Cyclical growth in a Goodwin–Kalecki–Marx model

This paper presents a disequilibrium macrodynamic model that incorporates certain elements from Goodwin (the dynamics of the rate of employment and income distribution), Kalecki (an investment function independent of savings, and mark-up pricing in oligopolistic goods markets), and Marx (the reserve-army and reserve-army-creation effects). The model has a system of differential equations for the rate of utilization, profit share, and rate of employment. We show that there exist limit cycles that depend on the sizes of the reserve-army effect and reserve-army-creation effect. This implies that there exists a situation in which the economy experiences endogenous and perpetual growth cycles. Moreover, we show that if the stable long-run equilibrium corresponds to the profit-led growth regime, an increase in the bargaining power of workers increases the rate of unemployment; conversely, if the equilibrium corresponds to the wage-led growth-regime, an increase in the bargaining power of workers decreases the rate of unemployment.     

Stabilisation, Policy Targets and Unemployment in Imperfectly Competitive Economies

This paper argues that the rate of equilibrium unemployment depends on the objectives of the Central Bank. In a model where the Central Bank uses monetary policy to stabilise the economy, we show that unemployment and inflation will be lower with an inflation target than with targets for output, money or nominal GDP. The intuition for this is that the elasticities of demand in both the product and the labour markets are greater when there is an inflation target; we show that this leads to a lower mark-up of price over marginal cost and makes wages more sensitive to unemployment.     

On Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in a market for pure indivisibles without money

This paper deals with the Walrasian property of Nash and strong equilibria of a specific strategic market game which refers to a pure exchange economy involving purely indivisible commodities and no money. The game is of sealed-bid auction type and it is shown that any Nash equilibrium at which no agent is in status quo is a strong equilibrium and implements a Walrasian equilibrium. Moreover, it appears that two modifications of the game's rules ensure that any strong equilibrium outcome is Walrasian. These results are identical to those obtained by Svensson for markets involving purely indivisible goods and money.     

Benefits and unemployment in an open economy: an equilibrium analysis

This paper examines the relation between uemployment compensation and unemployment in The Netherlands. This relation is studied by menas of a small macroeconomic model for an open economy that assumes equilibrium in the labour market and on the current account. The model yields an elasticity of unemployment to benefits of 1.0, which is high compared to microeconomic research and the outcomes of disequilibrium models for The Netherlands. According to the model, a rise in the ‘wedge’ (i.e. the difference betweenn real labour cost and real net wages) leads to an increase in unemployment, whilst shifting this wedge from the employers to the employees induces a fall in unemployment.     

Does money impede convergence?

Inspired by Clower’s conjecture that the necessity of trading through money in monetised economies might hinder convergence to competitive equilibrium, and hence, for example, cause unemployment, we experimentally investigate behaviour in markets where trading has to be done through money. In order to evaluate the properties of these markets, we compare their behaviour to behaviour in markets without money, where money cannot intervene. As the trading mechanism might be a compounding factor, we investigate two kinds of market mechanism: the double auction, where bids, asks and trades take place in continuous time throughout a trading period; and the clearing house, where bids and asks are placed once in a trading period, and which are then cleared by an aggregating device. We thus have four treatments, the pairwise combinations of non-monetised/monetised trading with double auction/clearing house. We find that: convergence is faster under non-monetised trading, implying that the necessity of using money to facilitate trade hinders convergence; that monetised trading is noisier than non-monetised trading; and that the volume of trade and realised surpluses are higher with the double auction than the clearing house. As far as efficiency is concerned, monetised trading lowers both informational and allocational efficiency, and while the double auction outperforms the clearing house in terms of allocational efficiency, the clearing house is marginally better than the double auction in terms of informational efficiency when trade is through money. Crucially we confirm the conjecture that inspired these experiments: that the necessity to use money in trading hinders convergence to competitive equilibrium, lowers realised trades and surpluses, and hence may cause unemployment.     

Wage indexation and the unemployment-inflation trade-off

A variety of wage indexation schemes are analyzed in the context of a simple dynamic disequilibrium macroeconomic model. These indexation schemes include rigid money wages (zero indexation), rigid real wages (full indexation), and intermediate cases (partial indexation). In a situation of unemployment, aggregate demand increases produce the most desirable results under rigid money wages. In a situation of excess demand for labor, aggregate demand increases produce the least desirable effects under rigid money wages. Mixed indexation schemes, in which money or real wages are rigid downward, are also examined as are the effects of stop-go policies.     

Imperfectly competitive cycles with Keynesian and Walrasian features

We consider a multi-sector overlapping generations model with oligopolistic firms in the output markets and wage-setting trade unions in the labour markets. A coordination problem between firms creates multiple temporary equilibria which are either Walrasian or of the Keynesian unemployment type. There exist many deterministic and stochastic equilibrium cycles fluctuating between Keynesian recession and Walrasian boom periods with arbitrarily long phases in each regime. The cycles are in accordance with certain empirical regularities. Money is neutral and superneutral, but appropriate countercyclical fiscal policies stabilize the cycles in a textbook Keynesian way.     

How an export boom affects unemployment

Does trade affect the equilibrium rate of unemployment? To answer this question, we propose a small open economy model that incorporates realistic features of labour markets. The model predicts that a sustained improvement in the terms of trade lowers unemployment. We test this prediction for the case of Australia, an economy that is subject to large terms of trade movements. We use a novel technique to estimate the structural model based on a combination of traditional econometric procedures and the calibration of time-varying parameters. Both reduced form and the structural estimates reveal strong evidence that higher export prices, capital accumulation in tradeable goods industries and lower unemployment benefits reduce the equilibrium unemployment rate.     

UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL WITH BARGAINING*

This paper develops a model which embeds the Nash-equilibrium version of McDonald and Solow's (1981) wage-bargaining model into an otherwise standard static equilibrium macro model. Equilibrium unemployment is possible. Real shocks to demand result in pro-cyclical employment and anti-cyclical real wage movements while money shocks are neutral. This is in some contrast to the results obtained by McDonald and Solow.     

A Macrotheoretic Model of the Chinese Economy

A stylized model of the Chinese economy is developed with three production sectors: agriculture, nontraded industrial goods, and industrial exports. The state purchases food from farmers by dual-track pricing; urban food sales are subsidized through ration coupons. Marginal prices clear markets except that currency controls constrain the availability of intermediates, the only imports. Devaluation is found to stimulate real variables, but deflates money variables; the reverse occurs with monetary expansion or raising the plan-track food procurement price. Lowering urban food subsidies or raising enterprise taxation reduces the budget deficit, reduces open and disguised unemployment, and deflates nominal prices.     

Money and Information

This paper investigates the role of money in markets in which producers have private information about the quality of the goods they supply. When the fraction of high-quality producers in the economy is given, money promotes the production of high-quality goods, which improves the quality mix and welfare unambiguously. When this fraction is endogenous, however, we find that money can decrease welfare relative to the barter equilibrium. The origin of this inefficiency is that money provides consumption insurance to low-quality producers, which can result in a higher fraction of low-quality producers in the monetary equilibrium. Finally, we find that most often agents acquire more costly information in the monetary equilibrium than in the barter equilibrium. Consequently, money is welfare-enhancing because it promotes useful production and exchange, but not because it saves information costs.     

Money,nonconvex preferences,and the existence of equilibrium: A note

Nonconvexities play a major role in several theories of money. This note suggests an additional such role. In particular, an economy is presented which fails to have a competitive equilibrium in the absence of fiat money. When fiat money is present, a steady-state competitive, equilibrium does exist and has the feature that money necessarily has value. This is because in any steady state, monetary equilibrium relative prices are bounded in such a way that the discontinuous portions of excess demand functions may become irrelevant.     

Excess supply equilibria

This paper addresses a fundamental problem in economic theory: How can there be equilibria of the economic system where some commodity is in excess supply, yet that commodity's relative price shows no tendency to fall? Of course, the principal example of such a phenomenon is an economy experiencing a prolonged period of involuntary unemployment of the labor force during which there is no significant change in the real wage.In the following pages, I shall describe a two-commodity, general equilibrium model that has a continuum of unemployment equilibria, one for any given unemployment rate. The important feature of this model is that workers establish their wage rates in an attempt to maximize expected utility. The information upon which these wage setting decisions are based is provided by actual labor market transactions.Despite the voluntary nature of the wage setting decision, I shall argue that each equilibrium of this economy exhibits involuntary unemployment in the Keynesian sense. For there will always be another equilibrium with a lower real wage, a higher level of employment, and at which (at least when workers are risk neutral) each worker achieves a higher level of expected utility.     

Heterogeneous determinants of local unemployment in Poland

We identify determinants of large disparities in local unemployment rates across Poland. Using an extensive panel data-set on the NUTS-4 level (i.e. the poviats level, or districts or counties level) we examine a wide range of determinants of local unemployment. Our research examines two groups of the determinants: one related to equilibrium theory and the other related to disequilibrium theory of local unemployment. We find that demographics, education and sectoral employment composition exert a stronger impact over rates of local unemployment than various demand factors. The impact of the determinants, while robust for outliers, is not homogeneous across Polish regions. In particular, in the most depressed local labour markets, skill improvement programmes do not appear to work and unemployment rates are relatively less responsive to investment. Our research suggests that there is no easy cure for local unemployment in Poland, but a few policies have the potential to slightly reduce existing disparities.     

Inflationary Finance, Capital Controls, and Currency Substitution

This paper studies currency substitution in an environment where agents' inflation tax-evasive demand for foreign money is balanced by the concern for the possibility that the government may impose economy-wide capital controls under which foreign currency transactions are costly. Under the assumption of endogenous beliefs, the results show a persistent demand for foreign money despite efforts by the government to reduce inflation. In addition, the economy can exhibit multiple, Pareto-ranked steady states with different levels of currency substitution. The stability analysis suggests that the economy converges to the inferior steady state, on the "wrong side" of the Laffer curve.     

Skilled-unskilled wage inequality and unemployment: A general equilibrium analysis

The paper develops a static three sector competitive general equilibrium model of a small open economy in which skilled labor is mobile between a traded good sector and the non-traded good sector and unskilled labor is specific to another traded good sector. Capital is perfectly mobile among all these three sectors. We introduce involuntary unemployment equilibrium in both the labor markets and explain unemployment using efficiency wage hypothesis. We examine the effects of change in different factor endowments and prices of traded goods on the unemployment rates and on the skilled-unskilled relative wage. Also, we introduce Gini-Coefficient of wage income distribution as a measure of wage income inequality; and show that a comparative static effect may force the skilled-unskilled relative wage and the Gini-Coefficient of wage income distribution to move in opposite directions in the presence of unemployment.     

Inflation and Unemployment in General Equilibrium*

When labor is indivisible, there exist efficient outcomes with some agents randomly unemployed, as in Rogerson (1988) . We integrate this idea into the modern theory of monetary exchange, where some trade occurs in centralized markets and some in decentralized markets, as in Lagos and Wright (2005) . This delivers a general equilibrium model of unemployment and money, with explicit microeconomic foundations. We show that the implied relation between inflation and unemployment can be positive or negative, depending on simple preference conditions. Our Phillips curve provides a long‐run, exploitable, trade‐off for monetary policy; it turns out, however, that the optimal policy is the Friedman rule.     

ON THE INEFFICACY OF TEMPORARY POLICY IN A DYNAMIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM WITH MONEY*

We construct a dynamic economy with many consumers with money in their utilities. Two main results—a turnpike theorem and inefficacy of temporary policy—are established in a dynamic general equilibrium framework in which price effects generated through markets are explicitly factored in. Turnpike, which is perfectly independent from wealth distribution among the heterogeneous consumers, will be globally attractive. Temporary policy is not effective not only for the future but for the current economy if the long‐run interest rate level is low. The inefficacy result coincides with an intuitive explanation by the standard permanent income hypothesis.     

Self-fulfilling expectations,history, and big push: A search equilibrium model of unemployment

We set up a search equilibrium model with general matching technologies to study the phenomenon of large-scale and persistent unemployment. Our emphasis is on dynamics. We find, in addition to self-fulfilling expectations, history or initial level of employment plays a nonnegligible role for selecting the equilibrium converging to the steady state with large unemployment. We also discuss some policy implications. We propose a method similar to the idea of big push in economic development for the economy trapped in the state of large unemployment to escape from it.     

Union games: technological unemployment

Summary. Given a production economy, we define union games by considering strategic behavior of the suppliers of factors. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as union equilibria. We analyze situations where the unemployment of factors is supported as a union equilibrium. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. This allows us to model a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the literature. We state a limit result that demonstrates that, as the market power of unions decreases, the corresponding sequence of union equilibria converges to the Walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors. We also provide some examples that illustrate the main results.Received: 21 October 2004, Revised: 14 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D51, C72. Correspondence to: Emma Moreno-GarcíaE. Moreno acknowledges financial support from the Research Grant BEC2000-1388-C04-01 (Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER). G. Fernández de Córdoba and E. Moreno acknowledge financial support from the Research Grant SA091/02 from Junta de Castilla y León. We are indebted to C. Alós-Ferrer, C. Pita, D. Anisi, J. A. Ortega, F. Jimeno, J. P. Torres-Martínez, M. Steinert and C. Hervés for helpful comments and insights. We are particularly grateful to T. Kehoe and an anonymous referee for suggestions that improved this paper.