1960s is that internal capital markets were expected to overcome the information deficiencies of the less-developed capital markets. Examining 392 bidder firms during the 1960s, we find the highest bidder returns when financially "unconstrained" buyers acquire "constrained" targets. This result holds while controlling for merger terms and for different proxies used to classify firms facing costly external financing. We also find that bidders generally retain target management, suggesting that management may have provided company-specific operational information, while the bidder provided capital-budgeting expertise.     

Inside the <Emphasis FontCategory="SansSerif">“</Emphasis>black box<Emphasis FontCategory="SansSerif">”</Emphasis> of private in-house meetings

We examine information content and related insider trading around private in-house meetings between corporate insiders and investors and analysts. We use a hand-collected dataset of approximately 17,000 private meeting summary reports of Shenzhen Stock Exchange firms over 2012–2014. We find that these private meetings are informative and corporate insiders conducted over one-half of their stock sales (totaling $8.7 billion) around these meetings. Some insiders time their transactions and earn substantial gains by selling (purchasing) relatively more shares before bad (good) news disclosures while postponing selling (purchasing) when good (bad) news is to be disclosed in the meeting. Finally, we conduct a content analysis of published meeting summary reports and find that the tone in these reports is associated with stock market reactions around (1) private meetings themselves, (2) subsequent public release of private meeting details, (3) subsequent earnings announcements and (4) future stock performance.