Earnings seasonality,management earnings forecasts and stock returns

We examine whether management earnings forecasts (MEFs) help reduce the stock return seasonality associated with earnings seasonality around earnings announcements (EAs) in Chinese A-share markets. We find that firms in historically low earnings seasons outperform firms in high earnings seasons by 2.1% around MEFs. Firms in low earnings seasons also have higher trading volume and return volatility than their counterparts around EAs and MEFs. MEFs significantly reduce the ability of historical seasonal earnings rankings to negatively predict announcement returns, volume and volatility around EAs. The reduction effects are stronger when MEFs are voluntary or made closer to EAs. The evidence suggests that MEFs facilitate the correction of investors’ tendency to extrapolate earnings seasonality and its resulted stock mispricing.     

Do Institutional Investors Enhance Accounting Earnings Attributes in the Korean Market?

This study examines whether the effectiveness of institutional monitoring depends on the economic conditions of emerging capital markets. We use trading volume data by investor type to compute a proxy for total institutional ownership. We then analyze the impact of the proxy variable on accounting earnings attributes and examine whether the association between the two depends on an expectation of market growth. We find that the effect of institutional monitoring decreases when market growth is expected to be low, implying that market growth may be a critical determinant of institutional investors’ long-term monitoring effectiveness in emerging capital markets.     

Earnings Announcements: Good News for Institutional Investors and Short Sellers

In this paper, we consider the trading behavior of institutional investors and short sellers around earnings announcements. The results suggest that institutional investors, and to a lesser extent short sellers, successfully anticipate earnings news. In the period immediately after the earnings announcement, both types of traders are active in the market and trade in response to the earnings announcement. In particular, short sellers are quick to increase their short positions when a company releases bad news. Institutional traders also trade in response to the news; however, they take longer to react.     

Earnings Volatility,Post–Earnings Announcement Drift,and Trading Frictions

We find that lower ex ante earnings volatility leads to higher Post–Earnings Announcement Drift (PEAD). PEAD is a function of both the magnitude of an earnings surprise and its persistence. While prior research has largely investigated market reactions to the magnitude of the earnings surprise, in this study we show that the persistence of the earnings surprise is equally important. A unique feature of the anomalous PEAD returns documented here concerns the association between abnormal returns and trading frictions. Besides demonstrating that firms with lower earnings volatility have higher abnormal returns, we also find that lower earnings volatility firms have lower trading frictions. Taken together, these findings imply that higher abnormal returns are associated with lower trading frictions. We exploit this implication to empirically demonstrate that PEAD returns due to earnings volatility are not concentrated in the firms with the largest trading frictions, which is in contrast to the findings in prior anomaly studies.     

How Investors Trade Around Interim Earnings Announcements

Abstract:   This study focuses on non‐institutional trading behaviour around interim earnings announcements in the emerging market. We separate the stock trading activity of Finnish households into five trading classes and compare the results to institutional trading. Data covering the years 1996–2000 shows that earnings news triggers trading in every trading class. We also find some evidence that actively trading individuals especially (compared to passively trading ones) show increased buying and selling activity before the event compared to the non‐event period. After the event we find that Finnish households in the most active investor class tend to follow a contrarian strategy, especially selling after good news. This adds to previous evidence by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000b) . Furthermore, the performance of the active investor classes is superior to that of passive ones. Finally, the institutional trading class is clearly less affected by the announcement than the active investor classes, suggesting that institutions utilize a broader information set than individual investors.     

Market Reaction to Multiple Contemporaneous Earnings Signals: Earnings Announcements and Future Earnings Guidance

We examine market reactions to contemporaneous announcements of current earnings and future earnings guidance for evidence on how investors trade off relevance and reliability. Current earnings are more reliable than future earnings guidance, but future earnings guidance may be more relevant for predicting future performance. We find that current earnings are more strongly associated with announcement-period returns than concurrently disclosed future earnings guidance, consistent with investors’ relative preference for reliability. We find similar return reactions to stand-alone earnings and to earnings released with guidance. In contrast, return reactions are lower for guidance announced simultaneously with current earnings than for stand-alone guidance.     

The Empirical Relationship Between Earnings Information and Stock Returns

Abstract:

The objective of this study was to examine, using a vector autoregressive model, whether the difference in earnings growth rates caused different reaction speeds in stock prices. Monthly returns of stocks listed in the Taiwan stock market from May 2003 to April 2013 were used as empirical data in this study. The analytical results showed that the returns of portfolios with higher earnings growth rates significantly led those portfolios with lower earnings growth rates when size, trading volume, institutional ownership ratio, and revenue factors were controlled, respectively. This paper finds that the earnings growth rate is a significant determinant of the lead-lag patterns observed in monthly stock returns.     

Earnings Virality

We examine the determinants and market consequences associated with earnings announcements going viral on social media, a phenomenon we label “earnings virality.” Using a comprehensive panel of historical Twitter data, we find that the typical earnings announcement receives relatively little social media coverage, but others go viral on social media, quickly reaching the feeds of millions of people. We find that viral earnings announcements generally have Twitter content that is more extreme in tone and contains less unique content. Further, earnings virality is positively associated with revenue surprises, investor recognition, retail investor ownership, and retail investor trading around the announcement. Earnings virality appears to be detrimental to markets, as it coincides with lower market liquidity and slower price formation. Overall, our evidence suggests that user-driven dissemination through social media platforms, when amplified and taken to extreme levels, may be harmful to markets.     

Business Cycle and Management Earnings Forecasts

This study examines the effects of the economic cycle on the properties of management earnings forecasts. Although a large volume of accounting literature examines the determinants of managerial earnings forecasts, the properties of such forecasts, and the response of market participants to earnings forecasts (Cameron 1986; King et al., 1990; Hirst et al., 2008), research on management earnings forecasting incentivized by macro‐economic factors has received scant empirical investigation. We use the National Bureau of Economic Research economic cycle definition to operationalize economic recession, and consider some commonly used management earnings forecast characteristics, including forecast likelihood, forecast frequency, forecast error, forecast pessimism, and forecast precision. We find that the likelihood of providing management earnings forecasts and frequency of forecasts increases during economic recession. We also find that economic recession is positively associated with forecast error, but negatively associated with forecast precision. Our findings suggest macro‐economic factors as an important determinant of management earnings forecasts properties.     

The Market's Valuation of Fraudulently Reported Earnings

This study examines the market valuation of accounting earnings during the period before it is publicly revealed that the earnings are fraudulent. Using both cross‐sectional and time‐series valuation models, we first find that the market accords less weight to earnings when the accounting numbers are fraudulent. We also show that the market better anticipates the presence of fraud when there is information in the public domain indicating a high ex‐ante risk of fraud. Our findings suggest that investors are able to accurately assess the probability of fraud and that such assessments affect the market's valuation of earnings even before it is publicly announced that fraud has occurred.     

Who Trades Around Earnings Announcements? Evidence from TORQ Data

Abstract:  Using TORQ database we investigate the intra-day trading volume reactions to earnings announcements of five trader groups, individuals, institutions, exchange members, program traders, and specialists. The results of this study indicate that institutions are most active in the immediate aftermath of an announcement. Individual investors are slow at the beginning but accumulate heavy volume afterwards and exceed institutional trading volume. We find support for Harris and Raviv (1993) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) , who respectively argue that divergence of opinion about a public information and portfolio rebalancing cause surges in pre- and post-announcement trading volume. Further we find evidence of swift and aggressive trading by informed and sophisticated institutions in the immediate aftermath of the announcement, and delayed, aggressive trading volume 'overreaction' by 'slow' and 'overconfident' individual investors as documented by Barber and Odean (2000 and 2002) and Daniel et al. (1998) . NYSE specialists provide the bulk of the liquidity needs around earnings announcements.     

Product Market Competition,Information and Earnings Management

We study theoretically the effect of product market competition on the incentives to engage in earnings manipulation, and we show how manipulating earnings is particularly rewarding in more competitive markets since the boost in market value of reporting good earnings is especially important. Using a panel dataset of about 70,000 observations spanning the period 1989–2011, we document that the competitive environment is an important determinant of Jones type discretionary accruals and it also affects real earnings management. In additional analysis, we find that the effect of competition on earnings manipulation is particularly important for companies that seem to be underperforming their competitors and that the competition‐earnings management linkage is moderated by the degree of information visibility at the industry level.     

Misvaluation and Insider Trading Incentives for Accrual‐based and Real Earnings Management

We investigate the incentives that misvaluation creates for: (1) insider trading; and (2) concurrent earnings management through both accruals and real activities. Managers of overvalued firms have an incentive to sustain overvaluation through income increasing earnings management and, at the same time, to sell their shares (Jensen, 2005 ). Managers of undervalued firms benefit from buying their firm's shares, however the negative effects of downward earnings management may offset incentives to enhance trading advantages. The results indicate that managers of both over‐ and under‐valued firms act opportunistically, managing earnings upward (downward) with accruals while selling (buying) shares. The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has been largely ineffective in eliminating trading motivated earnings management. Finally, we do not find evidence of a relationship between managerial trading and real earnings management.     

Conditional Mandates on Management Earnings Forecasts: The Impact on the Cost of Debt

Exploiting a unique conditional disclosure mandate on management earnings forecasts (MEFs) in China, we examine the differential effects of voluntary and mandatory MEFs on the cost of debt. We find that firms providing voluntary MEFs have lower cost of debt than do mandatory forecasters and nonforecasters. The results of the channel analyses reveal that voluntary forecasters have greater commitment to voluntary MEFs in future periods than do mandatory forecasters and nonforecasters, and the precision, accuracy, and timeliness of MEFs are higher for voluntary forecasters than for mandatory forecasters. Additional analyses show that the differential effects of voluntary and mandatory MEFs on cost of debt are stronger for voluntary forecasters operating in opaque information environments, issuing high-quality and confirming forecasts, controlled by private shareholders, and operating in highly competitive product markets. Overall, our results indicate that, compared with mandatory MEFs, voluntary MEFs are more informative for credit investors, particularly for firms facing greater information risk and operating uncertainty.     

Abnormal Returns from Predicting Earnings Thresholds

This study examines the performance of a trading strategy based on the prediction of firms concurrently reporting a positive earnings change and meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts. The evidence indicates that a model predicting both earnings thresholds concurrently can yield excess returns that are incremental to predicting only one earnings threshold. Further, I find that the prediction of forecast errors is relatively more important than predicting earnings changes as the incremental benefit from predicting earnings changes concurrently with forecast errors is small relative to a model that predicts only forecast errors. The results hold while controlling for various risk factors and known anomalies.     

Earnings Management Constraints and Classification Shifting

Prior literature has investigated three forms of earnings management: real earnings management (REM), accruals earnings management (AEM) and classification shifting. Managers make trade‐off decisions among these methods based on the costs, constraints and timing of each strategy. This study investigates whether managers use classification shifting when their ability to use other forms of earnings management is constrained. We find that when REM is constrained by poor financial condition, high levels of institutional ownership and low industry market share, managers are more likely to use classification shifting. Further, we find that when AEM is constrained by low accounting system flexibility and the provision of a cash flow forecast, managers are more likely to use classification shifting. In addition, when we limit our sample to firms that are most likely to have manipulated earnings, we continue to find support for constraints of both REM and AEM leading to higher levels of classification shifting. We also find support for the hypothesis that the timing of each earnings management strategy influences managers’ trade‐off decision. Our results indicate that managers use classification shifting as substitute form of earnings management for both AEM and REM.     

Weather,institutional investors and earnings news

We examine how pre-announcement weather conditions near a firm's major institutional investors affect stock market reactions to firms' earnings announcements. We find that unpleasant weather experienced by institutional investors leads to more delayed market responses to subsequent earnings news. Moreover, unpleasant weather of institutional investors is associated with higher earnings announcement premia. The influence of institutional investors' weather is robust after controlling for New York City weather, extreme weather conditions, and firm local weather. Additional cross-sectional evidence suggests that the strength of this weather effect is related to institutional investors' trading behavior.     

Earnings Announcements, Asymmetric Information, Trades and Quotes

This paper empirically analyses trades and quotes around the times of 37 earnings announcements in the Paris Bourse. We find that trading volume is larger on announcement days, spreads are wider after announcements, and the permanent positive (resp. negative) price impact of purchases (sales) is greater around announcements. While the findings pertaining to the spread and the permanent impact of trades are consistent with the view that earnings announcements correspond to an increase in information asymmetries, the result that trading volume is larger suggests that other effects are at work.     

Passive Institutional Ownership,R2 Trends,and Price Informativeness

A distinctive trend in the capital markets over the past two decades is the rise in equity ownership of passive financial institutions. We propose that this rise has a negative effect on price informativeness. By not trading around firm‐specific news, passive investors reduce the firm‐specific component of total volatility and increase stock correlations. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the growth in passive institutional ownership is robustly associated with the growth in market model R²s of individual stocks since the early 1990s. Additionally, we find a negative relation between passive ownership and earnings predictability, an informativeness proxy.     

The Influence of Long-Term Performance Plans on Earnings Management and Firm Performance

Boards of directors often implement long-term performance plans (LTPP) to focus management's attention on enhancing long-term shareholder value instead of concentrating their efforts on short-term earnings. This study provides estimation results suggesting that firms that compensate managers with LTPP are associated with lower levels of managed earnings than firms that have only short-term bonus plans. In addition, we find evidence that suggests that firms with long-term performance plans have significantly higher annual returns than firms that have only short-term bonus plans. We also find that firms with long-term performance plans are typically larger firms with smaller managerial ownership and larger institutional ownership than firms without long-term performance plans.