Managerial discretion and agency cost in Indian market

This paper investigates empirically the impact of managerial discretion on agency cost from the perspective of SG&A cost asymmetry and examines how corporate governance moderates this relationship. The analysis shows mixed evidence in favor for cost behavior and managerial choices in the Indian market. The cost asymmetry involves not only cost stickiness but also the anti-sticky behavior of SG&A cost under certain circumstances. The main drivers for this disparity are owing to manager's resource adjustment decision, the future expectation of sales and managers' empire-building behavior. Furthermore, findings suggest that strong corporate governance alleviates empire-building behavior of managers. Additional analysis shows, the asymmetric behavior of SG&A cost in crisis period is mainly a result of managers' resource adjustment decision and future expectation of sales change. Manager's empire-building behavior does not play an explicit role in this period. Next, the findings show that managers' discretion is influenced by future value creation potential of SG&A cost. Manager's empire-building behavior is more pronounced in low-value creation sample firms compared to high-value creation sample. Thus, manager's choice for resource adjustment decision and empire-building behavior changes according to the future value creation of SG&A cost, financial conditions and corporate governance mechanisms in Indian companies. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study performed in Indian capital market where the SG&A cost asymmetry tests the managers' empire-building behavior. Overall, findings of the study indicate manager's resource adjustment decisions and empire-building behavior caused by their consideration and this results in a form of agency costs. In comparison with developed markets, Indian markets have relatively less agency problem due to managerial empire-building behavior.     

On the medical loss ratio (MLR) and sticky selling general and administrative costs: Evidence from health insurers

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) imposed an important constraint on health insurers: if the medical loss ratio (MLR), determined as the ratio of claims paid to premiums collected, declined below certain legislative targets, the insurer would be obliged to rebate a portion of the premiums to the customer. It might be expected that this increase in the MLR would result in a decrease in premium dollars available to cover selling, general and administrative costs (SG&A) and a concomitant decrease in profits. However, there is earlier evidence that SG&A “cost stickiness” presents a counter-effect in this instance: namely, that an increase in SG&A costs per each dollar of revenue increase is more than the magnitude of a decrease in SG&A costs per each dollar of revenue decrease. In this context, this paper offers the first preliminary evidence of the impact of the MLR regulatory change on SG&A cost stickiness in the health insurance industry.Applying the Anderson et al. (2003) methodology, our sample of publicly-traded health insurers shows evidence of significant mitigation of the SG&A cost stickiness after the implementation of the ACA medical loss ratio rules and that in periods of revenue declines, SG&A costs decreased more significantly post-ACA than pre-ACA. These results further illustrate the tension created by regulatory policy designed to improve healthcare cost efficiency and its impact on the profit seeking activities of for-profit healthcare enterprises. Thus, this paper contributes to both healthcare and accounting literature by documenting a significant effect of regulatory policy on managerial decisions regarding cost control.     

Do changes in the SG&A ratio provide different information about changes in future earnings,analyst forecast revisions,and stock returns under different circumstances?

In fundamental analysis, increases (decreases) in the ratio of selling, general and administrative (SG&A) costs to sales (SG&A ratio) are perceived as negative (positive) signals regarding future firm performance. However, this interpretation focuses on the overall change in the SG&A ratio and ignores the underlying changes in the components of the ratio (sales and SG&A costs). Although prior research examines the changes in the SG&A ratio under some different circumstances, there is no study that examines all the ways that managers adjust costs in reaction to changes in sales. Therefore, I create six subsamples representing all possible combinations of changes in sales, SG&A costs, and the SG&A ratio and test whether changes in the SG&A ratio are informative about future earnings, analyst forecast revisions, and stock returns under these different circumstances. I find that changes in the SG&A ratio in four of my six subsamples provide information about changes in future earnings. I also find that analysts do not impound all of the information contained in the signals into their forecast revisions and in some cases investors appear to understand this fact.     

How right should the customer be?

If your salespeople aren't sure who their boss is--the district manager? the regional manager? the customer?--it could be a sign that your company's sales force controls are working at cross-purposes and that your sales function is in trouble. Sales force controls are the policies and practices that govern the way you train, supervise, motivate, and evaluate your sales staff. They include the types of compensation you offer your people and the criteria your sales managers use to evaluate the reps' performance. These controls let salespeople know which trade-offs the company would prefer them to make when the inevitable conflicts arise between what they want to do (spend lots of time and money to get a sale) and what they actually can do (use limited resources and still get the sale). When sales force controls aren't aligned--when, say, the system simultaneously encourages reps to be entrepreneurial but also to file detailed call reports and check in frequently with their bosses--individuals become discouraged and unproductive, and they eventually leave the company. The authors' research suggests there are significant differences between the control systems of companies that encourage salespeople to put the customer first-outcome control (OC) systems--and those that encourage reps to put their managers first--behavior control (BC) systems. In this article, they list the characteristics of OC and BC systems, describe the potential fallout from conflicts within these systems, and explain how you can tell which control system is appropriate for your firm. In most cases, the right choice will be a consistent system somewhere in the middle of the OC-BC continuum.     

Are Selling,General, and Administrative Costs “Sticky”?

A fundamental assumption in cost accounting is that the relation between costs and volume is symmetric for volume increases and decreases. In this study, we investigate whether costs are "sticky"—that is, whether costs increase more when activity rises than they decrease when activity falls by an equivalent amount. We find, for 7,629 firms over 20 years, that selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs increase on average 0.55% per 1% increase in sales but decrease only 0.35% per 1% decrease in sales. Our analysis compares the traditional model of cost behavior in which costs move proportionately with changes in activity with an alternative model in which sticky costs occur because managers deliberately adjust the resources committed to activities. We test hypotheses about the properties of sticky costs and how the degree of stickiness of SG&A costs varies with firm circumstances.     

Social comparison of cost behaviour and financial analysts

We investigate whether social comparison of a firm’s reported selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses affects financial analysts’ information uncertainty (and their behaviour). Based on a sample of US firms, we examine whether similarity of a firm’s SG&A to an industry-specific peer-based benchmark (or social benchmark) is associated with analyst forecast dispersion, forecast error and coverage. For external observers, the SG&A relative to sales (SG&A ratio) is a key diagnostic of a firm’s cost behaviour, but interpretational ambiguity of the SG&A signal is likely to incentivise search for information-relevant external cues to set expectations about and assess a firm’s SG&A ratio. Higher similarity to the social benchmark is expected to attenuate information asymmetry between analysts and firms regarding firms’ ability to effectively control overheads, decreasing analyst information uncertainty about cost behaviour and performance. In line with a varying weights model for social comparison, we observe a negative association between SG&A similarity and both forecast dispersion and error of one-year-ahead earnings for firms with a prior SG&A ratio exceeding the social benchmark. Our findings also show a negative relationship between SG&A similarity and analyst coverage, especially for firms with a prior SG&A ratio exceeding the social benchmark.     

Managerial incentives,options, and cost-structure choices

This study explores the relationship between changes in managerial risk-taking incentives and adjustments of firms’ cost structures, particularly the operating leverage (fixed-to-variable cost ratio). We find managers reduce operating leverage by substituting fixed costs with variable costs, mainly in the selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) and research and development (R&D) cost components, in response to reductions in option-based compensation following the issuance of FAS 123R. Managers facing a decrease in risk-taking incentives adjust operating leverage downward because high operating leverage intensifies the downside potential of earnings. Overall, we present compelling evidence that managers adjust the cost structure of their firms in response to a reduction in risk-taking incentives.     

Vital truths about managing your costs

Four truths apply to every business situation: 1. It is essential to be a lower cost supplier. 2. To stay competitive, inflation-adjusted costs of producing and supplying products and services must trend downward. 3. The true cost and profit pictures for each product/market segment must always be known, and traditional accounting practices must not obscure them. 4. A business must concentrate as much on cash flow and balance-sheet strengths as it does on profits. In order to ascertain exactly what your costs are, you must carefully isolate and assign various costs to specific products, accounts, or markets. Managers often do this badly, working on the basis of "average" costs. This ignores important differences among products and the fact that different products, different markets, and different customers incur different overhead costs. Most manufacturing companies' most important expense categories are R&D, sales, and general and administrative costs, but surprisingly, they generally don't get the attention they should. Neither do two crucial ratios-gross margin and the percent of assets employed per dollar of sales. Gross margins should usually not be less than 40%, and for most manufacturing companies, assets should not be over 60% of annual sales. Wrong deviation from these ratios will undermine profit targets. Once your costs are known and clearly assigned to product lines, markets, and key customers, they should be widely shared in the organization so that everyone will feel committed to cost management and know when deviations occur.     

The customer has escaped

Every company makes choices about the channels it will use to go to market. Traditionally, the decision to sell through a discount superstore or a pricey boutique, for instance, was guided by customer demographics. A company would identify a target segment of buyers and go with the channel that could deliver them. It was a fair assumption that certain customer types were held captive by certain channels--if not from cradle to grave, then at least from initial consideration to purchase. The problem, the authors say, is that today's customers have become unfettered. As their channel options have proliferated, they've come to recognize that different channels serve their needs better at different points in the buying process. The result is "value poaching." For example, certain channels hope to use higher margin sales to cover the cost of providing expensive high-touch services. Potential customers use these channels to do research, then leap to a cheaper channel when it's time to buy. Customers now hunt for bargains more aggressively; they've become more sophisticated about how companies market to them; and they are better equipped with information and technology to make advantageous decisions. What does this mean for your go-to-market strategy? The authors urge companies to make a fundamental shift in mind-set toward designing for buyer behaviors, not customer segments. A company should design pathways across channels to help its customers get what they need at each stage of the buying process--through one channel or another. Customers are not mindful of channel boundaries--and you shouldn't be either. Instead, they are mindful of the value of individual components in your channels--and you should be, too.     

Is your company ready for one-to-one marketing?

One-to-one marketing, also known as relationship marketing, promises to increase the value of your customer base by establishing a learning relationship with each customer. The customer tells you of some need, and you customize your product or service to meet it. Every interaction and modification improves your ability to fit your product to the particular customer. Eventually, even if a competitor offers the same type of service, your customer won't be able to enjoy the same level of convenience without taking the time to teach your competitor the lessons your company has already learned. Although the theory behind one-to-one marketing is simple, implementation is complex. Too many companies have jumped on the one-to-one band-wagon without proper preparation--mistakenly understanding it as an excuse to badger customers with excessive telemarketing and direct mail campaigns. The authors offer practical advice for implementing a one-to-one marketing program correctly. They describe four key steps: identifying your customers, differentiating among them, interacting with them, and customizing your product or service to meet each customer's needs. And they provide activities and exercises, to be administered to employees and customers, that will help you identify your company's readiness to launch a one-to-one initiative. Although some managers dismiss the possibility of one-to-one marketing as an unattainable goal, even a modest program can produce substantial benefits. This tool kit will help you determine what type of program your company can implement now, what you need to do to position your company for a large-scale initiative, and how to set priorities.     

Accounting for organizational performance: The construction of the customer in the privatized water industry

The concept of the customer exercising market power to obtain the desired combination of attributes in terms of price and quality of the product to be purchased has been integral to the Conservative Government's justification of privatization. However the practical import of giving effect to customer sovereignty was problematic if it was not accompanied by an increase in competition and choice for customers. This is particularly true of the recently privatized Water industry, where the monopoly character of the industry has remained unaltered. To give effect to its claims that customers would benefit, and to prevent overcharging and to protect standards of service, the Government had to introduce a new regulatory system operated by the Office of Water Services (Ofwat). In pursuing these objectives the Director General of Ofwat has stated that his aim is to secure for the customer a place that he/she would have were the companies operating in a competitive market. This paper, drawing on Miller and Rose's analysis of Governing economic life, examines the attempts that have been made to give effect to this “place for customers”. In doing so much of the analysis focuses on exploring how notions of “the customer”, and “customer service”, have been constructed through new forms of accounting and accountability, and how this new accounting for customer service has enabled the concept of “the customer” to be made operational within the newly privatized Water plcs, even though their monopoly status has remained unaltered. Central to this has been Ofwat's determination of performance indicators on levels of service to customers, its measurement of company performance against these indicators, and assessments based on these measures of companies' success in “serving customers”. The paper seeks to demonstrate how these new accounts of organizational performance required of the Water plcs by Ofwat have only been made possible by rendering “customer service” a calculable and comparable entity. The paper also looks at some of the ways in which this accounting for customer service has been incorporated into other accounts of managerial and organizational performance.     

ACTIVITY-BASED COSTING IN IRELAND: BARRIERS TO,AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR,CHANGE

This paper considers the state of managerial accounting in Ireland and argues that it is “marginalised”. As evidence, the study examines the adoption of one innovative technique, Activity-Based Costing (ABC), in Ireland and reports that the rate of adoption is lower in Ireland than in Anglo-American countries. This is a puzzling phenomenon given that management accounting practices such as ABC are more transferable across national boundaries, particularly across countries that share a common language, than country-specific Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. This paper posits that the marginalisation of managerial accounting in Ireland may be due to both supply and demand barriers. In particular, Ireland lacks a supply of innovative managerial accountants due to a lack of compulsory continuing professional education, practitioner journals devoted specifically to management accounting, and executive MBA programmes. Furthermore, neither the Irish business community nor academia in Ireland have demanded sweeping changes in the accounting curricula. Changes in the supply and demand of innovative management accountants will allow managerial accountants in Ireland to become agents of change rather than marginalised recorders of the past.     

Rosie’s East End Restaurant: An experiential introduction to auditing

This short interactive case introduces several auditing concepts in the context of a familiar activity: verifying the accuracy of a restaurant bill. You will work in student teams to first determine whether the bill is accurate, and then to decide whether you are willing to pay it. During the exercise, you will keep track of the various steps and procedures you used in making your decisions. After you complete the exercise, your instructor will relate the activity to various auditing topics in the auditing process such as audit evidence, internal control, materiality, professional responsibilities and the concept of “fairly stated.” Hundreds of students have completed this exercise and report that it has helped them grasp many essential features of the auditing process, while providing a useful frame of reference for more complex aspects of the audit process.     

Innovation versus complexity: what is too much of a good thing?

What's the number of product or service offerings that would optimize both your revenues and your profits? For most firms, it's considerably lower than the number they offer today. The fact is, companies have strong incentives to be overly innovative in new product development. But continual launches of new products and line extensions add complexity throughout a company's operations, and as the costs of managing that complexity multiply, margins shrink. To maximize profit potential, a company needs to identify its innovation fulcrum, the point at which an additional offering destroys more value than it creates. The usual antidotes to complexity miss their mark because they treat the problem on the factory floor rather than at its source: in the product line. Mark Gottfredson and Keith Aspinall of Bain & Company present an approach that goes beyond the typical Six Sigma or lean-operations program to root out complexity hidden in the value chain. The first step is to ask, What would our company look like if it made and sold only a single product or service? In other words, you identify your company's equivalent of Henry Ford's one-size-fits-all Model T-for Starbucks, it might be a medium-size cup of coffee; for a bank, a simple checking account-and then determine the cost of producing that baseline offering. Next, you add variety back into the business system, product by product, and carefully forecast the resulting impact on sales as well as the cost implications across the value chain. When the analysis shows the costs beginning to overwhelm the added revenues, you've found your innovation fulcrum. By deconstructing their companies to a zero-complexity baseline, managers can break through organizational resistance and deeply entrenched ways of thinking to find the right balance between innovation and complexity.     

An Instructional Case Comparing the Accounting Policies and Financial Results of Online Retailers

In the role of financial analyst for a venture capital firm, you are assigned the responsibility of evaluating two online retailers who have applied for financing to build a distribution center in western Canada. Based on your developing knowledge of Canadian accounting standards for private enterprises (ASPE), you evaluate the financial reporting policies and financial results of the two companies to identify the company that is best suited for your firm's support. Through this case, you will refine your understanding of ASPE and you will exercise your reasoning and analytical skills.     

CONTRACTING FOR VALUE: EVA AND THE ECONOMICS OF ORGANIZATIONS

EVA becomes more difficult to apply the farther down in the company you go, especially in organizations with more traditional “functional” designs. Because centralized functions are not independent self-contained entities with direct control over their own revenues, costs, and capital, the performance measures used to evaluate them are necessarily incomplete; they reveal only part of the picture. For example, Marketing may increase sales and operating income—the measures on which it is evaluated—but at the same time drive excessive use of capital in the Manufacturing plants. Manufacturing may reduce unit cost through long production runs, thereby minimizing changeovers and setups, but create excess inventory in the process. Costreducing measures could also lead to declining quality and customer satisfaction, ultimately eroding the company's reputation. In short, each critical function influences results in other parts of the company, and focusing only on activities under a manager's direct control can result in myopic and misleading measures of performance. In organizing key processes as internal EVA Centers, joint costs and benefits shared by different corporate functions or business units can be built into financial measures in a way that encourages collaboration. As one example, a firm can attempt to replicate market forces internally by requiring each marketing region to contract for capacity with the internal manufacturing group. In a traditional management system, Marketing reserves (and relinquishes) manufacturing capacity at no cost; the consequence is excessive demand for resources. An internal pricing mechanism that requires Marketing to pay a fee for capacity will force its managers to assess trade-offs as if it were contracting with an outside party. Such a system effectively requires that functional managers take a more company-wide view of their responsibilities. By including the cost of capital, it forces managers to define costs more carefully. By including the impacts on other functions, it also forces a broader definition of costs. And by using multi-year contracts among different divisions, the framework extends the time horizon over which costs and benefits matter.     

How valuable is word of mouth?

The customers who buy the most from you are probably not your best marketers. What's more, your best marketers may be worth far more to your company than your most enthusiastic consumers. Those are the conclusions of professors Kumar and Petersen at the University of Connecticut and professor Leone at Ohio State University, who analyzed thousands of customers in research focused on a telecommunications company and a financial services firm. In this article, the authors present a straightforward tool that can be used to calculate both customer lifetime value (CLV), the worth of your customers' purchases, and customer referral value (CRV), the value of their referrals. Knowing both enables you to segment your customers into four constituent parts: those that buy a lot but are poor marketers (which they term Affluents); those that don't buy much but are very strong salespeople for your firm (Advocates); those that do both well (Champions); and those that do neither well (Misers). In a series of one-year experiments, the authors demonstrated the effectiveness of this segmentation approach. Offering purchasing incentives to Advocates, referral incentives to Affluents, and both to Misers, they were able to move significant proportions of all three into the Champions category. Both companies reaped returns on their marketing investments greater than 12-fold--more than double the normal marketing ROI for their industries. The power of this tool is its ability to help marketers decide where to focus their efforts. Rather than waste funds encouraging big spenders to spend slightly more while overlooking the power of customer evangelists who don't buy enough to seem important, you can reap much higher rewards by nudging big spenders to make referrals and urging enthusiastic proponents of your wares to buy a bit more.     

THE SUBJECTIVITY OF THE FASB'S CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: A COMMENTARY ON BRYER

Bryer argues that the FASB's conceptual framework is inherently subjective because it is based on the concept of “economic value”, or the anticipated net cash inflows attributable to presently owned assets. By contrast, Marxist economics is based on objective facts that can be measured to a “socially required level of accuracy”. The objective facts of a Marxist conceptual framework rest on the theory that capital circulates in three forms: money, commodities to be sold, and commodities to be used in production. Capital, and, therefore assets, are essentially physical (or technical) in nature rather than monetary in nature. Measurement of assets is objective because Marxist theory emphasizes management stewardship and requires historical cost and a strict realization criterion for recognition of revenue. Bryer's argument that the FASB's conceptual framework is “unacceptably subjective” because it is based on “economic value” is misplaced. A careful reading of the FASB's concepts statements suggests that assets represent service-potential, or “use-value” in Marxist terms, and that economic-value is never advocated as a conceptual basis for the measurement of assets. The reason the FASB's conceptual framework is “subjective and vague” is that the FASB lacked the political will to advocate a conceptual preference for any particular measurement method.     

Defensive marketing: how a strong incumbent can protect its position

There has been a lot of research on marketing as an offensive tactic-how it can help companies successfully launch new products, enter new markets, or gain share with existing products in their current markets. But for nearly every new product launch, market entrant, or industry upstart grabbing market share, there is an incumbent that must defend its position. And there has been little research on how these defenders can use marketing to preemptively respond to new or anticipated threats. John H. Roberts outlines four basic types of defensive marketing strategies: positive, inertial, parity, and retarding. With the first two, you establish and communicate your points of superiority relative to the new entrant; with the second two, you establish and communicate strategic points of comparability with your rival. Before choosing a strategy, you need to assess the weapons you have available to protect your market position-your brand identity, the products and services that support that identity, and your means of communicating it. Then assess your customers' value to you and their vulnerability to being poached by rivals. The author explains how Australian telecommunications company Telstra, facing deregulation, used a combination of the four strategies (plus the author's customer response model) to fend off market newcomer Optus. Telstra was prepared, for instance, to reach deep into its pockets and engage in a price war. But the customer response model indicated that a parity strategy-in which Telstra would offer lower rates on some routes and at certain times of day, even though its prices, on average, were higher than its rival's-was more likely to prevent consumers from switching. Ultimately, Telstra was able to retain several points of market share it otherwise would have lost. The strategies described here, though specific to Telstra's situation, offer lessons for any company facing new and potentially damaging competition.     

AUDITOR LIABILITY: THE OTHER SIDE OF THE DEBATE

The auditing industry claims to be an unfair victim of lawsuits and has deployed its considerable economic and political muscle in a campaign to secure further liability concessions. Amongst other things, it seeks to replace “joint and several liability” of partnerships with “full proportional liability”, a “cap” on auditor liability and a statutory right to negotiate liability limits with company directors. This paper challenges the evidence and the arguments advanced by the UK auditing industry. It argues that there is little convincing argument to support that industry's claims. On the contrary, ordinary stakeholders are relatively powerless to take action against negligent auditors. It is noted that most of the major lawsuits are by one accountancy firm against another. The UK auditing industry already enjoys considerable privileges, such as incorporation and “contributory negligence”, a form of modified proportional liability. Despite these privileges, the industry has shunned public accountability. It is holding the UK public to ransom by threats of locating its operations in offshore islands. Scholars are urged to develop alternative public policy options and analysis.