企业中的核心控制权与一般控制权

企业中资产所有者与人力资本所有者之间的控制权安排是企业制度安排的重要内容，但现有文献对此问题的研究存在大量的争论。本文在现有控制权理论研究的基础上将企业的控制权划分为核心控制权与一般控制权，并以此为基础，分别探讨了这两类控制权的配置关系。本文认为，企业契约中核心控制权的配置是基于对权力外部性风险的控制，而一般控制权的配置则是基于核心控制权行使的边际收益与边际成本的均衡。     

创始人权威、控制权配置与家族企业治理转型——基于国美电器“控制权之争”的案例研究

以国美电器"控制权之争"为背景,采用案例研究方法探讨了家族企业的控制权配置模式及治理后果。研究表明:随着规模扩大、参与国际竞争程度提升,传统家族权威治理的局限性日益显现,引入职业经理人是我国家族企业治理转型的必然趋势;诸如国美等治理实践中频发的"控制权冲突",根源并不在创始家族的控制权让渡,而是源于权力制衡缺失引发的控制权私利;优化权力配置,形成核心控制权、一般控制权和现金流权之间的合理匹配与均衡,是实现创始家族和职业经理人互惠相容,确保治理转型成功的关键与微观基础。本文从控制权视角深化了对家族企业治理的理解,也为化解当前我国家族企业"集体转型之痛"提供了必要的理论借鉴。     

我国中小投资者法律保护与控制权私利关系实证检验

本文以1994-2003年间深沪两市发生的股权转让事件为研究对象,用控制权私利水平衡量法律保护的结果和效率．实证检验我国法律制度的完善是否起到保护中小投资者的作用。研究发现;我国证券市场存在较高的控制权私利水平,在中小投资者法律保护的不同阶段,控制权私利存在显著差异;总体上,中小投资者法律保护能起到降低控制权私利作用：1999年以前法律保护较差的阶段,投资者法律保护并没有发挥降低控制权私利的作用;但在2000年之后,法律保护逐渐发挥作用,控股股东获得的控制权私利不断降低。     

上市家族企业股权集中度与风险倾向、市场价值研究——基于市场化程度分组的实证

上市家族企业股权集中度与其风险倾向和市场价值之间究竟存在什么样的关系?家族集中控制到底是有利还是有弊?本文在总结现有研究的基础上,建设性地提出了以地区市场化程度作为分组变量,并且在对中小板上市家族企业数据的实证论证中得到支持。相比于其他国家的企业,转轨国家企业所面临的外部不确定性更高,所以,制度因素对企业行为的影响尤其明显。家族企业的发展和治理与外部环境的市场化程度是密切相关的,所以,它们会关注制度变迁过程中自身所面临的发展机遇,以及制度变迁对自身发展战略、投融资行为、经营决策、交易成本的影响。为了适应不同的市场化程度,家族企业会进行很多自适应的调试,其中包括家族对公司股权的集中控制。但是,在市场化程度不同的地区,股权集中对上市家族企业的影响是复杂的。在讨论中,本文也为相关部门的政策制定提出了有益的建议。     

向家族企业学习过冬

在经济景气时期，股权较分散的公司比家族经营的公司更能赚钱。但在经济萧条时期，家族企业的表现却远远超出非家族企业。同时，在1997至2009年的商业周期中，所有国家的家族企业，其长期财务表现都要优于非家族企业     

家族和民营企业的董事会与公司治理

家族企业：既是原始的也是现代的 家族企业是一种古老而常新的企业形式，它的起源可能已经无从考证，其现代新版本可以随手拈来。从一人、夫妻、父子、兄弟掌控到一个复杂的家族系列各种形式都有。创业者个人或家族的理念不同可能导致家族企业在制度形式和组织发展上走上完全不同的路径。既有完全一人掌握股权的成功典型．也有不断稀释股权，创业者最后只占百分之二三的优秀范例。     

未丧失控制权下股权转让之所得税费用的列报问题探析

中国经济已由高速增长阶段向高质量发展阶段转变，上市公司是资本市场提“质”关键。在产业链、供应链关键环节和中高端领域布局，引入战略投资者作为积极股东是推动上市公司高质量发展的重要一环，母公司转让所持子公司上市公司股权是引入积极股东的一种路径。母公司转让所持有子公司的股权可能产生两种结果，一种是丧失对子公司的控制权，另一种则是不丧失控制权。对后者而言，企业会计准则第33号对股权转让所产生的投资收益有明确、具体的规定，而对于股权处置产生的所得税，是计入损益还是计入权益，准则没有明确规定。本文将结合未丧失控制权下股权转让之案例，对相关准则及列报问题进行深入分析，以期为企业股权转让之所得税费用列报处理提供参考和借鉴。     

论内部会计控制制度建设

<正>一、内部会计控制制度概述随着经济的发展和现代企业规模的扩大,会计信息市场出现了产权、股权分散,多人共有产权的局面,而社会分工的进一步专业化,使得产权所有者、投资者把控制权交给拥有相关知识的人,最终产生了两权:所有权与控制权分离,投资者成了委托人,经营者、内部控制人成了当然代理人,在委托代理关系中,经营者为了完成受托责任,必须建立或依靠内     

二元股权结构与资本结构决策:一个基于博弈论的分析框架

二元股权结构和对于中小投资者的弱保护是中国证券市场的痼疾,一直受到众多学者的诟病,他同时被认为是中国股市众多现象--如上市公司过度融资、变更募资投向、财务保守行为等制度方面的原因.本文基于中国证券市场割裂设置的二元股权结构,运用博弈理论构建模型,证明:由于流通股和非流通股股东对于公司的不同控制权以及公司股权融资对于他们权益的再分配效应,使得上市公司的非流通股股东偏好通过配股或者增发褫夺流通股股东的利益.本文的理论研究表明,解决上述问题必须提高以流通股股东为代表的中小股东对于上市公司投资融资行为事前的评价能力和事后的行动能力.从中长期看具体的措施可以通过提高司法执行的效率、建立完善的经理人市场和发展机构投资者等方法来解决.     

创始人政治身份与家族企业控制权的代际锁定北大核心CSSCI

运用社会情感财富理论,本文提出了创始人政治身份促进中国家族企业控制权代际锁定的两种机理,即企业政治资本积累假说和社会情感财富维护假说。以2003—2015年上市家族企业为样本的混合截面数据分析结果表明,创始人政治身份显著增加了继承人担任公司董事长或总经理的可能性,创始人政治身份促进家族企业控制权的代际锁定。进一步分析结果表明,上述两种机制并存:创始人政治身份给家族企业带来融资便利、政府补助等经济利益,成为家族企业积累政治资本的渠道,这提供了支持企业政治资本积累假说的证据,因为企业政治资本有助于提升家族企业代际传承意愿和家族的社会情感财富;创始人更有可能把政治身份转移给继承人而非家族外人士的职业经理人,这提供了支持社会情感财富维护假说的证据,因为企业家政治身份代际转移成为中国情景下家族维护衍生于创始人政治身份社会情感财富的途径。本文揭示了民营企业家参政议政这项富有中国特色的政治制度安排影响家族企业代际传承的理论机理,丰富了政企关系和社会情感财富的研究文献。     

Institutional framework,corporate ownership structure,and R&D investment: an international analysis

We combine agency theory with the law and finance approach to analyze how the legal protection of investors and the corporate ownership structure affect corporate investment in research and development (R&D). We use information from 956 firms from the five most R&D-intensive industries in 19 developed countries. Our results show that better protection of investors’ rights by the institutional environment has a positive influence on corporate R&D. We also find that corporate ownership concentration works as a substitute for legal protection. This finding means that R&D investment of the firms in the countries with poor legal protection increases as ownership becomes more concentrated. Our results also show that the identity of shareholders has a relevant effect: Whereas banks and nonfinancial institutions as shareholders result in lower R&D, institutional investors as shareholders increase corporate investment in R&D.     

Are family ownership and control in large firms good,bad, or irrelevant?

Family ownership and control play an important role in large firms in Asia. There is a puzzle regarding the relationship between concentrated family ownership and control on the one hand and firm performance on the other hand. Three positions suggest that such concentration may be good, bad, or irrelevant for firm performance. This article reports two studies to shed further light on this puzzle. Study 1 uses 744 publicly listed large family firms in eight Asian countries (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand) to test competing hypotheses on the impact of family ownership and control on firm performance. On a country-by-country basis, our findings support all three positions. On an aggregate, pooled sample basis, the results support the “irrelevant” position. Using 688 firms in the same eight countries, Study 2 endeavors to answer why Study 1 obtains different results for different countries. We theorize and document that Study 1 findings may be systematically associated with the level of (minority) shareholder protection afforded by legal and regulatory institutions. Study 2 thus provides critical insights on a cross-country, institution-based theory of corporate governance.     

Rent appropriation of knowledge‐based assets and firm performance when institutions are weak: A study of Chinese publicly listed firms

Research summary : A firm's strategic investments in knowledge‐based assets through research and development (R&D) can generate economic rents for the firm, and thus are expected to affect positively a firm's financial performance. However, weak protection of minority shareholders, weak property rights, and ineffective law enforcement can allow those rents to be appropriated disproportionately by a firm's powerful insiders such as large owners and top managers. Recent data on Chinese publicly listed firms during 2007–2012 were used to demonstrate that the expected positive relationship between knowledge assets and performance is weaker in transition economies when a firm's ownership is highly concentrated and its managers have wide discretion. Moreover, rent appropriation by insiders was shown to vary with the levels of institutional development in which a firm operates. Managerial summary : Investing in knowledge‐based intangible assets (e.g., R&D) is an important value‐creation activity for the firm. Such value creation process can be facilitated by large shareholders and powerful managers, who can then take an advantageous position with critical insider information on these valuable intangible assets and therefore enjoy more opportunities to appropriate more value from them, leaving less value for other minority shareholders. The value distribution becomes increasingly skewed against minority shareholders when the institutional protection for them is weak. Indeed, in a large sample of Chinese publicly listed firms, we found that R&D investment becomes less positively associated with firm financial performance with the presence of large shareholders, high managerial equity, or CEO/Chairman duality, especially in Chinese provinces with weak institutional development. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Principal-principal conflicts during crisis

This paper explores principal-principal conflicts in corporate governance during times of economic crisis. We address the question: What external and internal governance mechanisms can best protect minority shareholders? Drawing on 877 publicly listed large corporations with concentrated ownership in seven Asian countries and regions, we compare different control structures between family firms and non-family firms during crisis. We find that family firms tend to choose certain control structures associated with potential principal-principal conflicts. However, these choices can be constrained by external and internal governance mechanisms. Specifically, legal institutions and presence of multiple blockholders serve as useful external and internal governance mechanisms, respectively, to constrain potential expropriation of minority shareholders.     

The private benefits of control in Chinese listed firms: Do cash flow rights always reduce controlling shareholders’ tunneling?

This study measures the size of private benefits of control (PBC) and explores the impact of ownership structure and board independence on controlling shareholders?? tunneling. Using data of Chinese listed companies between 2003 and 2006, we find that the average size of PBC, as measured by the price premium of block share transactions, is approximately 10.66% in Chinese listed companies. Also, firms with more independent directors on the board and firms with multiple large shareholders have a smaller size of PBC. Therefore, they experience a lower level of expropriation of minority investors by controlling shareholders. We particularly find evidence of a nonlinear U-shaped relationship between controlling shareholders?? PBC and their cash flow rights. On the left half of the nonlinear U-shaped curve, consistent with the interest-alignment effect of increased ownership concentration, increased cash flow rights appear to be effective in reducing controlling shareholders?? tunneling. However, on the right half, increased cash flow rights would exacerbate controlling shareholders?? expropriation of minority investors, which is the entrenchment effect of increased ownership concentration.     

Married to the firm? A large‐scale investigation of the social context of ownership

Research summary : Using a large sample of private firms across Europe, we examine how the social context of owners affects firm strategy and performance. Drawing on embeddedness theory and the institutional logics perspective, we argue that embeddedness in a family, in particular the nuclear family, can strengthen identification and commitment to the firm, but can also induce owners to behave more conservatively. Consistent with this argument, we find that family‐owned firms have higher profit margins, returns on assets, and survival rates compared to single‐owner or unrelated‐owners' firms, but also invest and grow more slowly, hold greater reserves of cash, and rely less on external debt. These differences are most pronounced when the two largest shareholders are married. Our results highlight the key role of marital ties in explaining differences in behavior and performance among firms. Managerial summary : Despite the prevalence of the married‐couple ownership structure in firms, little research has been dedicated to understanding how these firms are managed and perform. We examine the behavior and performance of firms owned by married couples in a large panel of closely held Western European firms. We find that married‐owner family firms are managed more conservatively relative to firms with unrelated owners and even to other family‐owned firms. In particular, married‐owner family firms invest and grow more slowly and rely less on external finance. However, they also exhibit greater performance stability and higher profitability. Our findings suggest that social relationships among owners have a large impact on firm strategy and performance, and highlight some potential trade‐offs to performance when married couples control firms. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Family ownership and firm performance: Influence of family management,family control,and firm size

This study examines the relationship between family ownership and firm performance by considering the influence of family management, family control, and firm size. Using proxy data of 786 public family firms in Taiwan during 2002–2007, this study found that family ownership is positively associated with firm performance. The positive association is strong particularly when family members serve as CEOs, top managers, chairpersons, or directors of the firms; however, the association becomes weak when family members are not involved in firm management or control. The findings suggest that the potential family-ownership effects are more likely to be realized when family ownership is combined with active family management and control. In addition, the association between family ownership and firm performance is stronger in small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) than in large companies.     

Meta-analyzing ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia: Towards a more fine-grained understanding

We present a meta-analysis of the relationship between concentrated ownership and firm financial performance in Asia. At the cross-national level of analysis, we find a small but significant positive association between both variables. This finding suggests that in regions with less than perfect legal protection of minority shareholders, ownership concentration is an efficient corporate governance strategy. Yet, a focus on this aggregate effect alone conceals the existence of true heterogeneity in the effect size distribution. We purposefully model this heterogeneity by exploring moderating effects at the levels of owner identity and national institutions. Regarding owner identity, we find that our focal relationship is stronger for foreign than for domestic owners, and that pure “market” investors outperform “stable” or “inside” owners whom are multiply tied to the firm. Regarding institutions, we find that a certain threshold level of institutional development is necessary to make concentrated ownership an effective corporate governance strategy. Yet we also find that strong legal protection of shareholders makes ownership concentration inconsequential and therefore redundant. Finally, in jurisdictions where owners can easily extract private benefits from the corporations they control, the focal relationship becomes weaker, presumably due to minority shareholder expropriation.

Multiple agency perspective,family control,and private information abuse in an emerging economy

Using a comprehensive sample of listed companies in Hong Kong this paper investigates how family control affects private information abuses and firm performance in emerging economies. We combine research on stock market microstructure with more recent studies of multiple agency perspectives and argue that family ownership and control over the board increases the risk of private information abuse. This, in turn, has a negative impact on stock market performance. Family control is associated with an incentive to distort information disclosure to minority shareholders and obtain private benefits of control. However, the multiple agency roles of controlling families may have different governance properties in terms of investors’ perceptions of private information abuse. These findings contribute to our understanding of the conflicting evidence on the governance role of family control within a multiple agency perspective.