A Real Options Approach to Abatement Investments and Green Goodwill

In this paper we adopt the green goodwill argument as to why firms voluntarily invest in abatement capital. We investigate the effects on the abatement investment decision of changes in uncertainty about future green goodwill, competitor abatement investments, regulations, etc., using a real options framework. Our results indicate that increased uncertainty about consumers' willingness to pay for green products in the future discourage voluntary abatement investments. The model also suggests that voluntary abatement investments are promoted by an increased threat of regulation and competitor abatement investments. Furthermore, the benefit-cost ratio of the abatement investment project, at the point where it is optimal to invest, is independent of what regulatory regime (stringent or lenient) the firm operates in. We also conclude that despite the fact that voluntary abatement investment exists, there may still be room for environmental policy.     

Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements

We examine the consequences of costly enforcement on the ability of voluntary agreements with industries to meet regulatory objectives, the levels of industry participation with these agreements, and the relative efficiency of voluntary and regulatory approaches. A voluntary agreement can be more efficient in reaching an aggregate emissions target than a conventional emissions tax, but only if: (1) profitable voluntary agreements in which members of the agreement pay for its enforcement exist; (2) members of a voluntary agreement actually bear the costs of enforcing the agreement; (3) the agreement is enforced by a third-party, not the government, and (4) this third-party enforcer has a significant advantage in monitoring technology and/or available sanctions over the government.     

自愿参与型环境规制与企业技术创新——公众关注度和市场进程的调节作用

“波特假说”有效性一直是学术界颇具争议的话题，然而现有文献对于自愿参与型环境规制与企业技术创新的关系讨论较少，也缺乏对其作用情景因素的关注。基于2011—2019年730家沪深A股上市企业面板数据，采用负二项回归模型和倾向得分匹配法，分析我国上市企业在市场化进程影响下，自愿参与型环境规制、公众关注度对企业技术创新的影响。结果发现，自愿参与型环境规制对企业技术创新具有正向影响；公众关注度在自愿参与型环境规制对企业技术创新的影响过程中起正向调节作用；自愿参与型环境规制、公众关注度和市场化进程交互项结果表明，企业位于市场化程度较高地区时，公众关注度对自愿参与型环境规制与企业技术创新的调节作用更显著。结论不仅丰富了“波特假说”相关研究，还为我国企业提高信息共享意识以及政府优化市场环境提供了微观证据。     

FEDERAL ACQUISITION OF WATER THROUGH VOLUNTARY TRANSACTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PURPOSES

Throughout U.S. history public land management agencies have attempted to achieve environmental objectives by relying on a broad range of policy tools, including both regulatory and voluntary mechanisms. An important component of these policies has been oriented toward the acquisition of land or partial interests in land from voluntary sellers. However, it has become clear that preserving or restoring damaged ecosystems increasingly requires more than land and easement acquisitions. The procurement of water for environmental purposes is becoming increasingly common. In some regions such acquisitions also represent a significant share of the local water market activity. Given the increasingly important role these transactions play in achieving federal environmental objectives, it makes sense to consider the alternative mechanisms available that could be used for such acquisitions. This paper examines the situations where the federal government has acquired water for environmental purposes and the extent to which competitive mechanisms—such as auctions—could be used in future acquisition efforts.     

Environmental quality and welfare effects of improving the reporting capability of citizen monitoring schemes

Public participation in environmental monitoring to alert regulators to possible non-compliance events has been credited with improving environmental quality and regulatory efficiency. At the same time, the reporting capability of such citizen monitoring schemes is known to be limited due to technical and organizational deficiencies. Recent enthusiasm for outside interventions that address these deficiencies in order to lower environmental harm and raise overall welfare therefore seems justified. A game-theoretic analysis of a monitoring and enforcement regime with citizen monitoring shows, however, that the effects of such interventions are likely to be subtle. A higher reporting capability of citizens involves substitution effects that have ambiguous effects on the regulator??s monitoring and enforcement costs: Welfare can actually decline and environmental improvements will fall short of expectations. In an extreme scenario we show that improved citizen monitoring can even have adverse effects on environmental quality.     

Adoption and use of technology with low litigation risk – the case of financial reporting on Twitter by ASX companies

ABSTRACT

Corporate adoption of technology faces challenges such as resource constraints and litigation risk. To investigate if low litigation risk encourages technology adoption and its use, this paper investigates corporate financial reporting on Twitter, a voluntary corporate disclosure practice without obvious litigation risk in Australia. This study reviews 4,540 financial reporting related tweets from 222 ASX listed companies’ Twitter accounts. An examination of tweet sentiment reveals a positive reporting bias, as listed companies are more willing to disclose positive financial reporting information on Twitter. A comparison of corporate financial reporting tweets prior to and after 2013 reveals that use of Twitter for opportunistic voluntary disclosure is gaining popularity, a trend that warrants close attention by regulators in order to protect investors from selective disclosure with reporting bias.     

Waste disclosure and corporate cash holdings

ABSTRACT

In this paper, we address an important and emerging question: Can firms’ voluntary waste disclosure affect corporate cash holdings? Using a sample of S&P 500 firms, we find strong evidence for a positive relationship between waste disclosure and the cash holding policy of firms. Furthermore, we find that waste disclosure significantly increases cash holdings only for firms with strong corporate governance quality. We also find that the significant relationship between waste disclosure and cash holdings remains unchanged only for firms that operate in environmentally sensitive industries. Our paper provides novel evidence on the role of voluntary waste disclosure as an environmental dimension that influences the cash policy of firms and highlights the little-known issue of waste disclosure as a significant research topic.     

Firm location,political geography and environmental information disclosure

As the subjective and objective factors that influence corporate behaviours, political region and firm location are of great importance to environmental information disclosure (EID). With spatial and political geography as a research perspective, this article makes a study by using the samples of manufacturing listed companies from 2009 to 2011. As a result, we determine that regulatory distance and political geography had negative effects on EID, while political geography weakens regulatory distance’s function. After considering an enterprise’s administrative rank, we determined that when the rank is higher, regulatory distance has negative effects on EID; when the rank is lower, the effects are the opposite. Regarding political geography, it always weakened the regulatory distance’s function. Moreover, the effects are significant only when the enterprises had low governmental regulation. The study shows the effects that firm location and political geography have made on EID. At the same time, this study also gives theoretical and empirical evidence to the necessity of raising governmental regulatory effectiveness.     

Environmental Protection,Agency Motivations,and Rent Extraction: The Regulation of Water Pollution in Louisiana

Direct environmental regulation has been in place in the United States for more than twenty-five years. Yet there has been little study of what actually affects regulatory enforcement levels. This study examines enforcement issues by focusing on water quality enforcement by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality. The study finds that penalties are more likely to occur, and are likely to be higher, the more serious a firm's violation of a regulation. Penalties are also more likely, and likely to be higher, if a firm has a previous record of environmental violations. In contrast to other studies, however, we do not find that enforcement varies across regional offices. In addition, we did not find any systematic effects of the Weingast and Moran (1983) theory of legislative dominance. We did, however, find evidence of rent extraction, along the lines of McChesney (1987; 1991).     

Foreign (in)direct investment and corporate taxation

Abstract Foreign investments of multinational firms are often complex in that they involve conduit entities. In particular, a multinational can pursue either a direct or an indirect investment strategy, where the latter involves an intermediate corporate entity and is associated with enhanced opportunities for international tax planning. As a consequence, in the case of indirect investments, the role of corporate taxation in destination countries may change. This paper investigates the effects of corporate taxation on foreign investment decisions of German multinationals, taking explicitly into account that firms choose in a first stage the investment regime (direct vs. indirect). The empirical findings, consistent with theoretical predictions, suggest that tax effects differ according to whether the investment is direct or indirect.     

Politically connected managers,government ownership and corporate socially responsible investments: evidence from China

We investigated the effects of politically connected managers on the corporate socially responsible investments of firms with different types of ownership. The results show that SOEs with politically connected managers are more likely to invest in corporate socially responsible investments compared to SOEs without such managers. However, private firms with politically connected managers are less likely to invest in corporate socially responsible investments than private firms without such managers.     

货币政策、商业信用与科技创新投资

实证检验了商业信用对企业科技创新投资的影响与作用机制，以及在不同货币政策期的异同。研究发现：总体上，商业信用能够缓解创新融资约束，促进企业科技创新投资；在货币紧缩期，商业信用对创新融资约束有显著缓解作用，对创新投资的促进作用较之货币宽松期更为明显。进一步研究表明，国有企业能利用商业信用促进创新投资，且在货币紧缩期通过对商业信用的利用，缓解创新融资约束、促进创新投资；该现象在民营企业中不存在，可能与国有企业对商业信用有更强的获取及控制能力有关。研究成果丰富了商业信用的经济后果内涵，为解决企业创新融资问题提供了新思路。     

The role of infrastructure investment and factor productivity in international tax competition

In this paper we use data from 30 developed economies from 1999 to 2014 to analyse the importance of infrastructure investments and factor productivity for explaining international capital tax competition. Our results indicate the existence of intensive tax competition in effective average corporate taxation during this period. It is also suggested that non-tax variables of third countries affect a country's corporate tax policy. Countries whose direct competitors have better infrastructures or are more productive compensate with lower capital taxation. In this way, their infrastructure investment and productivity-enhancing policies are used as strategic substitutes for capital taxation. With regard to the characteristics of closest competitors, we find that corporate tax competition is fiercer among countries that are characterized by similar infrastructure investments and geographical proximity.     

Firm value in commonly uncertain times: the divergent effects of corporate governance and CSR

Economic uncertainty disrupts firms’ ability to create value. Most related literature examines how various organizational characteristics affect value under extreme conditions – the global financial crisis. However, recent work in quantifying economic uncertainty now makes it possible to take a more nuanced approach in investigating the conditions under which this value reduction can be mitigated during more ‘commonly uncertain’ periods. In this paper we analyze the effects of corporate governance mechanisms and social responsibility investments on Tobin’s q across 13 years and 40 countries. Evidence suggests that shareholder-centric corporate governance policies restrict board and executive flexibility during uncertain times, and therefore stifle their ability to react effectively to adverse macroeconomic changes. We also find that CSR initiatives serve as insurance in that they preserve value under uncertainty by acting as a reservoir of social capital.     

Corporate Taxation and Productivity Catch‐Up: Evidence from European Firms

In this paper, we explore whether higher corporate tax rates, because they lower the after‐tax returns to productivity‐enhancing investments, reduce the speed with which small firms converge to the productivity frontier. Using data for 11 European countries, we find evidence that their productivity catch‐up is slower when the statutory corporate tax rates are higher. In contrast, we find that large firms are instead affected by effective marginal rates. Using the reduced‐form model of productivity convergence of Griffith et al . (2009, Journal of Regional Science 49 , 689–720), our results are robust to a host of robustness checks and a natural experiment that exploits the 2001 German tax reforms.     

Efficient contract enforcement

We study how the efficient choice of contract enforcement interacts with the efficient allocation of capital in a simple production economy. Contract enforcement makes trade possible but requires an aggregate investment of capital that is no longer available for production. In such an economy, more dispersion in ex-ante marginal products makes it optimal to invest more resources in enforcement. Furthermore, implementing the optimal allocation requires a specific distribution of the cost for enforcement across agents that is not monotonic and results in a redistribution of endowments. At the efficient solution, agents at the bottom of the endowment distribution benefit the most from investment in enforcement and these investments lead to a reduction in consumption and income inequality.     

How do independent directors influence innovation productivity? A quasi-natural experiment

Due to managerial myopia, managers may be reluctant to make long-term investment decisions that do not produce immediate results. Effective corporate governance can align managers’ short-term-oriented incentives with shareholders’ long-term interests. Because the board of directors is the paramount governance mechanism, we explore the role of board governance on managerial myopia. In particular, we investigate the effect of independent directors on corporate innovation. To minimize endogeneity, we exploit the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act as an exogenous shock that raises board independence. Our difference-in-difference estimates show that board independence leads to significantly higher investments in innovation as well as higher innovation productivity. Our results are consequential as they show that board governance has a palpable effect on important corporate outcomes such as innovation productivity.     

Monitoring,Appeal, and Investigation: The Enforcement and Legal Process

In this article, I consider a model of law enforcement in which a regulatory agency faces the following problem: To induce firms which are required to adopt a certain level of environmental care, the agency can make spot checks. This monitoring, however, measures a firms degree of protection only with error. On the basis of the observed signal, the agency then has to decide whether or not to fine a firm for taking insufficient protection. If it fines a firm which has actually met the level of environmental protection, the firm has the right to lodge an appeal. To plead the cause, the agency then is required to investigate at high cost the actual degree of the firms protection.In this context we ask how the regulatory agency allocates resources between different enforcement activities. We show how the structure of the optimal enforcement policy depends on the cost of the enforcement activities, on the uncertainty of observation, on its enforcement budget and other factors.     

REGULATORY DEALING: TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION VERSUS ENFORCEMENT STRINGENCY OF EMISSION TAXES

We analyze the role of targeted enforcement of emissions taxes when the regulator wants to minimize aggregate emissions via the adoption of new more environmentally friendly technology. The regulator wants to speed up the path of technology adoption generated by a policy of uniform enforcement (that monitors adopters and nonadopters with the same probability) by engaging in a regulatory deal where a reduced monitoring probability is granted in “exchange” for adoption of the new technology. We set up a theoretical model, characterize the circumstances in which such dealing minimizes aggregate emissions, and test our hypothesis using economic laboratory experiments. Our analytical and experimental results suggest that even though such a deal might imply an increased level of violation by adopters, such tolerance is rather an integral part of an overall enforcement strategy that minimizes aggregate emissions when the rate of adoption is endogenous. (JEL L51, Q53, Q55, Q58)     

Overseas Impacts of China's Outward Direct Investment

China's outward direct investment (ODI) has grown rapidly since 2004. But along with such phenomenal growth is a mixed feeling toward Chinese investments in host countries. This article explores some overseas impacts of Chinese ODI based on an analysis of China's policy environment and investment patterns. We argue that what Chinese investors bring to host economies includes (i) massive job creation, but limited technology transfers to the local economy; (ii) ample capital as well as entry into the Chinese market; and (iii) damage from corporate social misbehavior. However, we suspect that these overseas impacts may be transitory as three dynamics, increased conflicts, accelerated learning and China's domestic structural changes, are simultaneously set in motion.