Expensing stock options: a fair-value approach

Now that companies such as General Electric and Citigroup have accepted the premise that employee stock options are an expense, the debate is shifting from whether to report options on income statements to how to report them. The authors present a new accounting mechanism that maintains the rationale underlying stock option expensing while addressing critics' concerns about measurement error and the lack of reconciliation to actual experience. A procedure they call fair-value expensing adjusts and eventually reconciles cost estimates made at grant date with subsequent changes in the value of the options, and it does so in a way that eliminates forecasting and measurement errors over time. The method captures the chief characteristic of stock option compensation--that employees receive part of their compensation in the form of a contingent claim on the value they are helping to produce. The mechanism involves creating entries on both the asset and equity sides of the balance sheet. On the asset side, companies create a prepaid-compensation account equal to the estimated cost of the options granted; on the owners'-equity side, they create a paid-in capital stock-option account for the same amount. The prepaid-compensation account is then expensed through the income statement, and the stock option account is adjusted on the balance sheet to reflect changes in the estimated fair value of the granted options. The amortization of prepaid compensation is added to the change in the option grant's value to provide the total reported expense of the options grant for the year. At the end of the vesting period, the company uses the fair value of the vested option to make a final adjustment on the income statement to reconcile any difference between that fair value and the total of the amounts already reported.     

Managing Employee Stock Option Expense: A Fair Value Approach

Owing to special characteristics, classic option pricing models are not well suited to the valuation of employee stock options (ESOs). This paper attempts to conduct a more general fair value estimation based on attaching performance targets to option vesting. Considering a setting that includes factors such as options that may be exercised early at employee discretion, employee exit rates and firm default risk, this paper presents a sensitivity analysis and empirical tests of option value. The results highlight the importance of considering the characteristics of ESOs in the design of performance‐vested option plans so as to provide the most attractive incentives for employees.     

Accelerated Vesting of Employee Stock Options in Anticipation of FAS 123-R

In December 2004, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) mandated the use of a fair value–based measurement attribute to value employee stock options (ESOs) via Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123-R. In anticipation of FAS 123-R, between March 2004 and November 2005, several firms accelerate the vesting of ESOs to avoid recognizing existing unvested ESO grants at fair value in future financial statements. We find that the likelihood of accelerated vesting is higher if (1) acceleration has a greater effect on future ESO compensation expense, especially related to underwater options, and (2) firms suffer greater agency problems, proxied by fewer blockholders, lower pension fund ownership, and top five officers holding a greater share of ESOs. We also find a negative stock price reaction around the announcement of the acceleration decision. Furthermore, stock returns are significantly negative before the new vesting dates and positive afterward, suggesting that vesting dates could have been backdated.     

Revisiting the incentive effects of executive stock options

We develop a multiperiod framework to evaluate the incentive effects of executive stock options (ESOs). For a given increase in the grant-date firm stock price (and a concurrent increase in return volatility), the increment of total value at the vesting date acts as a proxy for the incentive effects of ESOs. If the option is attached to the existing contract without adjusting cash compensation, we suggest that a firm should not always fix the strike price to the grant-date stock price; instead, the strike price should vary with the length of the vesting period. We also show that, compared with at-the-money options, restricted stock generates greater incentives to increase stock prices in some scenarios, especially when equity-based awards are vested early. If the vesting period is long, the firm could grant options instead of restricted stock to maximize incentives.     

Valuing employee reload options under the time vesting requirement

Upon the exercise of an employee stock option, the embedded reload provision entitles the holder to receive additional units of new options from the employer. The number of units of new options received is equal to the number of shares tendered as payment of strike and the new strike is set at the prevailing stock price. The reload provision may be subject to a time vesting requirement, that is, after each exercise, the employee is prohibited from exercising the reload until the end of a vesting period. In this paper, we construct an efficient numerical algorithm that computes the market value of the employee reload options under a time vesting requirement. Also, we explore the analytic properties of the price functions and optimal exercise policies of the employee reload options.     

Valuing employee stock options under SFAS 123R using the Black–Scholes–Merton and lattice model approaches

In 2004, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 123 (revised 2004), Share-Based Payments (SFAS 123R), requiring all entities to recognize as expense the fair value of stock options issued to employees for services provided. Because employee stock options cannot be traded publicly, their fair value must be estimated using a model, with the Black–Scholes–Merton (BSM) and lattice models being the most appropriate alternatives.This teaching note provides an overview of employee stock options, followed by a discussion of the BSM and lattice valuation models, including their application and limitations. A project which has been used in financial accounting courses is also presented. The conceptual discussion coupled with illustrated examples will help students enhance their understanding of fair value estimation of and accounting for employee stock options under the recently adopted SFAS 123R.     

An IFRS 2 and FASB 123 (R) Compatible Model for the Valuation of Employee Stock Options

In this paper, we show how employee stock options can be valued under the new reporting standards IFRS 2 and FASB 123 (revised) for share-based payments. Both standards require companies to expense employee stock options at fair value. We propose a new valuation model, referred to as Enhanced American model, that complies with the new standards and produces fair values often lower than those generated by traditional models such as the Black–Scholes model or the adjusted Black–Scholes model. We also provide a sensitivity analysis of model input parameters and analyze the impact of the parameters on the fair value of the option. The valuation of employee stock options requires an accurate estimation of the exercise behavior. We show how the exercise behavior can be modeled in a binomial tree and demonstrate the relevance of the input parameters in the calibration of the model to an estimated expected life of the option. JEL Classification G13, G30     

SIX CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING EQUITY-BASED PAY

The past two decades have seen a dramatic increase in the equitybased pay of U.S. corporate executives, an increase that has been driven almost entirely by the explosion of stock option grants. When properly designed, equity‐based pay can raise corporate productivity and shareholder value by helping companies attract, motivate, and retain talented managers. But there are good reasons to question whether the current forms of U.S. equity pay are optimal. In many cases, substantial stock and option payoffs to top executives–particularly those who cashed out much of their holdings near the top of the market–appear to have come at the expense of their shareholders, generating considerable skepticism about not just executive pay practices, but the overall quality of U.S. corporate governance. At the same time, many companies that have experienced sharp stock price declines are now struggling with the problem of retaining employees holding lots of deep‐underwater options. This article discusses the design of equity‐based pay plans that aim to motivate sustainable, or long‐run, value creation. As a first step, the author recommends the use of longer vesting periods and other requirements on executive stock and option holdings, both to limit managers' ability to “time” the market and to reduce their incentives to take shortsighted actions that increase near‐term earnings at the expense of longer‐term cash flow. Besides requiring “more permanent” holdings, the author also proposes a change in how stock options are issued. In place of popular “fixed value” plans that adjust the number of options awarded each year to reflect changes in the share price (and that effectively reward management for poor performance by granting more options when the price falls, and fewer when it rises), the author recommends the use of “fixed number” plans that avoid this unintended distortion of incentives. As the author also notes, there is considerable confusion about the real economic cost of options relative to stock. Part of the confusion stems, of course, from current GAAP accounting, which allows companies to report the issuance of at‐the‐money options as costless and so creates a bias against stock and other forms of compensation. But, coming on top of the “opportunity cost” of executive stock options to the company's shareholders, there is another, potentially significant cost of options (and, to a lesser extent, stock) that arises from the propensity of executives and employees to place a lower value on company stock and options than well‐diversified outside investors. The author's conclusion is that grants of (slow‐vesting) stock are likely to have at least three significant advantages over employee stock options:

• ? they are more highly valued by executives and employees (per dollar of cost to shareholders);
• ? they continue to provide reasonably strong ownership incentives and retention power, regardless of whether the stock price rises or falls, because they don't go underwater; and
• ? the value of such grants is much more transparent to stockholders, employees, and the press.

     

The impact of SFAS No. 123(R) on financial statement conservatism

SFAS No. 123(R) requires firms to recognize the fair value of stock options as compensation expense over the vesting period of the options. Thus, SFAS No. 123(R) leads to an overall increase in financial statement conservatism. However, it is not known whether SFAS No. 123(R) increases conditional and/or unconditional conservatism. Because the different forms of conservatism have different implications for the quality of earnings, I investigate which types of conservatism are impacted by SFAS No. 123(R) to gain insight into the ramifications of the Standard. I find that SFAS No. 123(R) leads to an increase in both unconditional and conditional conservatism. I additionally find that the Standard causes an increased negative relation between contemporaneous economic gains and income. These findings hold outside of the sample period and under a non-priced based model of conservatism.     

Stock option compensation: impact of expense recognition on performance indicators of non-domestic companies listed in the U.S.

The IFRS 2, Share-based Payment, requires that companies recognize the fair value of employee stock options as an expense. To ascertain the impact recognition will have on companies domiciled in countries subject to accounting standards issued by the IASB’s liaison standard setting partners, this research examines the pro forma stock option disclosures provided in Form 20-F by Australian, British, Canadian, French, German, Japanese, and Irish companies.The findings indicate the average impact of expense recognition on diluted EPS will be approximately 40% and will be material at a 5% level for the majority of the companies. The impact varies significantly by country. On average the annual expense recognized will be approximately 15% of beginning stockholders equity. For the majority of the companies, the charge will represent less than 1% of beginning equity. Again the impact varies significantly by country.The findings indicate that absent requirements that stock compensation expense be recognized, a material upward bias will be reflected in performance indicators of many non-U.S. companies and cross-border comparability will be impaired. Since our analysis is based solely on data for the year 2000 for companies domiciled in seven countries, future research will be needed to ascertain the impact of expense recognition on a broader range of companies reporting under IFRS 2.     

Stock option grant vesting terms: economic and financial reporting determinants

Option grant vesting terms are a contractual provision that is shaped by accounting standards and other economic factors. We examine the effect of accounting standards, specifically SFAS 123(R), on the vesting terms of stock option grants while also modeling other economic determinants of this contract feature. We document significant variation in stock option grant vesting periods and patterns suggesting that firms actively choose vesting terms. Consistent with financial reporting incentives influencing contract design, we find that firms simultaneously lengthen vesting periods and alter vesting patterns after the adoption of SFAS 123(R). The changes in vesting patterns are consistent with firms trying to defer recognition of the option expense, while limiting the incremental risk imposed on the CEO. In addition, we find that vesting schedules are longer in growth firms where lengthening the executive’s investment horizon is more important and that firms with more powerful CEOs and weaker governance grant options with shorter vesting periods.     

Determining fair values of performance‐vested and forfeiture‐embedded employee stock options

This study provides a new approach to determine the fair value of ESOs by extending the performance‐vested option pricing model. The model developed in this study takes both vesting period and forfeiture rate into consideration to capture characteristics of ESOs. Empirical and sensitivity analyses give evidence for the importance of these two elements. Empirical results also support that the derived model can be employed to increase the accuracy of ESOs’ fair value.     

American GARCH employee stock option valuation

We implement a flexible simulation-based approach for the fair value of employee stock option (ESO) that accounts for the vesting period, departure risk and voluntary suboptimal early exercise. We introduce GARCH effects on the underlying asset and we analyze the price bias with respect to the constant volatility case. We also perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to changes in several ESO characteristics. We compare this valuation with FAS 123 method revealing a FAS overvaluation. Finally, we value a real ESO plan providing the confidence intervals for the estimated ESO prices.     

Do Firms Use Time‐Vested Stock‐Based Pay to Keep Research and Development Investments Secret?

I find that executives’ unvested equity holdings are larger when executives are employed by R&D‐intensive firms in industries that rely more on secrecy to profit from R&D. Moreover, I find that this relation is more pronounced for executives with a greater ability to exploit R&D‐related information and also holds for nonexecutive employees. In addition, I find that these firms use option grants with longer vesting periods and that unvested equity holdings reduce the likelihood that their executives leave to find employment elsewhere. Overall, my findings are consistent with firms using time‐vested stock‐based pay to reduce the leakage of R&D‐related information to competitors through employee mobility.     

Recognition versus Disclosure of Stock Option Compensation: An Analysis of Judgements and Decisions of Nonprofessional Investors*/CONSTATER OU PRÉSENTER PAR VOIE DE NOTE LA RÉMUNÉRATION SOUS FORME D'OPTIONS D'ACHAT D'ACTIONS: UNE ANALYSE DES JUGEMENTS ET DES DÉCISIONS DES INVESTISSEURS NON PROFESSIONNELS

Given the importance of stock options in the aggregate compensation of chief executive officers and other firm employees in the 1990s and early 2000s, the International Accounting Standards Board issued an International Financial Reporting Standard on stock‐based payments on February 19, 2004, requiring that all share‐based payment transactions be recognized at fair value in entities' financial statements. The Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants' Accounting Standards Board had already agreed to this principle and amended section 3870 of the CICA Handbook (stock‐based compensation) for financial periods beginning on or after January 1, 2004, making Canada the first major jurisdiction to require all public companies to expense employee stock‐based compensation awards. The revised section eliminated the possibility of disclosing pro forma net income and earnings per share only by way of a note. This research, conducted as a between‐subjects experiment with executive MBA students as nonprofessional investors, examines whether changes in the way stock option compensation is reported (recognition as an expense in the income statement or note disclosure of pro forma net income and earnings per share) affect financial statement users' judgements and investment decisions. Our results indicate that, consistent with the functional fixation hypothesis, the reporting method does indeed significantly influence subjects' judgement of the expected stock price direction, but has no material influence on their investment decisions.     

Accounting for Option–based Compensation: The Economic Cost Approach

The intrinsic value approach amortizes over the life of the option, the difference between the stock price on the date of the grant and the exercise price of the option. The fair market value approach amortizes over the life of the option, the market value of stock options on the date of the grant. These approaches do not reflect the changes in the option–based compensation cost after the grant date. This paper proposes an economic cost approach that not only adjusts for the changes in the value of the options during its life but also records the issuance of the stock at fair market value on the exercise date.     

Finance, Politics, and the Accounting for Stock Options

The politics of option accounting crosses party lines, reflecting both the interests of the affected constituencies and the desire for power over standard setting. House Bill HR-3574, which mandates an assumption of zero stock price volatility, runs counter to the recently passed Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) rule requiring fair-value expensing of stock options. For any option issued at or out of the money, where strike prices are normally set, expense recognition is zero under this bill's mandated assumption.
Besides excessive use of stock options, the lack of a "final peace" in the option accounting war appears to have encouraged another questionable corporate practice. This article examines a sample of "six-and-one restructurings," exchanges of options in which expensing of re-priced (deep out-of-the-money) options can be avoided if employees wait at least six months and one day before receiving new options. The authors found that market-adjusted stock prices tend to decrease during the six-month period before the strike price is reset. This result provides one more reason why companies should be required to use fair-value option pricing models to expense options.     

What determines early exercise of employee stock options in Australia?

Employee stock options (ESOs) are a popular way of remunerating employees. We analyse factors at the firm and option level affecting the employee's decision to exercise ESOs before they mature. Exercises over the period 1998–2004 are analysed and the key factor influencing early exercise is found to be dividends. Exercises frequently occur well before maturity, but in most cases little time value is sacrificed. Our findings have implications for the ‘fair’ valuation of ESOs in companies’ financial statements, as required by the relevant Australian accounting standard, AASB 2.     

Employee Stock Option Exercise and Firm Cost

We develop an empirical model of employee stock option exercise that is suitable for valuation and allows for behavioral channels. We estimate exercise rates as functions of option, stock, and employee characteristics using all employee exercises at 88 public firms, 27 of them in the S&P 500. Increasing vesting frequency from annual to monthly reduces option value by 11% to 16%. Men exercise faster, reducing value by 2% to 4%, while top employees exercise slower, increasing value by 2% to 7%. Finally, we develop an analytic valuation approximation that is more accurate than methods used in practice.     

Companies' Modest Claims About the Value of CEO Stock Option Awards

This paper analyzes company disclosures of CEO stock option values in compliance with the SEC's regulations for reporting executive compensation data to stockholders. Companies appear to exploit the flexibility of the regulations to reduce the apparent value of managerial compensation. Companies shorten the expected lives of stock options and unilaterally apply discounts to the Black-Scholes formula. Theoretical support for these adjustments is often thin, and companies universally ignore reasons that the Black-Scholes formula might underestimate the value of executive stock options. The findings not only cast light upon how corporations value executive stock options, but also provide a means of forecasting compliance with controversial new FASB requirements for firms to disclose the compensation expense represented by executive stock options.