收入分配格局演变的微观基础——兼论中国税收持续超速增长

在本文中,收入分配格局是指劳动者、资本所有者和政府在增加值中各占多大的比重。在企业层面上,税收制度不仅通过分配阶段而且深入生产环节对收入分配格局产生复杂影响。本文发现:为了提高劳动收入份额,有必要减少间接征税。但从长远来看,其关键是劳动要素变得更加重要;改制提高了资本和政府收入份额,挤压了劳动收入份额;对于中国税收持续超速增长,实际税负上升是主要原因,间接税设计和重复征税的影响并没有想象的那样大。本文对收入分配格局演变做出了谨慎乐观的判断,建议采用"减轻间接征税与加重直接征税并举"的策略。     

对税收基础理论几个问题的再认识

作者认为：税收是国家为实现其职能,凭借政治权力,参与一部分社会产品或国民收入分配和再分配进行的一系列经济活动：“取之于民,用之于民”是体现社会主义税收本质的社会特征;把它作为征税的依据是欠妥的;不能将纳税人等同于负税人,消费者是不是纳税人应以税法为准;仅有纳税意识是不够的,应该增强和提高包括纳税意识、征税意识、用税意识、创税意识等在内的整个税收意识。     

按照经济规律 加强税收 实现资金积累的高速度

(一) 税收是同国家直接联系的,税收的产生与发展,都与国家密不可分,税收是实现国家职能的重要工具之一。税收是国家的一种重要的财政收入。国家向纳税人征收税款,不论采取实物形态或货币形态,都是把一部分物质财富从纳税人手里无偿地转移给国家,变成国家所有,归国家分配使用。国家向纳税人征税,就是对一部分社会产品或国民收入进行分配或再分配。这种分配是国家凭借政治权力、通过法律的形式进行的,因此,税收具有强制性的特征。     

中国居民收入分配的公平认知与诉求

识别收入分配的性质,找到社会接受和认可的收入分配状态,对一个国家而言是非常重要的.文章利用中国综合社会调查(CGSS)2006年数据对我国居民收入分配的公平认知和诉求进行了检验.研究发现,居民对于权力决定成功、资本所有者剥夺劳动者、税收调节不到位等分配不公现象的认知显著增加了其收入分配不公平感,而这种不公平感的产生源于上述因素强化了居民对于农民、农民工、工人的实际收入偏低以及省部级以上官员、市长、大型企业董事长和总经理的实际收入偏高的认知.收入分配改革是一场关系利益格局调整的深刻变革,考虑到不同阶层在公平认知和诉求上的分化,国家需要在改革中协调好各阶层的利益关系,最大限度地取得全社会的共识.     

刍议市场化进程中权力对收入分配的影响——基于对劳动和资本的不同影响分析

改革开放以来中国的市场化进程不断推进,但其发展并不成熟。在现代的资本主义市场经济国家中,国民收入分配主要是靠市场机制这只"看不见的手"自发进行,因此,收入分配在经济市场化的条件下有可能会产生差距拉大的结果。但是在我们国家现有的经济市场化并不成熟的背景下,权力更多地会介入到初始要素分配阶段,所以我国的收入分配是在权力这只"看得见的手"的作用下,引起了劳动和资本之间的差距,这是没有彻底实行市场化的结果。本文正是论述权力对收入分配的影响。     

地方政治权力转移与企业社会资本投资周期--基于政企关系重构的动态研究

文章以2007－2012年我国A 股上市公司为样本,从政企关系重构的视角研究了地方政治权力转移对企业社会资本投资的影响。研究发现：(1)在地方政治权力转移当年,企业会显著提高社会资本投资力度。随着主政官员任期的增加,企业社会资本投资呈现下降趋势。这说明在主政官员任期内,企业社会资本投资呈现先增后减的周期性特点。这种周期性特点仅在民营企业中存在。(2)民营企业社会资本投资的周期性特点在地方官员来自外地、继任官员预期任期较长、管制行业以及融资约束程度高和无政治关联的企业样本中更加显著。(3)在地方政治权力转移当年,民营企业提高社会资本投资力度能够帮助其获得政府补助,但这种优势并不会立刻体现出来;同时,企业提高社会资本投资力度也会对自身的研发投入产生挤出效应,且挤出效应持续存在于继任官员的整个任期中。文章的研究为理解企业建立政企关系的手段、过程与效果提供了新的视角。     

转型社会中权力寻租与权钱交易的经济学分析

权钱交易不仅激励权力出租者的扩权和护权行为,使掌权者围绕公共权力配置与权力租金分配形成官僚同盟与竞争型官僚集团,还会导致社会公众的逃避权力控制和反抗权力行为与现象的发生;分权、充分信息与竞争性官僚市场构建是治理权钱交易与官员腐败的关键。     

论关税体制及其经济影响

关税是随着国际贸易的发展而产生和发展起来的。作为关税的征收依据,各国政府制定颁布的关税税则以法律形式规定了应激关税的税率、征税标准和计量单位,关税政策是一国政府调节其对外经济关系的重要手段。一、关税概述关税是进出口商品经过一国关境时,由政府所设置的海关向其进出口商所征收的税收。作为税收的一种,关税具有和其他税种同样的属性。国家为维持国家机器的存在和职能的发挥,需要参与国民收入的分配,凭籍其政治权力占有一部分国民收入。税收就是国家参与国民收入分配和再分配的一种形式,是取得财政收入的主要手段。因此,…     

论税收对要素收入分配的影响

我国自1994年分税制改革以来,一方面税收收入保持高速增长,另一方面国民收入分配格局发生显著变化——劳动要素分配份额迅速下滑,资本要素分配份额逐渐上升。本文的理论分析表明,税收通过替代效应和收入效应影响要素收入分配,前者改变了生产中要素相对投入比例,从而改变了税前要素收益率,后者则是通过直接税影响到税后要素收益率。本文利用系统GMM估计进行的实证分析表明,我国税收对要素收入分配具有明显影响:就直接税而言,企业所得税降低了资本分配份额,个人所得税中对劳动征税部分降低了劳动分配份额;就间接税而言,增值税明显降低劳动分配份额但对资本分配份额的影响不明显,营业税明显降低资本分配份额而对劳动分配份额的影响不明显。因此,如果从有利于调整要素收入分配格局角度考虑,我国有必要进一步调整现行税收政策、完善税收制度。     

转型期资本和权力关系的深层反思

市场经济和法治国家两大目标是反思转型期资本与权力关系的深刻背景。资本与权力的关系是处于动态演变之中的,表现为分离与结合的矛盾运动以及从同构到异构、单维到多维、松散到结构化的变迁。在转型期整个社会受到资本逻辑和权力逻辑的双重宰制,进而导致权力资本化、资本权力化以及权力-资本"产业链化"等非意图现象。为理顺资本与权力的关系,需要建立和强化资本与权力的隔离机制,建设强化市场型政府,并采取措施改善整个社会的权力结构。     

How does petty corruption affect tax morale in Sub-Saharan Africa?

Revenues from taxation gain in importance to finance economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa. One obstacle to enhancing the willingness to remit taxes can be the extortion of bribes by public officials. Using micro-level data from the Afrobarometer, we show that petty corruption erodes tax morale. The effect on tax morale is more severe in countries and regions where fewer people are affected by petty corruption and becomes insignificant if extortion of bribes is particularly prevalent. Differing levels of civic participation and potential access to tax funded services are also found to induce heterogeneous reactions to corruption experience. Applying a mediation analysis, we demonstrate that petty corruption not only has a direct effect on tax morale but also diminishes confidence in tax authorities and therefore affects tax morale indirectly. The harmful effects of corruption experience, however, operate mainly through a generally lowered inclination to uphold high levels of tax morale.     

A Note on the Taxation of International Capital Income Flows

Seemingly persuasive arguments can be made to suggest that income from foreign-owned capital should be taxed by a small open economy and that it should not be taxed I show that the case for taxing foreign capital income as part of an 'optimal' tax scheme rests on the assumption that tax rates on other forms of income are not set optimally. In particular, if economic profit is not fully taxed, a tax on foreign capital income is desirable. If all tax rates are set optimally, foreign capital income should not be taxed by the capital-importing country.     

Anticorruption reforms,tax evasion,and the role of harassment

We examine the impact of anticorruption reforms on tax evasion when corruption and potentially harassment are endemic among tax auditors. We find that the threat of harassment may counterintuitively boost the impact of such anticorruption reforms on tax evasion and also eliminate corruption. Specifically, a moderate anticorruption policy can discontinuously reduce tax evasion to a level even below that under no corruption. Further strengthening of such policy can nonetheless prove counterproductive and increase tax evasion. On the contrary, in the absence of harassment, a moderate anticorruption reform induces higher tax evasion and sustenance of bribery. In this case, only a large reform can reduce tax evasion and eliminate corruption.     

The effects of corruption on the human capital accumulation process: Evidence from Vietnam

This study aims to identify the effects of corruption on the human capital accumulation process in Vietnamese provinces/cities. I employ labour quality assessments of firms as a proxy for human capital and divide human capital accumulation into the following two processes: an educational process and a process through which educational outcomes and worker training transform into labour quality. The estimation results have some notable implications for the Vietnamese context. Corruption has both negative and positive effects on human capital. On the one hand, corruption reduces the positive effect of local government spending on educational achievements and worsens labour quality. On the other hand, the prevalence of corruption in provinces/cities increases the advantages of local schools in the competition to obtain funds from the central government; hence, corruption enhances educational achievements in those regions. The results of this study indicate that corruption adversely affects human capital overall.     

Some additional evidence on the interplay between corruption,tax policy and firm entry using US states

The effects that corruption and tax policy have on entrepreneurship and firm growth have been often studied in the literature. This current article adds to that literature by evaluating how the interaction effect between corruption and tax policy influences firm entry at the US state level, using a panel data set of all 50 US states between 2001 and 2014. Overall, the findings are consistent with the literature and suggest that while high levels of corruption and relatively burdensome tax policy have a negative effect on firm entry, high levels of corruption tend to dampen the negative effects associated with relatively high tax rates. Potential policy implications are discussed within this article.     

Tax Evasion and the Time Consistency of the Government's Income Tax Policy

It is shown that it is not necessarily optimal for the government to tax capital income at a high rate even when capital is in fixed supply because the supply of capital for tax purposes may be elastic if capital income tax evasion occurs. An example is given where the wage tax rate is positive and greater than the interest income tax rate even though capital is in fixed supply. Conditions are also derived under which the capital income tax rate is lower in the closed-loop policy game, where capital is fixed, than in the open-loop game, where it is not.
JEL Classification Numbers: E61, H26.     

The effect of corruption on capital accumulation

This paper examines the effect of corruption in infrastructure development as well as in capital and labor markets, on capital accumulation and output in an overlapping generations model. Corruption affects income redistribution, government expenditures on infrastructure, firms’ incentive to invest, and workers’ incentive to supply labor. An increase in corruption in infrastructure development decreases capital accumulation and output if the decrease in the savings of ordinary workers is sufficiently large. An increase in corruption in the capital market decreases capital accumulation and output. An increase in corruption in labor market decreases capital accumulation and output when labor supply is completely inelastic. Simulation results based on plausible parameter values indicate that an increase in corruption in the labor market will also reduce labor supply, capital accumulation and output.      

Tax Evasion,Corruption and Tax Loopholes

This paper addresses tax loopholes that allow firms to exploit borderline cases between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion. In general, tax loopholes are detrimental to a revenue‐maximizing government. This may change in the presence of corruption in the tax administration. Tax loopholes may serve as a separating mechanism that helps governments maximize revenues and curb corruption, which may explain why developing countries only gradually close loopholes in their tax codes.     

Dynamic analysis of bribery firms’ environmental tax evasion in an emissions trading market

Using an R&D-based growth model with dual regulation, we analyse how environmental policies influence pollution, corruption, a growth rate, and welfare. Considering that polluting firms bribe bureaucrats to evade paying environmental tax, we find that a stricter environmental tax leads to a decrease in growth rate via a decrease in the permit rent as well as an increase in pollution and corruption per firm and results in worsening households’ welfare and in improving the bureaucrats’ welfare. Thus, tax evasion with corruption improves households’ welfare and worsens the bureaucrats’ welfare. Our findings imply that tax evasion under dual regulation improves social welfare.     

Job creators,job creation,and the tax code

This paper considers the role of the tax code in determining income dispersion and vacancy creation. A “span‐of‐control” model is embedded into a search and matching environment. A cut to the tax on profits in isolation improves job creation and reduces before‐tax income inequality. The impact of a budget‐balancing increase in the wage tax depends on the bargaining power of firms. When it is high, firms pick up the lion's share of the tax burden. The tax acts like a barrier to entry: it benefits large firms at the expense of marginal ones. Net effects are an increase in unemployment and before‐tax income dispersion. Low firm bargaining power means workers pick up more of the tax burden. It acts like a subsidy to entrepreneurship reinforcing the impact of the profit tax reduction. Taxes on the returns to capital leave everyone worse off.