The Demise of Investment Banking Partnerships: Theory and Evidence

In 1970 the New York Stock Exchange relaxed rules that prohibited the public incorporation of member firms. Investment banking concerns went public in waves, with Goldman Sachs the last of the bulge bracket banks to float. We explain the pattern of investment bank flotations. We argue that partnerships foster the formation of human capital and we use technological advances that undermine the role of human capital to explain the partnership's going‐public decision. We support our theory using a new data set of investment bank partnership statistics.     

The Value of Investment Banking Relationships: Evidence from the Collapse of Lehman Brothers

We examine the long‐standing question of whether firms derive value from investment bank relationships by studying how the Lehman collapse affected industrial firms that received underwriting, advisory, analyst, and market‐making services from Lehman. Equity underwriting clients experienced an abnormal return of around ?5%, on average, in the 7 days surrounding Lehman's bankruptcy, amounting to $23 billion in aggregate risk‐adjusted losses. Losses were especially severe for companies that had stronger and broader security underwriting relationships with Lehman or were smaller, younger, and more financially constrained. Other client groups were not adversely affected.     

Analyst Impartiality and Investment Banking Relationships

This study examines whether investment banking ties influence the speed with which analysts convey unfavorable news. We hypothesize that affiliated analysts have incentives to respond promptly to good news but prefer not to issue bad news about client companies. Using duration models of the time between an equity issue and the first downgrade, we find affiliated analysts are slower to downgrade from Buy and Hold recommendations and significantly faster to upgrade from Hold recommendations, in both within‐analyst and within‐issuer tests. We also find affiliated analysts issue recommendations sooner and more frequently after an offering than unaffiliated analysts, and that unaffiliated analysts are more likely than affiliated analysts to drop coverage of sample firms. Our findings indicate that banking ties increase analysts' reluctance to reveal negative news, and that reform efforts must carefully consider the incentives of affiliated and unaffiliated analysts to initiate coverage and convey the results of their research.     

Europe's Single Banking Market

This article provides an overview of the main principles underlying the regulatory for banks in Europe.     

Banking Deregulation and Industry Structure: Evidence from the French Banking Reforms of 1985

We investigate how the deregulation of the French banking industry in the 1980s affected the real behavior of firms and the structure and dynamics of product markets. Following deregulation, banks are less willing to bail out poorly performing firms and firms in the more bank‐dependent sectors are more likely to undertake restructuring activities. At the industry level, we observe an increase in asset and job reallocation, an improvement in allocative efficiency across firms, and a decline in concentration. Overall, these findings support the view that a more efficient banking sector helps foster a Schumpeterian process of “creative destruction.”     

Competing for Securities Underwriting Mandates: Banking Relationships and Analyst Recommendations

We investigate whether analyst behavior influenced banks' likelihood of winning underwriting mandates for a sample of 16,625 U.S. debt and equity offerings in 1993–2002. We control for the strength of the issuer's investment banking relationships with potential competitors for the mandate, prior lending relationships, and the endogeneity of analyst behavior and the bank's decision to provide analyst coverage. Although analyst behavior was influenced by economic incentives, we find no evidence that aggressive analyst behavior increased their bank's probability of winning an underwriting mandate. The main determinant of the lead‐bank choice is the strength of prior underwriting and lending relationships.     

Corporate Hedging: The Relevance of Contract Specifications and Banking Relationships

This article examines the contribution of hedging to firm value and the cost of hedging in a unified framework. Optimal hedging and firm value are explicitly linked to firm risk, the type of debt covenants and the relative priority of the hedging contract. It is shown that in some cases hedging is possible only if the counterparty to the forward contract also holds a significant portion of the debt. Also, the spread in the hedging contract reduces the optimal amount of hedging to less than the minimum-variance hedge ratio. Among other results this article elucidates why some firms hedge using forward contracts while other firms hedge in the futures markets, as well as why higher priority forward contracts are more efficient hedging vehicles.     

Corporate Hedging: The Relevance of Contract Specifications and Banking Relationships

This article examines the contribution of hedging to firm valueand the cost of hedging in a unified framework. Optimal hedgingand firm value are explicitly linked to firm risk, the typeof debt covenants and the relative priority of the hedging contract.It is shown that in some cases hedging is possible only if thecounterparty to the forward contract also holds a significantportion of the debt. Also, the spread in the hedging contractreduces the optimal amount of hedging to less than the minimum-variancehedge ratio. Among other results this article elucidates whysome firms hedge using forward contracts while other firms hedgein the futures markets, as well as why higher priority forwardcontracts are more efficient hedging vehicles. JEL Classificationnumbers: G13, G22 and G33.     

Multimarket Contact and Profitability in Banking: Evidence from Italy

In this paper we test the theory according to which multimarket contact is a crucial factor hampering competition among firms, because it lowers the incentive to behave aggressively in one market if there is fear that rivals retaliate in other common markets. We consider the Italian banking industry in the period 2002–2005, employing both market-level and firm-level data. The empirical evidence supports theory predictions, since profitability is positively related to the average number of contacts among banks, and appear to be higher for those credit institutions experiencing more links. This result has also policy implications, given the increasing consolidation (and hence the growing number of interactions in local markets) that has characterized this sector in the last years.

Banking deregulation and credit risk: Evidence from the EU

This paper studies the effect of banking deregulation on credit risk. Its theoretical model shows that a bank is willing to invest more resources in screening borrowers when there is an entry threat, even though loan rates are driven lower. Thus, deregulation may result in improved loan quality and lower credit risk. This result is tested using bank-level balance sheet data and macroeconomic data for the European Union. The data reveal that competition intensified after the completion of the Second Banking Directive, while loan quality improved in most markets. Evidence is found that the loan quality improvement is associated with lower interest margin.     

The Relationships between Real Estate Price and Expected Financial Asset Risk and Return: Theory and Empirical Evidence

In pricing real estate with indifference pricing approach, market incompleteness is shown to significantly alter the conventional pricing relationships between real estate and financial asset. Specifically, we focus on the pricing implication of market comovement because comovement tends to be stronger in financial crisis when investors are especially sensitive to price declines. We find that real estate price increases with expected financial asset return but only in weak market comovement (i.e., a normal market environment) when investors enjoy diversification benefit. When market comovement is strong, real estate price strictly declines with expected financial asset return. More importantly, contrary to the conventional positive relationship from real option studies, real estate price generally declines with expected financial asset risk. With realistic market parameters, we show that there is a nonlinear relationship between real estate price and financial risk. When the market comovement is strong, real estate price only increases with financial asset risk when the risk is low but eventually declines with the risk when it becomes high. Our cross-country empirical results also show that the relationship between financial market risk and real estate price is non-monotonic, conditional on the degree of market comovement.     

Capital and Earnings Management: Evidence from Alternative Banking Business Models

This paper examines whether institutional characteristics distinguishing Islamic from conventional banks lead to distinctive capital and earnings management behavior through the use of loan loss provisions. In our sample countries, the two banking sectors operate under different regulatory frameworks: conventional banks currently apply the “incurred” loan loss model until 2018 whereas Islamic banks mandatorily adopt an “expected” loan loss model. Our results provide significant evidence of capital and earnings management practices via loan loss provisions in conventional banks. This finding is more prominent for large and loss-generating banks. By contrast, Islamic banks tend not to use loan loss provisions in either capital or earnings management, irrespective of the bank's size, earnings profile, or the structure of their loan loss model. This difference may be attributed to the constrained business model of Islamic banking, strict governance, and ethical orientation.     

Agency and Internal Capital Market Inefficiency: Evidence from Banking Organizations

Using banking data, I provide evidence that agency problems are at the root of internal capital market inefficiency. I find that publicly traded bank holding companies (BHCs) are less efficient in their internal capital allocation than nonpublicly traded BHCs. This suggests that the divergence of interests between the chief executive officer and the shareholders is an important source of the internal capital misallocation. I also demonstrate that BHCs incorporating a tiered organizational structure are less efficient than nontiered BHCs, but only within a sample of BHCs that are publicly traded. These findings imply that a greater degree of rent‐seeking activity by division managers contributes to internal capital market inefficiency only if the top manager is an agent. This is consistent with theoretical models that explain internal capital misallocations through the multiple layers of agency within an organization.     

银行业国际化的理论依据及其动因分析

伴随世界经济全球化、金融自由化的迅猛发展和国际资本在全球范围内的自由流动,银行业国际化进程不断加快,并对世界经济产生了深远的影响.为了探究其中的主要缘由,本文从国际贸易理论、资本流动理论、对外直接投资理论、产业组织理论等方面进行了多视角的理论归纳,同时,对其国际化的动因也从比较优势论、三类业务的专业优势论、内部化理论、金融结构论、金融抑制和金融深化论、金融服务和金融创新等角度作了多方面的分析.     

银行业管制与银行风险承担的理论与实践回顾

银行业管制的目的在于降低银行风险承担,控制系统性银行危机.但是20世纪90年代以来银行危机不断,不仅发展中国家,发达国家也经历了大萧条以来最为严厉的银行危机.本研究从银行业管制的实践出发,对银行业管制的基本措施与商业银行风险承担的关系进行了详尽的理论回顾与总结.研究表明监管者构建安全网络以控制系统性银行危机的实践提高了银行的风险承担,而旨在降低银行风险承担的特许权价值、巴塞尔协议提倡的资本要求、监督检查和信息披露等措施也只在某些特定情况下、一定程度上达到效果.     

Effect of Banking Regulation on Performance: Evidence from Turkey

In this study, we investigate the effect of regulation on banking sector performance in an emerging country context. Consecutive crises in the early 2000s led to three waves of reformist banking regulations in Turkey: (1) the banking sector restructuring program in 2002, (2) limitation of the full deposit insurance system in 2004, and (3) a corporate governance-related banking law in 2005. Results show that these actions had a positive effect on bank lending, asset quality, and profitability. Findings also support the view that the sequence and timing of banking reforms in Turkey acted as a shield against the global financial crisis of 2008.     

Local Banking Market Frictions and Youth Crime: Evidence from Bank Failures

Journal of Financial Services Research - This paper examines the impact of local banking market frictions measured by bank failures on youth crime. Using a difference-in-differences framework, we...     

Board Accountability and Risk Taking in Banking: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment

In this paper, a law reform is evaluated that aimed at improving the corporate governance of banks by tightening accountability and legal liability of outside directors. The causal effect of the reform on bank risk is identified by difference-in-differences and triple differences strategies. The estimation results show that banks subject to the reform increased capital and liquidity ratios. Hence, designing board-level governance can be an effective policy tool for altering the risk-taking behavior of banks.     

Discrimination in Lending: Theory and Evidence

Using a general equilibrium model of credit market discrimination, I find that both taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination have similar predictions for the intergroup differences in loan terms. The commonly held view has been that if taste-based discrimination exists, loans approved to minority borrowers will have higher expected profitability than those to majorities with comparable credit background. I show that the validity of this profitability view depends crucially on how expected loan profitability is measured. I also show that taste-based discrimination must exist if loans to minority borrowers have higher expected rates of return or lower expected rates of default loss than those to majorities with the same exogenous characteristics observed by lender at the time of loan originations. My analysis suggests that the valid method to test for taste-based discrimination should be reduced-form regressions. Empirically, I fail to find supporting evidence for the existence of taste-based discrimination.