Endogenous Growth,Taxes and Government Spending: Theory and Evidence*

This paper provides a theoretical and empirical investigation of the simultaneous effects of taxes and government spending on long‐run economic growth in an endogenous growth framework. A two‐sector model is considered: one sector produces physical output and the other produces human capital. Government expenditure is divided into several categories, and several types of taxes are included. The property tax is especially interesting because it is a major source of revenue for local government. The theoretical model is estimated using annual panel data from North Carolina counties. This study finds that state‐level fiscal policies affect economic growth but county‐level fiscal policies do not.     

财产税和地方公共支出对财产价值的影响

本文的目的是提供一些关于地方公共预算对社区内财产价值的影响的经验结论。通过财产税的转移理论，本文分析了整体税收对地主租金收入和对佃户付出的影响。研究结果表明了税收和支出方案对地方财产价值的影响方向，以及粗略估计的数量级。     

Cointegration and Causal Relationship between Taxes and Spending for Kenya,Nigeria and South Africa

Causal relationships between taxes and spending are examined for three African countries using the GDP as a control variable, and dummy variables to address structural changes in Nigeria and South Africa. There is one cointegration equation between nominal fiscal variables in all three countries, one cointegration equation for Kenya and two cointegration equations for Nigeria and South Africa for the real fiscal variables and their respective dummy variables. Short-term results of the nominal variables show fiscal independence for all three countries. In real terms, taxes cause spending for Kenya and Nigeria and a weak fiscal synchronization for South Africa. There is long run fiscal synchronization in nominal terms for all three countries, and in real terms for both Nigeria and South Africa, while real taxes cause spending in Kenya. Long-run estimates show a unit increase in nominal (real) taxes translating into a less than proportionate increase in nominal (real) spending for Kenya and South Africa, and a more than proportionate increase in nominal (real) spending for Nigeria. Fiscal imbalance is not a threat in the budgetary process in Kenya and South Africa, but an issue of concern in Nigeria, where oil revenues are a major source of support for budget short falls.     

公共资本性支出、经常性支出与内生经济增长

本文基于一个含有两类不同产出能力的公共商品的内生增长模型,通过数理分析得出在市场经济条件下最优公共支出结构的依据是公共商品各自的产出弹性.进而采用面板数据模型对13个发达国家1972～2009年的公共支出实践进行了实证研究.实证结果表明,经常性(资本性)支出对经济增长有正(负)效应.该研究结论为平衡预算下的公共支出结构决策提供了参考依据.     

Taxes and firm investment

We investigate the firm-level investment response to unanticipated narrative shocks to average personal and corporate tax rates using a universal micro dataset of publicly-traded U.S. firms for the post-1976 period. Using local projections, we show that: (i) corporate tax shocks have significant effects on investment while personal tax shocks do not; (ii) corporate income tax responses are negative overall, and this result is driven by smaller firms who face larger borrowing constraints, especially when the accompanying monetary policy is contractionary or output gap is slack; (iii) there is some evidence of positive personal income tax responses during monetary contractions by dividend-paying firms, which is consistent with the recent literature.     

依法纳税与税收征管

本文从经济假设和信息不对称角度出发,对纳税人偷漏税的原因进行了系统归纳。认为加强税收征管,完善纳税人依法纳税的实施机制是解决问题的有效途径。并着重运用博弈论模型探讨了建立有效税收检查机制的可行性和实施途径。     

Efficiency Wages and Taxes

Various taxes influence wage and employment outcomes in efficiency wage models. These findings are extended by incorporating more comprehensive tax functions and additional tax parameters. Moreover, the importance of different effort functions is evaluated. It is shown that higher marginal tax rates, holding the level of taxes constant, reduce wages and increase employment. Higher levels of taxes on income, labour costs and value-added tend to raise unemployment.     

Taxes,Strikes and Wages

A union and a firm bargain about wage increases. The firm possesses private information about its revenues. A two-period screening model is used to derive equilibrium wage demands by the union and to calculate measures of strike activity. Changes in wage demands and dispute probabilities due to alterations in various taxes are analysed. A more progressive income tax, a lower level of income taxes and higher payroll taxes reduce wages and strike activity. Hence, tax policy can be used not only to affect wages and employment, but lso to influence strike incidence.     

Taxes and female labor supply

The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed the U.S. income tax structure in a dramatic fashion. In particular, these two reforms reduced the marginal tax rates for married households. In this paper I investigate what part of the rise in labor force participation of married women between 1980 to 1990 (a rise of 13 percentage points) can be accounted by the changes in taxes. I build an heterogeneous agent model populated by married households. Households differ by age and educational attainment levels of their members and decide whether the second earner, the wife, should participate in the labor market. I select parameter values so that the model economy is consistent with the 1980 U.S. economy in terms of income tax structure, wages (skill premium and gender gap), marital sorting (who is married with whom), and female labor force participation. Using counterfactual experiments I find that 20–24 percent of the rise in married female labor force participation is accounted for by the changes in the income tax structure. Changes in wages account for 62–64 percent, and changes in marital sorting account for 14–16 percent of the rise in the participation rate of married women.     

How Leviathan Taxes

The Leviathan hypothesis remains a cornerstone of constitutional tax theory. Following Brennan and Buchanan's (1980) seminal contribution, the power to tax is often likened to a monopoly, and its use by a revenue-maximising government is said to obey the rules of optimal taxation theory. We revisit, and refine, this position, explaining its underpinnings and discussing the Leviathan solution in several well-known optimal taxation models. It turns out that the power to tax is not a perfect analogue of ordinary monopoly power and that the similarity between Leviathan and optimal taxation solutions hinges on the irrelevance of distributional weights.     

Trading Taxes vs. Paying Taxes to Value and Finance Public Environmental Goods

The potential sensitivity of environmentalresource valuation to payment vehicles is ofinterest to researchers and decision-makersinvolved in estimating and applying thesenumbers. A conceptual model is developed whichprovides insight into how the different paymentvehicles of a special tax and a taxreallocation affects the willingness to pay(WTP) for environmental goods. Hypothesistesting using contingent valuation datasuggests WTP with a tax reallocation is higherthan WTP with a special tax for ground waterquality protection in Georgia and Maine, USA.Technical measurement and welfare analysisimplications and limitations of valuing andfinancing public environmental goods using taxrealloactions are discussed.     

Adverse Selection and Pigou Taxes

It id assumed that firms have different technologies, and that an environment protection agency knows which technologies exist, but not which is used by which firms. Neither the emissions of individual firms nor their total emissions are observable. The output of each individual firm, however, can be monitored without cost. Based on this information tax schemes are constructed which induce firms to produce the socially efficient output quantities. Conditions about cost functions are derived which ensure the existence of tax schemes which yield first best solutions.     

Environmental Taxes and First-Mover Advantages

This paper studies whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in environmental policies. To analyze this question I assume transboundary pollution and two countries that have to decide whether to set environmental taxes sequentially or simultaneously. When taxes are set sequentially an effect, denoted as the sequential setting effect, arises that raises the equilibrium taxes. I show that whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in taxes depends on the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners. When this overspill is low enough, taxes are strategic complements and both the leader and the follower obtain greater welfare than under a simultaneous tax setting. However, the leader country obtains greater welfare than the follower. In this case, governments set taxes sequentially. When the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners is high enough, taxes are strategic substitutes and governments set taxes simultaneously. In this case, each government wants to avoid becoming the follower in taxes.