Auction design with opportunity cost

This paper studies revenue-maximizing auctions in an independent private value setting where potential bidders have known positive opportunity cost of bidding. The main findings are as follows. Firstly, there is no loss of generality in deriving the revenue-maximizing auctions within the class of threshold-entry mechanisms. Secondly, for any given set of entry thresholds, a second-price sealed-bid auction with properly set reserve prices and entry subsidy is revenue-maximizing. Thirdly, a variety of auctions are revenue-maximizing within the symmetric threshold-entry class. Two of them involve no entry subsidy (fee). Fourthly, we identify sufficient conditions under which it is in the seller’s interest to limit the number of potential bidders even if the revenue-maximizing symmetric threshold-entry auction is adopted. Lastly, the revenue-maximizing auction implements asymmetric entry across symmetric bidders in many cases. I am grateful to Jean-Jacques Laffont for his advice. I thank Isabelle Brocas, Juan Carrillo, Indranil Chakraborty, Jeff Ely, Jinwoo Kim, Vijay Krishna, Preston McAfee, Isabelle Perrigne, Eric Rasmusen, Guofu Tan, Quang Vuong, Joseph Wang for helpful comments and suggestions. Insightful comments and suggestions from the associate editor and two anonymous referees have greatly improved the paper. Earlier versions have been presented at the 2004 International Industrial Organization Conference, the 2005 Pan Pacific Game Theory Conference and the 2007 International Game Theory Conference. All errors are mine. Financial support from National University of Singapore (R-122-000-088-112) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Cultural differences,insecure property rights and the mode of entry decision

We develop a theory of a multinational corporation’s optimal mode of entry in a new market. The foreign firm can choose between a licensing agreement, a wholly owned subsidiary or shared control (joint venture). In an environment in which property rights are insecure, opportunism is possible, and the identification of new business opportunities is costly, we show that the relationship between the quality of the institutional environment and the mode of entry decision is non-monotonic. Licensing is preferred if property rights are strictly enforced, while a joint venture is chosen when property rights are poorly enforced. For intermediate situations, the better use of local knowledge made possible by shared control under a joint venture works as a double edged sword. On the one hand, it makes the monitoring activity of the multinational more credible, on the other it offers insurance to both parties, potentially compromising the incentives faced by the local partner. We are grateful to the Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano for providing financial support. For useful comments we would like to thank Klaus Desmet, Cecilia Testa, Henry Wan and Gerald Willmann and seminar participants at Cornell, Ente Luigi Einaudi, Fundacao Getulio Vargas, Kiel, Milano, Universidad de Sao Paolo, the Midwest International Economics Meetings in Indianapolis, SAET VI conference in Rhodes, and the City University of Hong Kong Conference on Intellectual Property Rights.     

Cost Savings From Generation and Distribution with an Application to Italian Electric Utilities*

In the last decade, the European Commission promoted a new regulatory framework aiming at a gradual liberalization of the energy markets. The introduction of competition among generators implies the need to separate generation from transmission and distribution activities. However, if savings can be reached by operating at different stages, vertical separation would increase the costs of providing power. This paper tests for the presence of economies from vertical integration on a sample of Italian local electric utilities and finds evidence of both multi-stage economies of scale and vertical economies. Even if the hypothesis of global subadditivity is not supported, our evidence suggests that a complete divestiture policy would entail efficiency losses. *For helpful comments and discussions, we thank two anonymous referees, Graziano Abrate, Bruno Bosco, Diego Piacentino, and participants at the 31st Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE), Berlin, Germany, 2–5 September, 2004, the 60th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance (IIPF), Milan, Italy, 23–26 August, 2004, and seminars held at the Bocconi University, University of Lecce, University of Naples, University of Pavia, and University of Turin, where earlier versions of this paper were presented. The financial support of MIUR (COFIN 2002) and HERMES Research Center is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies. **HERMES, Center for Research on Regulated Services, Fondazione Collegio Carlo Alberto, Via Real Collegio 30, 10024 Moncalieri (TO), Italy, http://www.hermesricerche.it.     

Economies of scope in the local telephone exchange market

Using cost data generated by an optimization model, we evaluate the degree of economies of scope in the local telephone exchange market. We find that economies of scope between switched and non-switched services are a decreasing function of customer density, while there are strong economies of scope, regardless of customer density, within the switched telephone market.The authors gratefully acknowledge partial funding from the National Regulatory Research Institute at the Ohio State University. This work was made possible in part by research computing facilities provided by the City University of New York and Tulane University. We thank Editor Michael Crew, two anonymous referees, and David Malueg for useful comments and suggestions. Remaining errors are, of course, our own responsibility.The computer software (compiled for use on MS-DOS machines) and user instructions developed for this paper are available at reproduction cost from the authors at either address. The authors are willing to collaborate with interested researchers in modifications of the source code; however, source code will not be distributed due to confidentiality restrictions.     

Exchange rates and asymmetric shocks in small open economies

We study the stabilizing properties of exchange rates in five small open economies during to periods of floating exchange rates and inflation targeting. In the cases of Sweden and Canada, the nominal exchange rates behave in a stabilizing manner. Most exchange rate movements emanate from the exchange rate itself and are hence not responses to fundamental shocks. However, these non-fundamental shocks have only negligible effects on output and inflation. Our findings indicate that exchange rates display some stabilizing properties but can mainly be characterized as disconnected from the rest of the economy. We would like to thank Nils Gottfries and participants at seminars at Uppsala University and the Riksbank for helpful advice and useful comments. Post gratefully acknowledges financial support from Handelsbankens forskningsstiftelser.     

The local bifurcation of Ramsey equilibrium

Summary The elasticity of substitution has been proposed as one factor in the generation of aggregate fluctuations in dynamic models with incomplete markets. We study the existence of periodic solutions in a one-sector neoclassical capital accumulation model under borrowing constraints with infinitely-lived heterogeneous agents. A dynamical system representing an equilibrium profile with only the most patient agent holding capital is analyzed when capital income is not an increasing function of total capital. Conditions for the linear approximation system at a steady state to have an eigenvalue of — 1 are found. A one-parameter family of maps based on a perturbation of the production function is introduced and the dynamical system is reduced to 1 dimension via an application of a center manifold theorem. Conditions for a stable flip bifurcation are shown to hold at the steady state.This paper is dedicated to Professor Nicolas Spulber, one of the great pioneers in the study of growth theory. He brought us together and encouraged our joint work on Ramsey equilibrium theory.We thank Nicolas Spulber for his usual insightful comments and we thank Michele Boldrin for a useful discussion. We also thank a referee for suggesting improvements in the paper as well as the seminar participants at the University of Rochester and Cornell University for their comments on the paper.     

Indivisibilities,lotteries, and sunspot equilibria

Summary We analyze economies with indivisible commodities. There are two reasons for doing so. First, we extend and provide some new insights into sunspot equilibrium theory. Finite competitive economies with perfect markets and convex consumption sets do not allow sunspot equilibria; these same economies with nonconvex consumption sets do, and they have several properties that can never arise in convex environments. Second, we provide a reinterpretation of the employment lotteries used in contract theory and in macroeconomic models with indivisible labor. We show how socially optimal employment lotteries can be decentralized as competitive equilibria without lotteries once sunspots are introduced.We thank Kenneth Arrow, Aditya Goenka, Ed Green, Jeremy Greenwood, Walter Heller, Steve Matthews, Herve Moulin, Roger Meyerson, Jim Peck, Patrick Kehoe, Ramon Marimon, Ed Prescott, Richard Rogerson, Nancy Stokey and Raghu Sundaram for their comments. We also thank participants in seminars at Northwestern, Yale, USC, Cornell, Barcelona, Madrid, Santander, and the Canadian Economics Association annual meetings in Victoria. We are grateful to the National Science Foundation (through grants SES-8606944 and SES-8821225), the Center for Analytic Economics, the Thorne Fund, and the University of Pennsylvania Research Foundation for research support. The views expressed here are those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.     

Commodity Taxation and the Effects of Entry: A Case of Variety Preferences

We study the relationship between commodity taxation and the effect of entry with imperfect competition. We develop a simple general equilibrium model with imperfect competition in which consumers have variety preferences. As a result, we see that introducing specific taxes increases social welfare. Furthermore, we show that the optimal tax rule is contrary to the inverse elasticity rule.Acknowledgement We wish to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.     

Asset trading volume in a production economy

Judd et al. (J Finance 63: 2203–2217, 2003) show that the stationary Lucas tree model cannot generate nontrivial asset trading: Heterogenous agents will optimally choose a fixed portfolio after initial rebalancing. This paper explores asset trading volume in production economies with heterogeneous agents and dynamically complete market structures. We establish a recursive version of the Negishi approach to prove the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Furthermore, we develop a general method to solve for equilibrium portfolios in production economies within a fairly general set of complete market structures. We thus establish the theoretical reasons why production economies in general generate a nontrivial volume of asset trading even if heterogeneity of the agents is kept to a minimum. We would like to thank W. Brock, D. DeJong and, especially, H. Ennis for comments and suggestions. We also thank seminar participants at Di Tella and San Andrés Universities (Argentina), the Institute for Advanced Studies (Austria), SED Meetings 2005 (Budapest) and SAET Conference 2005 (Vigo).     

Endogenous market segmentation with heterogeneous agents

Summary. An explanation is provided for the evolution of segmented marketplaces in a pairwise exchange economy. Large traders operating in a pairwise exchange market prefer to meet other similar traders, because this enables them to trade their endowments in a smaller number of encounters. Large and small traders, however, cannot be distinguished a priori, and the existence of the small traders imposes a negative externality on the large traders. We show that, under conditions which are not very restrictive, establishing a separate market (perhaps with an entry fee) designated for the large traders induces the two types of traders to segment themselves. However, this segmentation is not necessarily welfare improving. Received: January 12, 2001; revised version: July 17, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I wish to thank the participants in the Friday Theory Workshop at the University of Sydney, and the participants at the 17th Australian Theory Workshop at the University of Melbourne for comments and discussion. John Hillas and Stephen King pointed out an omission in an earlier version, and Catherine de Fontenay and Hodaka Morita made extensive comments on earlier drafts. This work was initiated while I was a short-term visitor at the University of Southern California.     

Theory of negative consumption externalities with applications to the economics of happiness

This paper investigates the problem of obtaining Pareto efficient allocations in the presence of negative consumption externalities. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, we show that even if consumers’ preferences are monotonically increasing in their own consumption, one may have to dispose of resources to achieve Pareto efficiency when negative consumption externalities exist. We provide characterization results on destruction both for pure exchange economies and for production economies. As an application, our results provide an explanation to Easterlin’s paradox: average happiness levels do not increase as countries grow wealthier. We thank an anonymous referee, Xiaoyong Cao, Li Gan, and Tapan Mitra for helpful comments and suggestions that improved the exposition of the paper. The first author thanks the National Natural Science Foundation of China and Private Enterprise Research Center at Texas A&M University for financial support.     

Testable Implications of Pareto Efficiency and Individualrationality

This paper investigates the testable implications of Pareto efficiency and individual rationality on finite data sets in exchange economies with finitely many commodities and agents. Efficiency alone provides no restrictions other than a trivial “no waste”-condition. Efficiency together with individual rationality implies robust restrictionsI appreciate the comments of Don Brown, Truman Bewley and Charles Steinhorn. I also thank seminar participants at Yale, Zuerich and Mainz, as well as conference participants at the 12th European General Equilibrium Workshop in Bielefeld. The generous support of the Cowles Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The paper also benefited greatly from the comments of an anonymous referee     

规模经济不需要行政性进入壁垒的保护

我国的很多垄断性产业处于市场内生性的结构性进入壁垒和政府设置壁垒的双重保护下。政府设置进入壁垒的原因被认为是保护在位企业的规模经济。本文的分析表明,这类企业的规模本身就构成了进入壁垒,并不需要行政性壁垒的保护。为弱化行政性进入壁垒下企业内生的低效率,有必要放松乃至解除行政性壁垒,但这并不必然导致竞争性低效率。     

Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models

The paper analyzes the endogenous formation of a financial intermediary, modelled as a multi-lender coalition, as the trade-off between economies of scale in monitoring and a ‘cost’ associated with the partial loss of control over the investments the multi-lender coalition makes. In contrast with previous contributions (e.g., Williamson in J Monet Econ 18:159–179, 1986), the model can account for the coexistence of financial intermediation and direct lending (a non-trivial equilibrium). We prove the existence of such non-trivial equilibria and provide a complete characterization of them. In particular, the stronger the diversity of opinions, the smaller the coalition size is. I owe Pierpaolo Battigalli and Larry Samuelson a special debt for their insightful comments and encouragements. I am also grateful to the co-editor, Stephen Williamson, and an anonymous referee for insightful comments. I also like to thank Rabah Amir, Francis Bloch, Guillaume Carlier, Pascal Courty, Martin Hellwig, Bart Lipman, Jean-Marc Tallon and Anne Villamil for helpful discussions. Finally, I thank the THEMA, University Cergy-Pontoise, where part of this paper was written, for their hospitality.     

Existence of Nash networks in one-way flow models

This paper addresses the existence of Nash equilibria in one-way flow models in a number of different settings. In these models players form costly links with other players and obtain resources from them through the directed path connecting them. We find that heterogeneity in the costs of establishing links plays a crucial role for the existence of Nash networks. The paper also provides conditions for the existence of Nash networks in models where costs and values of links are heterogeneous. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for useful suggestions. We would also like to thank Hans Haller and participants at the AEA Meetings 2007 for helpful comments. Sudipta Sarangi acknowledges the support of NSF grant HSD-0527315 and the hospitality of CREUSET, Jean Monnet University.     

Market crashes,speculation and learning in financial markets

A natural conjecture is that if agents’ beliefs are almost correct then equilibrium prices should be close to rational expectations prices. Sandroni (J Econ Theory 82:1–18, 1998) gives a counterexample in an economy with sunspots and complete markets. We extend Sandroni’s result by showing that the conjecture is generically true for economies with complete markets. We consider a standard General Equilibrium model with large but finite horizon and complete markets. We show that, for almost every such economy, if conditional beliefs eventually become correct along a path of events then equilibrium prices of assets traded along this path converge to rational expectations equilibria in the sup-norm. Moreover, we establish that, generically, there exist along any such path local diffeomorphisms between individual beliefs and equilibrium prices. I would like to thank C. Ewerhart and A. Kirman for their comments, as well as the seminar participants at the University of Minho, the General Equilibrium Workshop 2005 in Zurich, and the 15th Asian General Equilibrium Conference 2007 in Singapore. An anonymous referee also provided very valuable comments.     

Does a sudden death liven up the game? Rules,incentives, and strategy in football

Summary. In an effort to stimulate more attractive football, the international football association FIFA, has recently introduced the "sudden death" or "golden goal" rule for games going into extra time play. This paper analyses under which conditions, if any, the introduction of the sudden death rule improves the attractiveness of the football game. Our results indicate that the new rule will not change the behavior of equally powerful teams.Received: 20 November 2002, Revised: 12 May 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, L83.A preliminary version of this paper was presented at Queens University of Belfast and University of Southampton. The authors would like to thank the seminar participants. Indraijt Ray and an anonymous reviewer for their useful comments on earlier versions of this paper. We specially thank Giulio Seccia for his constructive comments. We also acknowledge K.U. Leuven for providing research support.     

Price,Programming and Potential Competition in US Cable Television Markets

Potential competition in the US cable television industry is empirically examined for 385 markets. Predicted entry probabilities are included in a supply-demand model to permit empirical investigation of the effect of potential competition on incumbent cable operators price and channel programming decisions. Estimation results show incumbents offer more channels to consumers in markets facing greater potential competition from broadband service provider (BSP) wireline overbuilders and/or incumbent local exchange carriers. In particular, when the probability of entry rises to about 42 the average cable system provides six more channels, and price per channel declines from US$ 0.77 to US$ 0.66.JEL Classification: L8, L9, L11We thank Ben Compaine, Shane Greenstein, Anne Hoag, Donald Waldman, Bradley Wimmer, the editor of this journal, an anonymous referee, and participants at the 30th Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy (TPRC 2002), September 28–30, 2002, Hilton Hotel, Alexandria, Virginia, for comments. Armando Galarraga and Nana Puangpathumanond provided research assistance, and Jane Frenette and Jonathan Levy provided excellent help with FCC cable entry and competition data. The usual disclaimer applies.     

More on money as a medium of exchange

Summary We extend the analysis of Kiyotaki and Wright, who study economies where the commodities that serve as media of exchange (or, commodity money) are determined endogenously. Kiyotaki and Wright consider only steady-state, pure-strategy equilibria; here we allow dynamic and mixed-strategy equilibria. We demonstrate that symmetric, steady-state equilibria in mixed-strategies always exist, while sometimes no such equilibria exist in pure-strategies. We prove that the number of symmetric steady-state equilibria is generically finite. We also show, however, that for some parameter values there exists a continuum of dynamic equilibria. Further, some equilibria display cycles.We thank the National Science Foundation and the University of Pennsylvania Research Foundation for financial support, as well as seminar participants at Stanford University, the London School of Economics, the Econometric Society World Congress in Barcelona, and the Conference on Monetary Theory and Financial Institutions at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis for their comments or suggestions. Alberto Trejos provided research assistance. The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.     

Rate-of-return dominance and efficiency in an experimental economy

Summary. One of the main challenges for monetary economics is to explain the use of assets that are dominated in rate-of-return as media of exchange. We use experimental methods to study how a fiat money might come to be used in transactions when an identically marketable, dividend-bearing asset, a consol, is also available. Our experimental economies, which have an overlapping generations structure, have the property that the only stationary rational expectations equilibria (SREE) require exclusive use of the consol as the medium of exchange. In a baseline treatment, agents use the consol exclusively, as would occur in an SREE. However, in other treatments, we observe episodes of rate-of-return dominance,with consistent use of fiat money as a medium of exchange. The results show that two properties of our economies are associated with the rate of return dominance anomaly. The first is a history of trading with fiat money, prior to the introduction of the consol. The second is the timing of the dividend payment; when the dividend payment follows the execution of trades between generations, hoarding of the consol occurs on the part of the old, who earn dividends by hoarding. In our economies, settling transactions with a dividend-bearing asset does not improve allocations over those resulting from trading with fiat money. Received: July 11, 2002; revised version: July 25, 2002 RID="*" ID="*"We thank Anne Villamil, participants in the 2000 Purdue University Conference on Monetary Economics, the Summer 2000 meetings of the Economic Science Association, and a referee, for very helpful comments. We thank the Krannert School of Management and the Purdue University Center for International Business, Education and Research for financial support and Vivian Lei for research assistance. We also thank Ron Michener for referring us to the historical account of the early introduction of money into the American colonies, as reported by Benjamin Franklin. Correspondence to: G. Camera