Monetary Policy in Low Income Countries in the Face of The Global Crisis: A Structural Analysis

We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a banking sector to analyse the impact of the financial crisis in developing countries and the role of the monetary policy response, with an application to Zambia. We view the crisis as a combination of three related shocks: a worsening in the terms of the trade, an increase in the country's risk premium and a decrease in the risk appetite of local banks. Model simulations broadly match the path of the economy during this period. We derive policy implications for central banks, and for dynamic stochastic general equilibrium modelling of monetary policy, in low‐income countries.     

Global banking,global crises? The role of the bank balance-sheet channel for the transmission of financial crises

We examine whether shocks to leveraged creditors with cross border holdings have an incidence on debtor countries׳ risk of suffering financial turmoil. We construct a new proxy of shocks to international banks׳ balance-sheets using credit ratings and the structure of their international assets. This allows us investigating the effect of (foreign) bank balance-sheet shocks on domestic financial turmoil in a large sample of 146 developed and emerging economies from 1984 to 2011. Our proxies of shocks towards bank balance-sheets are strong predictors of systemic banking crises in their debtor countries. Confirming these results, bilateral bank flows significantly decrease when creditor banks׳ assets are hit by negative shocks, as measured by credit rating downgrades from third-party countries. Short-term liabilities towards global banks appear to increase roll-over and funding risks, thereby amplifying the impact of shocks to foreign lenders’ balance-sheets. Domestic banking sectors vulnerabilities, such as illiquid assets and a low deposit-asset ratio, are found to increase crisis contagion risk. In contrast, a high level of global liquidity attenuates the transmission of shocks to international banks׳ assets to debtor countries.     

Lending conditions in EU: The role of credit demand and supply

We analyse the bank lending activity after the financial crisis and focus on bank-specific supply factors. Using a rich microeconomic dataset from Bankscope and macroeconomic shocks data, we employ OLS and 2SLS fixed effects models with banking controls, macroeconomic shocks and institutional quality. The banks’ loan-rate spreads increased despite the recent policy of low interest rates and quantitative easing. We use the bank asset quality as instruments to capture exogenous changes in loan supply. The empirical evidence shows that loan-rate spread and through this the supply of loans is negatively affected by a low asset quality and capital ratios.     

Bank loan supply shocks and leverage adjustment

We investigate the effect of bank loan supply shocks on firms’ leverage adjustment. We show that the impact of bank shocks is larger for firms with greater dependence on financially troubled banks. We measure firms’ pre-crisis loan dependence on troubled banks by using matched firm–bank loan data. Using the boom-bust cycle from 1987 to 2014 in Japan as a quasi-experiment, we find that financially constrained firms adjust their leverage slower during credit-crunch periods than during other periods. During credit-crunch periods following banking crisis, firms associated with failing banks or with banks that have a limited capacity to supply loans show a slower adjustment than other firms. Bank shocks have significant effects on small firms’ adjustment but not on that of large firms. These results are robust when we consider demand-side effects and perform other robustness tests. Our results imply that bank shocks have a persistent effect on borrowers’ leverage.     

Asymmetric monetary policy and the effective lower bound

We use the canonical New Keynesian model to study optimal discretionary policy when the nominal interest rate is constrained by the effective lower bound (ELB). We show that policymakers who seek to minimize a (symmetric) quadratic loss function involving deviations of inflation and output from targets will achieve an average inflation rate below target due to the contractionary effects associated with hitting the ELB. We also characterize optimal discretionary policy for policymakers who view output losses as asymmetric: they place weight on the output gap when output is below potential but place little or no weight on the gap when output is above potential. In comparison to optimal policy using the symmetric loss function, the average inflation rate is higher and closer to the central banks target. Moreover, in response to contractionary demand shocks that push the nominal interest rate to the effective lower bound, policymakers with an asymmetric loss function adopt a policy rate path that remains at the ELB longer but eventually rises more quickly than the path adopted by a policymaker with a symmetric loss function.     

BANKING UNION IN EUROPE: HOW MUCH CENTRALISATION IS NEEDED?

We examine the efficiency of banking regulation in a federation with two tiers of government and highly integrated banking systems. We assume that policy makers have incomplete information about banks’ true health, and banking sector turmoil can generate cross‐border spill‐over effects. We show that, in such an environment, the decentralisation of policy responsibilities for the regulation of banks can achieve the first‐best allocation and ensure financial stability. While national governments design banking regulations, the federal policy maker authorises inter‐regional income redistribution payments throughout the federation. Our results suggest that strengthening national responsibilities in banking regulation and supervision in the course of the further development of the European banking union may be advisable.     

A policy model to analyze macroprudential regulations and monetary policy

We construct a small‐open‐economy, new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general‐equilibrium model with real financial linkages to analyze the effects of financial shocks and macroprudential policies on the Canadian economy. The model incorporates rich interactions between the balance sheets of households, firms and banks, long‐term household and business debt, macroprudential policy instruments and nominal and real rigidities and is calibrated to match dynamics in Canadian macroeconomic and financial data. We study the transmission of monetary policy and financial and real shocks in the model economy and analyze the effectiveness of various policies in simultaneously achieving macroeconomic and financial stability. We find that, in terms of reducing household debt, more targeted tools such as loan‐to‐value regulations are the most effective and least costly, followed by bank capital regulations and monetary policy, respectively.     

The impact of setting negative policy rates on banking flows and exchange rates

In the aftermath of the great contraction of 2008, policymakers were faced with the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates. Central banks implemented several unconventional monetary policies to overcome the ZLB, including setting negative nominal interest rates. This paper explores possible unintended effects of setting negative policy rates. Using Danish data, I assess the impact of paying a negative interest rate on reserves. Results suggest that going into negative territory has a particular impact, distinct from that of simply lowering interest rates: it leads to higher banking outflows and depreciation of the currency. Due to the reluctance of commercial banks to pass on negative rates to their depositors (retail deposits can easily be switched into cash), paying a negative (vs. positive) interest rate on reserves creates a disconnection between the assets and liabilities of commercial banks' balance sheets. Commercial banks can avoid this disconnection by holding external assets or assets in foreign currencies. This incentive to increase banking outflows appears to explain the particular impact of going into negative territory.     

Banking sector resilience to financial spillovers

By using a large sample of bank-level data, we analyse whether the spillover effects of US financial shocks differ with the fundamental characteristics of the banking sectors in the affected countries. We find that a banking sector characterized by a higher degree of competition and larger margin of safety is less affected by financial spillovers. The results are robust to the inclusion of bank-level control variables that capture individual banks’ lending capacity.     

The transmission of financial shocks in an estimated DSGE model with housing and banking

We develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with housing and banking to study the transmission of financial shocks between the financial and real sectors. A deterioration in the bank's balance sheet induced by financial shocks could have amplified and persistent impacts on real activities. The amplification of the shocks are originated from financial frictions tied to households and banks. We find that a disruption in bank net worth initiated by capital quality shocks generates a decline in household loans, house prices and output. Bank liquidity shocks also have negative effects on these variables. Housing preference shocks could generate a positive comovement between house prices and output. All these findings are qualitatively consistent with empirical evidence, suggesting that these financial shocks are critical to the dynamics of house prices and other macroeconomic variables.     

Determinants of income diversification: evidence from Chinese banks

This article presents an analysis of the determinants of Chinese commercial banks’ income diversification decisions. Using a panel dataset comprising 88 Chinese domestic banks from 2003 to 2010, we find that bank diversification reflects a variety of managerial abilities: insolvency risks, cost, capital position, asset scale and ownership structure. A larger ratio of banking assets to gross domestic product and lower interest spread lead to a higher level of diversification. Moreover, national banks and regional banks have different strategic responses to the macroeconomic, and indeed, regulatory environment. Resisting shocks from the banking sector and the macro economy, and supplementing liquidity shortages from intermediation business seem to be the driving forces of national banks to operate in non-banking sectors.     

Monetary Policy in the Open Economy Revisited: Price Setting and Exchange-Rate Flexibility

This paper develops a welfare-based model of monetary policy in an open economy. We examine the optimal monetary policy under commitment, focusing on the nature of price adjustment in determining policy. We investigate the implications of these policies for exchange-rate flexibility. The traditional approach maintains that exchange-rate flexibility is desirable in the presence of real country-specific shocks that require adjustment in relative prices. However, in the light of empirical evidence on nominal price response to exchange-rate changes—specifically, that there appears to be a large degree of local-currency pricing (LCP) in industrialized countries—the expenditure-switching role played by nominal exchange rates may be exaggerated in the traditional literature. In the presence of LCP, we find that the optimal monetary policy leads to a fixed exchange rate, even in the presence of country-specific shocks. This is true whether monetary policy is chosen cooperatively or non-cooperatively among countries.     

Liquidity risk and financial competition: Implications for asset prices and monetary policy

This paper studies the implications of banking competition for capital markets and monetary policy. In particular, I develop a two-sector monetary growth model in which a group of agents is exposed to liquidity shocks and money is essential. Banks insure depositors against such risk and invest in the economy's assets. In this setting, I compare an economy with a perfectly competitive banking sector to an economy with a fully concentrated financial sector. Unlike previous work, banks can have market power in both deposits and capital markets. Compared to a perfectly competitive financial sector, I demonstrate that a monopolistic banking system can have substantial adverse consequences on capital formation, assets prices, and the degree of risk sharing. Furthermore, multiple steady-states can emerge and the economy becomes subject to poverty traps. More importantly, market power in financial markets may overturn the Tobin effect present under a perfectly competitive financial sector. This necessarily happens in economies with high degrees of liquidity risk and low levels of capital formation.     

Credit creation under multiple banking regulations: The impact of balance sheet diversity on money supply

Since the recent financial crisis along with more concentration of banking supervision, we have stepped into a new regulatory regime where multiple regulations are at play simultaneously. In this paper, we study the collective impacts of multiple regulations on credit creation in a heterogeneous banking system. Each single regulation imposes a constraint on credit creation for each bank, while with multiple regulations, only the most stringent one plays the determinant role on money supply. For the homogeneous banking system with identical balance sheets, they share the same binding regulation. In contrast, for the heterogeneous banking system with diverse balance sheets, the binding regulation for each bank may be different from other's. Those banks, who are bound by different regulatory constraints from homogeneous banks, would bring about an overall reduction in money supply, because those binding regulations impose a lower capacity (compared with the one in the case of homogeneous banks) for the banks to extend their balance sheets in this condition. We put forward an agent-based model of commercial banks integrated with two processes: credit creation and fund transfer, to demonstrate the reduction effect. The results facilitate the understandings of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy via banks and its interaction with prudential regulations.     

Endogenous contract structure and monetary policy

We analyze the co-determination of monetary policy and the labor contracts chosen by members of the public, who can either fix or index their nominal wages. Fixed nominal wages allow the central bank to offset productivity shocks, while the public fix nominal wages in response to the central bank offsetting shocks; so there is an equilibrium in which, realistically, nominal wages are fixed and shocks offset: a result which holds in single- as well as in multi-period games. In addition, there may be equilibria in which agents index their nominal wages, and the central bank optimally responds by stabilizing price. In contrast to conventional models, the Ramsey rule may be implemented in a finitely repeated game. The central bank does not deviate for fear that agents would change their labor contracts such that the central bank's least favored equilibrium will subsequently be played.     

Tipping the (Im)balance: Capital inflows,financial market structure,and banking crises

An emerging consensus among scholars and policy‐makers identifies foreign capital inflows as one of the primary determinants of banking crises in developed countries. We challenge this view by arguing that external imbalances are destabilizing only when banks face substantial competition from securities markets in the process of financial intermediation. We assemble a dataset of banking crises covering the advanced industrialized countries from 1976 to 2011 and find evidence of a conditional relationship between capital inflows, a well‐developed securities market, and the incidence of banking crises. We further explore the impact of capital inflows on banks’ actual risk taking as indicated by their capital adequacy levels and measures of insolvency risk. Our results demonstrate that prudential capital cushions tend to decline with the combination of capital inflows and prominent securities markets. We highlight the political decisions—often made during the early days of a country's financial development—that determine the relative prominence of banks vs. non‐bank financial institutions and conclude with policy recommendations.     

Bank behavior, incomplete interest rate pass-through, and the cost channel of monetary policy transmission

This paper employs a New Keynesian DSGE model to explore the role of banks within the cost channel of monetary policy transmission for shaping the interest rate pass-through from money market rates to loan rates. Banks extend loans to firms in an environment of monopolistic competition by setting their loan rates in a staggered way, which means that the adjustment of the aggregate loan rate to a monetary policy shock is sticky. We estimate the model for the euro area by adopting a minimum distance approach. Our findings exhibit that (i) financial costs are an important factor for price changes, (ii) frictions in the loan market have an effect on the propagation of monetary policy shocks as the pass-through from a change in money market rates to loan rates is incomplete, and (iii) the strength of the cost channel is mitigated as banks shelter firms from monetary policy shocks by smoothing loan rates.     

Bilateral exposures and systemic solvency risk

Abstract By introducing a structure of the balance sheets of the banks, which takes into account their bilateral exposures in terms of stocks or lendings, we get a structural model for default analysis. This model allows us to distinguish the exogenous and endogenous default dependence. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the liquidation equilibrium, we study the consequences of exogenous shocks on the banking system and we measure contagion phenomena. This approach is illustrated by an application to the French banking system.     

Money, credit and banking

In monetary models where agents are subject to trading shocks there is typically an ex post inefficiency since some agents are holding idle balances while others are cash constrained. This problem creates a role for financial intermediaries, such as banks, who accept nominal deposits and make nominal loans. In general, financial intermediation improves the allocation. The gains in welfare come from the payment of interest on deposits and not from relaxing borrowers’ liquidity constraints. We also demonstrate that when credit rationing occurs increasing the rate of inflation can be welfare improving.     

Oil prices and economic downturns: the case of Spain

We address the macroeconomic effects of an oil price shock in Spain. We apply a vector autoregression model (VAR) analysis to quarterly data for the Spanish economy since 1986, to elucidate the effects of variations in the oil price on the economy, considering the three main causes of disruptions in the oil markets: oil supply shocks, oil demand shocks and oil-specific (precautionary) demand shocks. We conclude that the effects in Spain strongly depend on the type of shock: the consumer price index (CPI) has mainly been influenced by oil demand shocks; output has only reacted to oil supply shocks; and monetary policy has mainly reacted after precautionary shocks. Second-round effects caused by the behaviour of nominal wages have not been found. Additionally, we discuss two facts: the ability of firms to increase markups in a context of rising demand and the procyclical role of monetary policy when faced with oil demand shocks.