资本市场的问题与出路

中国资本市场始终是国外关注的焦点。长期关注中国金融问题,并为中国金融改革提过宝贵建议的日本野村综合研究所的主席研究员大土冢正修先生,与国务院发展研究中心金融研究所所长、本刊编委会主任夏斌先生近日有一个对话。我们可以从中看到不同的思维视角,也能从中了解到日本友人在减资、黄金股,第三市场等方面的建设性意见。     

担保何以演变为恶意敛财融资

上市公司融资担保是一种正常的经济行为,可是它已经演变为一种恶意“圈钱”的方式     

储蓄资金如何进入资本市场?

中国人民银行行长戴相龙在九届全国人大五次会议记者招待会上答记者问时指出:"中央银行应该支持资本市场发展,我希望从近8万多亿储蓄分流一部分到资本市场.     

利率市场化的风险控制

利率市场化的风险是利率变化引起的风险,金融体系的脆弱引起的风险;国有企业高债率引起的财务风险及进而演化的破产风险;非国有企业由于利率的不规则波动引起成本不确定性增大;金融衍生工具的应用削弱了央行控制货币供应量的能力,使利率调控变得艰难而引起金融风险;市场化的利率使各项风险变得集中起来.风险控制的措施有对商业银行进行改造,使之成为自主经营、自负盈亏的独立实体;理顺银企关系,进行国企改革;央行加强对本国利率水平的调控;加强对商业银行的监管;弱化信息不对称,增加央行的政策透明度;充分地发展金融市场.     

货币市场利率风险与规避

货币市场利率的形成多是依赖于供求波动的市场机制而非行政控制,所以他们在中国的利率体系以及中央银行的宏观调控中起着重要的作用。同时,利率风险及其规避机制的建立就不得不引起大家的关注。     

货币市场和资本市场融合中银行风险的防范

在经济全球化的今天,资本市场与货币市场得到巨大的发展,二者的融合趋势不断增强,从而极大地推动了金融市场的发展,但金融风险却不断凸现.银行业如何在资本市场和货币市场融合趋势下提高自身盈利水平,加强自身抗风险能力,有效抵抗金融市场上出现的风险,更好地为经济发展服务成为当前银行业急需解决的问题.在分析现实环境的基础上,要把握货币市场与资本市场融合的趋势,有效防范金融市场融合过程中的风险.     

房地产市场的多方博弈和金融风险研究

2009年3月后,在一系列政策的刺激下,我国房价出现短期拐点,有回暖迹象.本文以博弈论的观点分析房地产市场的参与各方策略选择问题,指出在全球经济动荡的背景下,在政策"救"与"不救"及"如何救"的策略选择中,需注意金融风险转移,适时采取风险防范措施.     

如何通过金融创新化解我国金融市场风险

对于金融风险的管理,从宏观和微观等不同层面评估来看,金融市场、金融产品的单一化、同质化已经成为我国当前金融市场的最大风险之一.与此相对照,金融创新所推动的金融市场、金融产品、金融渠道乃至支付方式的多样化及其所带来的金融市场的灵活性,是消化、吸收和化解金融市场风险的非常重要的突破口.     

Bank Capital Standards for Market Risk: A Welfare Analysis

We propose a simple model that is suitable for evaluating alternativebank capital regulatory proposals for market risk. Our modelformalizes the conflict between bank objectives and regulatorygoals. Banks' decisions represent a tension between their desireto exploit the deposit-insurance put option and their desireto preserve franchise value. Regulators seek to balance thesocial value of deposits in mediating transactions against thedeadweight costs of failure resolution. Our social welfare criterionis standard: a weighted average agents' utilities. We demonstrate that banks do not incrementally alter their portfoliorisk as the economic environment changes. Rather, banks eitherchoose the minimal feasible risk or the maximal feasible risk.This pattern, in turn, drives regulatory decisions: The firstgoal of the regulator is to induce banks to choose the minimalrisk level. For all nontrivial cases, unregulated banks failto choose the first-best allocations. Traditional ex-ante capitalrequirements can induce banks to choose the socially-optimallevel of portfolio risk, but the required capital is often inefficientlyhigh. In contrast, variants of the Federal Reserve Board's precommitmentproposal imply far smaller efficiency losses, and achieve allocationsat or nearthe first-best for most reasonable model specifications.The ex-post penalties required for the optimal implementationof precommitment are not excessively large. The welfare gainsfrom precommitment are even higher when the precommitment penaltyfunction is precluded from sending banks into default. We concludethat state-contingent regulatory mechanisms, of which the precommitmentapproach is an example, offer the possibility of substantialgains in regulatory efficiency, relative to traditional statenon-contingent regulation.     

Bank Capital Standards for Market Risk: A Welfare Analysis

We propose a simple model that is suitable for evaluating alternative bank capital regulatory proposals for market risk. Our model formalizes the conflict between bank objectives and regulatory goals. Banks' decisions represent a tension between their desire to exploit the deposit-insurance put option and their desire to preserve franchise value. Regulators seek to balance the social value of deposits in mediating transactions against the deadweight costs of failure resolution. Our social welfare criterion is standard: a weighted average agents' utilities.We demonstrate that banks do not incrementally alter their portfolio risk as the economic environment changes. Rather, banks either choose the minimal feasible risk or the maximal feasible risk. This pattern, in turn, drives regulatory decisions: The first goal of the regulator is to induce banks to choose the minimal risk level. For all nontrivial cases, unregulated banks fail to choose the first-best allocations. Traditional ex-ante capital requirements can induce banks to choose the socially-optimal level of portfolio risk, but the required capital is often inefficiently high. In contrast, variants of the Federal Reserve Board's precommitment proposal imply far smaller efficiency losses, and achieve allocations at or near the first-best for most reasonable model specifications. The ex-post penalties required for the optimal implementation of precommitment are not excessively large. The welfare gains from precommitment are even higher when the precommitment penalty function is precluded from sending banks into default. We conclude that state-contingent regulatory mechanisms, of which the precommitment approach is an example, offer the possibility of substantial gains in regulatory efficiency, relative to traditional state non-contingent regulation.     

Time Varying Market Leverage, the Market Risk Premium and the Cost of Capital

This paper shows that, when as usual the market portfolio is proxied by a share portfolio, then the conventional Ibbotson (1999) estimator of the market risk premium violates Miller–Modigliani (1958 and 1963) propositions II and III. A new estimator of the market risk premium is proposed which is free of these defects. In addition, across the range of market leverages experienced in the US in the period 1952–1997, it generates estimates of the market risk premium that differ from those generated by the Ibbotson methodology by up to 2.5 percentage points, and weighted average costs of capital for firms that differ by up to 2.6 percentage points.     

资本充足率、市值资产比例与银行风险

基于风险和回报的基本关系,本文检验了以会计指标为主要计量尺度的资本充足率和以市场指标为计量手段的市值资产比例是否能够代表银行风险。研究发现,会计指标在没有被操控的情况下可以预测银行风险。虽然资本充足率也能够反映银行风险,但市值资产比例对银行股价回报的解释力更强,尤其在危机时期。本文建议,监管机构依然可以坚持选用资本充足率这样的会计指标监控银行风险,同时辅以市场指标,因为中国资本市场受到人为因素和政策因素干扰较多,股票价格不一定如实反映内涵价值,还应该坚持以会计指标为主。     

存在风险条件下的资本市场投资预期收益模型研究

风险是指预期收益的不确定性,是指在将来一段时间内遭受损失的可能性.进行资本市场投资,必然存在风险.资本市场投资风险就是投资预期结果(预期收益损失)的不确定性,有投资风险,就会有投资者对其进行的预期.本文建立了存在风险条件下的资本市场投资预期收益模型,并由此得出了不同投资者的预期收益--风险偏好的不同投资选择.     

资本市场系统风险:预警模型及其应用

在对常用预警技术进行回顾并构建预警指标体系的基础上,综合已有模型的优势,本文构建了一个基于各指标对应序列平稳性检验和神经网络的外推预测式系统风险预警模型.运用该模型对我国资本市场系统风险状态的实证预警研究表明,此模型性能稳定且精度较高,具有较好的应用前景.     

河南省资本市场存在的问题及发展对策

总体而言,河南省资本市场存在规模较小、市场结构不合理、上市公司运作不规范、中介力量薄弱等问题,这阻碍了当地经济的进一步发展.因此,采取必要措施,促进河南省资本市场快速发展,是新世纪大力发展河南经济的必由之路.     

股权出资应如何审验

《公司法》规定,发起人认缴股本的出资方式有三种:货币、实物和无形资产。其中,无形资产主要是指工业产权(包括专利权、商标权、著作权等)、非专利技术和土地使用权。然而,在实践中还存在一些其他的出资方式,如净资产出资、股权出资等。对于股权出资方式,不但我国现行立法中未明确规定可以作为出资,《独立审计实务公告第1号—验资》中也无相应的操作规范,因而注册会计师在对股权出资审验时要格外关注风险。股权出资中常见的陷阱案例例: A公司拥有B公司10%的股权,采用成本法核算。2000年1月,A公司与C公司拟合资成立D公司。A公司以其拥有的…     

Skin in the Game and Moral Hazard

What determines securitization levels, and should they be regulated? To address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase expected asset quality, subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling ABS to rational investors. Absent regulation, originators may signal positive information via junior retentions or commonly adopt low retentions if funding value and price informativeness are high. Effort incentives are below first‐best absent regulation. Optimal regulation promoting originator effort entails a menu of junior retentions or one junior retention with size decreasing in price informativeness. Zero retentions and opacity are optimal among regulations inducing zero effort.