Valuation of restricted shares by conflicting shareholders in the Split Share Structure Reform

The recent Split Share Structure Reform launched by the government in the Chinese stock market terminates trading constraints on restricted shares. In exchange for the consent of freely traded shareholders, restricted shareholders offer them consideration mainly in the form of restricted shares. We estimate the implied discount of restricted shares to be 38.22% on average, which is in line with the empirical and theoretical findings in the literature, suggesting that the consideration is not systematically underpaid and the reform is fair at the market level. At the firm level, however, freely traded shareholders receive less consideration when their bargaining power is weaker. The impact of state shareholders on the size of consideration has been found to be non-monotonic. Consistent with the literature that state shareholders exaggerate the agency problem, they tend to exploit freely traded shareholders by offering less consideration when the latter's bargaining power is weaker. Meanwhile, state shareholders are under political pressure to carry out the reform as quickly as possible and to set a good example for other firms. They therefore refrain from offering underpaid consideration when their freely traded counterparts have strong bargaining power and are more capable of rejecting unfair schemes and substantially delaying the progress of the reform.     

Improved corporate governance and Chinese seasoned equity offering announcement effects

Corporate governance and thus overall investor protection in China improved after the Split Share Structure Reform and the release of the new company law in 2005. This study examines the impact of improved corporate governance and investor protection on the market's reaction to seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcements in China. The market reacts to post‐2005 SEOs positively, while it reacts to pre‐2005 SEOs negatively. The different market reactions are attributed to the market's different perceptions of firms' intentions behind SEO decisions – that is, investors are more optimistic and have more trust in SEO issuers when they believe they are better protected.     

股票全流通经济影响研究进展:述评与启示

股权分置改革后上市公司股票全流通对我国资本市场产生了一系列深远影响,一方面体现为对上市公司治理、企业业绩和信息披露有直接影响,另一方面体现为解禁和减持时产生的股东行为变化和市场反应。本文分别从这两方面对相关文献进行了梳理,并进行了回顾与述评,指出已有研究中的不足,并从股改方案追加补偿承诺、控股股东的长期行为变化、高管薪酬与业绩敏感度变化趋势等方面指出了进一步研究的方向。     

The more the better? Foreign ownership and corporate performance in China

We examine the relationship between the degree of foreign ownership and performance of recipient firms, using a panel of 21,582 Chinese firms over the period 2000–2005. We find that joint-ventures perform better than wholly foreign-owned and purely domestic firms. Although productivity and profitability initially rise with foreign ownership, they start declining once it reaches a certain point. This suggests that some domestic ownership is necessary to ensure optimal performance. We referred these findings to a model of a joint-venture, where strategic interactions between a foreign and a domestic owner's inputs may lead to an inverted U-shaped ownership–performance relationship.     

长安银行公司治理的实践与探索

公司治理是现代企业制度的核心,公司治理的效果决定公司的发展速度和质量,积极探索和改进公司治理方式是银行持续健康发展的永恒主题。本文从合理的股权结构、有效的工作机制、优良的高管团队、监管机构有力指导等方面,就如何构建具有中国特色的金融企业公司治理进行了阐释。     

股权结构对公司治理的影响

股权结构是公司治理结构的重要组成部分和基础,对企业来说,是否具有完善的公司治理,决定了它的生死存亡。因为股份制已成为现代企业制度的基本形式,投资者只有在确信自己的利益能够受到保护之后才会向企业投资,而良好的公司治理正是保护投资者利益的重要制度。     

Dynamics in Ownership and Firm Survival: Evidence from Corporate Germany

This study investigates the determinants of changes in corporate ownership and firm failure for German firms. We find that many of the determinants of failure also affect ownership changes in this bank‐based economy. They include poor performance, weak corporate governance, high leverage, and small firm size. The ownership structure also plays a role for both events. Separate analyses of one of these events are therefore likely to miss important effects. The implications for the German corporate governance system are that the differences to countries with more market‐based systems are not as pronounced as previously speculated.     

Ownership Structure, Firm Performance and Top Executive Change: An Analysis of UK Firms

The results of this paper reveal a significantly negative relationship between the equity stake owned by a senior executive and the likelihood that this executive will be removed from office. We also establish the existence of a strong positive relationship between poor company performance and the likelihood that the top managers responsible will be forced out of their firms; this forced departure only tends to occur when the managers' stake in the firm is less than 1%; as the level of ownership rises, managers become increasingly entrenched in their posts. The stock market reaction to management change is greatest (a) when the departure is unexpected and (b) when the dismissed executive owns more than 5% of the equity of his company. This study also examines the influence of other aspects of ownership structure and board composition upon the likelihood of a top executive dismissal.     

中国上市公司股权分置改革的事件研究

市场对股改这一事件的反应显著,在股改日当天出现显著为正的累积超常收益,说明了股改给流通股股东带来了超常收益;资产重组和权证方式使得流通股东获得较多的超常收益,而广为流行的送股方式以及派现方式和缩股方式都没有给流通股东带来较多收益。     

股权转债权方案新探

由于股权分置的原因,形成了上市公司特殊的股权融资偏好的行为特征和资本形成机制,要解决我国资本市场这一矛盾,必须进行股权分置改革。“股权转债权”作为解决股权分置的新思路,对于条件适合的上市公司,不仅操作较简便,而且符合其流通股股东的利益,并能有效改善公司治理结构和盈利能力。     

The Interrelationship Between Managerial Ownership and Board Structure

Abstract:  The paper tests the hypothesis that high managerial ownership entrenches managers by allowing the CEO to create a board that is unlikely to monitor. The results show a strong negative relationship between the level of managerial ownership and corporate governance factors, such as, the split of the roles of the CEO and the Chairman, the proportion of non-executive directors, and the appointment of a non-executive director as a Chairman. I also find that companies with low managerial ownership are more likely to change their board structure to comply with the Cadbury (1992) recommendations. The results suggest that managers, through their high ownership, choose a board that is unlikely to monitor. Overall, the findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of the board as an internal corporate governance mechanism when managerial ownership is high.     

Impact of the Share Structure Reform on the Role of Operating Related Party Transactions in China

Prior literature suggests that related party transactions may have a potentially detrimental effect on firm valuation because it undermines the corporate governance benefits a firm offers to minority shareholders. The share structure reform provides a unique opportunity to study to what extent the negative valuation effect of related party transactions interacts with corporate governance. Our empirical analysis confirms that related party transactions are detrimental to firm valuation. More importantly, we show that the negative effect of operating related party transactions on firm valuation declined after the share structure reform, partly due to the fact that the quality of corporate governance improved after the reform.     

境外股东异质性、企业性质与公司治理效率——基于中国上市公司的实证检验

依据2014年一直有境外股东持股的沪深 A股上市公司样本数据,考量不同类型外资持股的治理效应进行实证检验。结果表明：境外股东持股能够提升公司治理效率,不同性质的境外投资者对公司治理的影响存在差异。外资基金和非金融类外资股东的治理效应是显著的,QFII未能对上市公司经营者形成有效监督和制约,外资银行、保险、证券公司反而一定程度上加重了上市公司的代理冲突。此外,外资持股在民营企业中的治理效应优于国有企业。     

终极所有权结构对审计定价的影响——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文以2005～2009年连续5年可获得相关信息的579家沪深上市非金融公司组成的平衡面板数据(共2895个观察值)为研究样本,在控制相关变量的基础上运用一系列混合最小二乘法实证检验终极所有权结构对审计定价的影响;实证结果表明,终极所有权结构是影响审计定价的重要因素,具体而言:(1)与现金流量权和控制权没有偏离的公司相比,现金流量权和控制权存在偏离的公司具有相对高的审计定价;(2)现金流量权和控制权的偏离度与审计定价显著正相关;(3)与终极控制股东是非国有的公司相比,终极控股股东是国有的公司的审计定价更高。     

对国有银行股改中的股权结构的缺陷分析及优化模式的探讨

本文从作为国有银行股改试点的中行和建行的现有股权结构出发,分析了现有股权结构对其公司治理的不利影响,进而引出了优化股权结构、引进战略投资者的几种方式,并重点讨论了如何以金股方式引进境外战略投资者.     

公司治理影响盈余管理的实证研究

尽管公司管理者有着各种各样的盈余管理动机,但是真正实施盈余管理行为会受到很多因素的影响,其中公司治理是最主要的影响因素。公司治理包括很多内容,本研究主要关注股权结构和董事会特征两方面与盈余管理之间的相关性。一般来讲,股权集中度与盈余管理呈正相关,董事会独立性与盈余管理呈负相关。本文在分析如何影响盈余管理的理论基础上,以2005至2009年我国上证180成分股为研究对象,提出研究假设并进行实证检验。结果显示,法人股比例、流通股比例与盈余管理呈现正相关关系,董事会特征则受制度影响,具有双重影响。文章最后,结合我国资本市场的实际提出相关建议。     

Institutional block-holdings of UK firms: do corporate governance mechanisms matter?

Using a sample of UK firms, we find that institutional block-holding is negatively associated with directors’ ownership and is positively associated with board composition, suggesting that institutional block-holders regard directors’ ownership and board composition as substitute and complementary control mechanisms, respectively. We also show that UK institutional block-holders prefer smaller firms and firms with a shorter listing history. The presence of institutional block-holders is associated with smaller boards and lower trading liquidity. Finally, our results indicate that the investment preference of UK institutional block-holders varies with the level of their shareholding.