Moral Emotions and Corporate Psychopathy: A Review

While psychopathy research has been growing for decades, a relatively new area of research is corporate psychopathy. Corporate psychopaths are simply psychopaths working in organizational settings. They may be attracted to the financial, power, and status gains available in senior positions and can cause considerable damage within these roles from a manipulative interpersonal style to large-scale fraud. Based upon prior studies, we analyze psychopathy research pertaining to 23 moral emotions classified according to functional quality (positive vs. negative signal) and target (self vs. other). Based upon our review, we suggest that psychopaths are high in moral emotions associated with other-directed negative signals, low in self-directed negative signals, and low in other-directed positive signals. We found no empirical articles related to self-directed positive signals. This understanding of the specific moral emotion deficits of corporate psychopaths provides greater theoretical understanding and practical implications of knowing which individuals not to promote, though more research is needed on moral emotions that are faked for manipulative reasons.     

For or Against Corporate Identity? Personification and the Problem of Moral Agency

This article explores the concept of corporate identity from a moral perspective. In it we argue that the reification and personification involved in attributing an identity to an organization has moral repercussions. Through a discussion of ‘intentionality’ we suggest that it is philosophically problematic to treat an abstraction of the corporation as possessing identity or acting as a conscious moral agent. The article moves to consider practical and ethical issues in the areas of organizational commitment, of health and safety, and corporate social responsibility, and finds that the notion of identity can be abused, although it will no doubt continue to be used as it does have some practical utility. In conclusion, we argue that despite being meaningless from a philosophical stance, the concept of corporate identity need not be discarded, however, it is far from benign and intense moral scrutiny is necessary wherever it is applied. Ian Ashman PhD is a senior lecturer in the HRM division of the Lancashire business School, University of Central Lancashire. He has recently authored a number of papers on business ethics, leadership and research methods, all of which draw upon his interest in philosophies of existential phenomenology. He is an executive member of European Business Ethics Network U.K. Professor Diana Winstanley PhD, FCIPD was Director of Postgraduate Programmes at Kingston Business School, Kingston University. She wrote over 50 articles and five books, including her latest, ‚Personal Effectiveness: A Guide to Action’ (2005, CIPD) and Ethical Issues in Contemporary Human Resource Development (2000, Macmillan). She was a trained humanistic counsellor and an executive member of European Business Ethics Network U.K. Her research interests were in the areas of workplace learning, development, diversity and business ethics. Sadly, Diana Winstanley, died last summer.     

Corporate Image: Employee Reactions and Implications for Managing Corporate Social Performance

Corporate image is a function of organizational signals which determine the perceptions of various stakeholders regarding the actions of an organization. Because of its relationship to the actions of an organization, image has been studied as an indicator of the social performance of the organization. Recent research has determined that social performance has direct effects on the behaviors and attitudes of the organization's employees. To better understand these effects, this study develops and empirically tests a model which links corporate leaders' actions, employees' perceptions of corporate image, and the employees' level of association with the organization. The effects of managing the social environment of an organization on its employees' perceptions of image, attitudes, and intended behaviors are discussed.     

Connected Moral Agency in Organizational Ethics

We review both the aspects of values-related research that complicate ideations of what we ought to do, as well as the psychological impediments to forming beliefs about the way things are. We find that more traditional moral theories are without solid empirical footing in the psychology of human values. Consequently, we revise the notion of values to align with their socially symbolic utility in self-affirmation and reformulate our understandings of moral agency to allow for the practicalities of context, circumstance, and connectedness. We close by discussing the research and practical implications for these revisions.     

Corporate Versus Individual Moral Responsibility

There is a clear tendency in contemporary political/legal thought to limit agency to individual agents, thereby denying the existence and relevance of collective moral agency in general, and corporate agency in particular. This tendency is ultimately rooted in two particular forms of individualism – methodological and fictive (abstract) – which have their source in the Enlightenment. Furthermore, the dominant notion of moral agency owes a lot to Kant whose moral/legal philosophy is grounded exclusively on abstract reason and personal autonomy, to the detriment of a due recognition of the socio-historical grounds of moral social conduct.I shall argue that an adequate theory of responsibility is needed, which does not only take into account individual responsibility, but also collective and corporate responsibility, capable of taking into consideration society and its problems. Furthermore, corporations are consciously and carefully structured organisations with different levels of management and have clearly defined aims and objectives, a central feature upon which I shall be focussing in this paper.     

Concepts and Definitions of CSR and Corporate Sustainability: Between Agency and Communion

This paper provides an overview of the contemporary debate on the concepts and definitions of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Sustainability (CS). The conclusions, based on historical perspectives, philosophical analyses, impact of changing contexts and situations and practical considerations, show that "one solution fits all"-definition for CS(R) should be abandoned, accepting various and more specific definitions matching the development, awareness and ambition levels of organizations.     

Moral Discourse and Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting

This paper examines voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting as a form of moral discourse. It explores how alternative stakeholder perspectives lead to differing perceptions of the process and content of responsible reporting. We contrast traditional stakeholder theory, which views stakeholders as external parties having a social contract with corporations, with an emerging perspective, which views interaction among corporations and constituents as relational in nature. This moves the stakeholder from an external entity to one that is integral to corporate activity. We explore how these alternative stakeholder perspectives give rise to different normative demands for stakeholder engagement, managerial processes, and communication. We discuss models of CSR reporting and accountability: EMAS, the ISO 14000 series, SA8000, AA1000, the Global Reporting Initiative, and the Copenhagen Charter. We explore how these models relate to the stakeholder philosophies and find that they are largely consistent with the traditional atomistic view but fall far short of the demands for moral engagement prescribed by a relational stakeholder perspective. Adopting a relational view requires stakeholder engagement not only in prescribing reporting requirements, but also in discourse relating to core aspects of the corporation such as mission, values, and management systems. Habermas’ theory of communicative action provides guidelines for engaging stakeholders in this moral discourse. MaryAnn Reynolds is an Associate Professor of Accounting in the College of Business and Economics at Western Washington University. Dr. Reynolds teaches intermediate financial accounting and is published in the areas of corporate social, environmental and ethical reporting. Kristi Yuthas is the Swigert Endowed Information Systems Professor in the School of Business Administration at Portland State University. Dr. Yuthas teaches accounting and information systems and is published in the areas of social and ethical impacts of management information systems.     

Moral Hazard,Agency Cost,and Firm Growth

We study how the agency cost implied by the moral hazard problem in a firm dynamics model affects the life cycle growth pattern of firms. In the early stage of a firm's growth, the agency cost restricts the firm's capital input and diminishes over time, so that the firm's growth is driven by efficiency improvements and an exogenous progress in productivity. In the long run, when the firm loses its potential to improve efficiency, growth is driven only by the progress in productivity. As a result of this growth mechanism, consistent with the data, the growth rate and its volatility, as well as Tobin's Q, decrease with age and size. Moreover, the cross‐sectional distributions of firm size and managerial compensation obey a power law, as they do in the data. In addition, the model provides novel implications for how the characteristics of the production technology and the preferences of the economic agents affect the growth pattern of firms, and these implications are potentially testable.     

Defining a Post-Conventional Corporate Moral Responsibility

The stakeholder approach offers the opportunity to consider corporate responsibility in a wider sense than that afforded by the stockholder or shareholder approaches. Having said that, this article aims to show that this theory does not offer a normative corporate responsibility concept that can be our response to two basic questions. On the one hand, for what is the company morally responsible and, on the other hand, why is the corporation morally responsible in terms of conventional and post-conventional perspectives? The reason why the stakeholder approach does not offer such a definition, as we shall see, is because the normative stakeholder approaches tend to confuse the social validity with the moral validity or legitimacy. It leads us to a conventional definition of corporate moral responsibility (CMR) that is not relevant to the pluralistic and global framework of our societies and economies. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate this intuition.     

Beyond Stockholders and Stakeholders: A Plea for Corporate Moral Autonomy

In order to ensure that corporations act in socially responsible ways. R. Freeman says that firms should be legally required to act in accordance with the directives of a moral theory which he developed especially for business – a theory which has come to be called "normative stakeholder theory" (NST). I argue that NST fails as a moral theory and that this failure indicates: (1) that we should abandon the quest to develop a special moral theory for use in business, and (2) that we should not attempt to impose the use of any moral theory upon business, but rather should allow corporations to determine their moral responsibilities in any way they see fit.     

止步代理——反思银行保险

尽管现在银行保险炒得风风火火 ,但是其发展仍旧一波三折。目前仍旧停留在代理的表层 ,同时还存在不少的问题。不能只从数字表面看 ,而应该从更深层面分析银保合作的动因及动向 ,尤其是银行在其间扮演的角色以及对其它渠道的相互影响。     

Stakeholder Duties: On the Moral Responsibility of Corporate Investors

Stakeholder theory usually focuses on the moral responsibility of corporations towards their stakeholders. This article takes the reverse perspective to shed light on the moral responsibility of stakeholders??specifically, investors or ??financiers??. It explicates a distinction between two types of financiers, creditors and shareholders. Many intuitively judge that shareholders have greater or more extensive moral responsibility for the actions of the corporations they invest in than do bondholders and other creditors. Examining the merits of possible arguments for or against treating owners and creditors differently elucidates which arguments can support the moral duties of investors generally, and different duties for different groups of investors specifically. The paper considers three possible lines of arguments, rooting investors?? responsibility, respectively, in how they enable corporate conduct, how they benefit from it, and to what extent they are complicit in it. The paper argues that a notion of complicity is the only tenable ground for holding investors liable; sketches an account of complicity based on the recent philosophical literature on collective intention and collective action; and concludes that shareholders but not creditors can generally be seen as complicit on this account.     

The Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility in Indonesia: Problems and Implications

The adoption of the 2007 Indonesian Law No. 40 has created significant debate over the nature of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), namely, whether it is voluntary or mandatory. On the one hand, the adoption of such a law represents a legal recognition of the existence of CSR, and this clarification on the legal nature of a concept is necessary for understanding the obligation and responsibility. On the other hand, it has created much confusion surrounding its substance and procedures. This article tries to analyze the development and consequences of CSR under 2007 Indonesian Law No. 40, through the discussion of mandatory versus voluntary dichotomy. It is argued in this article that the mandatory nature of CSR is legitimate and therefore encouraged; however, in practice, this is problematic, as it not only requires a precise concept of interpretation of CSR and identification of the duty bearer and beneficiaries, but also an effective implementation mechanism and a means of verifying the impact.     

Precarious Professionals: (in)Secure Identities and Moral Agency in Neocolonial Context

We contribute to the literature on ethics in the professions by theorizing how global mobility precipitates professional insecurity and constrained moral agency. We present our findings of a study of accountants migrating to Canada. Using postcolonial theory and relational/poststructuralist theories of identity and ethics, we contrast the experiences of marginalized and privileged migrant accountants to show how those with “diverse” social identities are not recognized by professionals in Canada and must seek recognition from Canadian colleagues, employers, and clients to reconstitute their professional identities and moral agency. We discuss the implications of the exclusion and marginalization of professionals for migrants, the profession, and society more generally.     

Anti-Corporate Anger as a Form of Care-Based Moral Agency

Although corruption is ubiquitous, attitudes toward it differ among countries. Until the 1997 OECD Convention, the U.S. had been one of the only two countries with an explicit extraterritorial anti-bribery law, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977. The FCPA employs a two-pronged approach to control the supply side of corruption: (1) anti-bribery provisions; and (2) accounting (books and record and internal controls) provisions. I offer evidence, albeit indirect, to show that the FCPA had limited success. The OECD Convention adopts the same two-pronged approach, but, since it is a multilateral treaty, is likely to be more successful provided that enforcement is vigorous enough. The signatory nations effectively form a cartel to reduce the cost of doing business. As with any cartel, however, each multinational corporation has an incentive to deviate. Thus, the mutual enforcement of the agreement is crucial for its success. However, the two-pronged approach is not sufficient, since internal control does not adequately monitor decisions made at the top level. I argue that the two lessons drawn from the U.S. experience are: (1) law enforcement must be credible; and (2) internal controls alone are not sufficient. Stronger and more effective corporate governance within an appropriate regulatory framework is needed to ensure that multinational corporations conduct their business in an ethical manner.     

Moral Agency,Profits and the Firm: Economic Revisions to the Friedman Theorem

The paper reconstructs in economic terms Friedman’s theorem that the only social responsibility of firms is to increase their profits while staying within legal and ethical rules. A model of three levels of moral conduct is attributed to the firm: (1) self-interested engagement in the market process itself, which reflects according to classical and neoclassical economics an ethical ideal; (2) the obeying of the “rules of the game,” largely legal ones; and (3) the creation of ethical capital, which allows moral conduct to enter the market process beyond the rules of the game. Points (1) and (2) position the Friedman theorem in economic terms while point (3) develops an economic revision of the theorem, which was not seen by Friedman. Implications are spelled out for an instrumental stakeholder theory of the firm. Dr. Sigmund Wagner-Tsukamoto is researcher in business ethics at the School of Management of the University of Leicester, UK. He holds two doctorates, one in social studies from the University of Oxford, UK, and one in economic studies from the Catholic University of Eichstaett, Germany. He has widely published on green consumerism and institutional economic issues that concern organization theory and business ethics theory. His publications include the books Understanding Green Consumer Behaviour (Routledge, 1997 & 2003) and Human Nature and Organization Theory (Edward Elgar, 2003).     

Friedman's Stockholder Theory of Corporate Moral Responsibility

In this paper I critically discuss MiltonFriedman's classic article, ``The SocialResponsibility of Business is to Increase itsProfits.' Friedman offers several argumentsfor his stockholder theory of corporate moralresponsibility, according to which acorporation's only moral responsibility is topromote the financial well-being of itsstockholders. I first consider aninconsistency in his statement of his position– namely, the distinct and non-equivalentconstraints he places on profit-maximization(``the rules of the game' and ``the rules ofsociety'). I then turn to a consideration ofsix arguments Friedman gives to support histheory, spelling them out in detail and showingthat none of them is sound. I conclude with abrief intuitive argument against his theory.     

Integrating Ethics All the Way Through: The Issue of Moral Agency Reconsidered

Integrating “ethics all the way through” an organization suggests that the issue of moral agency and the corporation be reconsidered. Is the corporation a moral agent in some sense or is it no more than the people who are a part of the organization? Views which stress the role of the individual lose sight of the whole corporate entity, and views which think of the corporation as a collective lose sight of the individual. A view which rejects both these alternatives sees the corporation as a type of community where there is a dynamic tension between the corporation as a whole and the individuals who are part of the organization. This view has implications relative to the focus of efforts to integrate ethics throughout an organization.