Impediments to International Franchising in the Business Format Sector

Franchising in the business format area by U.S. firms is a dynamic industry with excellent growth potential in view of the crumbling down the barriers in the world economy. The authors have identified eight major impediments to the growth of international business format franchising as a result of a survey conducted among a sample of U.S. franchise marketing executives. The study has come up with some major recommendations for the U.S. franchisors to improve the effectiveness of U.S. franchisors to market and support franchisees in foreign coutries. The sample size being quite small, the study should be considered as an exploratory study, and several areas for future study have been recommended in this paper.     

Multi-unit franchising: Growth and management issues

Entrepreneurs in a number of retailing sectors have eschewed the creation of company-owned chains and have embraced franchising as a preferred method for growing their businesses. There have been two leading reasons proposed for this preference. First, that franchisees provide the financial capital necessary for expansion, and second that franchisees manage the outlets better than company employees would if the unit were company owned. Interestingly, although many entrepreneur/franchisors confirm the relevance of the capital acquisition argument in their decision-making, theoretical analysis has discounted its importance. Instead, researchers have focused on the incentives of employee store-managers to misrepresent their ability and their effort as the dominant impetus behind franchising. Misrepresentation by employees as to ability and effort imposes costs and inefficiencies on the entrepreneur's chain. Arguing that franchising solves these problems by having the stores managed by persons with claims to the profits, these researchers have, by and large, rejected the capital acquisition argument for franchising in favor of this incentive-based rationale.Within this view, multi-unit franchising presents a curious anomaly. Multi-unit franchising, either through the incremental expansion by the franchisee one unit at a time or through the rights to open multiple units contained in an area development agreement, creates a collection of mini-chains within the franchise system. These mini-chains are operated by employee store-managers. Of course, they are employees of the franchisee, but they are employees nonetheless, and as franchise researchers have traditionally argued regarding the entrepreneur's employees, they will have incentives to misrepresent their ability and effort. Moreover, multi-unit franchising is ubiquitous.If multi-unit franchising is at odds with the incentive rationale for franchising, and it has a positive association with the growth of franchise systems, it must be providing the entrepreneur with some other benefit. In this study, we argue that the benefit it provides is access to capital. Through a study of fast-food franchise systems, we demonstrate that the more a chain engages in multi-unit franchising (i.e., the greater the proportion of multi-unit franchisees it has), the faster it grows, even faster than franchise systems generally. Moreover, we show that the level of commitment franchisors feel toward continuing to franchise is negatively related to the average number of units per franchisee and negatively related to their ability to obtain financial capital elsewhere. In other words, although multi-unit franchising helps an entrepreneur grow his or her business by providing increased access to capital, store level incentive problems get increasingly troublesome as franchisees get more and more units. It would appear, therefore, that capital acquisition is a relevant reason for engaging in franchising after all.     

“Conflict-performance assumption” or “performance-conflict assumption”: Insights from franchising

Franchising is an organizational governance form where relational and formal contracts complement each other and where franchisor and franchisees together may obtain better performance than working alone. Although relational contracts may adapt to changing environments, they are not as efficient in ambiguous settings. In franchised stores, liability for low performance is not always clear. Indeed, franchisor and franchisees work in close collaboration, and, therefore, this ambiguity on causes of low performance may lead to conflicts. The franchising literature, as far as we know, has addressed practitioners' concerns regarding performance on one side, and conflicts on the other side, but no study has exclusively focused on low performance and the emergence of conflicts. Our research contributes to the franchising literature by filling this relative gap and, contrary to “conflict-performance assumption” (Pearson, 1973; Duarte and Davies, 2003) held in the broader context of distribution channels, we consider low performance to be a cause, rather than a consequence, of franchisor/franchisee conflicts. This empirical study deals with franchising in France, the leading market in franchising in Europe and the third largest in the world. We used a qualitative approach based on 44 in-depth interviews with 27 franchisors and executives/high-level managers of franchise chains, as well as 17 franchisees from various industries to get a dual, and so more complete, assessment of franchising practitioners' views of performance-related conflicts. Our research findings show that franchisees, as independent small business owners, give priority to financial results compared to other goals and they are driven to continuously improve the performance of their store(s). When expectations are not met, franchisees sometimes blame franchisors because they are interdependent in their success and liability is not straightforward. As a collaborative team, franchisors and franchisees may benefit from minimizing conflicts and preventing them with the careful selection and management of franchisees that share franchisor's values and have internal locus of control.     

Why franchise companies expand overseas

Business format franchising is becoming an increasingly international activity. From 1971 to 1985, U.S. franchisors added foreign outlets at a rate of 17% per year, almost twice as fast as they added domestic outlets (Aydin and Kacker 1990). As a result, by 1990 more than 350 U.S. companies had more than 32,000 franchised outlets overseas. By 2000, 60% of all franchisors in the United States are expected to have outlets overseas (Hoffman and Preble 1993).This study examines the 815 largest U.S. franchisors to understand what capabilities encourage them to expand overseas. It finds that the key capability that predicts the intent to expand overseas is superior capability to reduce franchisee opportunism. Franchisors who seek foreign franchisees have developed a greater capability to bond against and monitor potential franchisee opportunism. The data show that these differences are consistent across all industries in which franchising takes place.The results of this study indicate that foreign entrepreneurs can identify the American franchisors most likely to expand overseas by looking at their pricing structure and their monitoring capabilities. The easy identification of characteristics from which to find American franchisors will help to reduce the search costs of potential foreign franchisees. This reduction in search costs will make the establishment of international franchise relationships less expensive.This study also provides guidance to franchisors interested in expanding overseas. The results show how franchisors can structure their franchise relationships to reduce potential franchisee opportunism. This ability to reduce franchisee opportunism will make it easier for franchisors to enter high-growth foreign markets using the franchising business mode.This study also has implications for researchers. It suggests that international business research examine further the mechanisms by which firms make contractual modes of international business work. Whereas many firms may internalize international market transactions under conditions likely to lead to market failure, the large number of franchisors who use franchising as an international expansion mode despite conditions of market failure suggests that more attention be paid to mechanisms that companies can use to reduce the probability of failure of international contractual transactions. By helping to explain how franchisors monitor foreign franchisees or bond them against opportunistic behavior, this study suggests that the international business literature develop a more complex understanding of the workings of international business transactions than the simple choice of internalization or contractual entry modes.     

Conflict management capabilities in franchising

Conflicts are common in franchising, however, they become dysfunctional above a certain threshold. Our aim is to understand how conflict management processes and, in particular, problem solving, persuasion, bargaining and politics, are developed and implemented within franchise chains and how they contribute to franchisors’ organizational capabilities. We do so through a qualitative study based on 44 in-depth interviews with franchisors and franchisees operating in France. Our main findings show that the implementation of these conflict management processes over time and with various franchisees nurture conflict management capabilities of franchisors.     

Franchise management capabilities and franchisor performance under alternative franchise ownership strategies

Franchising is a key entrepreneurial growth strategy, but a well-known downside is franchisee free-riding. Drawing upon alliance capabilities research, we describe franchise management capabilities and suggest that they are one way franchisors reduce free-riding and thus enhance performance. We also submit that these capabilities are especially helpful for “plural form” franchisors who own outlets in parallel with franchisees. Using a sample of 229 franchisors, we show that franchise management capabilities relate positively to franchisor performance among plural form franchisors. For “turnkey” franchisors who franchise all, or almost all, outlets these capabilities relate indirectly to performance through lower opportunism and improved brand reputation. Franchise management capability is therefore an important new theoretical construct linking franchising to franchisor performance.     

Franchising growth and franchisor entry and exit in the U.S. market: Myth and reality

Franchising has been and continues to be a very popular way to do business for a number of retailers and service businesses. However, the type of franchising that has been growing the most, namely business-format franchising, has not grown at the kind of phenomenal rates that the trade press often suggests. Since the Department of Commerce (DOC) canceled its publication Franchising in the Economy, we no longer have access to census-type data on franchising in the U.S. However, looking at the period during which the DOC did publish these data, one finds that the number of business-format franchisors is highly correlated with the number of units in these chains. Thus, we use data from recent issues of various franchisor directories to assess the number of franchisors in the U.S., and infer from this how business-format franchising has grown in the U.S. We find that business-format franchising has been growing over the last decade at a rate that is, at best, commensurate with the growth of the economy as a whole.We believe that the confusion about the extent of growth in franchising arises, in part, from the fact that many new firms enter into franchising each year, leading to the notion that this way of doing business is growing tremendously. However, we show that many firms also exit from franchising each year, for a net growth rate much below the entry rate.This paper shows that franchising is not a panacea for entrepreneurs, whether franchisor or franchisee. From the franchisor's viewpoint, the high rate of exits suggests that many firms fail despite franchising, and many others choose to stop franchising after trying it for a few years. Clearly, these firms have found that franchising is not right for them. Furthermore, the results show that the characteristics of the chain at the time it becomes involved in franchising, as described in the main franchisor directories—such as the royalty rate, the advertising fee, the franchise fee, the amount of capital required, and the sector of operation—have little capacity to explain “survival.” The main variable that affects “survival” among those that are typically reported in franchisor listings is the number of years that the franchisor has been in business before starting to franchise. Hence our results suggest this is one dimension in which franchisors can make decisions that affect the probability that they will be successful in franchising. Although we are unable to explain most of the variance in outcome, the results mostly imply that other, less easily observed or quantified characteristics of the chain and the franchisor, such as maybe the “innovativeness” of the product, the amount of support provided to franchisees, the financial backing of the franchisor, etc., likely influence “success” the most, and thus, are worth investigating further.From the perspective of franchisees, the amount of exit found here suggests that in the majority of systems, franchisees cannot expect that their franchisor will be around for the whole duration of their contract—which averages about 15 years according to the Department of Commerce. This does not mean that the majority of franchised businesses will find themselves in an “exiting” system—a small minority of very well-established franchisors accounts for the majority of franchised businesses, and these are likely to remain successful for years to come. But entrepreneurs buying franchises from less established systems are likely to face franchisor exit, either failure or departure. This paper confirms that franchisees should thoroughly investigate the franchise system they want to invest in, going beyond the information about royalty rates, advertising rates, rankings, etc., found in franchisor directories, and toward more product, market, and other less easily accessible information about the chain.     

Antecedents of early terminations in franchising: franchisor versus franchisee cancelations

Franchisors capitalize on franchisee entrepreneurial capacity to grow. However, enabling franchisees to develop their ventures may damage system consistency. This dilemma makes conflict particularly prevalent in the field of franchising. Nevertheless, prior research has reported an incomplete picture of factors leading to serious disagreement and premature termination in franchise partnerships. We address this gap, first, by adding the entrepreneurial autonomy of franchisees as a relevant but underexplored source of conflict and, second, by providing a more fine-grained analysis of franchisors’ versus franchisees’ drivers of termination. Specifically, we focus on the controversial issues of pricing and local advertising policies and analyze how expanding franchisees’ entrepreneurial autonomy in these decision areas is related to contract terminations depending on who ended the relationship (the franchisor or a franchisee). The study also highlights less controversial requirements and conditions (e.g., upfront investments, franchisor experience …) that may reduce early terminations. Our empirical objectives are met by using survey data from a sample of franchisor companies. The results show how the performance outcomes of entrepreneurial autonomy differ depending on the decision area in which it is exercised. Results also throw light on the consequences of various critical franchise policies that may be masked if both types of termination (franchisors vs. franchisees) are considered together.     

Standardisation versus Adaptation: Geographical Pressures to Deviate from Franchise Formats

There is a tension in business format franchising between, on the one hand, standardisation and uniformity and, on the other hand, geographical variations in market conditions and resource availability. Previous research has demonstrated in the case of independent small firms that local geographical conditions influence business strategy. This paper examines whether variations in the local geographical environment, notably in terms of demand and supply side conditions, affect format implementation and whether franchisors permit franchisees to make local adaptations of the format in response to local environmental conditions. The study is based on interviews with 40 UK-based franchisors, all of whom were at the later stages of roll-out or in the consolidation stage of network development. Local variations in the business environment do create a conflict with the need to maintain the uniformity of the franchise format. Adaptation was restricted to peripheral format components. No changes were made to the core format components. Most franchisors recognise that their franchisees are an important source of innovation. However, implementation of franchisee ideas across the system is found in only a minority of cases. These findings link to the franchisee control–autonomy debate, confirming other studies which suggest that franchisees enjoy considerable operational autonomy.     

Franchisee Selection for Social Franchising Success

Franchisee selection is a major input for franchising success. In this article, we argue that franchisee selection criteria do not differ between social and commercial franchising. They may be even more relevant for obtaining social franchising success. We discuss criteria for franchisee selection and present details of our multiple case study research to support the argument. Our study finds that evolved social franchisors do adopt similar selection criteria as commercial franchisees. In addition, constraints faced with franchisee selection among commercial franchisors are reflected also among social franchisors. We contribute to franchising literature by extending commercial franchisee selection criteria to social franchisee selection. A major managerial implication of this research is that existing franchising professionals could easily assist new social franchisors in developing their social franchisees. Future research could be study criteria weights and methodology adopted for making final selection. A new research direction could involve studying if selection criteria would differ based on (a) social cause and (b) franchisee location.     

Crossing mother: Entrepreneur-franchisees' attempts to reduce franchisor influence

Contractual terms guide many entrepreneur-franchisees' actions with the franchisor. However, it is impossible for franchisors to completely specify all future actions. They compensate by continually attempting to influence franchisees, using what franchisees perceive as suasion in their ongoing interactions. We develop a theoretical framework for understanding the informal interaction dynamics between franchisors and franchisees.Most franchise arrangements include the payment of royalties based on sales. This encourages a growth-oriented strategy, usually appropriate for the franchisees during the initial stages of their operations. Whereas a franchising strategy can reduce entreprenerial risk for franchisees, it does not eliminate it. Thus, as sales of the franchisees increase, profit-oriented strategies will be favored because they represent the payoffs that accrue to continuing entrepreneurial effort and risk-taking. These strategies may be in opposition to franchisors' sales orientation when market conditions do not allow continual growth without margin penalties. A research model is developed, depicting the relationship between franchisees' strategies and performance, and the moderating effect that contractual goals and franchisees' perception of franchisors' attempts at suasion have on this relationship. A set of research hypotheses was then empirically tested using a large sample of franchisees from the commercial truck retailing industry.The results indicate that sales-growth and profit-growth goals are not always congruent. Balancing the goals of the franchisor and franchisee did not appear to be a popular option; either one or the other was emphasized. More importantly, the results indicate that when franchisees perceive attempts by franchisors to use suasion, lower levels of profits result, but there is no corresponding increase in the level of sales.In the long-term, franchisors are likely to determine that current contractual arrangements are not protecting their longer term interests. Thus, they will be expected to attempt to modify franchise contracts in ways that force franchisees to implement sales-gain strategies. This will require that entrepreneur-franchisees anticipate future events more carefully at the time they are examining the original franchise contract. Because most entrepreneurs are concerned with immediate survival at the start-up stage, this makes examination of the contract less likely to happen; the franchise option is attractive because it reduces such risks.We recommend that entrepreneurs write ex ante contingent claims contracts that ensure a gradual reduction of franchisor influence. Although this would assume a power or knowledge balance that favors the franchisees, which is unlikely during the start-up phase, it will change over time as franchisees gain a better understanding of the local competitive dynamics. Thus, it may well serve the franchisees to take a defensive posture or push a royalty arrangement that decreases the emphasis on sales over time. This is most likely to be effective where the entrepreneur is considering several competing franchises at the time of the signing of the contract.Finally, we recommend that entrepreneur-franchisees should not assume that the expert advice offered by their franchisor is always in their best interests. Although technical advice is more likely to be unbiased and should be fully exploited, as this is what makes the franchise valuable, strategic advice, or that which relates to goal setting may well be colored by the financial interests of the franchisor. Franchisors are unlikely to consider the possibility that franchisees would be better served by formulating their own strategies, nor are they likely to consider that the franchise network would be better off, in the longer term, by the collective impact associated with numerous franchisees independently formulating their own strategies. In short, although we do not suggest that franchisees should always assume that “crossing mother” is the best response to all perceived franchisor-suasion efforts, they should carefully examine all strategic advice.     

Criteria used in the selection of franchisees: an application in the service industry

The service industry is one of the greatest driving forces behind the growth of franchising in many countries. The aims of this study are to identify the characteristics of the franchisee profile preferred by franchisors in the service industry and to show how the simulation of franchisees with conjoint analysis constitutes a powerful tool for the correct selection of franchisees by franchisors. Criteria that franchisors in the service industry look for in franchisee candidates are ranked by importance using conjoint analysis; a decomposition methodology that is rarely used in this field. The value of the paper is significant as it provides a practical framework for franchisors for the selection process of franchisees when choosing from a group of potential franchisees.     

Trust and Fairness During Strategic Change Processes in Franchise Systems

A very important challenge for franchisors is adapting the strategies of their franchise systems to new threats and opportunities. During such strategic change processes (SCPs) franchisees are often required to make major financial investments and/or adjustments in their trade practices without any guarantee of positive benefits. It is, therefore, important that franchisees trust their franchisors during such change processes and that they perceive the change process as fair. This article aims to generate theory on franchisees?? perceptions of trust and fairness during SCPs. On the basis of case studies regarding eight change processes in four Dutch drugstore franchise systems, this article distinguishes different levels of franchisee trust and discusses five instruments that franchisors can ??institutionalize?? in their franchise systems to influence their franchisees?? trust and fairness perceptions.     

Brand equity heterogeneity among strategic groups in service franchising

Independent franchisees work cooperatively with service franchisors to strengthen the franchisor's brand name. However, agency theory predicts that franchisor inputs such as brand names and operational routines might be harmed by franchisees' free riding. In addition, previous literature has addressed the issues of strategic group emergence and performance differences between groups in recent decades. Thus, this study builds upon an emerging symbiotic view of franchising behind agency theory and incorporates a strategic groups level of analysis to investigate whether franchisees have strong incentives to maintain standards as franchisor seeking market penetration. By investigating potential brand equity differences among service franchisors for Taiwanese telecommunications service chains, this study found that different strategic groups exist in service franchising chains. From replication testing, the current results demonstrate that service franchising brand equity heterogeneities exist among franchisors within and across strategic groups. Therefore, this study broadens agency theory's explanation of service franchising.     

The effect of organizational context on entrepreneurial strategies in franchising

Franchising systems play a vital role in the creation of new jobs and economic development. Although the role of the franchisor as entrepreneur is generally assumed, there has been limited research on the conduct of entrepreneurial activities in the franchising system as a whole. In particular, researchers and practitioners need to better understand the influences of organizational context on entrepreneurial activities system-wide.The research reported in this article examines the influences of the organizational context of the franchisor on the entrepreneurial strategies of franchisors, their innovation efforts, and franchisor support of entrepreneurial activities by franchisees. Specifically, this study examines how the organizational context variables of size, age of the franchise, its growth rate (both absolute and relative), and time in franchising affect franchisee perceptions of entrepreneurial strategies of their parent franchisor, their innovation efforts, and franchisor managerial support for entrepreneurial activity and innovation by the franchisee.Franchisee perceptions of their parent franchisors’ entrepreneurial strategies were assessed with respect to four dimensions identified in previous research as central to an entrepreneurial orientation: low concern for stability, willingness to take risks, aggressiveness in competition, and proactiveness (in seeking new opportunities). Innovation by franchisors was measured with respect to introduction of new products and techniques.Drawing on research that emphasizes the importance of instituting special organizational devices and rewards and recognition systems for promoting entrepreneurial activity, franchisor support for franchisee entrepreneurial activity and innovation (e.g., the development of new products and services, new techniques to improve customer service) was measured by the importance franchisees assigned to the use of a franchise council, the recognition of new ideas at the annual meeting of the franchise system, and the presence at franchisor headquarters of a champion for innovation.Consistent with other studies examining the influence of organizational context, it was hypothesized that organizational size and age would be negatively related to franchisee assessments of entrepreneurial strategies, the introduction of new products and techniques, and franchisor managerial support for franchisee entrepreneurial activity and innovation. In contrast, rapid growth was hypothesized to be positively associated with entrepreneurial strategies and support for franchisee innovation. No hypotheses were proposed with respect to time in franchising.Results of the study showed, as hypothesized, that franchisor size was associated with a concern for stability and strategies that were risk averse, cooperative, and reactive rather than proactive. However, size was positively associated with the frequent introduction of new products and also positively related to franchisor support for franchisee innovation. Contrary to expectations, age was positively associated with entrepreneurial strategies including a low concern for stability and an aggressive style of competition. In addition, age was positively associated with the introduction of both new products and new techniques. Relative growth, rather than an absolute rate of growth, was associated with all of the entrepreneurial strategies except risk-taking as well as with the frequent introduction of new products. Although no hypotheses were proposed for time in franchising, the findings show that it is associated with a greater concern for stability as well as the infrequent introduction of new products and techniques.The findings from this study suggest that franchisors need to institute measures to counteract the potentially deleterious influences of franchise system size on the entrepreneurial orientation within their franchising systems. It also suggests the resources of a large organization need to be combined with the flexibility of smaller units for competitive advantage. Entrepreneurial activity by franchisors and franchisees implies a partnership in adapting to the environment and can provide a competitive advantage. The challenge for franchisors will be managing new ideas from the field and adapting to a competitive environment while at the same time preserving the integrity of the franchising system.     

Does the Franchisor Provide Value to Franchisees? Past,Current, and Future Value Assessments of Two Franchisee Types

The degree to which a franchise system penetrates a target market over time often is influenced by the rate to which its individual franchisees expand. Yet a franchisee's decision to expand the business operation depends, in part, on the perception of value that the franchisee expects to receive from the franchisor in return for a variety of fees (for example, entry fee, advertising fees, royalties). Moreover, the franchisee's experience with its franchisor may strengthen or weaken his or her perception of franchisor value. The change in perception of franchisor value can influence franchisees' decisions to expand their franchise operations. To date, scant research exists on factors influencing a franchisee's decision to expand. In the reported study, a four-stage analysis was conducted to examine empirically whether franchisees' opinions about the value of their franchisors changes over time. The study findings reveal that franchisees had the strongest, positive opinions when asked to recall an earlier decision to expand their franchise operations. These opinions weakened when franchisees contemplating expansion of their operations were asked for their current and anticipated future opinions of franchisor value. Overall, franchisees were undecided when asked about their perceptions of current franchisor value and anticipated future franchisor value. Implications of these findings for theory and practice of franchising are discussed.     

A longitudinal study of franchisor failure according to Altman’s Z model

Purpose: The foremost objective of this study is to obtain segments/clusters of franchisors that are more likely to fail. A second aim is to evaluate the influence of the usual variables of the franchise contract on the solvency of franchises.

Design/methodology/approach: This study set up a database with information collected from several Spanish franchising yearbooks and franchisors’ websites to establish the census of Spanish franchisors. This article worked with a census of the franchises operating in Spain from 2001 to 2011. Latent class regression analysis is used.

Findings: This research found four segments or classes of franchisors with regard to their failure pattern. In addition, this article defined the most influential variables in the franchisors’ risk of failure. The relationships between the variables that define a franchise contract and the Z scores of Altman’s model have been extracted. The dependent variable has been the Altman’s Z model and the independent variables are those that define the franchise contract.

Research implications: This methodology offers potential franchisees a new criterion for assessing the franchise chains they are investigating, taking into account their risk of failure. This allows franchisees to better highlight those franchisors that have a lower crash risk and avoid the damage incurred by the closure of the chain. The information provided for franchisees should be accessible, usable, and suitable to help franchisees to choose the best franchise systems in which to invest. This methodology is of course very useful for franchisors, because they can comprehend their financial situation and how they could manage the franchising variables in order to improve their solvency.

Practical implications: All the segments are solvent, except Segment 3. The distinguishing feature of this segment is that over 64 percent of the firms are retailer chains. In addition, more than 20 percent of the franchises from our database are in financial danger, and this is the group where the number of service companies is lower.

Originality/value: This research is unique in two ways. First, this study presents a new methodology in this field that allows researchers to use the historical-financial data of franchisors, and the information of the franchise contract to predict franchisor failure. Second, this article helps franchisees to make their own decisions on the basis of the franchisors’ level of risk of failure. Third, this research offer a theoretical contribution about franchisor failure, this topic is scarcely treated by academic literature.     

Contractual Discrimination in Franchise Relationships

Franchisors often modify the contract terms offered to prospective (new) franchisees – to incentivize growth in the number of franchisees, to access capital, or to improve their financial performance. We argue that changes in contract terms offered to new franchisees (contractual discrimination across franchisees) can alter existing franchisees’ perceived equity in their relationship with the franchisor, and affect their freeriding. Specifically, we hypothesize, and show, that positive (negative) discrimination towards new franchisees reduces (maintains) existing franchisees’ perceived equity in their relationship with the franchisor, motivating existing franchisees to increase (eschew) freeriding – with impact on franchisors’ performance. To do so, we first take advantage of an exogenous event (the great recession of 2007-09) to study how 120 restaurant franchisors changed their contract terms to new franchisees and how that affected their post-recession net income (Study 1). We show that changes in contracts for new franchisees impact franchisors’ post-crisis performance, as a function of the number of existing franchisees. Second, with two experiments (Studies 2 and 3) with entrepreneurs and franchisees, we document that the observed changes in performance occur because contractual discrimination affects existing franchisees’ perceived equity and their intentions to free-ride. Thus, we contribute to the literature on equity in franchising relationships, on contract evolution in franchising, and its impact on financial performance.     

When the Music Stops Playing: Post-litigation Relationship Dissolution in Franchising

Franchise relationships engender franchisor–franchisee conflicts and are prone to premature dissolution. Building on agency theory and institutional theory, this study examines what specific reasons – from both franchisors’ and franchisees’ perspectives – may cause post-litigation relationship dissolution (PLRD) and how franchise regulations moderate these relationships. We argue that both franchisor and franchisee may misrepresent themselves before their relationship begins (adverse selection) and behave opportunistically after the contract is signed (moral hazard), that is, ‘dual agency’. Based on 20-year archival records of franchisor–franchisee relationship histories gleaned from multiple data sources, we found that PLRD is likely to be caused by franchisors’ passive moral hazard and by franchisees’ active moral hazard. In addition, franchisor adverse selection has a greater impact on PLRD than franchisee adverse selection. With regards to regulatory influences, the presence of relationship law weakens the impact of franchisees’ passive moral hazard, but not their active moral hazard, on PLRD. Contrary to what we hypothesize, the presence of registration law amplifies the impact of franchisee adverse selection on PLRD. Ultimately, this study creates a better understanding of the antecedents and curbing mechanisms of PLRD in franchising.